



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

RESTRICTED



CR60865733

KJ36.6 H64

Catholic's ready ans

The Catholic's
Ready
Answer
Rev. M. P. Hill, S. J.

7



424 ✓
✓ FV

THE CATHOLIC'S READY ANSWER





THE CATHOLIC'S READY ANSWER

*A Popular Vindication of Christian Beliefs and
Practices Against the Attacks of
Modern Criticism*

BY
REV. M. P. HILL, S.J.



NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO
BENZIGER BROTHERS

PRINTERS TO THE
HOLY APOSTOLIC SEE

PUBLISHERS OF
BENZIGER'S MAGAZINE

Imprimi potest.

ANTONIUS J. MAAS, S.J.,
Praep. Prov. Maryl.—Neo Ebor.

Imprimi potest.

REMIGIUS LAFORT, S.T.D.,
Librorum Censor.

PEEKSKILL, JUNE 8, 1914.

COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY BENZIGER BROTHERS, NEW YORK

SEP 18 1917

Digitized by Google

K J 36.6

H 6 4

PREFACE

125004

It is not many years since Father F. X. Brors, of the German Province of the Society of Jesus, sent forth to the world a small volume entitled "Modernes A B C" (Modern A B C), of which the scope and to a great extent the contents were identical with those of the work which we now present to the English-speaking public. Written in German and intended to meet the controversial needs of the Author's own countrymen, the little book soon justified its appearance in the field of polemics—at least if we may so judge by its great popularity. German Catholics of average education found in the "Modernes A B C" an arsenal from which they could draw defensive weapons which were not less effective than easily handled. The number and the variety of the subjects treated and the ability with which they were discussed enabled the reader to give apt replies to all manner of objections brought against revealed religion and the teachings of the Church.

Recognizing the merit of the work, we very readily acceded to a request of the Messrs. Benziger Brothers to reproduce it in the vernacular. The mere translation was accomplished in a comparatively short space of time; and if we could have been satisfied with a bare rendering of the original into English **THE CATHOLIC'S READY ANSWER** would have seen the light of day long before the present date; but as we proceeded with the translation we became more and more convinced that the new version, to meet the requirements of polemics in English-speaking countries, must diverge in some respects from the original. The need of much adaptation, of not a few omissions, and of a considerable number of additions seemed imperative.

There was one peculiarity of the work which was quite distinctive of it and to which it doubtless owed much of its success, but which, nevertheless, we thought might be a drawback in regard to one class of readers whom we were anxious to reach. In the treatment of important subjects such as the Eucharist, Miracles, and Socialism the subject-matter was in each case broken up, distributed under a number of distinct captions, and despatched in short articles, which were crisp and to the point and served to equip the reader with ready answers, especially useful in an emergency. Very much of this character we have indeed sought to preserve in the work we have now sent to the

press; but in order to meet the wants of sincere inquirers after the truth, who are very numerous in English-speaking countries, and who would probably prefer a more full, thorough, and continuous discussion of the more important subjects, we have thought it advisable in some cases to unite the *disjecta membra* of the original in articles of exceptional length. In the place of the subordinate topics thus left untreated separately, cross-references, aided by the index at the end of the volume, will point them out to the reader in the logical position they occupy in the longer articles. This method we have adopted the more readily as we have desired to make the work serve the purpose of a treatise, brief but fairly complete, on the evidences of religion.

Finally, notwithstanding the general comprehensiveness of the original, it left untouched a certain number of subjects, *e.g.*, Christian Science, Pragmatism, Theosophy, which of late years have arrested the attention of the Christian apologist. Articles on these subjects we have thought it our duty to supply.

In the pursuit of these aims we have not been unaware that our book has been gradually assuming the character of a new work instead of being simply an English version of the old one. If this has been, in some sense, inevitable, and if it compasses the object we have had in view, our act of contrition for having tampered with the able work of a skilled controversialist will perhaps be somewhat qualified.

Both in the original and in the English adaptation the work, though chiefly polemical in its scope, does not strictly confine itself to controversy, but endeavors to inculcate right notions of individual duty, especially as bearing on situations in which conscientious persons often find themselves in the very complex life of the present age. This is particularly the case in the articles on Mixed Marriages, Divorces, Labor Unions, and Education, which we trust will be helpful to those whose principles are in danger of being warped under the influence of their environment.

Whilst thanking the Author of the "Modernes A B C" for his permission both to translate and to adapt the work, let us express the hope that in the not distant future he may be gratified to know that the seeds of truth which he has sown broadcast in his native land have, by propagation, borne fruit beyond the sea.

CONTENTS

| AGNOSTICISM | | PAGE |
|---|--|------|
| An Agnostic Query—"Why trouble ourselves about matters such as God's existence, of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing?" (Huxley)... | | 7 |
| ANGLICANS | | |
| See "Religion, A Change of," and "The Church of Christ—How to Find It." | | |
| APES AND MEN | | |
| The Ape Theory—Man bears so striking a resemblance to the ape that we are forced to conclude that he is descended from the ape..... | | 13 |
| BIBLE HEROES | | |
| Objection—The heroes of the Old Testament are represented as being special favorites of the Almighty. On the other hand, they seem to have had many vices. What, then, are we to think of the Bible as a teacher of morality or as a divinely inspired book?..... | | 16 |
| BIBLE INTERPRETATIONS | | |
| Protestant Position—The Bible teaches all necessary truth to all who approach the study of it in the right spirit. In the Scriptures God speaks to the human soul, and no interpreter of His words is needed but the soul itself, enlightened by the Holy Spirit..... | | 18 |
| BIBLE, THE, AND MODERN THOUGHT | | |
| Objection—The Bible is for many reasons deserving of veneration, but it is quite out of harmony with modern thought. The science, the aspirations, and the general point of view of the modern world are at the opposite pole from the contents of the Bible..... | | 22 |
| BIBLE "MYTHS" | | |
| Objection—The Bible contains many stories that remind us forcibly of the myths of early pagan history. How can we be expected to believe the story of the Serpent | | |

BIBLE "MYTHS"—(Continued)

PAGE

tempting Eve—that of the Flood, with its fabulous quantity of water—that of Noe collecting the countless species of animals?—And then, is not God frequently represented in a strangely human way—when, for instance, He is described as taking slime and forming it into a human body, or as shaping Adam's rib into a woman—or when He is said to be moved to wrath, or to repent of His creation of man?..... 29

BIBLE, THE, AND THE PEOPLE

An Accusation—It is notoriously the settled policy of Rome to withhold the Bible from the people: witness the number of decrees on the subject in the history of the Papacy. Versions of the Bible in the language of the people have been an object of the Church's special aversion 37

BIBLE, THE, AND SCIENCE

Objections—According to the Bible the world was made in six days, whereas geology proves that enormous periods of time were required to bring the earth to its present condition. The earth, which astronomy has shown to be only a satellite of the sun, is represented by the Bible as having been created before the sun; and the heavenly bodies, generally, are described as though they were lamps hung in the heavens to light the earth..... 44

BIBLE, THE, AND TRADITION

Protestant View—The Bible alone is the Christian's rule of faith 48

BLESSED VIRGIN, THE

Objections—To a non-Catholic, devotion to the Virgin Mary seems to be given a very undue prominence in Catholic worship: witness the feasts of Mary and the frequent devotions to Mary. Besides, there is little or nothing to distinguish this homage from a real worship of one of God's creatures..... 54

BOYCOTTS

See "Labor Unions"

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT COUNTRIES

The Charge—The leading countries of the world to-day are Protestant. Great Britain, Germany, and the United

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT COUNTRIES—(Cont.)

States are the foremost nations in point of political power, commerce and industry, and general enlightenment; whilst Catholic countries, such as Spain, Italy, and Ireland, are very unprogressive, and France is apparently on the decline. PAGE 58

CELIBACY

A Prejudice—"Take from the Catholic Church the compulsory celibacy of its priests, and the universal sway of the Church is at an end." Celibacy is unbiblical and its effect on morality is dubious.—Tschackert. 63

CEREMONIES IN PUBLIC WORSHIP

Erroneous View—The public worship of the Catholic Church captivates the senses, but it savors little of adoration in spirit and in truth.—Tschackert. 65

CHANCE

A Thoughtless Assertion—The world owes its existence to chance. 67

"CHRISTIAN SCIENCE"

The New Religion—"Christian Science is based on teachings of Scripture which it interprets, giving the Christ principle in divine metaphysics which heals the sick and sinner. It explains all cause and effect as mental, and shows the scientific relation of man to God."—Mrs. Eddy's "Science and Health" 68

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

A Modern Pronouncement—One of the results of modern criticism is that Jesus of Nazareth no longer stands upon the lofty eminence on which His adorers had placed Him. He now takes rank only with those great men who approach nearest to the divine. In the light of modern criticism His miracles are shorn of their supernatural character. Neither His words nor His works prove Him to have been more than man. 74

CHURCH OF CHRIST, THE—HOW TO FIND IT

Objection—If the true Church of Christ is still in existence the claimants to that title are so numerous that the problem of finding the Church is beyond the powers of any but extraordinary minds. The average man might be excused if he gave up the search. 97

| CHURCH, THE, AS MEDIATOR | | PAGE |
|--|--|------|
| Objection—The Church thrusts herself between Christ and mankind; and yet Christ is our one Mediator with God. None the less the Church has lost the world-subduing power she once possessed..... | | 119 |
| CHURCH, THE, AND SALVATION | | |
| Objection—Catholics are taught that outside the Church of Rome there is no salvation. It is a poor recommendation of the Roman religion that it sends the majority of men to eternal perdition..... | | 122 |
| COMMUNION UNDER ONE KIND | | |
| Objection—"The cuppe of the Lord is not to be denied to the laye people. For both the parts of the Lord's Sacrament, by Christe's ordinaunce and commaundement, ought to be ministered to all Christian men alike."—Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, Art. 20. | | 125 |
| CONFESSION DIVINELY INSTITUTED | | |
| Objection—It is not in the power of the creature to forgive offenses committed against the Creator; hence confession, in which the priest presumes to pardon sins, can not be of divine institution..... | | 129 |
| CONFESSION AND THE PEOPLE | | |
| Some Common Accusations—Confession—at least private confession—is an invention of the priests. It is the secret force by which the Roman Church enslaves the consciences of the people. One of the worst features of auricular confession is the practice of questioning penitents about their sins..... | | 136 |
| CREATION | | |
| See "God's Existence" | | |
| CREEDS AND DEEDS | | |
| Erroneous View—Right conduct does not seem to depend much upon formulas of belief. There are good and bad men in all religions. The great thing, after all, is to do what is right..... | | 141 |
| CREMATION | | |
| Objection—What is to prevent a Christian—Catholic or non-Catholic—from directing that his body be burned after his death? There is nothing intrinsically wrong | | |

CREMATION—(Continued)

PAGE

in cremation and it may be made an important factor
in public sanitation..... 144

DARWIN

A Misapprehension—Darwin was “the incorporated ideal of a man of science.”—Huxley, as quoted by President Schurman. Darwin was not a Christian, and the weight of his authority must help considerably to tip the balance in favor of unbelief..... 146

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

Objection—The Catholic Church is continually introducing new dogmas. Such innovations are not within the competence of the Church, which received the deposit of the Faith to be transmitted unchanged to the end of time. Papal infallibility became an article of faith only thirty or forty years ago. Did the Vatican Council receive a new revelation on the subject?..... 150

DIVORCE

Objection—The Catholic Church forbids divorce in all cases. This law is more severe than that taught by Christ Himself; for He tells the Pharisees (Matt. xix. 9) that at least on account of infidelity to the marriage bond a husband may leave his wife and marry another. 153

DOGMAS

Objection—The binding force of dogmas is an unendurable slavery for the human mind and an obstacle to scientific research. “Let us not forget that the manufacture of dogmas at the Vatican has not yet come to an end.”—Tschackert. 162

EDUCATION. THE TRUE CHRISTIAN IDEAL

Objections—Let the priests attend to religion—the school-master has nothing to do with it. The teaching of religion is the work of the church and the Sunday-school. The school hours are short enough for the acquiring of the secular knowledge needed to fit the pupils to fill their respective places in life..... 164

EQUALITY AMONGST MEN

Objection—All men are the same at their birth. Why, then, are they divided later into classes? Before God they are equal. God is no respecter of persons..... 173

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| EUCCHARIST, THE. I. THE REAL PRESENCE | |
| Objection—The Roman Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist can not be deduced from the words of institution, "This is My body, etc.," for these words may be understood figuratively or spiritually..... | 175 |
| EUCCHARIST, THE. II. THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE RATIONAL | |
| Objections—The Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is repugnant to reason; for it is irrational to suppose that a body can be in two or more places at once, or that the body of the Lord can be contained within the compass of a host, or that the accidents of bread and wine, <i>e.g.</i> , color, figure, taste, can remain without the substance of bread and wine..... | 185 |
| EUCCHARIST, THE. III. TRANSUBSTANTIATION | |
| Anglican Position—"Transubstantiation . . . can not be proved by Holy Writ, but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions." —Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church, Art. 28. | 188 |
| EUCCHARIST, THE. IV. ITS CONGRUITIES | |
| Objection—The Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is repugnant to all sense of fitness. We instinctively reject the notion that Christ's real body is given to us as food. | 195 |
| EUGENICS | |
| An Accusation—Every human being should love his kind, and a love of his kind should awaken in his breast an interest in the future of his race. The improvement of the race is the object of eugenics, and a want of sympathy with the present eugenic movement betrays either selfishness or an unenlightened conservatism.. | 199 |
| EVOLUTION | |
| An Evolutionary Boast—"In the theory of natural selection we have the key to 'the question of all questions,' to the great enigma of the place of man in nature and of his natural development." "The possibility of giving a mechanical explanation of organic nature was not seen until Darwin provided a solid foundation for the theory of a descent."—Haeckel..... | 207 |

FAITH

PAGE

- A Misconception**—Faith is a groping in the dark. It is unreasonable to admit anything without evidence. "To make an act of faith in the experiences of another is a thoughtless act, which afterward comes home to one in the shape of pestering doubts."—Harnack, "Dogmengeschichte," I, p. 74 f. 216

FREE LOVE

- A Socialist's Plea**—The only true marriage is marriage founded in love. When love ceases it is immoral for the parties to remain united. Marriage is a private compact, in which no one but the married couple should have any say. 218

FREEMASONRY

- Objection**—Why is the Church opposed to freemasonry without any distinction? Whatever may be the aims of masonry on the continent of Europe there is nothing hostile to the Catholic Church or to religion generally in Anglo-American masonry, whose object is mutual aid among the members of the fraternity and the promotion of the spirit of brotherhood throughout the world 221

FREE THOUGHT

- A Freethinking Reverie**—A freethinker is the only one who knows what freedom means. He has burst the fetters of religious servitude, the most galling of all fetters, especially such as the Roman Church binds upon her subjects. 228

GALILEO

See "Scientific Freedom"

GOD'S EXISTENCE

- An Atheistic Gibe**—Theism (a belief in a personal God) would have us divide the world into earth and sky. Men run about the earth and God is seated in the skies, whence He rules the earth. But astronomy steps in and removes the sky, and with it the God who dwells in it. Astronomy has pushed the limits of the universe so far as to leave no room for a God.—Schopenhauer. 230

GOOD WORKS

PAGE

- Objection—Good works are not necessary for salvation, for St. Paul says: "We account a man to be justified by faith alone, without the works of the Law." (Rom. iii. 28) 240

GRACE

- Objection—Catholics are forever speaking of the necessity of grace. "Without grace I can do nothing," is the common formula; and yet I can do many a good deed without feeling the need of God's help. 240

HAECKEL

- On the Tripod—The development of the individual life from the embryo form is but a representation in little of the development of the entire species from a primitive form. This is that "irrefragable law which is the heaviest piece of artillery made to do battle for the truth. Under its repeated assaults the magnificent fabric of the Roman hierarchy will tumble like a house of cards."—Haeckel. 242

HELL

- Objection—God is good and merciful; but a good and merciful God would not condemn a soul to eternal torments; therefore the eternity of hell is a contradiction of our belief in His goodness and mercy. 246

HUMAN RACE, THE. HOW OLD IS IT?

- A Modern Objection—In the mud of the Mississippi skeletons have been found that must have been there at least 60,000 years. Hence the Bible's reckoning of four thousand years from Adam to Christ is discredited by physical science. 249

INDIFFERENTISM

- The Plea of the Indifferentist—Religious creeds are a matter of personal preference, and a search for the right creed, if there is any such thing, can not be expected of the average man. On the other hand, we all have a grasp of certain principles of morality which are the mainstay of society. With these society may well rest contented 252

INDULGENCES

PAGE

- Erroneous Views**—1. Indulgences are an easy means of obtaining pardon for sin—even future sin—without repentance. They have been applied to the releasing of souls from purgatory, and for that purpose they might be bought for money.—2. “In theory [indulgences] always presupposed repentance; but as the business was managed in Germany [before the Reformation] it amounted in the popular apprehension to a sale of absolution from guilt, or to the ransom of deceased friends from purgatory for money.”—Fisher, “*Outlines of Universal History*,” p. 397..... 260

INFALLIBILITY OF THE POPE, THE

See “Pope, The—His Prerogative of Infallibility”

JESUS OF NAZARETH. HIS EXISTENCE

- A Bold Assertion**—It is not historically certain that Christ ever existed; and yet the whole of Christianity is based on the life of Christ..... 266

JUSTIFICATION

- Lutheran View**—“The doctrine of justification by faith alone is the new experience of salvation [*Heilserfahrung*] first enjoyed by Luther and then transmitted to the Church.”—Leimbach’s “*Hilfbuch*”..... 268

LABOR UNIONS

- A False Principle**—Strikes, boycotts, and other such expedients employed by labor unions, are the only weapons they can wield in their defense. Why may they not be used in the most effective way possible? In time of war one can not be overnice in his choice of means to attain his end..... 271

LATIN IN THE LITURGY

- Objection**—Why use Latin in the liturgy? Why may not English-speaking nations use their own language, as the Greeks and Syrians use theirs? Latin is a strange tongue to the vast majority of worshipers..... 278

LOURDES

See “Miracles”

| MARRIAGE A SACRAMENT | | PAGE |
|--|--|-------------|
| Ultra-Protestant View—"Marriage is an outward, material thing, like any other secular business. Marriage, with all that appertains to it, is a temporal thing and does not concern the Church at all, except in so far as it affects the conscience."—Luther..... | | 280 |
| MARRIAGE INDISSOLUBLE | | |
| See "Divorce," "Free Love," and "Marriage a Sacrament" | | |
| MASS, THE | | |
| Protestant View—"The popish sacrifice of the Mass, as they call it, is most abominably injurious to Christ's one only sacrifice, the alone propitiation for all the sins of the elect."—Westminster Confession of Faith (Calvinistic). | | 284 |
| MATERIALISM | | |
| A Comfortable Error—"The only practical philosophy of life is materialism. Teaching as it does that all things are matter—that there is no soul, no immortality, no virtue, no vice, no heaven, no hell—it gives a man his first feeling of being released from bondage. Materialism is, then, the real redemption of man..... | | 294 |
| MESSIAS, THE | | |
| A New Error—"The Messiah can not be a definite person, or a real person of any description. The promised Messiah is nothing else than the blessing that rests upon the Jewish race. Hence the Messiah has already come.... | | 296 |
| MIND AND MATTER | | |
| Erroneous View—"Mind is only a phosphorescence of the brain. Hence mind—to call it by that name—is but a state or condition of matter. Spiritual mind or soul vanishes under the light of analysis and experiment.. | | 299 |
| MIRACLES | | |
| Objections—1. The universal experiment of mankind, as Hume reminds us, is a proof of the impossibility of miracles. 2. Reported miracles can not be proved to be real ones. 3. If miracles are possible, science has no meaning, as science has established the constancy and uniformity of natural laws, and miracles are violations of natural laws..... | | 304 |

MISSIONS

PAGE

See "Church of Christ, The, How to Find It," and "Church, The, as Mediator"

MIXED MARRIAGES

Objection—The evils of mixed marriages are exaggerated, especially in a country like ours, in which there is a growing liberality of sentiment in matters religious. In a country in which "live and let live" is the prevailing principle, Catholic husbands and wives have little to fear from the religious hostility of their partners in wedlock. 322

MONKS

Objection—Monks and monasteries may have had a reason for existing in the Middle Ages, but in our day they have outlived their usefulness. The present age wants labor—social labor—and no praying or idleness. (Socialistic). 327

MORALITY AND ADENOIDS

A Modern Error—Moral habit and action are traceable to the pathological condition of the body and the emotional state of the mind. Free will and divine grace have nothing to do with morality. Here is a schoolboy who but yesterday was dull and peevish and showed vicious propensities. He is sent to a physician, who discovers it is all a matter of adenoids! These once removed, he is a model of all that a schoolboy ought to be. Evidently, he has needed the divine less than the physician. 328

MORALITY WITHOUT RELIGION

An Illusion—As men will never agree on the subject of religion the one remaining bond of society is morality without religion. Most men are agreed as to the essentials of morality. In this common sentiment, therefore, must we seek the basis of the social life of the future. 330

MYSTERIES

Objection—A mystery is either in accordance with or against reason. If the first is true there is no mystery at all. If the second is true mysteries must be rejected. 332

| | PAGE |
|---|------|
| ORIGINAL SIN | |
| Protestant View—"Human nature, in consequence of Adam's sin, is utterly depraved." "As the Roman Church does not consider concupiscence sin, that is only another proof that she has an erroneous conception of sin"..... | 333 |
| PANTHEISM | |
| A Pantheistic Plea—Pantheism, which teaches that God and the universe are one, has been held by so many eminent thinkers that it can not be so utterly foolish as it is sometimes considered; and the tendency toward pantheism is rapidly increasing..... | 336 |
| PAUPERISM (Anti-Socialistic) | |
| See "Socialism II—Its Philosophy of History" | |
| POPE, THE. I. SUCCESSOR OF ST. PETER IN THE ROMAN SEE | |
| Erroneous View—"On the subject of St. Peter's residence in Rome we possess no trustworthy information."—Schaefer's "Manual of Instruction," etc.—"It is only a guess . . . that St. Peter was ever at Rome at all; it is only a guess that he was ever Bishop of Rome."—Dr. Littledale..... | 340 |
| POPE, THE. II. CHRIST'S VICAR | |
| Erroneous View—The Primacy of the Bishop of Rome is not founded on Scripture and is simply the result of a struggle for supremacy in which the Roman pontiff won | 343 |
| POPE, THE. III. HIS PREROGATIVE OF INFALLIBILITY | |
| (To be read after the preceding article on the Pope as Vicar of Christ) | |
| Objection—To err is human. All men are subject to error, and the Pope is no exception. Is not the dogma of Papal infallibility a deification of the Pope?..... | 359 |
| PRAGMATISM | |
| An Old System Revamped—Truth is neither absolute nor eternal. The truth of a proposition is to be tested by | |

PRAGMATISM—(Continued)

PAGE

the effects it produces on the mind that considers or accepts it—and, in general, by its influence on life. If it brings about a readjustment of one's ideas, or changes a mental attitude, or awakens a new motive of conduct, it has just that amount of truth. The truth of an idea is to be tested by how it works. 370

PRAYER AND NATURE'S LAWS

Objections—1. "The hearing of prayers for temporal blessings would be an interference with natural laws, which science demonstrates is impossible. 2. The hearing of such prayers would involve a miracle; but it is preposterous to suppose that God works a miracle every time He grants a temporal favor."—Professor Tyndall. 374

PRIMACY OF THE POPE

See "Pope, The. II. Christ's Vicar"

PROPERTY

Erroneous View—"Private ownership is robbery."—Proudhon 377

PROTESTANTISM

See "Reformation, The"

PURGATORY

Protestant View—"The doctrine of purgatory is not Scriptural, nor does reason find sufficient ground for accepting it. 380

RATIONALISM

Objection—I follow the light of my reason. I can not be forced to admit what I can not understand. Why was my reason given me? 387

REFORMATION, THE

Protestant Position—"The Reformation was "the restoration of the Church to the primitive truth and power of the Gospel of the Redemption." It has been a source of manifold blessings. To call it a revolution or rebellion is to slander it. 388

RELICS

See "Saints" and "Superstition"

RELIGION, A CHANGE OF

PAGE

- Objections—"To change one's religion, or even one's communion, is a very serious and solemn, nay a very awful, step to take, whatever that religion may be."—R. F. Littledale. And why should I become a Roman Catholic? Is it possible that all these hard things I have heard said against the Roman Catholics have no foundation? And why should I leave a religion that has afforded me so much help and consolation? And then, too, Providence has placed me under the guidance of spiritual directors who bid me quiet my fears and remain where I am; what warrant should I have for rejecting their counsel?..... 393

RELIGION. IS IT A PRIVATE AFFAIR?

See "Socialism IV—Its Bearings on Religion"

RESURRECTION OF CHRIST, THE

- Objections—1. The disciples of Christ, in thinking He had risen from the dead, were laboring under an hallucination. Their minds were so filled with the thought of the Master that faith and imagination combined to create an image of His living humanity, which they took for the reality.—Pfleiderer, Strauss, et al. 2. The story of the Resurrection can not be accepted as authentic because the number and order of succession of the Lord's apparitions to His disciples can not be ascertained with certainty.—Harnack..... 398

RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, THE

- Objection—It is chemically impossible that men's bodies should rise from their graves; for the same chemical elements have passed in succession into different human bodies. How can they be assigned to individual bodies at the Resurrection? A human corpse decays; in the course of time it becomes a fertilizer for grass; the grass is eaten by a cow; the cow finally becomes food for men..... 403

REVELATION

- Objections—How can God, who is a Spirit and infinite, speak to men or make any revelation to them? Even if He could make a revelation, it would be unnecessary; men by the aid of their understandings can arrive at a knowledge of God and of natural religion and by the exercise of their wills lead a religious life..... 405

ROMAN SEE, THE
See "Pope, The," I, II, III

PAGE

SAINTS

Objections—The Catholic veneration of saints detracts much from the purity of divine worship, which should be concerned with God alone. The intercession of saints is a doctrine opposed to Scripture, for Christ alone is our advocate and mediator; and Scripture nowhere tells us that the dead can hear our prayers... 406

SCIENCE AND FAITH

A Grievous Error—In a truly scientific mind science and faith can not exist without coming into collision, for no one who knows and realizes the results of scientific research can remain a believer..... 413

SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM

A Mistaken View—The authority claimed by the Catholic Church is an obstacle to modern scientific progress, its attitude toward physical science operating as a clog upon individual research..... 420

SECRET SOCIETIES

Objection—Why is the Church opposed to secret societies? If individuals may lawfully have secrets, why may societies not have them?..... 426

SELF-DENIAL

Objection—Self-denial can not be a virtue. It is a repressing of the sensuous inclinations; and yet these inclinations have been implanted in our souls by God Himself. 428

SOCIALISM. I. ITS ECONOMIC FALLACIES

A Socialistic Argument—The workingman is the sole producer of wealth; therefore he should be the sole owner of it. And yet the capitalist appropriates nearly the whole product of the workingman's labor. The only remedy for this abuse is the socialistic commonwealth, each member of which will be insured the possession of what he produces..... 430

SOCIALISM. II. ITS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Socialistic Delusions—"Two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history and the revealing of the secret of capitalistic production by means of surplus value, we owe to Marx. Through them socialism has become a science."—Frederick Engels..... 439

SOCIALISM. III. ITS IMPRACTICABILITY PAGE

- A Dream**—Socialism will turn a complex problem into a very simple one. Instead of attempting to secure justice for all classes it will abolish all distinction of classes. All must be workers. The one class, the people, will own its own industries, work for itself, and pay itself according to the work done. 446

SOCIALISM. IV. ITS BEARINGS ON RELIGION

- A Snare**—Religion is a private affair. The social democracy is concerned "solely with the purely secular questions connected with the struggle for economic, social, and political emancipation. Social democracy never asks its followers what religious opinions they hold; and in general its position toward religion is that of a neutral." (Von Vollmar, in the Reichstag, Dec. 5, 1900.). 447

SOUL

- Objection**—Observation and experiment have failed to discover the existence of a soul in man. The so-called spiritual acts that are supposed to prove the existence of a spiritual soul have been discovered to be modifications of the cell-tissue of the brain. 452

SPIRITISM

- It is contended in favor of spiritism that the phenomena which it presents are a plain matter of observation and evidence and are attested by numerous and trustworthy witnesses. They are to be accepted as any other facts are accepted for which we have the evidence of our senses; but if they are accepted they will revolutionize religious thought. 456

SPONTANEOUS GENERATION

- An Argument**—There was a time when no living thing, plant or animal, existed on the earth. Therefore, when living things appeared they must have been evolved out of non-living matter; the organic must have grown out of the inorganic. 462

STRIKES

See "Labor Unions"

SUPERSTITION

PAGE

- A Groundless Accusation—The Catholic Church permits, and even fosters, every manner of superstition. The Mass, the worship of images and relics, the use of scapulars, beads, Agnus Deis—to all of which a special supernatural virtue is attributed—furnish abundant proof of the accusation..... 466

THEOSOPHY

- Its Pretensions—Theosophy is the only system of thought that furnishes a key to the mysteries of human life and explains the presence of evil in the world. The number and the respectability of its adherents and the wondrous power displayed by some of them are no small argument in favor of the intrinsic value of the system. 469

TOLERANCE

- An Accusation—Tolerance is the first duty of the citizen as regards religious matters; but "the Roman Catholic Church, if it would be consistent, must be intolerant."—Tschackert 475

TRADITION AS A RULE OF FAITH

- Objection—Tradition can not be a source of true knowledge. There is nothing as unreliable as an old story that has passed from mouth to mouth and is subject to change at every telling. Even written documents are not safe from alteration. Every new copy made is likely to contain fresh errors..... 476

TRANSUBSTANTIATION

See "Eucharist, The. III. Transubstantiation"

TRINITY, THE

- Objection—The mystery of the Trinity is at odds with the multiplication table: one, surely, can not be three.... 478

VALUE, SOCIALIST THEORY OF

See "Socialism I. Its Economic Fallacies"

VIRGINITY

- The Plea of the Flesh—The leading of a pure life in a state of virginity is impossible for natures like ours..... 480

VIRGIN MARY, THE

See "Blessed Virgin, The" and "Saints"

The Catholic's Ready Answer

AGNOSTICISM

An Agnostic Query.—"Why trouble ourselves about matters—such as God's existence—of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing and can know nothing?" (Huxley.)

THE ANSWER.—If a man tells me he knows nothing about God I can believe him, because he is supposed to know the state of his own mind; but if he tells me that nothing *can* be known about God I wonder at the hardihood of the assertion and feel that I have a right to ask him to prove the proposition. But proving propositions is not a rôle familiar to agnostics as such.

What is an agnostic? The definition given by the Century Dictionary is sufficiently accurate for our purpose. An agnostic is "one of a class of thinkers who disclaim any knowledge of God or of the ultimate nature of things." Agnostics, generally, profess to know nothing about God; some maintain that there is no convincing evidence of His existence; others go so far as to aver that no such evidence is possible and that God, if there is a God, is forever unknowable.

Agnosticism takes shape in individual minds according to their several habits and dispositions. One form of agnosticism assumes lightly and after little or no reflection that it is impossible to get at a knowledge of God or of man's final destiny. It is generally one of the fruits of indifference, which makes it a matter of small concern whether a man has any religious belief or not, so long as he does nothing to compromise his honor or his reputation. Another agnostic attitude of mind is the result of promiscuous though one-sided reading accompanied, perhaps, by a modicum of reflection—though its real root often lies deeper

and must be sought in the moral nature of the reader. But there is a higher kind of agnosticism which wears more of a scientific air. It goes the whole length of asserting that all knowledge is confined to phenomena or appearances.

Observation and experiment, we are told by this class of agnostics, report to us the existence of phenomena which are, or may be, manifestations of realities lying beyond them, but of these realities nothing is known and, according to some agnostics, nothing can be known. Hence God and the human soul and all the essences and principles of things, placed as they are beyond the reach of experience, cannot be objects of human knowledge.

One type of agnosticism, elaborately expounded by Herbert Spencer, does not reject religion, but starves it out of existence. It acknowledges a *First Cause* of all things and holds that it appeals to the emotional element in man and thus begets religion; but the *nature and attributes* of the First Cause it regards as unknown and forever unknowable: the First Cause is to us simply the First Cause and nothing more.

Now it should be plain to any one who has a grasp of the idea of religion that the First Cause, merely as such, does not appeal to the religious sentiment and cannot inspire religious acts. True, the idea of a First Cause does contain in germ the basis of all genuine religion; for the human reason can deduce from the notion of the First Cause the idea of an infinite and eternal God and of a Creator and Sovereign Lord, to whom praise, thanksgiving, adoration, and service are due—and these are real acts of religion; but the Spencerian agnostic will not permit us to draw any such deductions; for, according to Herbert Spencer, “the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.” Thus the only pabulum supplied religion is a knowledge of a First Cause as such.

What single act of religion can an agnostic of this type suggest as being rational in one who only knows that there is a First Cause? Wonder and a sense of awe are indeed feelings which may well be awakened by the thought of a First Cause of all things; but is the indulgence of a feeling of wonder or of awe a religious act? As well might we say that an atheist is paying his morning devotions when he stands wondering at the power of Niagara. Will such meager knowledge inspire an act of praise or of thanks-

giving? We are not supposed to know whether the First Cause is deserving of praise or of thanks, for the agnostic will not permit us to know anything about Its (or His) attributes—to know, for instance, whether It (or He) is free, bountiful, or merciful. The same is true of adoration and dedication of will. The only act left would be that of exclaiming, “Oh, First Cause!” or “Ah, First Cause!” Herbert Spencer had much better have left the subject of religion untouched.

Our purpose just here is not to prove that God is knowable or that He exists; that we have endeavored to do in the article entitled “God’s Existence.” We are only making a little study of the agnostic frame of mind and of the intellectual behavior of agnostics. One of the most notable points in agnostic ways of thinking and speaking is the *downright dogmatism* of the agnostic. If the attitude of agnosticism were one of simple ignorance or of doubt, or if its followers simply admitted their inability to see the force of the arguments in favor of theism, agnosticism would be less irrational. But for the most part agnostics are nothing if not dogmatic. They assert positively that the Absolute is unknowable; but in doing so they show an attitude of mind which is anything but scientific and one that runs counter to the spirit of inquiry which is the boast of the age. Scientists of our day, whether consistently or not, profess an open-mindedness which makes them accessible to truth, no matter in what quarter it presents itself, and which tends rather to widen than to contract the domain of possible knowledge.

These remarks are particularly applicable to agnostics who devote their energies to the physical sciences. Immersed in science and for the most part narrowed in their sympathies by early education, they simply have no patience for examining the claims of any source of knowledge but the one that is familiar to them. The following extract from Huxley’s “Physical Basis of Life” will illustrate this pseudo-scientific frame of mind. Commending Hume’s agnostic achievements, he remarks:

“So Hume’s strong and subtle intellect takes up a great many problems about which we are naturally curious, and shows that they are essentially questions of lunar politics, in their essence incapable of being answered, and therefore not worth the attention of men who have work to do in the

world. . . . Why trouble ourselves about matters of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing and can know nothing? We live in a world which is full of misery and ignorance, and the plain duty of each and all of us is to make the little corner he can influence somewhat less miserable and somewhat less ignorant than it was before he entered it."

Huxley was a feverishly busy man during the greater part of his life. His business was chiefly concerned in extending the bounds of physical science. His philosophical reading was one-sided and his survey of the field of philosophical inquiry superficial; so that it ill became him to pronounce so decidedly on what could or could not be known in sciences which he had not mastered.

The physical sciences are not the only legitimate occupants of the field of knowledge. Psychology and natural theology are sciences no less, nay even more, than physics, chemistry, and biology; for the latter sciences, when they have got beyond a certain number of laws which may easily be verified, deal very largely in pure hypotheses. The rational sciences, on the other hand, are concerned with ultimate truths, at which the experimental sciences must stop short. The processes of thought followed are, to say the least, as rational as those of the physical sciences. When the rational psychologist argues from the spiritual operations of man to his possession of a spiritual soul, or when the theologian argues from the order observed in the universe to the existence of a Supreme Intelligence by whom that order was conceived and brought into being, or when the metaphysician argues from the finite and the conditioned to the Infinite and the Unconditioned, he argues as rationally, to say the least, as one who would conclude from the presence of smoke the action of combustion.

And yet the reasonings and conclusions of the rational sciences have been brushed aside by the agnostics and positivists of our day, but in many cases by men who have not hesitated to reason away the human mind itself. Hume, who set the pace for all such destructionists, regarded the mind as only a series of conscious acts. He removed the blackboard from the figures described on it and left the figures standing in the air. When a man has reached that stage of intellectual degeneracy he may be tempted to deny anything, even his own existence.

Metaphysics and theology have unfortunately fallen into disrepute in an age that boasts so much of its "positive" knowledge; for both sciences are accused of building airy fabrics of thought on little or no foundation of reality. Well, there may be a species of metaphysics or of theology answering that flattering description, but we challenge the judgment that affixes any such stigma to the writings of the great scholastics. The reasonings of an Aquinas, a Scotus, or a Suarez are not to be rated as puerilities. These names may suggest a remote age and things no less remote from our interest, but the cream of the scholastic philosophy is given in the higher course of studies in every Catholic college. Had our scientific agnostics been put through the discipline involved in those studies the world would know little of dogmatic agnosticism. As to the theology that deals with revelation, it is based on evidence as positive as any that furnishes the groundwork of the physical sciences. The historical evidences of Christianity have won the assent of countless brilliant minds in every century—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries not excepted. Pasteur towered above all the other scientists of the nineteenth century, and yet he accepted the teachings of Catholic theology.

We believers do not contend that our knowledge of God is perfect. We claim to possess an *imperfect yet true* knowledge of God. If we can not comprehend His attributes we can at least form some conception of them and give them their right names. The Infinite transcends experience and is necessarily wrapped in mystery to the finite mind; but we can know it as a *fact*, incomprehensible though it is. When we say that God is infinite we mean that He possesses all conceivable perfections—a perfectly rational proposition and one within the range of human thought.

The illogicality of the agnostic mind when it makes a serious attempt at philosophizing is brought into strong relief by the writings of Herbert Spencer. Though an agnostic, he arrives at the conclusion that behind phenomena there is an unknowable Something—the Absolute, the Unlimited, the First Cause. Is it not strange that such a Being is deemed unknowable when we know so much as that about Him? And must we be forbidden to advance a step farther and deduce from those primal attributes other attributes which are logically contained in them?

It borders on the ridiculous to see a philosopher of Her-

bert Spencer's reputation shrinking from concluding that the Great First Cause is intelligent, because, forsooth, if we attribute to It intelligence, it must be finite intelligence, as that is the only kind of intelligence of which the mind can form a conception. In dealing with an argument of that description we can clinch the matter by means of a dilemma: The Great First Cause is either intelligent or non-intelligent. Is It non-intelligent? Spencer cannot say Yes, for amidst all his vagaries he has a grasp of the principle that an intelligent piece of work—such as the universe—proves intelligence in the worker. Therefore *in some way* the Great First Cause must be intelligent. The intelligence we thus predicate of God need not be a limited intelligence; for we may take the notion of intelligence and negative all limitation and imperfection in it and apply it to God. We can not bring home to our limited understandings *how* any being can be infinitely intelligent, nor can we find in our experience anything analogous to it, but our reason points to it as a *fact*—a mysterious fact, but a fact all the same.

If we now add intelligence to the list of God's attributes, God is more known than He was before; and if we add, one after another, all the attributes which a sound philosophy has deduced, we shall have built up the science of natural theology, and Herbert Spencer will be left wandering about in the curious labyrinth which he has been at such pains to construct.

We need not shrink from all manner of philosophizing on arriving at the confines of the Absolute; because although we are only scratching on the surface of things, nevertheless, by the aid of the God-given instrument we employ, we are enabled to discover at least a few solid ingots of genuine knowledge.

ANGLICANS

See "Religion, a Change of" and "The Church of Christ—How to Find It."

APES AND MEN

The Ape-Theory.—Man bears so striking a resemblance to the ape that we are forced to conclude that he is descended from the ape.

THE ANSWER.—In the first place, why argue from resemblance to descent? Or, if you argue at all, why not conclude that the ape is a degenerate man? Both arguments would be unsound, but the one would be as good as the other. What interest can you have in thus degrading man by bringing him down to the level of the ape? Better argue thus: *So striking is the contrast between man and ape that man could not possibly have been evolved from the ape.*

The contrast consists chiefly in this, that *man has a soul* endowed with reason and free will, which the ape has not. This is abundantly proved by the fact that man, by means of thought and reflection, advances from one invention or discovery to another, whilst the ape, in common with other brute animals, follows his instincts and behaves to-day precisely as his ancestors did thousands of years ago. He has not learned to build houses, to cook his food, or to do anything characteristic of man in the most rudimentary degree of civilization. The ape's power of mimicry is a superficial attribute which furnishes no proof of reason or thought.

Even in bodily structure the contrast is so obvious, at least to the anatomist, that no basis for the evolutionary theory can be found in that quarter. This is especially evident in the size of the brain, as also in the way in which the skull is joined to the spinal column—a circumstance that determines whether the animal is to have the erect posture of a man or the stooping posture of a beast. "The testimony of comparative anatomy," says Bumüller, "is decidedly against the theory of man's descent from the ape."—*Man or Ape*, p. 59.

Moreover, if such descent were a fact we should find some intermediate forms between the mere ape and the fully developed man. We should have found long before to-day what is popularly known as the missing link; but the missing link has nowhere been discovered, either in fossil remains or in living forms of animal life. The earth has been ransacked, but not a trace has come to light of

the much sought for ape-man. Occasionally supposed discoveries have created a flutter in the scientific world, but they have invariably proved to be mares' nests. And yet if Darwin's theory of infinitesimal variations covering enormous periods of time were correct numerous specimens of intermediate forms should have been discovered.

The distinguished scientist Virchow, who certainly can not be accused of undue bias in the matter, bears the following testimony to the actual state of science on the subject:

"If we make a study of the fossil man of the quaternary period, who came nearest to our historical ancestors in the course of descent—or, better, of ascent—we find at every turn that he is a man like ourselves. Ten years ago, when a skull was found in a peat-bog, among lake-dwellings, or in some ancient cave, it was thought to furnish indications of a wild and half-developed state of human existence. Men thought they scented the atmosphere of apedom. But since then a gradual change has been wrought in our estimate of such remains. The old troglodytes, lake-dwellers, and peat men have turned out to be a very respectable set of human beings. Their heads are of such a size that many a living man to-day would feel proud if he had one as large. . . . We must candidly acknowledge that we possess no fossil types of imperfectly developed men. Nay, if we bring together all human fossils of which we have any knowledge and compare them with human beings of the present day, we can assert without any hesitation that among living men there is, proportionately, a much larger number of individuals of an inferior type than among the fossil remains thus far discovered. Whether the greatest geniuses of the quaternary age have been lucky enough to have been preserved to our day, I dare not conjecture. . . . But I must say that no skull of ape or ape-man which could have had a human possessor (or, as we take him to mean, could have been in any half-sense human) has ever yet been found. . . . *We cannot teach, nor can we regard as one of the results of scientific research, the doctrine that man is descended from the ape or from any other animal.*"—*The Liberty of Science*, p. 30f.

In the Congress of Anthropologists held in Vienna in 1889 he adds the following to the words just quoted:

"We have sought in vain the missing links that are supposed to connect man with the ape. The primeval man, the genuine *proanthropos*, has not yet been found. Anthropologists cannot regard the *proanthropos* as a legitimate subject for discussion. They may see him in their dreams, but in their waking moments they must acknowledge him to be nowhere in sight. At Innsbruck in 1869 scientists in the fever-heat of discussion believed they could trace the evolution of the ape into the man; to-day we are unable to trace the derivation of one race of men from another. At the present hour we can say that the fossil men discovered stand as far removed from the ape as ourselves. Each living race is distinctively human, and no race has yet been discovered which can be designated as apish or half-apish. . . . It can be clearly shown that in the course of five thousand years no appreciable change of type has taken place."

Dr. Bumüller sums up the results of his study of the question in the following statements, every one of which rests upon solid demonstration:

"On no recognized principle of classification can man be associated with the ape; for, to say nothing of his gifts of understanding and speech, he stands quite alone by reason of the vastly superior development of the brain portion of his nervous system, and hence can lay claim to an independent position in the animal kingdom. Neither is his descent from the ape attested by science, for as yet no connecting link has been discovered, either in the higher walks of apedom or in the lower walks of humanity. Even the possibility of a connecting link is disproved by the tendency of apes and half-apes, in the course of their higher development in anatomical structure, to diverge more and more from the human type, and by the testimony of paleontology (the science dealing with remains of extinct species of animals preserved in the earth). Such is the present state of scientific investigation; and its results are in harmony with the view which the human understanding, lay and professional, has ever entertained when not under the tyranny of theories that happen to be the fashion of the hour."—*Man or Ape*, p. 91. Munich, 1900.

Dr. Zittel, an acknowledged leader in this branch of science, enumerates in his "Outlines of Paleontology" the most important discoveries made of human remains and

makes the following comment: "Such material as this throws no light upon the question of race and descent. All the human bones of determinable age that have come down to us from the European Diluvium, as well as all the skulls discovered in caves, are identified by their size, shape, and capacity as belonging to the *homo sapiens* [man], and are fine specimens of their kind. They do not by any means fill up the gap between man and the ape."

Dr. Ranke, another eminent paleontologist, speaks with evident sarcasm, and in reference to certain scientific pretensions, of "the famous, or perhaps better, the notorious" relics discovered in the Neanderthal.

Science, after its many wanderings, is coming back to what Holy Writ has told us in words few and simple: "And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. ii. 7). "And God created man to His own image" (Gen. i. 27).

BIBLE HEROES

Objection.—The heroes of the Old Testament are represented as being special favorites of the Almighty. On the other hand, they seem to have had many vices. What, then, are we to think of the Bible as a teacher of morality or as a divinely inspired book?

THE ANSWER.—The Patriarchs and some of the other leaders of the Jewish people are indeed represented as favorites of the Almighty on account of their great personal virtues. They may have had their failings as well, but their lives were written, not so much on account of their personal qualities as with a view to exhibiting the special providence that presided over the destinies of their race. As fathers and leaders of the Chosen People they were objects of God's special care. But that did not exempt them from the failings to which all flesh is heir. Needless to say that their faults, great or small, have met with scant justice at the hands of the skeptical and the critical.

The faults of Bible characters, such as they were, show by their very presence in the narrative that the sacred

writers had no thought of giving a roseate hue to their descriptions of the deeds of their countrymen, and that their single aim was to give a trustworthy report of facts. This is, indeed, *the unique distinction enjoyed by the Bible* among the historical records of ancient peoples: even unworthy deeds associated with great names are faithfully registered. Unlike other such records, the books of the Bible were not composed as a tribute of adulation to reigning dynasties or to serve as a flattering unction to national vanity. The writers penned an exact and impartial account of God's dealings with men and of men's behavior toward God. There is no similar record in existence. None like it ever could have arisen out of the bosom of paganism.

The real and genuine shortcomings of Bible heroes we cannot, of course, either palliate or deny. The Bible itself condemns them. But at the same time we must refuse to accept the judgment of sworn enemies of the Bible when they are pleased to ascribe faults, even crimes, to the great personages of the Bible where there is no evidence of guilt.

Because Abraham, for instance, made his wife Sara pass for his sister when both were in danger of falling into the hands of the King of Egypt, we cannot agree with the critics when they set him down as an instigator of lying. His accusers ignore the fact that in Abraham's language the word "sister" had a larger signification than in our modern tongues, and the fact that, after all, Sara was Abraham's half-sister, and hence might be called simply his sister.

In the same censorious spirit the critics characterize David as a captain of bandits and a usurper of the throne. They have lost the key to the interpretation of the facts. The very first and last fact in Jewish history is forgotten, namely, that the Jewish form of government was a theocracy. God Himself was in a very special sense the Ruler of the nation. In His hands were the making and unmaking of its kings. If Saul was rejected and David made to reign in his stead, it was done by divine appointment, and David was consequently no usurper. If David before ascending the throne acted on his own responsibility and took the field against the enemies of his people who were inflicting serious harm upon them, he did nothing inconsistent with just warfare. Neither this nor anything which he did in self-defense constituted him a bandit.

In the heyday of prosperity David did indeed commit a twofold sin of a most grievous nature; but the description of this event and of its consequences, whilst showing on the one hand the rigor of God's justice, presents on the other a most remarkable example of repentance in an offender—a repentance that charmed the heart of God Himself. The Lord deigned to call him a man after His own heart and to show him, and his descendants for his sake, the mercy of a Father. Surely this touching example of mercy—so characteristic, if we may use the expression, of God's dealings with men—ought to move the reader of the sacred narrative to adoration and love rather than arm him against the object of God's clemency.

The defender of the Bible is not bound to find an excuse for every act of the patriarchs that seems in any way dubious. In some cases those acts may have been in a greater or a lesser degree sinful. This is probably true in the case of Jacob when he personated his brother Esau and fraudulently obtained his father's blessing. True, he may have known from his mother, who certainly knew it by revelation (Gen. xxv. 23), that in the designs of Providence he was to take precedence of his brother. But would that excuse the deception practised on his father? And yet if he sinned it does not follow that he sinned grievously, or that he should have ceased to be an object of God's special providence as a propagator of the Jewish race.

The instances we have given of unfair criticism are samples of the superficial judgments passed upon the behavior of the patriarchs and upon the spirit and character of the historical books of the Bible.

BIBLE INTERPRETATIONS

Protestant Position.—The Bible teaches all necessary truth to all who approach the study of it in the right spirit. In the Scriptures God speaks to the human soul, and no interpreter of His words is needed but the soul itself, enlightened by the Holy Spirit.

CATHOLIC POSITION.—The above, if we mistake not, is a fair statement of the Protestant view of private interpretation. It differs essentially from the Catholic principle,

according to which private interpretation is controlled by the authority of a divinely established Church.

But now a question: What are the grounds of the Protestant position? As the Bible is the Protestant's final rule of faith, he should be able to quote chapter and verse for this as well as for any other article of his faith. Where in the whole compass of the sacred writings is there a passage enunciating the principle of private and independent interpretation? There are passages in abundance setting forth the benefits resulting from a reading of the Word of God, but none which declare that the individual reader is independent of all control in his interpretation of it.

In opposing such independence we do not mean to imply that the Bible is simply an unintelligible book. Quite the contrary, many parts of Scripture are plain narratives of matters of fact, and the more obvious sense of the text is the true one, or at least *one* true one. But other parts of the Bible abound in mysteries, or in other obscurities of one kind or another. This was doubtless the case even in the original version of the several books; but what shall we say of the modern translations—the imperfect medium through which all but a few readers get a glimpse of the revealed truth?

Now, is it likely that every chance reader, however good his disposition, possesses a "key to the Scriptures" and sees his way through all their obscurity of thought and expression? Is it not to be feared that the assumption of such power of interpretation will have injurious, and in some cases even disastrous, effects upon the reader? St. Peter the apostle, speaking of the epistles of St. Paul, says of them that they "contain certain things hard to be understood, which the unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction" (2 Peter iii. 16). If this declaration, made by no less an authority than St. Peter, and to the very people to whom the epistles of St. Paul were addressed, was justified at the time, is it not to be feared that now, after twenty centuries, the same causes are producing even worse effects?

The Apostle here mentions two effects which he traces to three causes. The two effects are: 1. The wresting—that is to say, the twisting or distorting—of the meaning of Scripture; 2. The spiritual self-destruction of the reader. The causes are: 1. The intrinsic difficulties of the text;

2. Ignorance; 3. Instability (unsteadfastness, as it reads in the Revised Version). The same three causes are in operation to-day, and doubtless tend, in varying degrees, to produce the same effects. The text, with its intrinsic difficulties, remains. Ignorance remains; for the three R's are the highest reach of knowledge for millions; and what special insight into Scripture is furnished by the three R's?

But have not some gone much farther than the three R's? Surely; they have learned their chemistry, or their physics, or their mathematics. But none of these sciences furnish a key to the obscurities of St. Paul. But have we no theologians or exegetes? Certainly we have; and they have helped us not a little to understand the sacred volume; but if we may believe Dr. Littledale it was just from this class that most of the ancient heresies took their rise; and all the theology in the world can not, of itself, secure a man from that instability of which St. Paul speaks—that is to say, from that intellectual and moral giddiness which often accompanies the greatest learning.

But, our opponents will tell us, at least let a man approach the reading of the Scriptures in a prayerful spirit, and he may expect to receive interior illumination. Doubtless a prayerful reading of Scripture has produced much insight into the meaning of the sacred text. But let us not mistake the issue in the present discussion. We do not deny the possibility of personal illumination. God, from the beginning, has deigned to speak to the individual soul. But—and this is the most important thing we have to say in the present article—there is nothing more illusory than the impression of having been enlightened from on high; and in the whole course of religious history nothing has proved more pernicious than the seeing in supposed illumination a practical rule of faith or of conduct.

Where God does really enlighten, no one can enlighten so well; but it is one thing to be enlightened, another to *think* one is enlightened. Many of our Catholic saints have received what they have described as marvelous illumination, but none were more distrustful of such illumination than the very recipients of it. And yet just the contrary has been the case with those leaders of men from Luther to Mrs. Eddy who have confidently proclaimed a special illumination in their interpretation of Scripture. And when we see the number of such claimants to inspiration

and compare their clashing creeds—all based on the same Word of God—and listen to the war of words in which each denounces all the others, we begin to see the utter hollowness of the theory of private interpretation.

Religious chaos was never intended to be the result of the preaching of the Christian revelation. And yet chaos is the necessary result of Christian preaching when it is based on private interpretation. But worse than chaos are the ultimate logical consequences of the theory, for amidst the chaos at least some fragments of the truth remain; but even these are destined to disappear under the powerful solvent of independent judgment. The principle of private judgment is to-day working itself out most consistently in the land of its origin. In Germany individual judgment, even amongst the ministers of religion, who are supposed to have committed themselves to a fixed creed, is rapidly dissolving the fabric of Christianity itself.

Personal illumination is, therefore, in no absolute sense a safe guide. In one's meditation on Scripture one may, of course, feel that reflection throws some light upon words or sentences heretofore obscure; many sound conclusions may be drawn; spiritual insight may increase; but still, considering that there are many things in Scripture "hard to be understood," and that so many readers of Scripture have been mistaken in their interpretations, it is only rational that one should submit to guidance, if a guide can be found. And that a guide has been provided by a kind Providence can not be matter of doubt when one reflects on the unspeakable wisdom displayed in all God's works and, on the other hand, on the sad consequences which are seen to follow the rejection of authority in so important a matter as the interpretation of the word of God.

Evidently, then, there is an infallible interpreter appointed by God Himself; and that infallible interpreter can be no other than the Church of Christ, which St. Paul tells us is "the pillar and ground of truth." (1 Tim. iii. 15.)

BIBLE, THE, AND MODERN THOUGHT

Objection.—The Bible is for many reasons deserving of veneration, but it is quite out of harmony with modern thought. The science, the aspirations, and the general point of view of the modern world are at the opposite pole from the contents of the Bible.

THE ANSWER.—Language like this is held by persons in our day who fancy that all men of enlightenment have ranged themselves with science on the one side against the Bible and its adherents on the other. Is it not the unique distinction of the Bible that it has *compelled* the attention of the enlightened since the beginning of Christianity? From the first great convert of St. Paul's at Athens to that group of brilliant minds, ending with St. Augustine, which adorned the early centuries of the Church, and thence onward to the great lights of the modern world, we find the great minds of the world's history humbly accepting the Bible as the revealed Word of God and as their guide, conjointly with the Church, to eternal life.

From the way our critics talk one would think that at least all men of science had discarded the Bible; and yet when the facts are inquired into it is found that the great leaders of science, the men without whom science would be whole centuries behind its present stage of development, have been sincere Christians and believers in the Bible. When we find a Bacon, a Copernicus, a Newton, a Leibnitz, or, to come down to our own generation, a Kelvin, a Pasteur, clinging to the Bible, though standing themselves on the very pinnacle of science, we have good reason for thinking that science and the Bible are not such irreconcilable foes after all.¹

The ranks of unbelievers have indeed swollen in our day, but the radical cause of this phenomenon does not lie in any shortcomings of the Bible. The cause is usually of a personal nature. It is natural that some should have a personal interest in wishing that the Bible were not authentic; for if the contents of the Bible are true a personal service of God and a restraint of the passions are impera-

¹See "Science and Faith," page 413.

tive. Thus the wish is father to the thought. And the habit of mind thus engendered is fostered by a neglect of the duties of religion. Faith is a grace, and grace is forfeited by a failure to correspond to it. A personal shrinking from the scorn of unbelievers—and no class is more intolerant than they—accounts for the attitude of a large number who talk much about “modern thought,” or who have other such shibboleths constantly on their lips.

This being the case, we are compelled to discount considerably the face value of the testimony which is supposed to be rendered against the Bible by big numbers. After doing so we shall probably find a comparatively small number of persons who from one cause or other—a lack of Christian training, it may be, or the fact that they have never seen a complete exposition of Christian evidences—profess, if not opposition to the Bible, at least an inability to accept it as the depository of a divine revelation.

Now, it is more than likely that some who belong to this class have really never read the Bible, or that they have read only parts of it, here and there, or that they have read it under the guidance of one of those microscopic experts, of the “higher criticism,” who are skilled in examining single words and phrases, but who are unable to see the wood for the trees. To any sincere mind thus circumstanced we must beg leave to make the following suggestions:

Read the Bible, both the Old and the New Testament, from beginning to end. You will notice that you are reading, not one book but many books, a whole literature, in fact, whose one subject is God in His dealings with the human race. Begun several thousand years ago, it has received additions at intervals according as God has deigned to reveal Himself to His chosen people. Now, notwithstanding the multiplicity of its parts and the length of time it took to compose them, you will discover, on the one hand, a remarkable *unity*, and on the other, a remarkable *growth of ideas*. You will see the light of truth increasing from the dawn to the perfect day. You will see evidence of prophecy fulfilled. Finally, you will see salvation brought to the Gentiles and the light of truth diffused throughout the world by the coming of Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

One of the fruits, it may be hoped, of so comprehensive

a view of the subject will be an answer supplied to a very important question; to wit, How are we to account for the extraordinary place in history of the Jewish race? How account for its sublime conception of the Deity, and for the purity and holiness of its public worship, amidst the idolatries and impurities of all the surrounding nations? How for its monuments, its customs, its laws? How shall we account for the very preservation of a race of so unique a character, and one that never rose to empire, for well-nigh two thousand years, amidst circumstances constantly tending to its destruction? Given the Jewish race, we look for its complement in a literature that shall interpret it as a fact in the world's history. And if such a literature be forthcoming, who will be surprised to find it abounding in the marvelous?

And yet a mere reading of the Bible will not suffice. The Bible can not be read in any and every frame of mind. To read it in a fault-finding temper would be fatal to an understanding of its meaning and spirit. Yet we are not counseling that it be read with a wish to believe, or with a strained effort to get into sympathy with its contents. We might in that case seem to be advising a species of auto-suggestion, against which our very knowing generation is so much on its guard. All that we ask is that you bring to the reading of the Bible as much open-mindedness as you would bring to the reading of any other body of literature, sacred or profane. We ask you, not to believe, but to regard as conceivable, not only that there is an infinite and eternal God, or that He is able to reveal His mind and will to those whom He has created, but also that He might on occasions manifest His presence and His power by extraordinary events. The evidence that there is such a God and that He *has* so manifested Himself to mankind will develop itself in your mind as you proceed through the volume.

We feel confident that no skeptic can read the sacred writings from beginning to end in the unbiased temper we have been describing without feeling his whole attitude of mind undergoing a change. This will be especially the case when he arrives at the narrative of the Saviour's life as given in the Gospels, a life which, when viewed both in its own wonderful details and in its relation to types and prophecies, indeed, to the whole of Jewish history, proves that there has been a veritable opening of the heavens,

and that God has in a most remarkable and touching way revealed Himself to mankind in the earthly career of His eternal and only-begotten Son.

But perhaps you are under the spell of the "scientific" hubbub which has tended of late years to trouble some Christian minds. You have perhaps heard the note of triumph sounded by anti-Christian scientists, and sounded still louder by many of their unscientific followers. But a slight review of the results of scientific research will probably convince you that in this scientific jubilation there has been much noise but little wool.

The experimental sciences, to begin with, have been invoked against the supernatural element in Holy Writ; especially against miraculous interference with what are called nature's laws. Miracles are impossible, we are told, because they are an interference with the constancy and uniformity of natural laws. Now, in the first place, it must be remembered that we stand in no need of modern science to be informed that nature behaves in certain uniform ways, *e.g.*, that fire burns and that water quenches fire. Common observation has told us as much since the days of Adam. Science has but extended and methodized common observation. Nature's uniformity is no more certain to-day than it was thousands of years ago. But apart from that matter, neither science nor common observation can go a step further than to declare that it is *of the nature* of water, or of fire, or of any other natural agent to behave in a certain way, and that they have *as a matter of fact* so behaved. But to declare that under no circumstances can they behave otherwise is quite beyond their province.

There is no warrant in science, therefore, for saying there can be no interference with nature's laws. Ordinary experience proves that such interference is possible. A stone, in obedience to the law of gravitation, falls earthward, but its fall may be arrested by a human hand. *Why can not God, the Author of nature, arrest its fall as well?* Science would not be disproved by interference in either case. Science can only tell us what things do in accordance with their natures, not what they will do as a matter of fact. The miracles of the Bible are therefore not proved impossible by science.

Ah, but there is evolution in my way, you will remind me. How can I ever get beyond that?

Why is evolution such an obstacle in your way? If you could once step out of your anti-Christian environment evolution would appear in a somewhat new light. You would find that among sincere Christians, even among Catholics, there are those who are convinced that within certain limits there has been an evolution of species among animals and plants. Opinions favoring a limited evolution of species may be traced back as far as certain of the Fathers (the great Christian authorities of the early centuries), notably St. Augustine, of the fifth century. You probably mean by evolution just one type of evolutionary theory, the pure Darwinian, which held sway for a few decades, but which, as professional scientists well know, has since been shoved more than half-way off its throne.¹

Indeed, the fortunes of pure Darwinism furnish a striking illustration of what the cooler heads among Catholic theologians have been predicting for many a day. Let scientific theorizing run its course, they have told us, and if it be opposed to Christian truth it will eventually show a suicidal tendency. Among leading evolutionists natural selection is no longer in the ascendant.

It was always a thorn in Darwin's side that certain devout Darwinians would not follow their leader the whole length of the theory of Natural Selection. Even the joint author and propounder, with Darwin, of the theory of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace, steadily held to the spiritual nature and the divine origin of the human soul; and after more than a half century's study of the subject he published a work, "The World of Life," in which more emphatically than ever he averred that phenomena which he described and of which he had made a very special study proved the existence of "*a creative Power,*" "*a directive Mind,*" "*an ultimate Purpose,*" which is no other than "*the development of Man,*" a being who was intended to interpret the rest of nature and deduce from its phenomena the existence of "*a supreme and over-ruling Mind as their necessary cause.*" Here is evolution, after its long excursion in the wilds, meeting Christianity at the crossroads and hailing it as a friend.

There seems to be nothing inconsistent with Christian teaching in holding that the present countless species of

¹See "Evolution," page 207.

animals and plants have been evolved from a smaller number of primitive species. And even though any such evolution of species should have required immensely long periods of time to elapse before the appearance of man on the earth, there can be little or no difficulty in granting their existence; for although the whole material universe was made in "six days," as the Bible narrates, there is no certain indication in the Bible of the length of each of the six days. For all we know to the contrary it may have been an exceedingly long period.

In pursuance of the evolutionary idea as applied to man, the most strenuous endeavors have been made to discover the "missing link," that is to say, any fossil remains of an extinct species intermediate between man and the ape. As such connecting species would, in Darwin's view, be exceedingly numerous, it is a wonder that we have not been stumbling against them in every morning's walk in the country. As it is, an occasional reputed discovery has created a sensation for a brief period but eventually has been shelved, once and for all, as a scientific myth.¹

As to the more extreme types of evolutionary theory—the Haeckelian, for instance, which is an extension of Darwin's ideas to the whole range of being—we shall have to refer you to the articles entitled respectively "Evolution" and "Haeckel," remarking, however, that you will search in vain in the books of Haeckel and his compeers for anything that even pretends to be a demonstration of any single proposition that is distinctive of their system.

As regards the objections so frequently urged in the name of astronomical science, we shall have a word to say about them in the article entitled "Bible and Science."

No less futile are the objections based on historical and archeological science and on the "higher criticism." The attacks made upon Christianity from this quarter are probably more persistent and relentless than any others. And yet what has been accomplished by our assailants? What fact or what principle has been evolved which contradicts any *essential* or *quasi-essential* Christian idea? For, not every idea that has gained currency among Christians can be regarded as an essential part of Christian doctrine. Propositions that have been defined by competent author-

¹See "Apes and Men" and "Human Race, The.—How Old Is it?"

ity, and those all but certain, or morally certain, facts or truths which have been generally held as such by Christians; as, for instance, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, these are matters about which we should feel concerned if even *prima facie* evidence against them, or anything resembling it, were supplied by honest criticism; but such is not the case.

The false anti-Christian hypotheses so freely adopted by the "higher critics" have actually retarded the progress of true criticism. Here, as everywhere else, hunting on the wrong trail has been a sheer loss of time. It is refreshing to hear a leading specialist in matters archeological, such as Professor Sayce of Oxford, taking to task the more extravagant of the "higher critics."

"The arrogance of tone," he remarks, "adopted at times by the 'higher criticism' has been productive of nothing but mischief; it has aroused distrust even of its most certain results, and has betrayed the critic into a dogmatism as unwarrantable as it is unscientific. Baseless assumptions have been placed on a level with ascertained facts, hasty conclusions have been put forward as principles of science, and we have been called upon to accept the prepossessions and fancies of the individual critic as the revelation of a new gospel."—*The "Higher Criticism" and the Verdict of the Monuments*, p. 5.

Not unfrequently, whilst the "higher critic" is weaving his fabric of mixed fact and hypothesis, the spade of the explorer among the ruins of some ancient city turns up an object bearing an inscription which obliges the critic to undo his work to the last thread. Speaking of the effect of archeological discovery on the conclusions of the "higher criticism," the author quoted above remarks:

"The assumptions and preconceptions with which the 'higher criticism' started, and upon which so many of its conclusions are built, have been swept away either wholly or in part, and in place of the skepticism it engendered there is now a danger lest the oriental archeologist should adopt too excessive a credulity. The revelations of the past which have been made to him of late years have inclined him to believe that there is nothing impossible in history any more than there is in science, and that he is called upon to believe rather than to doubt."—*Op. cit.*, p. 23.

So that there are two sides to the picture, one of which you had hardly supposed to be in existence.

We have been dealing almost exclusively with modern science, because it is chiefly science—or what is taken for science—that is flaunted so contemptuously in the face of religion. As to the "aspirations" of the modern world, these are likely to prove its bane. The inflated human spirit aspires to being the self-sufficing lord of the earth and the supreme arbiter of human destiny, with no need of God or of heaven, or of grace or of salvation. But this is not the first time that the aspirations of created beings have soared too high. "I will ascend above the height of the clouds, I will be like the Most High," was the aspiration of Lucifer. "We shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," was the aspiration of our first parents. And who can doubt that the same Nemesis will overtake the third and last class of aspirants as overtook the first and the second?

The proud aspirations of the human spirit will ever have been the worst obstacle both to the happiness and to the truest progress of the race. And why so? Because—and here we shall be using language familiar to modern thought—*such aspirations are supremely unscientific*. How so? Simply by not recognizing that the true basis of all rational aspiration lies in a fact; and that fact is that we are *created* beings, and consequently must submit to be taught and ruled by the Creator.

No wonder that your general point of view is not the same as that of the writers of Holy Writ.

BIBLE "MYTHS"

Objection.—The Bible contains many stories that remind us forcibly of the myths of early pagan history. How can we be expected to believe the story of the Serpent tempting Eve—that of the Flood, with its fabulous quantity of water—that of Noe collecting the countless species of animals?—And then, is not God frequently represented in a strangely human way—when, for instance, He is described as taking slime and forming it into a human body, or as shaping

Adam's rib into a woman—or when He is said to be moved to wrath, or to repent of His creation of man?

THE ANSWER.—In reading many of the interesting and remarkable things narrated in the Book of Genesis we must not be surprised if the events connected with *the foundation of a universe and of human society* are not of the commonplace type that make up our daily history. Supposing a creation and a revelation, what wonder if the hand of God should in some sense be visible in His creation? What wonder if a mingling of the human and the divine should be a matter of frequent occurrence?

An impartial and broadminded examination of the Bible stories in question will show that, so far from being a counterpart of pagan mythology, they stand out in bold relief from the whole mass of ancient legendary lore, and exhibit a dignity and sobriety of content which is conspicuously wanting in the fabulous history of pagan origins.

To pass in review all the alleged mythical stories of the Bible would be to write a commentary far outrunning the limits of these brief articles. We shall have to content ourselves with a specimen or two. From these the reader will get an idea of the light in which *we* read the Bible.

The Serpent Tempting Eve

An evident fable, says the skeptic; and he dismisses the subject with a shrug of his shoulder.

Nevertheless it is not so evidently a fable. Animals do not speak, but beings of the purely spiritual order, such as the angels, may use the animal nature, or material substance of any kind, for their purposes. But perhaps our objector is a materialist and does not believe in spiritual natures. The angels are to him only another mythical feature of the Bible narrative. To prove the existence of spiritual beings does not fall within the scope of the present article;¹ but whilst referring our skeptical friend to other parts of this work, we can not refrain from asking him *why* he denies the existence of spiritual beings. Is it not to be feared that his opposition to the spiritual is resolvable into a mere *feeling*, or *impression*, based upon a crude, unreasoned notion that anything imperceptible to the senses

¹See "Mind and Matter," "Soul," "Materialism."

—anything that has not three dimensions—has no reality whatever, is simply nothing? But we must assume here the existence of spirits and show how, on this assumption, the narrative we are considering acquires a dignity and a degree of credibility which remove it far from the absurd or the fabulous.

The evil one made use of the serpent as an instrument of temptation. But why make use of an animal of any kind? Because an animal, and especially the serpent, was the best suited to his purpose. Consider the circumstances. The devil, who is a spiritual being, plans the ruin of man, who is partly of a spiritual, partly of a corporeal nature. The devil seldom tempts by direct suggestion, but usually through our natural concupiscence. But in the state of primitive innocence concupiscence, by God's special favor, was absent. There was nothing in man's nature in sympathy with moral evil. Hence the only available instrument within the devil's reach was the purely animal nature, with which man has so much in common. He chose the serpent, at that time gracious of form and known to be "more subtle [wise] than any of the beasts of the earth." We may add that he selected as the direct object of his temptation the woman rather than the man, as the weaker of the two.

Eve was doubtless surprised to find the serpent, wise though he was, using human speech; but she knew there were superior beings in the universe who might speak through the serpent; and if she was aware that she stood in the presence of such a being the fact easily explains the deference she showed the serpent's judgment during the temptation. As sensible appetite was then under the control of reason and gave no handle to temptation, the devil assailed her through reason itself. He plied her with the *why* and the *wherefore* of God's commands.

"*Why* hath God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise? . . . God doth know that in what day soever you shall eat thereof your eyes shall be opened: and you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil."

Pride was awakened, as it had been among the angels. Eve, the joint ruler with Adam of God's creation, was already high in the scale of being, but now she would rise higher; she would be a goddess; she would know how to distinguish good from evil, and thus be the arbitress of her

own destiny. It was only now that sensible appetite was awakened: "And the woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold." She plucked the fruit, ate of it, and afterward used the devil's arguments to induce her partner to do the same—adding, no doubt, an appeal to his affection.

Such is the story of man's fall from grace—a story whose details are so true to nature, so intrinsically probable, and withal so replete with dignity. And yet it is a story that has been brushed aside as a piece of absurd fiction.

The Flood

No less vigorously has the biblical account of the Flood been assailed; and yet, as regards the *fact* as distinguished from the *circumstances*, the Bible account has been confirmed by the traditions of so many ancient peoples that even the most skeptical must admit its truth. This is one of the many instances in which an independent study of antiquity has corroborated the sacred text.

"The historicity of the biblical Flood account is confirmed by the tradition existing in all places as to the occurrence of a similar catastrophe. F. von Schwarz . . . enumerates sixty-three such Flood stories which are in his opinion independent of the biblical account. R. Andrée discusses eighty-eight different Flood stories and considers sixty-two of them as independent of the Chaldee and Hebrew tradition. Moreover these stories extend through all the races of the earth excepting the African; these are excepted, not because it is certain that they do not possess any Flood traditions, but because their traditions have not as yet been sufficiently investigated. Lenormant pronounces the Flood story as the most universal tradition in the history of primitive man, and Franz Delitzsch was of opinion that we might as well consider the history of Alexander the Great a myth as to call the Flood tradition a fable. It would indeed be a greater miracle than that of the Deluge itself if the various and different conditions surrounding the several nations of the earth had produced among them a tradition substantially identical. Opposite causes would have produced the same effect."—A. J. Maas, S.J., in the "Catholic Encyclopedia," vol. iv., p. 407.

So much for the fact:—an extraordinary event, which impressed itself deeply upon the memory of mankind really took place, and the history of it the Bible professes to give in its details. It is these details that are principally attacked by the "higher critics."

It goes without saying that it is the supernatural element

of the history that bears the brunt of the attack. The Flood story savors too much of the miraculous to be acceptable to the atheistic critic. The gathering together of the countless species of animals and the housing of them in the Ark—the feeding and tending of so vast a herd by eight persons—the submerging of immense continents to the height of the loftiest mountains, and the consequent emptying of half the seas—the preservation of fresh-water and salt-water fish in a mixture of brine and rain-water, which must have been fatal to both kinds—these and other circumstances are rejected by the "higher critics" as fabulous, because apparently miraculous.

Whether there is any need of invoking the miraculous, strictly so called, to explain the facts as narrated may be a question. God could have given Noe special assistance short of the miraculous to enable him to perform the task assigned him, and by a purely natural catastrophe, though on an extraordinary scale, could have accomplished without miracle the destruction of the human race. But still, if it be shown that any one of the disputed circumstances calls for a miracle, we, of course, shall not be staggered by the prospect of admitting one. We believe in the possibility of miracles, and would naturally look for them in a universal deluge. In a destruction of an entire race we should expect an assertion of God's power and majesty of the most impressive kind.

And yet we must add that even the most devout believer in miracles will place a limit to his acceptance of miracle stories in the concrete. "Miracles are not to be multiplied without necessity" (i.e., necessity of interpretation), is a sound adaptation of a medieval formula. Working under the guidance of this principle, many of the most orthodox Christian scholars have endeavored with some success to reduce the limits of the miraculous in the case of the Flood.

One question on which many others are thought to hinge is whether the Deluge covered the entire globe, or only a part of it. In the first place, it is well to remember that among the ancients the common conception of the earth was not that of a globe, but rather of a more or less flat surface, with a mysterious substructure of one kind or other, and with watery bounds whose extent was no less mysterious. Its vastness was not even dreamed of. No expression in their literatures ever conveyed the idea of a

globe 25,000 miles in circumference and covered by oceans and continents of enormous extent. But, great or small, the earth was seldom spoken of *as a whole* except by philosophers and astronomers. Words in ancient writings which we frequently render by "the earth," or "the world," meant, at the most, the inhabited part of the earth, which in Noe's time could have been a small fraction of the whole. Frequently they meant only that part which was most familiar to the writer and his countrymen.

It is conceivable, therefore, and even probable that when any such expression as "the earth," or even "the whole earth" is found in the history of the Flood its meaning is to be similarly restricted. It has been noted, moreover, that the Hebrew expression which has been translated "the earth" may easily be rendered "the land," "the region." If this rendering be adopted the interpretation of the Deluge history will be comparatively easy.

Views in favor of a restriction of the geographical area of the Deluge have been held by many "orthodox" writers, and amongst them a large number of Catholics. We, for our part, should welcome any successful attempt at demonstrating that the Deluge was geographically not universal. Any such demonstration would obviate the necessity of our believing that God flooded the entire globe in order to destroy a race inhabiting only a small part of it; and expressions denoting universality might be regarded as only relatively universal; that is to say, as relating to a particular region; and thus the defender of revelation would have a freer hand in dealing with its adversaries.

Another question has been mooted which can hardly be a question for Christians who hearken to the voice of authority and tradition; namely, whether the Deluge was universal as regarded the human race. Were *all* men destroyed, or were only those destroyed who inhabited a certain limited area to which alone the Bible history refers? The Biblical account, considered in itself and apart from authority and tradition, may possibly admit of an interpretation limiting the destruction of men to a part only of the entire race, but indirectly, that is to say, through the interpretation given it by the Fathers of the Church, it forbids any such view. No Christian, therefore, who respects the authority of those great teachers of the early Church can safely permit himself to hold that any part of the

human race was saved from the deluge except Noe and his family, who had taken refuge in the Ark.

It has been objected that the history of the race furnishes evidences that not all men are descended from Noe's family, and that consequently some must be descended from a part of the race unaffected by the Flood. The supposed evidence lies in such facts as the following: Nations which certainly have sprung from Noe found in the places in which they first settled inhabitants who had occupied those places for a considerable time. Egyptian monuments of very remote antiquity exhibit the Negro just as we find him to-day; even at that early period he was completely differentiated from the Caucasian. Languages, too, have developed in a way that must have required a greater time than has elapsed since the Flood. The gist of all such arguments is that more time is needed to explain the development of races and languages than is allowed by any version of the Bible.

This objection has been urged with some persistency, and yet it is based on a false assumption. We do not pretend to have established a fixed and certain system of biblical chronology. So that if it can be demonstrated from undeniable facts that the development of races and languages required a longer time than is usually assigned, there is nothing in Christian hermeneutics forbidding the concession of a longer interval between the Flood and the present day.

Such, if we mistake not, is the general attitude of Catholic scholars toward history and science in their bearings on biblical questions. Obscurity and mystery hover over many parts of the sacred writings; but where a clear and decided meaning is not otherwise discernible the well-balanced Catholic student avails himself of the services of history or of science, whenever either can offer an interpretation at once well based and well defended.

Our position, then, is briefly this: We are ready, if need be, to accept even as miracles the wonderful events by which God visited His wrath upon a sinful race; it is rational and, in some sense, natural to suppose that at the close of one great act of the drama of human existence, and one that was marked by an all but universal catastrophe, the power of the Almighty should have been more than ordinarily manifest; but at the same time we are aware

that Christian, and even Catholic, scholarship points to an interpretation of the text which reduces the miraculous element to comparatively small dimensions. Only that part of the earth may have been submerged upon which human beings were living—God's primary purpose being to destroy the human race. On this hypothesis such expressions as "all flesh," "all things wherein there is the breath of life," need not be taken in a strictly universal sense. They are neither more nor less universal than the expressions which have been rendered by "the earth," which may have meant in reality only that "region" of the earth inhabited by men. Whilst holding, then, that all *human beings* were destroyed by the Deluge, we need not hold that the entire globe was submerged; and whilst holding that all living things within reach of the Flood were destroyed, we can still believe that many species of animals (not including men, however), were not touched by the Flood. If this be the case Noe's task of collecting specimens of each species may have been a comparatively easy one.

As to the anthropomorphism of the Bible, or its representation of God as acting in a human way, we know, on the one hand, from the Bible itself that God is purely spiritual and that He is infinite and unchangeable; and if, on the other hand, He is represented as acting in ways inconsistent with these attributes it is only because He wishes to accommodate Himself to our human limitations. "He knoweth our frame" and adapts His ways to ours. He is described as being moved to anger, or as being pleased with the sweet odor of a sacrifice, or as repenting of having created man. The deep impression produced upon men's minds by such modes of representing the Deity enables us to understand something of God's motive in permitting Himself to be so described.

As regards apparitions of God vouchsafed to His servants, although it was forbidden in the Old Testament to represent Him by any graven image, nevertheless He Himself deigned to give man a sense of being brought nearer to his God by sensible forms which impressed upon men's minds the awful feeling that they were face to face with their Maker. When God is represented as fashioning earth into a human body it need not be supposed that an actual moulding of the clay by an apparently human hand might have been witnessed. At any rate, it is plain from the

Scriptures that when God produces anything He does so by a simple act of His will, and that His willing of anything is from all eternity. Neither change nor motion is in *Him*, but only in things without.

BIBLE, THE, AND THE PEOPLE

AN ACCUSATION.—It is notoriously the settled policy of Rome to withhold the Bible from the people: witness the number of decrees on the subject in the history of the Papacy. Versions of the Bible in the language of the people have been an object of the Church's special aversion.

THE ANSWER.—As a general proposition it is untrue that the Church withholds, or desires to withhold, the Bible from the people. The Church has at times placed restrictions, not precisely on Bible reading, but on the reading of *certain versions* of the Bible, and, even then, only when such restrictions were necessary as preventives of serious harm.

The Bible is indeed a sacred thing, but the most sacred of things may be abused. And who will deny that the Bible has been abused in the hands of the unworthy? The prevention of such abuse is so rational that the opposition of Protestants to it would be quite unintelligible if we were not aware of the effect of early education in sealing up the mind against all access of new ideas that seem to conflict with early impressions. "Dare be open-minded" on the subject of the Bible, is the friendly admonition we would give to our Protestant readers.

Now, in detail, what are the real facts of the case? The first fact takes the shape of a letter. It may be found among the introductory pages of the modern reprints of the Douai (or Douay) Bible, which is in every good Catholic household. It is written by Pope Pius VI to Archbishop Martini of Florence in reference to the latter's translation of the Bible into Italian. The following is the text of the English translation of the part of the letter that particularly concerns us:

"Beloved Son: Health and Apostolical Benediction.—At a time that a vast number of bad books which most grossly attack the Catholic religion are circulated even among the unlearned, to the

great destruction of souls, you judge exceedingly well that the faithful should be excited to the reading of the Holy Scriptures; for these are the most abundant sources which ought to be left open to every one, to draw from them purity of morals and of doctrine, to eradicate the errors which are widely disseminated in these corrupt times. This you have seasonably effected, as you declare, by publishing the sacred writings in the language of your country, suitable to every one's capacity; especially when you show and set forth that you have added explanatory notes, which being extracted from the holy Fathers, preclude every possible danger of abuse." (Dated April 1, 1778.)

Here we see the precious treasure of God's word placed within the reach of all who have a knowledge of the language in which the version is printed, whilst at the same time precautions are taken against any abuse of it. The word of God is given in its entirety, but its interpretation is safeguarded by extracts from the Fathers, that is to say, from the great authorities of the early Christian ages. The version of the Bible praised by the Pontiff is in the Italian language; but that was not by any means the first time that the sacred writings appeared in a modern tongue.

Our second fact is that in nearly every modern language there have been numerous translations of the entire Bible. As these versions were either positively approved or appeared with the knowledge of the authorities, it is altogether impossible that the settled policy of the Church can have been to withhold the Bible from the people. To any one who knows the facts, or even a fraction of them, the accusation must seem to be a calumny. Germany, the birth-place of the Reformation, is conspicuous for the number of editions of the whole Bible in the language of the people produced in Catholic times. Bibles in German were among the very first products of the printing-press.

The art of printing, we may remark in passing, is an invention of Catholic days; and printing-presses were at work more than half a century before Luther's revolt in 1517, sending forth to the world copies of the Bible in Luther's own language. Between 1466 and 1518 there appeared as many as *fourteen editions of the complete Bible in High German and five in Low German*. This is a fact which no historian of to-day will deny, though it is probably never mentioned within the walls of the non-Catholic Sunday-school. In the light of this fact Luther's dramatic story about the joy and delight he felt at discovering at the age

of twenty a complete Bible, of which he had hitherto seen only fragments in the homilies, must seem quite astonishing. If the story is true it is significant, not as pointing to the rarity of Catholic Bibles, but as throwing a light of its own upon the character of Luther's education. The truth is that in the schools which Luther attended as a boy the ancient classics were the absorbing and almost exclusive subject of study—this according to his own testimony—whereas in the more conservative schools and in those in which the traditional methods of the Church were followed the Bible was part of the regular curriculum.

We have said nothing, though much might be said, about the numerous German versions of the whole or of parts of the Bible issued in manuscript before the invention of printing. It was the work of a lifetime to produce, and it required a little fortune to purchase, a manuscript of the entire Bible before the printing era had dawned; still the laborious work of producing was carried forward in the monasteries; and the demand on the part of those who were able to purchase was large enough to occasion the production of an immense number of copies of the Scriptures, some of which are still extant.

It is needless to say anything of the numerous editions of the Bible in Germany which have appeared in recent centuries. The Allioli edition, with its clear and copious exposition of the text, would alone be sufficient to disprove the assertion that versions of the Bible in the language of the people are the Church's special aversion.

In the Italian language eleven printed editions of the whole Bible appeared before the end of the fifteenth century. Much the same story might be told about Spain and France.

In England the people had the open Bible from the earliest centuries. Anglo-Saxon versions of Scripture are well known to scholars. Fragments of them are extant and may be read in modern reprints. When in the course of time the old language became unintelligible, the Bible was rendered into the more modern tongue. Even Cranmer admits as much. "When," he remarks, "the Saxon language waxed old and out of common usage, because folk should not lack the fruit of reading [the Scripture], was again translated into the newer language, whereof yet also many copies remain, and be daily found." Blessed Thomas

More, whose word carries as much weight with non-Catholics as with Catholics, tells us: "Myself have seen and can show you Bibles fair and old which have been known and seen by the bishop of the diocese, and left in laymen's hands and women's, to such as he knew for good and Catholic folk that used it with soberness and devotion."

Even so stout a champion of Protestantism as John Foxe cannot refrain from adding his voice to the general chorus of testimony. "If histories be well examined," he assures us, "we shall find both before the Conquest and after, as well before John Wickliffe was born as since, the whole body of the Scriptures by sundry men translated into this our country tongue."

Strange, you will say, that such thorough-paced Anti-Romanists as Foxe and Cranmer should have let the cat out of the bag as they would seem to have done in the above passages; but the truth probably is that whilst they knew it would serve their immediate purpose to make the true statements we have quoted, they never suspected the controversial use to which their words would be put in a later age.

Since 1582 English-speaking countries have had the New Testament, and since 1609 the Old Testament, translated into modern English idiom. The Douai, or Douay, Bible is a familiar object in Catholic households.

In a word, *the open Bible is a well-attested fact as regards the Catholics of the world, and our case is made out.*

"Not so," says a voice somewhere in the audience, "there may have been an English Catholic Bible, but it must have had few readers, as there was a positive ban put upon the reading of the Scriptures in the English tongue."

Be this our answer: Never, either in England or elsewhere, has the Church banned a Bible because it was in the language of the people; but it *has* forbidden the reading of certain versions of the Bible which perverted the meaning of Holy Writ. Could the Church of God have done less? Granted a Church with authority—and what is a Church without authority?—was she to permit the Scriptures to appear with a falsified text? Whatever action the Church has ever taken with regard to English Bibles, it was entirely of a piece with its legislation from the beginning, whose object was to preserve from pollution the stream of divine revelation. *To this legislation all Chris-*

tian churches are indebted for their possession of a Christian Bible of any kind. But let us glance at the facts of the case.

The reader will hardly need to be informed that in the fourteenth century a priest named John Wycliffe was cited to appear before the ecclesiastical authorities to answer the charge of heresy. Wycliffe has been styled "the morning star of the Reformation," in accordance with the Protestant fashion of claiming kinship with all those who have had difficulties with their ecclesiastical superiors regarding matters of faith. But Anti-Romanism, like misery, acquaints a man with strange bedfellows. Wycliffe was indeed, in many respects, the morning star of the Reformation, but there is no orthodox Protestant of the present day who would not be shocked by certain of his views, which are not even Christian. He died in apparent communion with the Church, but he had fairly launched what was known after his death as the Lollard heresy.

The Lollards were fanatical revolutionists, equally dangerous to the Church and to society. It was against the Lollard perversions of Scripture that the Church directed her anathemas. In 1408 a convocation held at Oxford forbade any unauthorized person to translate the Scriptures—and who will say that such prohibitions are not within the right of a Church tracing its descent to the apostles, the greatest of whom, St. Peter (2 Epist. iii. 16), warns solemnly against wresting the Scriptures from their true meaning, whether by mistranslation or by any other process? The Convocation forbade, in the second place, any one to read *without approbation* any version of Scripture made either during or after Wycliffe's lifetime; and Wycliffe had died twenty-four years before. As Blessed Thomas More remarks, we "hope, dear reader, you see in this law nothing unreasonable, since it neither forbids good translations to be read that were already made of old before Wycliffe's time, nor condemns his because it was new, but because it was 'naught' [i.e., bad, perverse]."

How then, it may be asked, after so wide a diffusion of the Scriptures in the vernacular languages, could the notion ever have arisen that the Church would fain keep the Bible from the people? We shall have to let our readers puzzle over it.

But our opponents have one more shaft in their quiver.

It must be conceded that Catholics are anything but a Bible-reading body. Bibles are multiplied, but Bible-readers are not.

In answer to this reproach we would remark, in the first place, that in this matter it is easy to exaggerate the contrast between Catholics and Protestants. There is a vast deal more reading of the Scriptures among Catholics than is suspected outside the Church. Priests, to begin with, are obliged daily to recite an office in which there is always a portion of the sacred text from the New or the Old Testament. Many priests have devoted their lives to a study of the sacred writings. Besides the priests there are hundreds of thousands following the way of the counsels (and these have scarcely any counterpart in Protestantism); to wit, the members of the Religious Orders, who meditate daily on the life of our Blessed Saviour as narrated in the Gospels. The public reading of Scripture is also a common practice in houses of Religious. For the faithful at large passages from the Gospels and Epistles are selected to be read from the pulpit. Children are taught their Bible history, which is sometimes worded from the text of the Bible itself. In some of our Sunday-schools the older pupils receive special instruction in the Bible. Any one who knows the run of Catholic publications must be acquainted with a number of small annotated editions of the Gospels, which are issued to meet the demand for Bible knowledge among Catholics.

A good deal of this will be a surprise to our non-Catholic friends; but this is only a sample of what they have yet to learn about their Catholic neighbors. And besides all this, it is a fact of no small importance that whilst the reading of the Bible has undoubtedly been on the increase among Catholics, *it has very notably decreased among other Christian denominations.*

But significant as these facts certainly are as showing how much the Scriptures have been held in reverence by Catholics, we confess we do not by any means stake our case—nor should we, even if the facts were double or treble their present volume—on the amount of Bible-reading which may be placed to the credit of Catholics. If Bible readers were even fewer than they are, we should not be a bit concerned, if we could feel any assurance that they were growing in appreciation of what is to them of much

more importance than even Bible reading. If, for instance, they were daily learning to appreciate more and more the need and the efficacy of divine grace, especially as received through the sacraments; if they were conceiving daily a greater sorrow and detestation for sin, which they know is a condition for receiving pardon in the sacrament of Penance; if in greater number and with growing fervor they were dedicating their lives to the service of their neighbor, for the sake of Him who regards what is done to the least of His brethren as done to Himself—and all these are known to be distinctive Catholic traits—then we should be reconciled to their comparative neglect of Scripture reading.

After all, it is *the general point of view* of the two religions respectively that makes the greater part of the difference between Catholics and Protestants in this matter. Given a religion that takes its stand solely on the Bible, there is at once an antecedent likelihood that a sort of omnipresence of the Bible will be a distinguishing feature of that religion. But given a religion which holds that Christ established a *living authority*, whose teachings are by a special providence preserved from error, in whose custody the sacred writings are placed, and from whose first commissioned teachers a considerable part of those writing have emanated (we mean, of course, those forming the New Testament), at once the Bible ceases to be the be-all and end-all of a man's religion. It takes its place beside another great oracle of divine wisdom, in which is heard the *living voice of apostolic authority*.

Before drawing this article to a close we would add that there is another important reason why the Bible, at least the whole Bible, is not so universally or so indiscriminately read by Catholics. There are passages in the Old Testament which should never be placed under the eyes of the young or the frivolous, in whose case a morbid curiosity might easily turn the sacred text into an instrument of harm. The use to which the Bible has frequently been put by both of the classes mentioned is only too well known.

And now, finally, we would ask our Protestant friends, what do they fancy could have been the Church's motive for its supposed policy of depriving the people of the word of God. We have seen that as a matter of fact *she did not deprive them of that treasure*, as the Bible has been

rendered into all the vernacular tongues in every age of the Church's history. But had she adopted a different policy what could she have feared or hoped for by so doing? Were the contents of Scripture a secret of which none but a few possessed a knowledge? Or were they a secret on which depended her power or influence or the personal advantage of her rulers? The very notion of such secrecy is too absurd to be entertained for a moment. The Bible was as open as could be in all the languages known to scholars (or clerks, as they were called in those days) among the laity and the clergy. And yet the clerks were the very class that could trouble the peace of the Church most. They were the reading and thinking class, and independence of judgment would naturally assert itself in their ranks more than elsewhere.

As for a reading public in anything like the modern sense, it simply did not exist. And yet, as we have seen, even for the comparative few who could read, or had leisure to read, the Church provided the Scriptures in the common tongue. In giving the Scriptures to all classes the Church was not unmindful of the admonition of the Apostle that the sacred writings contained many things difficult to be understood and things which the unlearned and the unstable wrested to their own destruction; for, inculcating as she did obedience to the Church as the divinely appointed interpreter of the Scriptures, she reduced the danger of a reckless and independent interpretation to the minimum. The non-Catholic reader of the Bible has no such safeguard; and hence Catholics might justly charge the Protestant churches with placing the Bible in the hands of the unlearned and the unstable without furnishing any safeguard against the vagaries of human interpretation.

BIBLE, THE, AND SCIENCE

Objections.—According to the Bible the world was made in six days, whereas geology proves that enormous periods of time were required to bring the earth to its present condition. The earth, which astronomy has shown to be only a satellite of the sun, is represented by the Bible

as having been created before the sun; and the heavenly bodies, generally, are described as though they were lamps hung in the heavens to light the earth.

THE ANSWER.—The objection represents the state of mind of very many who get their ideas on these and kindred subjects from popular lecture-courses and seldom or never consult a reliable authority. Serious-minded men, distinguished in the world of science, have pondered the first chapters of Genesis and have *not* come to the conclusion that the Bible and geology are at variance; nay, not a few of them have seen a substantial agreement between the Mosaic order of creation and the sequence of events discovered by the geologist. Some have even marveled at the points of identity between the testimony of the Book and the testimony of the rocks.

In what sense was the world made in six days? Were the days of the same duration as ours? The word used in the original Hebrew, *yom*, means day; but as the Hebrews had no word to express "epoch," "era," and the like, the word *yom* might be used for that purpose. That the word was rather elastic in usage is proved by the very passages under discussion. In one place it means daytime as distinguished from night-time (i. 5), and elsewhere in the same verse darkness and the succeeding light as constituting one day; whilst in ii. 4, 5 it means the entire period of creative activity. There is no difficulty, then, in taking the expression to mean a period or epoch. But if it *can* be taken in that sense the objection falls to the ground, because believers in the Bible need not take it as meaning a day of twenty-four hours' duration.

As a matter of fact, the term has been taken in the sense of an epoch by a respectable body of Catholic exegetists and theologians. Their interpretation is based, first, on the indefinite character of the word, second, on the facts narrated in the account of the work of the first three days, and finally on the principle that the Christian interpreter of Scripture may in the case of obscure passages invoke the aid of the natural sciences no less than that of philology and general history.

During the first three days of creation the alternation of day and night was not caused by the rising and setting of

the sun, because it was not till the fourth day that the sun was made to shed its light upon the earth. Hence those three days were not determined as to length, as our days are, by the apparent revolution of the sun. They were determined as days by the recurrence of light after darkness, but there is no reason compelling us to believe that their length was the equivalent of our twenty-four hours. There is much reason for thinking they were long periods of time. Certainly the events of the first three days were so stupendous in the aggregate that if they were dependent on the operation of natural laws they would necessarily require the lapse of long periods of time. And in the bringing about of such events, as, for instance, the emergence of continents from the deep, is it not more probable that God left such changes to the working of natural laws created by Himself than that He intervened by a direct exercise of His power?

This is enough for our purpose: the narrative of the sacred writer has its mysteries, but it can not be proved to contain any falsity.

As to the account of the origin of the heavenly bodies, which the objector holds up as a sample of the mythical in the Bible, we have this to say: There are always two ways of telling a story; Moses has *his* way of telling of the origin of sun, moon, and stars, and science has a way of its own, though it must be said that in this particular case science tells its story in faltering accents, as not being at all sure of its authenticity.

Moses tells us distinctly that God made "two great lights," the one to rule the day, the other to rule the night, as also the stars, and that "He set them in the firmament of heaven to shine upon the earth." Now, here God is represented either as having *created* the heavenly bodies, there and then, or as having made them, after they were created, luminaries in respect to the earth, *i.e.*, by making their light reach the earth. In neither case does the narrative fall under the ban of astronomical science. Supposing that the heavenly bodies were at that moment created, and therefore were created after the earth, does astronomy say anything to the contrary? It is able, doubtless, to tell us something of the earth in its present relations to the sun and the moon; but has it yet demonstrated in what precise order sun, earth, and moon came into being? The nebular hypothesis, according to which the earth emanated from

the sun when both were in a gaseous state, is, after all, *only* a hypothesis.

But there is no absolute necessity of supposing that when God is said to have "made two great lights" He is represented as there and then creating two heavenly bodies. He may have already created sun and moon, but now *made them into lights* in respect to the earth, i.e., made their radiance for the first time *reach* the earth, possibly by the removal of the dense mists that may have covered the earth.

It must be remembered that although the earth is, physically, an insignificant part of the universe and a satellite of a greater body, it may nevertheless be the *moral center* of the whole, and the part that dominated all others in the designs of the Creator. The rest of creation may well have been planned and ordered with a view to its ministering to the planet that was to be the habitat of man and the scene of God's great mercies to the human kind. As Moses apparently wrote from this point of view his narrative calls for an interpreter who realizes this circumstance, but whose mind is none the less open to the teachings of science on the subject. Science, however, has nothing to say that is certain and reliable.

We have said that many scientists have found substantial agreement between the biblical account of creation and the geological record. Among others our distinguished American geologist, Professor Dana, following the lead of the French scientist, Guyot, has exhibited in detail some most striking points of agreement in the two records. Having first drawn up a table showing the "stages of progress" in the history of the globe, he compares it with a tabulated analysis of the work of the six days, and finds that "the order of events in the Scripture cosmogony corresponds essentially" with the order assigned them by physical science.

He remarks, furthermore, that the Scripture narrative, "*if true, is of divine origin*" (italics Dana's). "For no human mind was witness of the events; and no such mind in the early age of the world, unless gifted with superhuman intelligence, could have contrived such a scheme; . . . and none could have reached to the depths of philosophy exhibited in the whole plan."

But the superior wisdom displayed by the biblical account of creation is of a piece with the superior knowledge,

the clearness of detail, and the sobriety and saneness of the entire Book of Genesis as compared with the primitive traditions of the Gentiles, whose early legends are characterized by the opposite qualities, especially by a grotesqueness which is almost the earmark of early legendary lore.

BIBLE, THE, AND TRADITION

Protestant View.—The Bible alone is the Christian's rule of faith.

CATHOLIC TEACHING.—The Bible, though it is the word of God, is not the Christian's sole rule of faith. Ultimate guidance in matters of faith must be sought in the authority of a divinely established Church, which, according to the Apostle of the Gentiles, is the "pillar and ground of truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15). The Bible and the traditional teachings of the Church—or tradition—may indeed be regarded as the twofold basis of the Christian religion; but the Church, which is the interpreter of divine revelation and to which the promise was given that the Paraclete, "the Spirit of truth," would abide with it *forever* (John xiv, 16, 17), furnishes by its teachings the ultimate criterion of a Christian's faith.

With any of our separated brethren who may happen to light upon these pages we must plead, here as elsewhere, for a little open-mindedness. We must remind them that there has been a tradition of opinion among Protestants on certain subjects; miracles, for instance, private judgment, the Bible, which even the cleverest Protestant minds have found it difficult—nay, impossible—to place upon a basis either of fact or of principle. Ask any Protestant why he thinks, as most Protestants do, that miracles ceased with the deaths of the apostles—he has no answer. Ask him to prove that the Bible is the only rule of faith—he is equally helpless. Can he prove it from the Bible itself? Surely not. There is no statement, explicit or implied, to that effect in the pages of Holy Writ. And yet the Bible is his final criterion of truth. Does it not seem as though the Protestant accepted this principle without inquiring into its validity, or without asking himself whether, after all, it is anything more than a Protestant tradition dating from the stormy period when those who revolted against the

authority of the Church were forced to do so under cover of the Bible?

Moreover, there are Protestant prejudices against certain Catholic ideas which have the effect of shutting out all inquiry into their meaning. Catholic tradition as conceived by the Protestant mind hardly rises above the level of the loose, haphazard sort of tradition that weighs so little with the serious historian. Tradition of that description is not of the kind to which Catholics appeal. Tradition as conceived by the Catholic is a *divinely guarded continuity of teaching*, raised above the accidents of time by reason of *the ever-living teaching authority of the Church*, which in virtue of the divine promises can never fail in its mission. The fact of such continuity of teaching we have sufficiently descanted upon in other parts of this volume. Our present task is to show by proofs more or less direct that the Bible can not be the sole and self-sufficing rule of faith.

A few facts bearing on the origin of one part of the Bible will make this abundantly clear. "The Bible, the *whole* Bible, and nothing but the Bible," is a familiar Protestant formula. Now one considerable part of the Bible is the New Testament. Whence came the books of the New Testament? Did they not emanate from the apostles and their immediate disciples? If so, they were brought into being by the Church, of course, under God's direction and inspiration. They were an expression of the Church's mind. Their only guarantee of authority was derived from their connection with the Church.

When the Holy Ghost wished to make use of human instruments for the committing to writing of certain facts and truths belonging to the new revelation He chose them from among the accredited teachers of the Church. It was because those writers were so accredited that their writings were accepted as oracles of revelation. The whole of the New Testament is, therefore, the immediate production of the Church. Though inspired by God, its inspiration is vouched for through the Church. So far, then, from being independent of the Church, the writings of the New Testament are no less dependent on the Church than any other epistle or book is dependent on its writer; dependent, first, for its existence and afterward for its interpretation. No part of the New Testament can, therefore, be a rule of faith except in so far as the Church guarantees its interpretation.

Now, this being the case, and considering the vital connection between the Old and the New Testament, the same power of interpretation must extend to both parts of Holy Writ. The New Testament contains the fulfilment of the types and prophecies of the Old. The meaning of the Old is more precisely determined by the meaning of the New. Interpreting the one implies the power to interpret the other. The Church, therefore, which is the immediate author, and consequently interpreter, of the New Testament, must be equally the interpreter of the Old. Nor could it be otherwise in the case of a Church which was constituted the "pillar and ground" of truth, a Church which once heard the promise, "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come He will teach you all truth."

The appointed guardian of all revealed truth, the Church must find it within her competence to decide what is and what is not revealed truth, and in what sense it is revealed truth, be it written or unwritten. Hence every part of the written record of divine revelation must be subject to her interpretation. The Bible as an inspired volume proceeds only from God; as a depository of a rule of faith it must be interpreted by the Church. Therefore, taken by itself, it is not the sole and self-sufficing rule of faith. Besides the Bible and, in the sense just explained, superior to the Bible, is the living and abiding authority of a divinely established Church.

And this brings us to tradition, which, in its active sense, is nothing else than the continuous and uninterrupted exercise of the teaching authority in successive ages. Tradition as thus described differs exceedingly from ordinary forms of tradition, which furnish so small a guarantee of historic truth. In the first place, it is preserved from error by a special providence. The promises given by Christ to His Church have been fulfilled and the Paraclete has in very truth abided with her (John xiv. 16). In the second place, every human means has been employed to preserve the tradition inviolate. No doctrinal decree is issued without a safe anchorage in the past, and each age bears witness to the faith of the age preceding it. Finally, the continuity of the episcopate, especially as preserved by communion with the See of Peter, has kept intact the identity of the tradition, just as the continuous life of the soul preserves the unity and identity of the human body.

The necessity of such tradition and authority is obvious when we consider that the New Testament, though all true, does not contain all the truth. Things were revealed by God or lawfully established by the Church of which the Scriptures make no mention, one notable example being the transfer of the Sabbath from the last to the first day of the week. Where is the Scripture warrant for this or for other changes, to which even the Protestant Leibnitz calls attention, as for instance, "the permission of 'blood and things strangled,' the canon of the sacred books, the abrogation of immersion in Baptism, and the impediments of Matrimony,"—"some of which," adds Leibnitz, "Protestants themselves securely follow, solely on the authority of the Church, which they despise in other things?"

And why *should* the Scriptures be supposed to contain the whole of revelation? Is not this also a Protestant assumption, accepted blindly and never inquired into? Does the Bible itself tell us that it contains *all* that Christ taught? Surely not; and yet the Bible is the Protestant's rule of faith. More than this, it is antecedently improbable that the Bible contains the whole of Christian doctrine. If it did, the New Testament would be the part of the Bible in which that doctrine would be found in its entirety; and yet the circumstances of the origin of the New Testament forbid us to think that it either was or was intended to be the sole depository of all that Christ came to teach.

Consider for a moment how the books of the New Testament came into existence. The apostles, to begin with, taught by word of mouth. This was their normal way of spreading the Gospel. Nevertheless, they found it useful in the course of time to compose, or have others compose, brief histories of Our Lord's life on earth. These have survived in the books of the four evangelists. Occasionally, after the Faith had been preached in any city—Ephesus, for instance, Corinth, Rome—and the apostle who had preached it had taken his departure, he would address an epistle to his spiritual children of that place; it might be to confirm them in the Faith or to correct an abuse. And after the Faith had spread to the ends of the earth, Luke, a physician, a disciple of St. Paul, wrote the first history of the Church—"The Acts of the Apostles." And when John had had his wonderful vision he told the faithful all he had seen, in his "Book of the Revelation," or the "Apoca-

lypse." At a later period all these writings were collected into a single volume. The New Testament, then, is composed of documents written *as occasion required or according as it seemed opportune*. Such was the origin even of the four Gospels, which were written at different times, by different persons, each with its own individual character and relating incidents not related in the others; each, possibly, written for a special object, for certainly St. John's gospel was written for the special purpose of demonstrating the divinity of Christ.

Now, in all this, is there any suggestion of completeness? Is it not likely that some teachings of the apostles would not find a place in any such mass of occasional documents? The occasion not requiring it, the doctrine would not be committed to writing. Where is there any proof, or suggestion, or intimation, that a number of fragments, appearing at different times, would, if put together, form a complete and independent exhibit of Christian truth, and such as would make it quite unnecessary to have recourse to the teaching of the Church, such indeed as would reduce the Church to a position of utter subordination in respect to the books of the New Testament?

God could, indeed, have intended that the fragments, when put together, should form a mosaic in which nothing was wanting to complete the picture of Christian revelation; but the question at issue is not whether He *could* have so intended, but whether He *did*. The burden of proof lies with those who assert that He did.

The Protestant mind is so deeply imbued with the idea of a Book, containing all that is necessary to be known, a Book in which all must read and out of which all must get what meaning they can, and, on the other hand, it has lost so completely the notion of a Church divinely empowered to interpret the sacred books, that writers like ourselves might well despair of success in pleading the cause of plain logic and common sense did we not know that at least by the grace of God, if not solely by human persuasion, many have been led to see the fundamental error of the Protestant position.

A no less forcible argument than the preceding one lies in the fact that the very *genuineness* of the books composing the Bible needs to be vouched for by the authority of the Church, and therefore by tradition. The writings com-

posing the New Testament are not the only writings of apostolic times which were in circulation among Christians or which laid some claim to authorization. There were other gospels besides the four; as, for instance, the gospel of the Hebrews and the gospel of St. Matthias. They were numerous enough to be counted by the dozen. These are known to-day as the apocryphal gospels. Whatever amount of truth they contain, they have been from the earliest centuries excluded from the list of inspired writings. But *by whom* or *by what* were they so excluded? By the only authority competent to deal with them—that of the Church. It was the Church that fixed what is called the Canon of Scripture; that is to say, which separated the inspired books from the uninspired. It is the constant maintenance of the true Canon of Scripture—and this is tradition—that has handed down to the present generation the pure and unadulterated word of God. Consequently if our Protestant friends possess to-day a Bible which is in any degree genuine *they owe it to Catholic tradition.*

The need of authority and tradition in determining the rule of faith and worship is forcibly illustrated by the arbitrary way in which Protestants, from the beginning, have appealed to the Old Testament in matters of the first moment. Every Christian knows that a vast change was inaugurated by the coming and teaching of Christ. Old ordinances were abrogated and new ones introduced. The details of this great change were announced either by Our Lord Himself or by His Church enjoying plenitude of power. That such high authorization was needed was the conviction of all Christendom before the advent of Protestantism.

Where Scripture was silent or not sufficiently explicit on the subject of the great changes it was understood that either the word of Christ or the word of the Church was alone decisive. What, then, are we to think of the conduct of sectarians, appearing at a late age in the history of the Church and presuming to settle on the basis of the Old Testament questions which had been settled centuries before; as when Luther, for instance, to justify his official authorization of Philip of Hesse's taking of a second wife during the lifetime of the first, enunciated the principle that what could be done under the Law of Moses could be done under the law of Christ? What are we to think of

the inconsistency, and consequently of the arbitrary and independent conduct, of sectarians in our age who in the case of marriage impediments choose to follow the Church in some matters where Scripture is silent, thus acknowledging the Church's authority, whilst in others they appeal to the Law of Deuteronomy? Has God left the determining of these matters to the caprice of individuals?

The ultimate rule of faith is, therefore, not the Bible, but the authority of the Church. The Bible is the word of God, but it needs to be interpreted by the traditional teaching of the Church.

BLESSED VIRGIN, THE

Objections.—To a non-Catholic, devotion to the Virgin Mary seems to be given a very undue prominence in Catholic worship: witness the feasts of Mary and the frequent devotions to Mary. Besides, there is little or nothing to distinguish this homage from a real worship of one of God's creatures.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic Church as seen from the outside does, perhaps very naturally, present to non-Catholics what seem to be objectionable features, such as the one complained of above, but *not always after careful and honest inquiry*. The Catholic religion—to borrow a comparison from Cardinal Wiseman, which we have used elsewhere—sometimes produces on outside observers the effect which a stained-glass window produces on a passer-by on the street in the daytime. The forms represented on the window are distorted and the picture is unintelligible; and in the same manner the forms and proportions of things within the Catholic Church produce a false impression on those who see things from without. Within the fold of the Church the impression is altogether different, as innumerable converts can testify.

The truth is that devotion to Mary, however prominent in the services of the Church, plays *an essentially subordinate part* in the entire system of Catholic devotion; and, what is more to the purpose, it is *an essentially different thing from the worship paid to God*. God, as being the

supreme Lord of the universe, is adored; Mary is only *venerated*—not adored or worshiped—as the Mother of the Son of God made man. Mary is prayed to, but only as the most powerful intercessor before the throne of God. Between the worship of God and the veneration of Mary there is a gulf as wide as the one between God and His creatures—between the Infinite and the finite.

And yet God Himself has deigned to associate Mary so intimately with Himself in the work of the Redemption that no Christian can realize what is told us in the Gospels without giving a prominence in his thoughts to the human instrument employed by the Almighty for the accomplishment of His designs. Think of the essential dignity of the Mother of the Incarnate Word. Think of the praises lavished upon her by the inspired voices of angels and men. “Hail, full of grace,” or, if you will, “Hail, thou who art so highly favored”—“The Lord is with thee; blessed art thou among women;” these are the words of the Angel Gabriel, who added: “The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. And therefore also the Holy One that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God” (Luke i. 28-35).—“And it came to pass that when Elizabeth heard the salutation of Mary the infant leaped in her womb. And Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Ghost. And she cried out with a loud voice and said: Blessed art thou among women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. And whence is this to me that the Mother of my Lord should come to me?” (Luke i. 41-43).—“And Mary said: My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour; because He hath regarded the lowliness of His handmaid; for, behold, from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed” (*Ibid.* 46-48). Such is the greatness of Mary as reflected in the narrative of the inspired writer. *When angels and saints unite in sounding the praises of Mary, the Church of God cannot be silent.*

The recognition of her dignity and of her personal merits was one of the most prominent features of the devotion of the early Church. The Roman Catacombs, in which the first Christians took refuge from the violence of their persecutors, exhibit even to-day unmistakable evidence of early devotion to the Blessed Virgin. Visitors to the Catacombs may see her represented on the walls of those underground

chambers just as she is represented in Catholic churches of our time. And that these pictures illustrate a devotion that was universal among the Christians of the first centuries is attested by the extant writings of the period. Open the works of the Fathers and testimonies multiply as you turn the pages. The writings of St. Irenaeus, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Ephrem (Syrus), St. Augustine, St. Jerome, St. Peter Chrysologus, St. Proclus, St. Basil of Seleucia, contain passages relating to Mary that are worded like any typical passages that may be taken from Catholic writings of our own day.

"Through her," says St. Proclus, "all women are blessed. . . . Eve is healed. . . . Mary is venerated as becomes the Mother, the handmaid, the cloud, the bridechamber, the Ark of the Lord. . . . Therefore, we say, Blessed art thou amongst women, who alone hast found a remedy for Eve's sorrow, hast alone wiped away the tears of that mourner, hast carried the price of the world's redemption, hast received the treasure of the pearl in trust."

And St. Ambrose: "Let the virginity and life of the Blessed Mary be drawn before you as in a picture, from whom as if in a mirror is reflected the face of Chastity and Virtue's figure. . . . In learning, the prime stimulus is to be found in the nobleness of the teacher; now what has more nobleness than God's Mother?"

Not only praise and veneration were bestowed on Mary by the Fathers; they also invoked her intercession. One among several instances is found in the Sacramentary of Pope Gelasius: "We beseech Thee, O Almighty God, that the glorious intercession of the blessed and ever-glorious Virgin Mary, Mother of God, may protect us and bring us to eternal life."

This was the doctrine and practice of an age which our separated brethren generally regard as an age of pure worship.

The Blessed Virgin is honored as the most highly favored of God's creatures, but only as such. She is prayed to only as one who can pray for us. This, which is the genuine Catholic doctrine, is taught in all our children's catechisms. If in Catholic devotions there occur any expressions that seem to non-Catholics to attribute to Mary anything more than intercessory power, these expressions are very rare and are never intended to mean more than that she obtains

from God everything she asks. Catholics do not ordinarily pray as though they were conscious of the presence of hostile critics, but they have no doubt about the meaning of their own words. Some of our popular treatises on the Blessed Virgin are no less unpalatable to Protestant tastes; and naturally so, for Protestants do not realize as Catholics do the unspeakable dignity of one who was made the Mother of the Word Incarnate; nor do they appreciate as Catholics do what it is to have so great a friend at court as the Mother of the glorified Jesus. Though at the same time it should be borne in mind that in all devotions apart from the direct worship of God even Catholics have their personal tastes. While they all agree that God's saints should be honored, they have their personal attractions and repugnances as regards particular ways of honoring them and praying to them.

OBJECTION.—Devotion to the Blessed Virgin may be reasonable enough when practised in moderation, but in Catholic practice it obtrudes itself everywhere. The more devotion to Mary the less devotion to her Son.

ANSWER.—Again our objector sees the stained-glass windows from the wrong side. He may have dropped into a Catholic church in the evening and heard the sodality singing the Litany of the Blessed Virgin or the preacher decanting on one of her virtues (a most Christian act); but let him get up in the morning earlier than usual and betake himself to the nearest parish church, any day in the week. There he will find a number of silent worshipers absorbed in something that is taking place at the altar. At the ringing of a little bell the silence is solemn and all heads are bowed in adoration. Some minutes later a number of persons approach the altar-rail to receive the Bread of Heaven. Here is the central act of Catholic worship, in comparison with which all things else are insignificant, or rather, it is through this that all things else have any value. The week-day scene just described is repeated on Sunday, only with more solemnity. On that day the churches are thronged, and are filled again and again in successive hours, whilst the churches of other denominations are often half empty. Evidently devotion to the Blessed Virgin does not draw us away from Christ.

Strange, that the very Church that is accused of worshipping the creature instead of the Creator should be dis-

tinguished among all the churches for its adherence to the central doctrine of Christianity, the divinity of Christ. In an age when Protestantism is losing its grasp of that truth—if not in its formularies at least in the sincere belief of many Protestants, including ministers—the Catholic Church not only believes it and teaches it with uncompromising fidelity, but gives the most solemn expression to its belief in its public worship. What can compare with the external splendor or the intensity of personal devotion associated with the great feasts commemorating the mysteries of Our Lord's life; His Birth, His Passion, His Resurrection? Holy Week has a meaning in the Catholic Church; it has little or no meaning elsewhere. Evidently, again, devotion to the Blessed Virgin does not draw us away from Christ.

But its effect in this regard is not merely negative: *it positively draws us nearer to Christ*. The feasts of the Blessed Virgin mark a general increase of fervor. The faithful are present at the holy sacrifice of the Mass, and very many receive Communion after confessing their sins with humble and sincere contrition. Innumerable converts to the Church, who now see the Church from within, know from experience that true and sincere worship of God is promoted by devotion to the Mother of the Incarnate Son of God.

BOYCOTTS

See "Labor Unions."

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT COUNTRIES*

The Charge.—The leading countries of the world to-day are Protestant. Great Britain, Germany, and the United States are the foremost nations in point of political power, commerce and

*It may be well to remind the reader that this article, as well as all the others, was written before the outbreak of the Great War, an event which has set many things in a new light; but the only effect it can have upon the article is to place additional emphasis upon one of the important lessons which the author has sought to convey.

industry, and general enlightenment; whilst Catholic countries, such as Spain, Italy, and Ireland, are very unprogressive, and France is apparently on the decline.

THE REPLY.—The above indictment of Catholic countries is *misleading as a statement of facts* and is *false in the inferences* lurking in it. But before coming to close quarters with it let us glance at the spirit as well as at the logical bearings of the anti-Catholic contention in the matter.

In the first place, is it a commendable thing to be insisting so much on temporal prosperity as a test of the merits of a religion? The great test of any religion must be found in its spiritual elements. And, after all, is not the Protestant argument one that could be turned to good account, in their own favor, by the Jews? The children of Abraham might plead in their own case that, although scattered over the face of the earth and without a country, they nevertheless bear with them a mark of divine favor in the possession of the good things of this life. The Israelites had indeed the promise of temporal prosperity as regards a good deal more than the possession of gold, a promise whose fulfillment depended on their fidelity to God; but for us Gentiles, is there any law that infallibly points to temporal well-being as a sign of spiritual well-being and divine approbation?

Think of the strange inferences that might be based upon such a principle. Pagan Japan has recently stepped into the front rank of nations: does that fact make Shintoism, or Buddhism, or Confucianism, any better than it was ten years ago? Does Russia's colossal power argue that what Protestants are pleased to call Russian superstition bears the seal of divine approval?

In the second place, if the anti-Catholic argument is valid to-day, it must have been valid long before to-day. Well, then, let us go back a couple of centuries. At that period the dominant nations were Spain, Austria, and France—Catholic countries, all three. Apply the Protestant principle to that situation and see how it works. And suppose the whirligig of time should bring about a similar situation in the future—what then? It really looks as though our separated brethren were taking advantage of

the fact that just at present the wheel of fortune has placed the Protestant nations at the top. But suppose it should be given a new turn—Protestant prosperity and Protestant arguments would have a great fall. The secret of the prosperity of the leading nations of to-day is not to be found in Protestantism; it must be sought elsewhere; but on that point we shall have a word to say presently.

We have been granting that the leading powers are Protestant, but the statement needs a qualification. In Germany considerably more than a third of the population is Catholic, and for many years the Catholic party has held the balance of power. If we turn to our own country we find that under the rule of the Federal Government there are some twenty-two or twenty-three million Catholics. Our Catholic ancestors played an important part in the making of our country and in the development of its resources. Their children to-day are forging ahead in all directions, and where they find a fair opening are proving to the world that their Catholicity is no bar to success in a worldly sense. As to France, all its greatness dates from its Catholic past, and it still remains the richest country *per capita* in the world. But after all, why confine our attention to the greater nations? Greater and less do not change the species. There is a group of smaller nations that may be studied no less profitably than the larger. Sweden is a Protestant nation and in the days of yore was one of the doughtiest champions of Protestantism. What is Sweden to-day? And what is its recent consort, Norway? Both countries are but ciphers in the great transactions of the modern world.

Protestant Sweden was on the way to imperial greatness when she fell into the hands of Charles XII. The chivalric follies of that monarch soon stripped the country of important possessions, drained the national treasury and sacrificed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Swedes. Internal dissensions and other causes gradually lopped off her dependencies and completed her ruin. We shall not be so ungenerous as to attribute the decline of Sweden to Protestantism, but we would ask for the same impartiality on the side of our critics in dealing with Catholic countries. Holland is a Protestant country in the sense in which Germany is, and Holland, we admit, is not by any means starving; but to what trifling dimensions its greatness is shrunk if the

Holland of to-day be compared with the Holland that was once on the point of becoming a world-power and ranking with Great Britain and France. Belgium is a Catholic country, and yet it may be pointed to as an object-lesson in general progressiveness. It is a bee-hive of industry, and on the whole is probably the most happy and prosperous country in the world. Its well-filled treasury, its thriving commerce, its social and economic institutions, models of their kind, are a pointed refutation of the oft-repeated charge that Catholicism unfits a nation to achieve temporal happiness and prosperity.

But the treatment of questions like the present one would be utterly superficial if we failed to get at the real causes of national prosperity. Now these are proved to consist, in the main, in purely natural advantages possessed by the nations that have prospered. Qualities of soil and climate, geographical position, and in our time the possession of native coal; these circumstances, together with the more exceptional ones of national temperament favoring progress, and the occasional guiding influence of great men, are the dominant factors producing what is called national greatness. It is easy to talk in a high strain of the progressive spirit generated by the "true Evangel"; and it may be a trifle unpoetical to have to descend from so high an altitude to the consideration of such practical realities as coal-beds; but it has the great advantage of bringing one nearer to the truth. To eschew such considerations is to act the part of a superficial philosopher.

England without her supply of native coal would to-day rank as a second or third rate power. On the continent it is the presence or the absence of such natural advantages that must account for the difference, not only between country and country, but also between parts of one and the same country. The visitor to Germany entering from the West lights first upon the Rhine Province, which nature has dowered with a rich vintage and fields of golden grain, whilst a plentiful supply of native coal ministers to commerce and manufactures. The Rhine Province is mainly Catholic. On the other hand, East Prussia, which is predominantly Protestant, is a comparative waste, and there the industries languish. A like comparison might be drawn between Catholic Bavaria and Protestant Saxony.

It must be noted, however, as regards the present domin-

ion of coal, that it is likely to be supplanted in no small degree by the utilization of the natural waterfall as a motive agent. Here is Italy's chance; and as a matter of fact Italy has begun to improve the advantages she possesses in the watercourses of the Apennines.

And what about Catholic Spain? Where Spain is not hated she is regarded with a mournful interest such as is always awakened by the sight of fallen greatness. Spain's great good fortune in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proved her bane in the end. Immense colonial interests and a large influx of the precious metals diverted her attention from those truer sources of wealth, agriculture and commerce. But there is nothing to lead us to think that if her interests had been in the guardianship of Protestants they would have fared better. Political folly entailing the loss of large possessions may be abundantly illustrated from the history of Sweden, Holland, and England.

As to Ireland, it is true, doubtless, that she is the least prosperous country in the world; but there is no need of pleading her cause, here or elsewhere. It has been successfully pleaded at the bar of civilization. One thing is constantly evidenced by Irishmen, and that is that wherever they find a field for the display of their native energy—as in the United States, Canada, and Australia—they show the world that centuries of ill usage have neither damped their spirit nor dulled their power of thought or action.

So it really does look as though our critics had been building up an argument against us on the basis of the merest accidents of political and economic history. But even though their argument were more logical, there is one fact that should weigh more than all others in the estimate formed of modern European nations; to wit, that the greatness of some of the leading countries of Europe is reared upon the unscrupulous statecraft of those who had in their hands the making of those nations in days gone by. We need but mention the names of Frederick II of Prussia, Catherine II of Russia, and the Man of Blood and Iron who was the creator of the present German Empire. Are the critics of Catholicism prepared to admit with these worthies that it matters not how a state is made provided it is made?

But the day will come when the nations will no longer

be classified as Catholic and Protestant and when the struggle will no longer be between different forms of Christian belief. Religion and Irreligion will then be the only contestants in the field; and in that day the one great bulwark of religion will be the Catholic and Apostolic (or Roman) Church; for in no other religious body is there such promise of vitality, engendered by unity, as that held out by the Church which is under the guidance of the successor of St. Peter.

CELIBACY

A Prejudice.—"Take from the Catholic Church the compulsory celibacy of its priests, and the universal sway of the Church is at an end." Celibacy is unbiblical and its effect on morality is dubious.—Tschackert.

THE TRUTH.—We admit without the slightest reservation that the celibacy of the clergy is of vital importance to the Catholic Church in the prosecution of its divine mission. None but an unmarried clergy could wield the influence or win the credit or authority needed for the successful guidance and government of the faithful of Christ. None but unmarried clergymen are fitted to go as missionaries to foreign lands and labor there for the conversion of souls. This statement is amply borne out by the history of non-Catholic missions. (See MARSHALL'S "Christian Missions.") The missionaries of Canada, the Far West, and South America have a unique place in history owing to their self-sacrificing devotion. *How changed their story would be if wives and offspring and domestic finances figured in its pages!*

Nay, even in Christian countries none but unmarried priests could risk their comfort, to say nothing of their lives, as Catholic priests do to-day in their ministrations to souls. Without her unmarried clergy the Catholic Church could never have accomplished all that she has in the course of centuries. The salutary influence of clergy upon people which is one of the fruits of celibacy may be styled universal dominion if our critics are minded to call it such; we shall not make that a *casus belli*.

The objector seems to regard the compulsory element

in celibacy as the secret of the Church's power; but in no absolute sense does the Church compel any of her children to be celibates. No one is under any obligation to enter the priesthood. To force one into the priesthood is forbidden by the laws of the Church. It is only after a voluntary reception of the higher orders that one is obliged to remain unmarried; and the obligation then imposed upon her clerics by the Church is justified and to a great extent necessitated by the nature of their clerical functions.

There are other professions in which the unmarried state is preferred as a condition of success. In the teaching profession, for instance, preference is given to unmarried women over those who have the cares of family life. Why should it be a reproach to the Church to require in candidates for the priesthood conditions that will make them more efficient priests? Add to this the fact that the young men who present themselves for orders not only voluntarily but cheerfully make this sacrifice of their liberty in order to devote themselves the more to God and the Church.

But we are told that celibacy is contrary to the teaching of the Bible. Strange that the statement should be made by any one who has read the Bible. Is it not well known that Christ gave the highest praise to voluntary celibacy when it was chosen for the sake of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. xix. 12), and that St. Paul places voluntary virginity far above the married state? When Protestant readers of the New Testament come to the seventh chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians they would do well to pause awhile and ask themselves whether they have ever understood the plain meaning of that chapter, which really seems to be very Catholic and very un-Protestant. Let them read that chapter as well as the nineteenth of St. Matthew, referred to above, and if then they can regard the effect of celibacy on morality as dubious, their opinion is clearly at variance with the words of Christ and His Apostle.

CEREMONIES IN PUBLIC WORSHIP

Erroneous View.—The public worship of the Catholic Church captivates the senses, but it savors little of adoration in spirit and in truth. (Tschackert.)

THE TRUTH.—The worship of the ancient Jewish religion captivated the senses, and yet it was instituted by God Himself. It was not simply and solely a matter of external ceremony. It was a worship in truth, though not as yet in the fulness of truth.

Christian worship was indeed intended to be an adoration in spirit and in truth; but it does not follow that it was not to have any external expression. Christ Himself practised outward worship in the ceremonies of the Pasch and in the institution of the Eucharist. It was He who instituted the sacraments of the Church, and the sacraments are outward rites as well as means of interior sanctification.

Outward ceremony must, of course, be animated by an interior spirit. Such is the teaching of the Catholic catechism. But interior worship is not enough, at least for mortals like ourselves, who possess both bodies and souls. Interior worship without the external expression would be imperfect. It would not be the worship of the *entire man*.

Protestants themselves are conscious of the deficiencies of their modes of public worship. They feel the need of *something to stimulate* their adoration in spirit and in truth. If outward forms disappear, the habit of inner worship is likely to evaporate. A man who never prays with his lips will soon forget to pray in his heart. Our being is so framed that we must lean for support upon outward acts if we would preserve what is interior.

The great Leibnitz, though a Protestant, was in perfect accord with the Catholic view in this matter—a fact which is evident in the following striking passages taken from his "System of Theology":

"I do not agree with those who, forgetful of human weakness, reject under pretence of the 'adoration in spirit and in truth' everything that strikes the senses and excites the imagination. For every one who seriously considers the nature of our mind as it exists in this body will easily admit

that, although we can form within the mind ideas of things which are outside the sphere of sense, yet we are unable, notwithstanding, to fix our thoughts upon them and to dwell on them with attention, unless there be superadded to the internal idea certain sensible signs, such as words, characters, representations, likenesses, examples, associations, or effects."—"Whatever leads the mind most effectually to the consideration of God's greatness and goodness, whatever excites our attention, reproduces pious thoughts, nay, whatever renders devotion sweet and grateful, all this is deserving of approval."—"I am of opinion that God does not disregard as unworthy of His service, the use of musical instruments, nor vocal harmony, nor beautiful hymns, nor sacred eloquence, nor lights, nor incense, nor precious vestments, jewelled vases, or other offerings; nor statues or graven images of pious objects; nor the laws of architecture and perspective, nor public processions, the chiming of bells, the strewing the streets with carpets, and the other expedients which the overflowing piety of the people has devised for the divine honor, and which certain people, in their morose simplicity, despise."—London Ed., 1850, p. 48-50.

Those who hold the Protestant view seem to regard the gorgeous ceremonial of the Catholic Church as something purely adventitious, or as something merely laid on from without, as flowers and festoons are used to decorate a banquet-hall. The truth is that *Catholic ceremonial springs from the very heart of interior Catholic faith and worship*. It is a thing that grows from within and unfolds itself to outward view as a matter of necessity. Granted a Catholic's firm belief in the real presence of Christ the Son of God under the sacramental species; granted a belief that He is our continual Guest and holds His court invisible within the sanctuary of His temple; what is more natural than to surround His presence with the pomp and magnificence which ordinarily accompany the great ones of the earth? It is not simply a question of Catholic devotion arraying itself in gorgeous apparel. It is much more a question of its showing its own interior spirit in the most natural and expressive manner. It is thus that Catholic ceremony, because *vitally* connected with true interior devotion, is not a hindrance to true devotion, but rather fur-

nishes a natural outlet for it, at the same time that it reacts upon it and intensifies it.

We may remark in conclusion that the use made of the phrase "adoration in spirit and in truth" is a fair sample of the purely mechanical application of texts of Scripture introduced by the Reformation. The expression was used by Our Lord in His conversation with the woman at the well. (John iv). He tells her that the time is at hand when there shall no longer be any question whether Jerusalem or Samaria is the true place of worship, but when God shall be honored by a worship having its origin in the illumination of the Spirit and in the fulness of the truth about to be revealed. There is not the smallest intimation of Our Lord's disapproval of the ceremonies of divine worship.

CHANCE

A Thoughtless Assertion.—The world owes its existence to chance.

THE TRUTH.—The world does not owe its existence to chance, for, absolutely speaking, nothing is due to chance. One of the earliest principles taught us is that nothing either is or takes place without a sufficient reason. This is so clear that no reflecting man will deny it. One of the commonest questions asked by children and grown persons alike is, How do you account for this? or, Who made that? And yet full-grown men and women are heard to say that the world was made by chance.

The only real significance the phrase can have is that the causes of some things are unknown. "Made by chance" is a convenient expression for those who reject creation or who deny the existence of God. As there was no God to create the world and as the world could not have produced itself, it must have been produced—by what? By chance, of course. But what is chance? It is . . . !

And yet the word "chance" has a meaning. If two friends should meet quite accidentally on the street, their meeting would be attributed to chance. The word would then be used in a *relative* sense, the only sense it can really have. There was no reason why the two friends should have met, *so far as any previous intention was concerned.*

Hence, relatively to the intention, or simply in a relative sense of the word, the meeting was the result of chance. There is no cause to which it can be attributed so far as intention was concerned; hence the term has a negative and exclusive force and indicates no positive agent of any kind. But if one cause of the meeting of the friends is excluded, the existence of other causes is not denied. So far as other causes were concerned the meeting was not accidental, but the necessary result of deliberate acts of volition. The one friend had resolved to go to a certain place—that was one act of volition. The other friend had resolved to go in the same direction—second act of volition. There were two positive causes operating toward the production of the one result.

In no absolute sense, therefore, can anything be said to be produced by chance. There is always some positive cause to which its production must be referred. For what regards the positive cause of the world's existence we must refer the reader to the article entitled "God's Existence."

"CHRISTIAN SCIENCE"

The New Religion.—"Christian Science is based on teachings of Scripture which it interprets, giving the Christ principle in divine metaphysics which heals the sick and sinner. It explains all cause and effect as mental, and shows the scientific relation of man to God."—Mrs. Eddy's "Science and Health."

THE TRUTH ABOUT IT.—What is called "Christian Science" is in reality neither Christian nor scientific. The adoption of the name is indeed a tribute to two great factors of modern civilization and an acknowledgment of their power, but is nevertheless an affront offered both to Science and to Christianity.

"Christian Science" is a form of worship and a system of healing founded by Mrs. Mary Baker Glover Eddy. Mary Baker, known latterly as Mrs. Eddy, was born at Bow, near Concord, N. H., in 1821. She was clever as a child, but she received little instruction within the walls of the class-room; never, in fact, getting beyond the three R's. She gravely but naively tells us, however, that a brother

of hers, a student at Dartmouth, taught her a great deal of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, and that at the age of ten natural philosophy, logic, and ethics were her favorite studies. Her progress in these more abstract branches must have come to a halt early in her career. Logic, certainly, was not her forte in later years.

Though a farmer's daughter and living in a house in which every one else worked, she was permitted to grow up in idleness; but this was partly due to her physical ailments. An exceedingly sensitive nervous system showed itself in frequent fits of hysteria; and even in the intervals between her hysterical fits she was troubled with a morbid restlessness, which could only be appeased by some form of bodily motion, as walking or rocking. As late as her married life she had to be rocked in a huge cradle made for her special accommodation.

But apart from her physical ills there was always about her an air of superiority that secured her the privilege of playing the lady. She was possessed of an extraordinary amount of quiet self-assertion and a certain masterfulness of will which stuck to her throughout her life, carrying her through all manner of vicissitudes, through the experience of three marriages and one divorce, and through a host of difficulties incident to the propagation of her new system, till finally, before her demise, it landed her safely on the Olympus which is the abode of the venerated founders and foundresses of new religions.

At the period of Mary Baker's youth New England was the great rallying-place of most of the strange *isms* that have lighted on this orb of ours. Mesmerism and Spiritism were particularly rampant. Mary Baker went with the current, dabbling in Mesmerism and practising Spiritism and clairvoyance as an amateur. The great turning-point of her life was her visit as a patient to Dr. Phineas Parkhurst Quimby, at Portland, Maine. Quimby was "Doctor" only by courtesy, for he had received no medical training. The son of a blacksmith at Lebanon, N. H., and a clock-maker by profession, he is nevertheless described as an original thinker and a questioner of received opinions—in fact, something of a village philosopher.

Quimby was caught by the prevalent mesmeric fever and practised Mesmerism and mind-reading in connection with healing. He finally got an inspiration. He discovered, or

thought he discovered, that the secret of his cures lay, not in Mesmerism, but in the implanting in the minds of his patients a belief in their future recovery. He was at last convinced that no disease has any real existence except in the mind, and that, therefore, the most direct and effectual means of curing diseases of all sorts would be to operate exclusively on the mind. So, henceforth, it was physic and Mesmerism to the dogs!

Dr. Quimby's method of healing was apparently a species of suggestion, in its present technical sense. It was a purely natural means of restoring health in the case of certain diseases. Any gentle and unobtrusive means of getting the patient into the right frame of mind was employed. The healer would first gain the confidence of the sufferer and would use some insinuating method of producing in his mind the proper state of "receptivity." Then by repeating a word or a sentence several times, or by a look or an attitude, or even by a spell of silence, he would gradually influence the patient's thoughts so as to bring them into perfect unison with his own; and the disease disappeared with the thought of it and the belief in it.

Besides the practical part of his system there was a set of abstract doctrines that gradually developed in Quimby's mind. These, with the aid of his friends, he managed to set forth in a series of essays, which he sometimes communicated to his patients. Mingled with his practical precepts were a number of very Quimbyish conceptions of Christian truths; and these, according to one of Mrs. Eddy's biographers, were much the same in substance as Mrs. Eddy's theorizings in later years. The terminology, we are also assured by the same authority, was often identical with that used afterward by the foundress, and Quimby in one or two places even called his system "Christian Science."

Attracted by the Doctor's reputation, Mary Baker, who by that time had become Mrs. Patterson, came to Portland in 1862. After a course of "scientific" treatment she was partially cured. She felt she had a new lease of life, and was loud in her praise of the great physician. She remained a while in Portland and had access to Quimby's papers. Was it from Quimby that she learned the theory and practice of "Christian Science"? That is a question upon which we shall not enter. At a later period she cer-

tainly repudiated all indebtedness to Quimby and claimed that the system she taught originated with herself. Whether she was justified in so doing is a question on which others have taken sides, but which does not concern us here.

It is needless to follow Mrs. Eddy through her checkered career after her dealings with Dr. Quimby. Suffice it to say that during a long struggle for existence she clung to her healing system and gradually succeeded in gaining many adherents to it, chiefly among Spiritualists. Meanwhile the new religion was taking shape in her mind—a religion that was to be the basis and the interpretation of the new method of curing. In this new religious system every distinctive doctrine of Christianity is set aside; the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Creation, the Fall of Man, the idea of sin in general, the Redemption, and the Last Judgment. And yet the foundress professes to base it on the Gospels. Taxed with inconsistency, she would tell you that Christian Science is indeed opposed to the literal meaning of the Gospels, but that there is a hidden or esoteric meaning known to Christ and a chosen few! It is the old Gnostic vagary over again.

According to this *new* revelation there is no such thing as either disease or *six*. Disease is but an error of the mind, of "mortal mind" as distinguished from the "Divine Mind," or the "Divine Principle." Mind is the only reality; matter has no being; our bodies are only phantasms of the imagination. It is fear that produces disease, or seems to produce it, for it has no reality. It is fear that produces colics and fevers. It is belief in the possibility of broken bones that actually breaks them, or seems to break them, for in reality there are no bones to be broken. There is no such thing as sin, for we and God are one; or, better, man is the thought of God. But enough of this. No sensible man can read such a farrago without making an apology to himself for doing so.

It may seem surprising that the *deliramenta* of this misguided woman should have made conquest of so many minds; but no one who reflects on what has been occurring here in America these sixty or seventy years past can be surprised at the success of any religious movement, no matter how strange its antics. A country that has seen the rise of Mormons, Spiritists, Theosophists, Economites, Sun Worshipers, Dowieites, Ángel Dancers, and Holy Ghost and

Us societies, will not be surprised at the reception given to the extravagances of "Christian Science." There is a certain amount of vague religiosity pervading American society which is ready to be caught up by any chance wind of doctrine.

But, after all, it is hardly likely that "Christian Science" has been adopted by so many for the sake of its abstract teachings. It is not Mrs. Eddy's crotchets on the subject of life, death, and immortality that have attracted the multitude. It is the other phase of the system that draws—the healing phase. Its theological setting adds to it the dignity and the sanction of a religious cult; but we can easily imagine what small notice would be taken of Mrs. Eddy's theological dreams if they were not associated with the wonderful, or the seemingly wonderful, in another sphere. This much-needed element of the system is supplied by the cure of disease.

What are we to think of the cures attributed to "Christian Science"?

We must make a distinction: 1. Some of them are, or may easily be, genuine. 2. Others are complete and acknowledged failures. 3. In the case of numberless forms of diseases not even an attempt is made to apply the remedies of "Christian Science."

As regards the first of these categories, it is not by any means a matter of surprise that "Christian Scientists" should work a certain number of cures. There are diseases which are most effectually healed by the methods of the new religionists (we mean, of course, the methods minus the admixture of trumpety theology); but then the methods are not new; they are known to specialists of the medical profession who are certainly innocent of "Christian Science." There was no need of Mrs. Eddy's producing a travesty of Christianity to prove that there are diseases of the body that have their root in the mind, and that the best way of curing such diseases is by influencing the thoughts and feelings of the sufferers. It is this conviction that guides the specialist in his treatment of certain nervous disorders. As regards the more special features (if there are such) of "Christian Science" treatment, they do not seem to be essentially different from the various forms of suggestion employed by proficient in psychophysics.

Now if Mrs. Eddy has brought into more general notice a method of healing which is genuine and has taught others how to use it successfully, she has rendered a service to humanity; but beyond that point she ceases to be a public benefactress. When in connection with her cures she practically (we shall not say culpably) foisted upon the unthinking and the credulous a nonsensical set of religious beliefs, she proved herself anything but a benefactress. But this is not all. Many of the attempts at healing made by her followers have egregiously failed, and in many cases the failure has involved the sacrifice of human life. The ordinary means of saving life have been deliberately neglected; and yet it is one of the plainest dictates of common sense and of ordinary charity that when any such methods of healing as those of "Christian Science" are seen to fail the ordinary methods should be resorted to. Accordingly, society has justly regarded such transactions as criminal.

There is one large class of human ailments which "Christian Science" can do absolutely nothing with. Bruises, sprains, abscesses, cancers, fractured or amputated limbs, are quite beyond the range of Mrs. Eddy's therapeutics. And yet they, too, are supposed to be diseases—or errors—of mortal mind. Why can not the errors be eradicated? Mrs. Eddy would answer that it is because our faith in the Divine Principle is imperfect—we can not entirely rid ourselves of the perverse impression that we have broken an arm or a leg, and hence the apparent fracture remains.

But let us remind her of a very notable contrast. She has presumed to associate her name in a special manner with that of the Divine Saviour of the world; but how did it come to pass that Christ was a more perfect healer than Mrs. Eddy? There was no form of disease which He did not cure instantaneously. Lepers, lifelong cripples, men blind from their birth, were cured by the simple touch of His hand, often by a sole word of command. Even the dead rose from their graves at His bidding. The seal of divine power was upon all His works. When God vouchsafes a revelation to the world He connects it with indubitable manifestations of supernatural power. Mrs. Eddy had a revelation to communicate to the world and she could appeal only to what was purely natural and human—to methods of curing which were not beyond the limits of

unaided human power and are plainly restricted in their range.

But a word to the wise is sufficient. We fear we have exceeded this measure in the case of "Christian Science."

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

A Modern Pronouncement.—One of the results of modern criticism is that Jesus of Nazareth no longer stands upon the lofty eminence on which His adorers had placed Him. He now takes rank only with those great men who approach nearest to the divine. In the light of modern criticism His miracles are shorn of their supernatural character. Neither His words nor His works prove Him to have been more than man.

THE CHRISTIAN DOGMA.—Jesus of Nazareth is as truly God as He is man. Amidst the vauntings of the pseudo-science of the age believers in the divinity of Christ should give heed to the warning of the Apostle, writing to the Colossians: "Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy, and vain deceit; according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ: For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally" (ii. 8, 9).

A special providence hovering over the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God has provided such an abundance of evidence in its favor that no one who studies the subject with any degree of thoroughness and without bias should fail to be convinced. The proofs of Christ's divinity advanced in this short essay are addressed directly and chiefly to those who believe in a God and a divine providence and who accept, as most contemporary critics do, the four Gospels as authentic narratives of facts. To the unbeliever we hope we shall at least have furnished matter for serious reflection.

Before setting about our main task we shall place before our readers a few preliminary observations with a view to arranging the perspective for those who may need to be shown things in their just proportions.

I.—JESUS OF NAZARETH AND MODERN THOUGHT

What proofs of Christ's divinity are likely to be the most effective in our age? We are convinced that no new ones are needed, as the old ones have lost nothing of their force. The one great source of arguments in favor of Christ's divinity is Christ's own life. It was the story of His life that convinced the world in the beginning, and the story of His life has lost nothing of its convincing power in the lapse of time.

But is no account to be taken of modern thought?

Much less than is sometimes supposed. So far as the question of Christ's divinity is concerned we fail to see any difference between the thought of the twentieth century and the thought of the first. The present century has its own methods of attack and defense, but its weapons are substantially the same as those of the first. If to-day there are materialists and phenomenologists and atheists and deists and agnostics and evolutionists and rationalists and spiritists and mystics, each and all of these types of thinkers were represented in the society of the early Christian centuries. They were to be found in the various schools of Epicureanism, Stoicism, or Neo-Platonism, or were connected with one or other of the systems classed as skeptical, mystical, or oriental. Our modern philosophies are the old philosophies revamped. They have run through one or more cycles of their existence and now seem destined to run through another, till again vanquished by the truth.

It was in an age so similar to ours that the doctrine of Christ's divinity first won the assent of a large part of the human race. The philosophers were not, it is true, the first to receive the light; but when they were attracted to it they grouped themselves into that magnificent galaxy of intellects which is one of the glories of the early Church. We need but mention a Justin, an Athenagoras, a Theophilus, a Tertullian, a Clement of Alexandria, an Arnobius, a Lactantius, an Augustine—converts, all of them, from the false philosophies of the age. Whoever is disposed to belittle the authority of such names as these has much to learn about the history of the human intellect. St. Augustine alone, in point of keenness and depth of philosophical insight, might be weighed against a score of intellectual worthies of the past century; and St. Augustine believed in the divinity of Christ.

But, it may be objected, are you not forgetting some of the intellectual features of the age—its advances in physical science, for instance?

No, we are not forgetting the progress made in physical science, but the bearing of physical science on the question of Christ's divinity is anything but manifest. Science has been cited as a witness against Christ's miracles and against miracles in general, but, as the reader may see from the article entitled "Miracles," the witness breaks down under a little cross-examination. As to Christ's miracles in particular we hope the skeptical reader will receive some enlightenment from the present discussion.

One fact must be patent to any one who is at all acquainted with modern thought; to wit, that after centuries of criticism the life of Jesus of Nazareth still remains the one great fact of history in the presence of which all others sink into comparative insignificance. A few representative quotations from eminent writers of the nineteenth century will amply bear out the assertion.

Goethe is quoted by Professor Harnack as saying: "Let intellectual and spiritual culture progress and the human mind expand as much as it will—beyond the grandeur and the moral elevation of Christianity, as it sparkles and shines in the Gospels [*i.e.*, in the life of Christ] the human mind will not advance."—"In these words," remarks Professor Harnack, "Goethe, after making many experiments and laboring indefatigably at himself, summed up the result to which his moral and historical insight had led him."—*What is Christianity?* p. 4.

Professor Harnack adds in his own name to Goethe's testimony: "The message brought [by Jesus Christ] was of the profoundest and most comprehensive character; it went to the very root of mankind, and, although set in the framework of the Jewish nation, it addressed itself to the whole of humanity—the message from God the Father. Defective it is not, and its real kernel may be readily freed from the inevitable husk of contemporary form. Antiquated it is not, and in life and strength it still triumphs to-day over all the past. He who delivered it has as yet yielded His place to no man, and to human life He still to-day gives a meaning and an aim—He *the Son of God*"—*Ibid.*, p. 130. The italics are Harnack's.

Renan thus apostrophizes Jesus of Nazareth: "A thou-

sand times more living, a thousand times more loved, since Thy death than during the days of Thy passage here below, Thou shalt so truly become the corner-stone of humanity that to blot Thy name out of this world would be to shake the world to its foundations. Between Thee and God men will no longer distinguish. Complete vanquisher of death, take possession of Thy kingdom, whither Thou shalt be followed, over the royal road which Thou hast traced, by generations of adorers."—*Vie de Jésus*, p. 297.

The closing passage of the same work runs thus: "Whatever unexpected events the future may have in store, Jesus will never be surpassed. His worship will renew its youth incessantly; His legend will never cease to draw tears; His sufferings will melt all better hearts; every generation will proclaim that amongst all the children of men none have been greater than Jesus."

It is difficult to realize that the writers of the above words were not believers in the Godhead of Jesus. Their utterances, nevertheless, though they can not be quoted as direct tributes to the divinity of Christ, have a controversial value to the believer in His divinity which can not be overrated. They testify to the sublimity of the moral character of the Saviour, and to the no less sublime mission with which He was entrusted by God.

Now such being the character and mission of Jesus of Nazareth, His own testimony regarding Himself is of the first importance. If He testifies to His own divinity and if, moreover, His testimony is confirmed by miracles, there is no resisting the conclusion that He was, in the extremest Catholic sense of the words, the Son of God.

II.—THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY TAUGHT BY HIMSELF

One who professes to be a messenger from God and is proved to be such by testimony from on high can not be the bearer of a false message. God is not a deceiver, either in Himself or in His messengers. Now God has so ordered events that we possess a superabundance of evidence that Jesus was such an accredited messenger from Heaven. But it is equally evident that a part of His message to mankind was the truth of His divinity. We shall prove, in the first place, that He was a Messenger from God—indeed no less than the Messiah expected by the Jews—and in the second place that He taught the doctrine of His divinity.

The facts upon which this demonstration will rest will be taken mostly from the Gospels, and the Gospels we assume to be authentic narratives. Our modern criticism has confessed its inability to get rid of the first three Gospels as genuine and authentic documents. The Gospel of St. John they call in question, although it has been acknowledged in the Church since the very earliest centuries. But let them discount or reason away the fourth Gospel as much as they are inclined—there will be testimony enough and to spare for our purpose in the first three; and this will be abundantly confirmed by the witness of the other books of the New Testament.

HIS WORDS AND WORKS.—The public life of Our Lord, lasting three years, fairly teemed with miracles and prophecies. The sacred writers narrated them without any ceremony and as though they were a matter of course. It was arranged by Providence that Our Lord should appear on earth at a time when written records could be given a wide circulation, though indeed many of the sacred writings were published at a time when numerous witnesses of the miracles were still living. As regards the events themselves, nothing was done in a corner. The world flocked to see what any one might see at any hour of the day during three long years. Few persons have had the hardihood even to think that there did not appear in the world a man called Jesus of Nazareth whose life was an extraordinary tissue of wondrous deeds.

Attracted by His fame, let us follow the crowds that pour forth from the towns and villages, and see for ourselves what manner of man He is. We find we are as much taken by Himself as by His miracles. "A man of God," we say, "if ever there was one." Notwithstanding His extraordinary deeds He is meek and humble of heart. Far from being above the law, He observes it with scrupulous exactness. His words breathe a heavenly wisdom such as has never been heard in the synagogues. His whole bearing betokens a holiness of life without flaw or imperfection; a holiness nurtured from the interior and making no account of soulless forms.

His wisdom, His holiness, and His miracles combined send a thrill of admiration through the multitudes. "Blessed is the womb that bore Thee and the paps that gave Thee suck." Such is the cry of those whose hearts

are well disposed; but even His enemies are filled with astonishment at the wisdom of His words. "Never did man speak like to this man," is the answer which those who have been sent to seize Him and drag Him before the magistrates give to their masters.

But evidently He has been sent not only to edify and enlighten. He has a mission of a very special kind. He is sent to bring tidings of salvation, not only to His own people, but also to the Gentiles. There should be no reason for surprise if a messenger from God should appear at this time and in this country. The Jews are expecting their Messias, to whose coming prophecy after prophecy has taught them to look forward. Even the Samaritan woman gives expression to the general expectation: "I know that the Messias cometh . . . when He cometh He will tell us all things."

Indeed, the Lord frequently declares that He is the Messias. This He explicitly tells the Samaritan woman (John iv. 26). He says the same by implication to those who have been sent by the Baptist to learn whether He is the one who is to come: "Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, to the poor the Gospel is preached" (Luke vii. 22); meaning that the evidence is overwhelming that He has been sent from on high. Again, by applying the words of the Prophet Malachy to John, who He says is "more than a prophet," He declares him the forerunner of Himself as Messias: "Behold I send My angel before Thy face, who shall prepare Thy way before Thee" (Luke vii. 27).

To the direct and open confession of Peter, "Thou art the Christ [*i.e.*, the Messias], the Son of the living God," Jesus answers: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona; because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 16, 17). When the Jews gather about Him and urge Him to tell them plainly if He be the Messias, His answer is: "I speak to you and you believe not. The works that I do in the name of My Father, they give testimony of Me" (John x. 24, 25). At His last supper, just before His passion, He proclaims openly: "This is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent," —*i.e.*, Jesus the Messias, as "Christ" and "Messias" have the same meaning (John xvii. 3). When asked by the

high-priest, "Art Thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed God?" He answers and says to him, "I am" (Mark xiv. 61, 62).

How is it possible to make light of the assertions of a man of such transcendent wisdom and holiness? If His claim is not admitted the only possible ground for rejecting it is that whilst He was sincere He was deceived and under an illusion. But the victims of an illusion are sooner or later discovered to be such. Poor human nature can not hide its moral or intellectual distempers long. Mental distortion could not long be concealed in the case of one who professed to have a mission like that of Our Lord. He would surely do something extravagant or something disedifying. He would be found uttering prophecies which were not to be fulfilled. As likely as not he would exhibit pride of intellect, or even an independence of the law. But symptoms of illusion in the case of Jesus of Nazareth are almost unthinkable.

Still, it was to be expected that if He was sent by God, God would find a means of accrediting His mission in the minds of the people. And testimony from on high was by no means wanting. At His baptism in the Jordan a voice from heaven was heard, saying: "This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" (Matt. iii. 17). In like manner, at the Transfiguration, from out the cloud that overshadowed the three disciples were heard the words: "This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased: hear ye Him" (Matt. xvii. 5; 2 Peter i. 17).

But this divine confirmation of His authority was not the only ratification of His claim to being the Messiah. To this direct commendation of Him from above was added a display of miraculous powers of the most astounding kind—and to this He Himself appealed. Miracles almost flowed from His hands. Multitudes of the sick, including the palsied and the leprous, and of the blind, the deaf and the mute, cripples and paralytics, came to Him, or were carried to Him, and were cured in an instant. Not unfrequently they were cured at a distance—simply by His willing it. He even brought the dead back to life, as in the case of the son of the widow of Naim, and in that of His friend Lazarus, who had been dead four days and was already putrid.

He showed himself master of inanimate nature. He calmed the winds, walked upon the waters of a lake as

though He were walking on the hard ground, changed water into wine, multiplied five barley-loaves and two small fishes so as to be able to feed more than five thousand persons and leave twelve basketfuls of fragments after all were satisfied. He expelled devils from the bodies of the possessed; and the devils, as they fled from their victims, were forced to acknowledge His mission from on high. "And the devils went out of many, crying out and saying, Thou art the Son of God. And He, rebuking them, suffered them not to speak: for they knew that He was the Christ" (Luke iv. 41).

Miracles such as these were witnessed daily, hourly, during a period of three years. They were wrought in many cases in the presence of vast crowds and under every conceivable variety of circumstances. "And much people followed Him from Galilee, and from Decapolis, and from Jerusalem, and from Judea, and from beyond the Jordan."—"And His fame went throughout all Syria" (Matt. iv. 25, 24).

Akin to His strictly miraculous powers was His gift of prophecy, under which head we include His knowledge of the secrets of the heart and of things beyond the reach of His senses. To Nathanael, when he was brought to the Lord by Philip, He described the incidents preceding his coming, and showed such a knowledge of him without having seen him before that Nathanael at once gave utterance to a fervent act of faith. He foretold that Peter would find a coin, wherewith to pay the tribute, in the mouth of a fish which He bade him draw from the sea. He predicted the treason of Judas, of whose treachery no one else had the smallest suspicion, and the triple denial of Peter, who was the loudest in his profession of loyalty. Meeting a Samaritan woman at a well, He tells her, to her utter astonishment, the story of her sinful life.

He foretells that He will be delivered for condemnation and crucifixion to the heathen, that He will be mocked and scourged and finally crucified, but that on the third day after His burial He will rise from the dead. We shall see later how the prediction of His resurrection was fulfilled. He prophesied the descent of the Holy Ghost upon His apostles—a prophecy which was so wonderfully fulfilled on the day of Pentecost. The transference of the kingdom of God to the Gentiles, the preaching of the Gospel through-

out the world; the endurance of the Church under the fiercest persecution, a prophecy that has been verified during nineteen centuries; the circumstances of the destruction of Jerusalem and the total and permanent dispersion of the Jewish people—all these events were the object of clear and distinct prophecies.

None of these predictions could have been the result of mere human foresight. That a handful of Galilean fishermen were destined to make conquest of a world could never have entered into men's dreams. That an institution of such humble beginnings as the Church, wielding none but spiritual arms and preaching *a crucified God*, should win the allegiance of the great and the learned and the powerful of every age and country, could never have been foreseen save by one who was supernaturally and wonderfully inspired. As to the destruction of Jerusalem and the utter dispersion of the Jewish race, no mere shrewdness in reading the signs of the times could have enabled any one to present such a picture of desolation, particularly in its specific features, as Our Lord sketched in connection with these two events. The absolute dispersion of a vanquished people is an anomaly in history, as conquered nations have in all other cases been amalgamated with their conquerors.

Can there be any doubt in the mind of any reader of this book of the reality of these wonderful occurrences? Can there be any doubt of the trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives, which were published within the lifetime of very many witnesses of the public career of Our Lord? The first two Gospels were issued to the world before thousands of young men who had seen and heard the Lord had yet reached middle age. Had these first readers of Matthew and Mark seen in the Gospels an old legend which no one could verify and which might well be supposed to contain the accumulated fabrications of the ages, they would have paused—even the most credulous of them—before accepting stories which were almost one tissue of miraculous events. But many of these events they had witnessed themselves, and the rest they were not surprised to see narrated in script by those who professed to have witnessed them all.

The age could not have been imposed upon by a false account of events of such recent occurrence. As well might we suppose that the hundreds of thousands of persons to-

day who remember our Civil War would accept accounts of miraculous events accompanying the campaigns of Grant, or of Sherman, or of McClellan. Any historian of the war who should indulge in such fancies would be regarded as demented. But the writers of the Gospels feared no such reception for their narratives. Many of their readers had been witnesses of what was narrated; nay, many of them, doubtless, who had once been palsied, or crippled, or blind, had benefited by the exercise of His miraculous power. No one who realizes all this can have any doubt that the life of Jesus of Nazareth fairly teemed with miracles and that He wielded the powers of the universe with such sovereign mastery as to prove either that He was God or the One sent of God, the Expected of Nations.

It is with this latter alternative, that He was the Expected of Nations, the Messiah, that we are just here concerned; the more so as it was to His miracles that he principally appealed in declaring Himself the Messiah. The argument was irresistible. If such multiplied marks of divine approbation accompanied His asseveration that He was the Messiah, the conclusion was inevitable that He was in very truth the Messiah. For the Jews there was no loophole of escape from this conclusion except the theory that His miracles were performed by the aid of Beelzebub. But this objection He abundantly refuted. It was absurd, He told them, that Beelzebub should help Him to drive his own minions out of the bodies of the possessed. "If Satan . . . be divided against himself how shall his kingdom stand? . . . But if I by the finger of God cast out devils, doubtless the kingdom of God is come upon you" (Luke xi. 18, 20).

To any one, then, who believed in a God who would not lead His people into error, or allow them to be deceived by false signs of divine favor, the events which had happened could have but one meaning: the kingdom of God had indeed come upon them; Jesus was the Messiah; His word was the word of God; His teaching about Himself, whatever it might be, would be infallible. And we shall see that a prominent point of His teaching about Himself was that He was the eternal Son of God, equal to the Father—or, in other words, God made man.

But the greatest of Our Lord's miracles remains yet to be

considered; to wit, His Resurrection, a miracle to which He Himself appealed by anticipation. To those who had insincerely sought of Him a sign or miracle that should satisfy their skepticism He answered that no sign would be given them but that of Jonas, who after being buried three days in the body of a whale came forth alive. His reference was to His Resurrection. His death seeming to many to prove the falsity of His claims, His Resurrection was needed to reestablish His authority.

Here again Providence had arranged for a triumph over human incredulity. His sepulcher situated in a public place, the sealed stone rolled against the entrance, the strong guard placed about the tomb by Pilate, and the still stronger guard consisting of the host of Christ's relentless enemies—and then, on the day predicted, the empty tomb, with the grave-cloths laid carefully by and folded, thus indicating the improbability of a hasty and stealthy removal of His body by His friends, and finally the numerous circumstantial accounts of apparitions, some of them to single individuals, others to groups large and small, at intervals during no less than forty days, the various narratives being characterized by a sincerity which is so distinctive of the sacred writings of the chosen people and of their successors in the Faith, the early Christians—all these circumstances combined furnish a body of evidence from which no sincere skeptic, it should seem, can find an escape.

And yet some of our "higher critics," among other trivial objections to the Resurrection, are found to urge as a reason for rejecting the great truth the seeming impossibility of making out of the Gospel narratives a clear story in which every small detail shall be made to fit into its place and help to interpret the others. There is indeed some obscurity as regards the less important circumstances; but is that sufficient reason for rejecting the whole history, which is so clear and full and convincing as regards the main issue? In the case of every such series of events it is difficult to make the accounts of many independent witnesses agree in each small detail. In the case of our great Battle of Gettysburg, which was a three days' contest waged by two large armies over a wide extent of ground, we are not surprised at experiencing some difficulty in bringing into harmony the various printed accounts of the battle that

are now extant; and yet they all witness to a great battle fought at Gettysburg.

Let any one read, one after the other, the four Gospel accounts of the Resurrection and the events that followed it, and then ask himself: Can all this be fiction? *The invention of it would have been the next greatest wonder to the Resurrection itself.*

We have nothing to say here to the atheist or to the agnostic or to disbelievers in the supernatural generally. We must refer them to other articles in this little work, e.g., "God's Existence," "Agnosticism," "Miracles." We are appealing to those who believe that earth's happenings are under a Providence, which, we maintain, would never have permitted the drama in which Jesus of Nazareth was the principal figure to be enacted without its having the meaning which we and all other Christians ascribe to it. Neither are we concerned just here with certain recent attempts at explaining the miracles of Jesus as purely natural though extraordinary phenomena. We shall cast a glance at these at the close of the article.

To the honest skeptic we would say: Give a fair examination to the facts of the life of Jesus of Nazareth. Don't read disquisitions on the Gospels, but read the Gospels themselves, one after the other; and then, especially if you can make yourself acquainted with such parts of the Old Testament as will enable you to see the life of Jesus against its background of sacred history and prophecy, you will at least be convinced that there are some things in heaven and earth—pardon the expression—not dreamed of in your negative philosophy. And now let us hasten to the second part of our inquiry.

Did Jesus Himself teach the doctrine of His Godhead?

He not only taught it but inculcated it. The Gospels abound in utterances of His which were understood both by His friends and by His enemies as pointing to His divinity. There is not, it is true, any such explicit statement as, "I am the Lord God, the Maker of heaven and earth"; but His reasons for withholding so plain an assertion of the truth, though hidden in the divine counsels, are perhaps not entirely beyond the reach of human conjecture. Coming in the guise of a human teacher and speaking in human accents to human minds and hearts, He knew that His divinity must be made gradually to dawn upon those human

minds and to penetrate insensibly into well-disposed human hearts. He must first convince them of His mission from on high, and then of His sonship in respect to God; and finally He must imply in many different forms of expression His equality and identity with God. This gradual but effective process we may say without presumption was worthy of Him who was and is the wisdom of the Father. From the beginning He spoke as one having power. He was listened to as a teacher of transcendent authority. "Never did man speak like this man," was the testimony of his enemies. His words indeed fell upon the ears of the envious and narrow-minded scribes and Pharisees as good seed falls upon bad soil; but in the humble and the open-minded they produced a belief in the Saviour which finally culminated in the wholehearted declaration of St. Peter: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," and the even more explicit profession of faith of St. Thomas: "My Lord and my God."

We shall now quote a number of Our Lord's utterances bearing on His divinity. Any attempt to explain them except by the doctrine of the divinity will land us between the horns of a dilemma. For if Our Lord did not mean to teach the doctrine of His divinity He ran the greatest possible risk of leading the people into idolatry, for He said everything short of asserting, "I am God." But as it was impossible for one of His transcendent holiness to lead the people into idolatry, He must have meant what He seemed to imply by His words. Even such declarations as the following would have had a seductive effect if uttered by any one who was not divine: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John xiv. 6); "I am the vine, ye are the branches" (John xv. 5); "Without Me you can do nothing" (John xv. 5).

And yet these are not the strongest expressions bearing on the divinity. Let us reflect for a moment on the significance of the following: "The Son of man is Lord even of the sabbath" (Matt. xii. 18); "*What things soever* [the Father] doth, these the Son also doth in like manner" (John v. 19); "As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will" (John v. 21); "That all men may honor the Son as they honor the Father" (John v. 23). Let us endeavor to realize the effect of these words on the devoted followers of

Our Lord. Could they have thought Him less than God when He laid claim to the same honor as the Father? And if He was not God they were led into idolatry.

When the high-priest adjured Him by the living God to declare if He were "the Christ, the Son of God," His answer was, "Thou hast said it,"—a form of expression which was equivalent here to, "Yes, I am the Christ, the Son of God." And so His words were understood by the high-priest, who, rending his garments, exclaimed: "He hath blasphemed: what further need have we of witnesses?" (Matt. xxvi. 63-65). Why "blasphemed," unless He was supposed to have insulted God by an assumption of divinity? To have claimed the Messiahship alone would not have been deemed blasphemy; but to have called Himself the Son of God was enough to create a plausible ground for accusing Him of blasphemy. The accusation was the same as that made on so many other occasions, and on the same grounds: He had called God His Father, and thus made Himself equal to God (John v. 18; x. 30, 33; xix. 7). But He takes no pains to explain His words and give them a milder meaning than had been conveyed to His hearers. He abides by His assertion and suffers death in consequence. And yet He was speaking before the most sacred tribunal of His nation, which He respected as representing the authority of God Himself, and hence must have felt conscious of His obligation to correct any false interpretation of His words. We must, therefore, conclude that there was nothing to correct: He was in very truth the eternal Son of God and equal to the Father.

The conclusion we have drawn from the declaration made by Our Lord before the high-priest derives no little confirmation from a notable profession of faith made by St. Peter. The Lord had asked the disciples, "Whom do men say that the Son of man is?" And they answered Him: "Some John the Baptist, and other some Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the prophets. Jesus saith to them: But whom do you say that I am? Simon Peter answered and said: Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answering, said to him: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona; because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 13-17). It must be noted, in the first place, that the appellation "son of God" was, in accordance with Hebrew usage, often

given to persons specially favored by God and to the anointed kings of Israel; but in the above passage the definite article *the* must denote a special and exclusive relation between the Son and the Father. Then, too, the solemn scriptural phrase "the living God" seems to indicate the speaker's awful sense of the dignity of that sonship which he was ascribing to his Master. Hence we are not surprised at the solemnity with which the Master congratulates Peter: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona; because flesh and blood [*i.e.*, human wisdom or experience] hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven." Special enlightenment from on high was needed for the learning of so sublime a truth. To be the eternal Son of God was infinitely greater than to be the Messias. A knowledge of the latter dignity was open to those who witnessed His wondrous works, to which He Himself appealed when questioned by the messengers of the Baptist; but to know that He was the eternal Son of God was a favor due to special divine tuition.

Those who were the recipients of this favor were indeed to be congratulated on having understood the Scriptures, which to others were, in regard to this truth, a sealed book. For had not Isaiah foretold in words that were understood as relating to the Messias: "For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us, and the government is upon His shoulder: and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace"? (ix. 6).

But apart from these special events which we have been noticing, the extraordinary way in which He habitually spoke of His relations with His Father tended to create a belief in His divinity. His mode of speaking in this connection, if used by any one else, and in the ordinary intercourse of life, would imply that in the speaker's mind the term "Father" was understood in the strictest and most literal sense. And again, supposing He were the Messias without being God—great indeed, but still standing at an infinite distance from God. He would never have presumed to use such language in reference to Himself and God.

The quotations that follow prove, each and all, that the sonship of which Our Lord speaks is a natural one; but a

natural relationship with God necessarily implies an identity in nature with Him.

"*All things whatsoever* the Father hath are Mine" (John xvi. 15). "*What things soever* [the Father] doth, these the Son also doth in like manner" (John v. 19).

"I and the Father are one." "That you may know and believe that the Father is in Me and I in the Father" (John x. 30, 38).

"I speak that which I have seen with My Father" (John viii. 38).—"With" here means the same as *apud* in Latin, i.e., "in the company, or in the house, of." The significance of this particle cannot be overrated: it indicates an eternal abiding with the Father.

"All things are delivered to Me by My Father; and no one knoweth who the Son is, but the Father; and who the Father is, but the Son; and to whom the Son will reveal [Him]" (Luke x. 22).

"Did you not know," He said to His mother and His foster-father when they found Him with the doctors in the Temple, "that I must be about My Father's business?" (Luke ii. 49.)

The climax is reached in this species of testimony when Our Lord relates the parable of the wicked husbandmen. It is given in the three synoptic Gospels (Luke xx.; Mark xii.; Matt. xxi.). When the master of the vineyard had sent one servant after another to receive the fruits of the vineyard, and the servants had been either killed or maimed by the husbandmen, he said: "I will send my beloved son. It may be, when they see him they will reverence him." But, quite the contrary, they fell upon the son, saying: "*This is the heir*—let us kill him, that the inheritance may be ours." Our Lord makes it plain in the context that the son in the parable is Himself, and the husbandmen the Jews, who are to put Him to death. The parable would have no meaning if Jesus were not the only-begotten Son, possessing the same divine nature as the Father.

Finally, we have the two striking passages in which Our Lord proclaims, in the one indirectly, in the other directly, the eternity of His being. "You sent to John," He once said to His enemies, "and he gave testimony to the truth" (John v. 33). He therefore appeals to the testimony of John. Let us then turn to the words of the Baptist: "This is He of whom I said: After me there cometh

a man who is preferred before me, because He *was* before me"—that is to say, existed before me. But as he had not existed before him in time, having been born after him, He must have existed before him in eternity. Who and what He was in His eternal existence is set forth in the concluding words of St. John's testimony: "And I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of God" (John i. 30, 34).

Speaking to His enemies on another occasion, He said: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it and was glad." The Jews therefore said to Him: "Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?" Jesus said to them: "Amen, amen, I say to you, before Abraham was made, *I am*." There is no parallel to this in human language. The Jews might have expected Him to say "I was," instead of "I am"; but "I was" could not have expressed the eternity of His being, which is one indivisible present, without past or future. Again, therefore, He thought it not robbery to be equal to God, to that God who, when Moses asked Him what answer he should make the people if they should ask him the name of the God who was sending him, said to Moses, "*I am who am*. . . . Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you:" or, as rendered more exactly from the Hebrew, "*I am* hath sent me to you." Eternal Being is His very essence. But even though He had said, "I was" instead of "I am," He would have indicated His divine life in eternity before either He or John had come upon earth.

And now we are prepared for the full and explicit confession of St. Thomas the apostle: "*My Lord and my God*." We may now say without presumption that our thesis is proved: Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah, and therefore His teaching was the truth; but part of that teaching was that He was God; therefore He was God.

And yet we have not finished. We have been dealing with the direct utterances of the Master; we have yet to see the meaning of His words brought out in the clearest and most explicit terms by His apostles, who were His accredited representatives—to whom He had given the commission to teach in His name—"Going, therefore, teach all nations"—to whom He had given the promise, "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the

world"—and upon whose teaching He had promised to put the seal of miracles—a promise which was abundantly fulfilled.

What do the apostles teach about the divinity of Christ?

St. Peter, the Prince of the apostles, begins his Second Epistle with these words: "Simon Peter, servant and apostle of Jesus Christ, to them that have obtained equal faith with us in the justice of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ."

St. John, in his First Epistle, v. 20, writes thus: "And we know that the Son of God is come: and He hath given us understanding, that we may know the true God and may be in His *true Son*. *This is the true God, and life eternal.*" "This," in the last sentence is equivalent to an emphatic "He," referring to "true Son," who is here described as the true God and life eternal. The expression "His true Son" would alone be convincing.

St. Paul, who was taught by God Himself, but whose teachings were guaranteed to the faithful by the apostles as well as by his own miracles, says of Jesus: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man" (Philipp. ii. 6, 7). No mere mortal could think it no robbery to be equal to God; and if Jesus thought it no robbery it was because He was very God. Being in the form, *i.e.*, having the nature of God, He emptied Himself, not by divesting Himself of His divine nature, but by taking to Himself our human nature.

Again St. Paul, writing to the Colossians (i. 15-17), says: "Who [*i.e.*, the Son] is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature; for in Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers: all things were created by Him and in Him. And He is before all, and by Him all things consist." By "firstborn of every creature" is to be understood, not born into this world the first of all creatures, but first generated, or eternally generated, and before all creatures; *primogenitus omnis creaturæ*, as the Latin Vulgate has it. This is implied in the succeeding clauses, which plainly describe Him as the Creator and Preserver of all things, and therefore as the Sovereign God.

It is not surprising, then, that St. John should bear witness to the same sublime truth. The first chapter of his Gospel begins with these words: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word *was God*." It is of the Word that he says a little further on that He "was made flesh and dwelt among us."

The last-mentioned enunciation of the great truth needs no comment, except, perhaps, in reference to a modern criticism to the effect that the writer of the Gospel, in speaking of the Word, has appropriated the language and the thought of a philosophy which had some vogue at the time when the fourth Gospel was written—the system of Philo Judaeus—and that, consequently, no little suspicion is cast upon the genuineness of the Gospel attributed to St. John. Much has been written in refutation of this position, but the better part of it may perhaps be summed up in these few words: First, the Word as conceived by Philo was not identical with the conception of St. John. It (or he) was an inferior being, in nowise identical with the divine Essence; whereas according to St. John "the Word was God." Second, even on the supposition that the writer of the Gospel adopted the language of the philosopher, he employed it in the service of truth. St. John had discovered the *true* Word, of whom an imperfect notion had been conceived by the philosopher. He had learned to know the Word who is the Wisdom of the Father and who is one with Him in nature (see "Development of Doctrine" and "Dogmas").

The teaching of St. Paul in the ninth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, verse 5, is no less explicit than that of St. John. "Of whom [the Israelites]," he says, "is Christ, according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed forever."

III—A MODERN EXPLANATION OF CHRIST'S MIRACLES

We have said that the question of Our Lord's miracles is not affected by any of the real achievements of the science of the day; but it is one of the peculiarities of the age that there are a number of half-fledged sciences whose cultivators are indeed occupying a legitimate field of research but are, some of them at least, governed by anything but a scientific spirit. Over-confidence of assertion, and even of prediction, is their characteristic note. Prominent among these latter-day sciences is one that may be called the sci-

ence of mind influence. It investigates, among other things, the influence of mind upon matter. A certain number of facts are adduced to prove that mind produces effects upon human organisms hitherto thought impossible. Extremists in this line of investigation go so far as to say that all supposed miraculous cures are due entirely to the influence of mind upon matter, that they are purely natural effects produced by natural causes, that they are the work of man and nature, and not of God.

Our Lord's miracles are explained by some members of this school as having been due to what is technically called suggestion. What is suggestion? Suggestion is the employment of any means other than reasoning or the ordinary arts of persuasion; as for instance, the enunciation of a word or a sentence, or the use of a sign, a look, or an attitude, in order to induce in another a desired state of mind. It is a species of personal influence, or of personal magnetism, in the more popular sense of the word. In the degree in which a person is open to any such influence he is said to be suggestible. The quality varies with the individual, and some have it in a very abnormal degree. In the case of supposed miraculous cures, we are told, the effect may really be produced; the blind may be made to see and the lame to walk, but the effect is due to suggestion. In the case of Our Lord's miracles the spell of His presence and the power of His words induced a state of intense belief in the sufferers; so intense indeed as to work a cure in the affected organ. It was the intense faith of the sufferer that straightened out his distorted limbs, or mended his broken bones, or flooded his sightless eyeballs with light!

"Wonderful!" exclaims some innocent reader. "Incredible!" Wonderful, if you choose, replies the would-be scientist, but not incredible; the thing *can* be done, because it *has* been done. And accordingly, a certain number of facts, more or less accurately reported, are brought forward as proving that states of mind may be made to produce extraordinary states of body. A certain class of facts that have been casually and somewhat frequently observed is first adduced in evidence. The following, for example: A man is knocked down by a passing cart. In his fright he fancies that a wheel has passed over one of his arms and crushed it, whereas it has only grazed it. On rising to his feet, however, he finds that his arm is paralyzed. Here a

frightened state of mind has inflicted a serious injury upon his body.

But this is mild compared with other alleged facts. It is asserted, for instance, that persons in a hypnotic state may be made, through the medium of suggestion, to experience certain pathological conditions of the body foreseen and predicted by the operator. We are told that in one case at least a hypnotic subject has been told that on a certain day and at a certain hour he would find upon his arm sores or scars having a certain shape and spelling certain words and that the prediction was verified.

On the basis of a few such facts, real or supposed, it is argued that if mere states of mind are known to have produced such effects upon the body, we are not warranted in placing any limit to the influence of mind upon matter. Why may not the reputed miraculous cures wrought by Christ have been directly produced by the faith of the sufferer and not by any supernatural power possessed by his healer?

This question we shall endeavor to answer. In the first place, soul and body are so intimately united that it is not surprising that the one should influence the other; nor would it be surprising to learn that the mind can exercise a much greater influence over the body than has been generally supposed. But what are the facts of the case? We are confronted with an embryo science which has noted, in some cases with the simplest credulity, a certain number of facts, very few of which have been subjected to rigid scientific scrutiny. And the more significant of the incidents reported have happened in the case of persons *in most abnormal states of mind or body*. Are we to suppose that the persons cured by Our Lord were hypnotics? Considering the vast number cured, are we not to suppose that they presented about the average of psychic susceptibility? Extraordinary psychic phenomena occur under extraordinary psychic conditions. Are we to suppose that the hundreds, perhaps thousands, who were so wondrously healed supplied such extraordinary conditions? And yet we never hear of any being turned away as unfit subjects.

It must be noted, in the next place, that some of Our Lord's cures were wrought upon persons at a distance—notably in the case of the son of the ruler of Capharnaum. Even admitting the power of suggestion, can its power be

exercised without any communication between the two persons concerned? We hear, it is true, not a little nowadays of mind influencing mind without any observable medium of communication. Telepathy is one of the magic words of the hour; but a little investigation will show that from a scientific standpoint it is little more than a word. Whether there is such a thing as genuine telepathy remains to be determined by further research; the facts thus far observed being such as to create, it is true, an impression of the mysterious, but not a conviction of the finality of the evidence. Besides, the facts reported are perfectly trivial compared with the miracle of the sudden cure of a mortal illness at a considerable distance, as in the case of the ruler's son. But there is one class of cures reported in the Gospels in which the very possibility of faith by suggestion is excluded. We refer to the cure of those distempers caused by demoniac possession. In these cases the victim of possession, inspired by the evil one within him and acting as though he were identified with him, would cry out in horror at the approach of Him whom he regarded as his greatest enemy. There is small intimation of faith here.

But, waiving these considerations, let us endeavor to realize something of what is implied in the assumption that the cures wrought by Our Lord were due to purely natural causes. If they were not supernatural and purely miraculous, by what manner of means did He effect them? The answer of our adversaries is that He possessed a wonderful practical knowledge of the use of suggestion; such a knowledge, we would add, as modern practitioners may not hope to attain after generations of accumulated experience. But whence did He get it? If He was the Incarnate God it is, of course, conceivable that He deigned to make use of a natural expedient like suggestion; but what then becomes of His appeal to His miracles precisely as miracles? That He regards them as wrought by the power of the Most High and as the seal placed by the Most High upon His life and His work is evident throughout the Gospels.

If, on the other hand, He was no more than man, how are we to account for His knowledge? How could a country carpenter, who was reputed among His townsmen to know nothing and who was scorned by them as a wicked pretender when He came among them in the course of His public life and presumed to explain the Scriptures—how could

He be supposed to have learned the profoundest secrets of nature by the simple act of passing beyond the limits of His native village? Had His Heavenly Father suddenly given Him a knowledge of suggestion? He could as easily have given Him the power of *bona-fide* miracles, which would have redounded more to the glory of Father and Son. But even if He had taught Him a knowledge of the purely human art, the sudden accession of such enormous knowledge and power would have been no less wonderful than the power of miracles. Thus it is difficult in any case to escape from the supernatural.

But Providence has forestalled the criticism of the twentieth century as it has that of other centuries. Our Divine Lord provided that His miracles should be of so varied a character that adverse criticism, psychological or otherwise, if it took exception to some would find itself baffled by others. Bodily cures were not the only miracles wrought by Our Lord. Every species of miracle is represented in the Gospel accounts of His public life. Not only upon living men, but upon the dead; not only upon human forms, but also upon the forces of inanimate nature, were His miraculous powers exercised. By a single word of command He restored to life a young man who was being carried to his grave. For the raising of Lazarus Providence had brought it about that he should be dead four days and that his body should be already putrid, thus making the evidence of the miracle afterward wrought most patent. He changed water into wine, calmed terrific storms, walked upon the waters of a lake and enabled one of His apostles to do the same. Followed into a desert place by a vast throng, He multiplies five barley-loaves and two fishes in the hands of His disciples so as to enable them to feed more than five thousand persons and fill twelve baskets with the fragments that remain after all are satisfied. A similar miracle He performed in favor of four thousand persons.

But His miracles were not confined to the domain of what are called nature's laws. The world of spirits was no less affected by His presence on earth. The devils, as we have seen, confessed His power as they were driven from the bodies of the possessed. Let any one who is inclined to skepticism on this point read the account of the exorcism of the demoniac in the country of the Gerasens (Luke viii; Mark v; Matt. viii). In this instance the devil, after re-

ducing his victim to a state of the wildest desperation, finds himself in the presence of the Saviour. Through the medium of the possessed one he adores Him and cries out with a loud voice: "What have we to do with Thee, Jesus, Son of God? Art Thou come hither to torment us before the time?" Not far from them there was a herd of swine feeding. Jesus having asked the demon his name, the answer came, "My name is Legion, for we are many." And the demons asked the Lord not to drive them out of the country, but to cast them into the herd of swine. The Lord gave the command and the devils took possession of the swine, which numbered about two thousand; and immediately the swine rushed headlong down the side of the mountain and were drowned in the sea.

His miracles were multitudinous, beyond all reckoning. They might be witnessed daily, almost hourly, during the space of three long years. They were frequently worked in the presence of vast multitudes, just as occasion occurred and without any sign of preparation—without any apparatus suggestive of the magician—without a single failure, such as occurs in our time at the séances of spiritistic mediums, where the failure is attributed to the presence of an unsympathetic spectator.

Moreover, the Gospels in which they are narrated bear the marks of a singular sincerity and simplicity, whilst their authenticity is further guaranteed by the fact that they were published in the lifetime of very many witnesses of the events narrated. It is to be noted, finally, that the miraculous career of Our Lord was not an isolated episode of history. It became the corner-stone of the Christian religion, which has changed the face of the earth and has profoundly influenced the destinies of nations. It was the divine power exhibited in His works, and in the works of His apostles, who wrought in His name, that brought to the feet of the apostles those who believed that in very truth the Kingdom of God had come among men.

CHURCH OF CHRIST, THE

HOW TO FIND IT

Objection.—If the true Church of Christ is still in existence the claimants to that title are so numerous that the problem of finding the

Church is beyond the powers of any but extraordinary minds. The average man might be excused if he gave up the search.

THE ANSWER.—The problem is not so difficult in itself; it is often made difficult by the way in which it is approached. Christ established a Church that could be recognized by all men, high and low, learned and unlearned. "Go ye into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature." These are His words; and when He added, "He that believeth not shall be condemned," He implied that to recognize the truth was possible, and more than possible, for otherwise the refusal to do so would not incur damnation.

But the acceptance of the bare teaching of the Gospel was not enough; that teaching was to be enshrined in a *Church*—an organized society—to whose rulers obedience was to be due. Christ speaks of "building" a Church, that is to say, of founding a permanent organization for the guidance of men to salvation. He enjoins obedience to it in such words as, "He that will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican." The sacred writings abound in allusions to a Church, or assembly of believers, governed by the apostles or those appointed by them; a Church, too, about entering or not entering which there could be no question: to belong to it was a universal obligation.

CONDITIONS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM

The obstacles preventing one from getting at the truth about the Church vary, of course, with the individual. There are persons who feel a sort of fascination in merely skirmishing with the subject, and, generally, in merely playing with religious ideas. Religion is an interesting subject; mystery is always alluring; and in our age there is a tendency to speculate about religion much in the spirit in which Doctor Johnson says the Greeks were wont to do, that is to say, without much sense of personal religious obligation. But such is not the spirit that pervades the New Testament. In the mind of Christ religion has a practical aspect which can not be dissociated from it. A right mode of worship, a working out of one's salvation by the

aid of religion, a submission to divinely appointed authority in the Church (one true Church, as is plain), all this was an essential part of the plan of salvation to which Christ came to give effect.

There is no choice left us but to use the means of salvation which He has provided. As He equipped the apostles and their successors with extraordinary powers, even that of binding and loosing, and that of opening and closing the gates of heaven, and commanded all men to hear them—"He that heareth you heareth Me: and he that despiseth you despiseth Me" (Luke x. 16)—the possession of such authority would be absurd if men might at pleasure submit or refuse to submit to those who possessed it. Membership in the Church presided over by the successors of the apostles is therefore a matter of the strictest personal obligation; and for those who are not yet among its members the duty of inquiry and of prompt and generous action is one of the most pressing nature.

Before or after one has begun his inquiry he may be hampered by another obstacle—*prejudice*, especially inherited prejudice, or that instilled in early childhood—prejudice that tends to block out all inquiry in certain directions in which it is taken for granted that the truth can not possibly be found. Many a convert to the Faith has been kept out of the Fold of Christ by prejudice the greater part of his life. Whenever there is question of putting oneself in an order established by Providence, or of personal salvation, which is the same thing, the closing of any avenue by which truth may reach the mind involves a risk which no man has any warrant for taking.

Another obstacle lies in the *complexity* of the problem; a complexity, however, which is not of its essence. The solution is difficult because it seems to be a matter of deciding between hundreds of sects all of which are denominated Christian, or of shifting from one sect to another till the right one is found. The problem must be simplified, and so simplified that a key to its solution may be put into the hands of all. The Church, we must repeat, is a Church that may easily be recognized by all, for to all the Gospel was to be preached. The Church must, therefore, possess distinguishing marks which can easily be recognized.

THE MARKS OR SIGNS OF THE TRUE CHURCH

The necessity of some marks or notes by which to distinguish the Church is acknowledged by Protestants as well as by Catholics; but the notes set forth by Protestants may be shown to be impracticable as guides. Protestants tell us that the true Church is to be found wherever there is a right preaching of the word of God and a right administration of the sacraments. Now this double criterion is clearly delusive; not only because it fails to distinguish the Church from schismatical bodies, but also and chiefly because these two supposed notes of the Church are, practically, no notes at all—that is to say, outward visible marks which are easily distinguished. They are facts, it is true, to any one to whom they can be proved to be facts, but they are not *signs* or *marks* which can be matter of direct observation. Sermons and rites are, of course, observable facts, but the rightness or wrongness of sermons or rites is not an observable fact. If I am told, therefore, that any given religious sect is known to be the one true Church of Christ by the fact that it preaches the Gospel aright and administers the sacraments aright, my answer at once is a challenge: *Prove* that such is the character of its preaching and of its sacramental system. I have asked for a *sign* and am given instead a *proposition* that needs to be proved.

The Catholic Church, on the other hand, insists on the application of tests which are more ready to hand but which, nevertheless, are infallible. The notes of the Church to which she appeals are supplied by the Nicene Creed, which is accepted by the greater part of Christendom.

The true Church is *one, holy, catholic, and apostolic*.

Here we have four distinguishing traits which, comparatively speaking, are easily discerned. The church possessing them can not easily conceal them. Unity and catholicity (or universality) will be manifest to the average observer. Holiness in ends, means, results, can not long lie hidden. As to apostolicity, or the Church's descent from the apostles, if any world-wide church possesses it, the fact will be written legibly on the pages of history.

Now the Roman Catholic Church is the only church to which these marks, either singly or in their totality, belong.

In the first place, there is *prima facie* (or first sight) evidence of their belonging to the Church of Rome. The

"old" Church, as every one calls it, conspicuous for its unity, spread throughout the world (it is anything but narrow or national), and exerting a special power and influence for good—does not this sound like a description of the Church of Rome? And in what other church does the presence of these traits show itself on the very surface? Here, then, we have a point of departure for the inquirer: the claims of the Roman Catholic Church merit first consideration, just as in physical science first indications all pointing one way have the first claim to the attention of the investigator.

In the course of his study the inquirer will be led to see that the "old" Church is the veritable Church of the apostles by reason of the continuity of its tradition; that its unity is perfect and could only have been preserved by a special providence; that its holiness is greater than at first sight appeared, and is due mainly to the preservation of the divine element in its ministrations; and that in its character of a world-religion it is as universal as the merciful designs of its divine Founder.

The inquirer will now be ready for a more particular study of the notes as possessed by the Roman Catholic Church.

APOSTOLICITY.—What is the origin of the present hierarchy of the Catholic Church, that is to say, of the graded ministry consisting of the Pope, the patriarchs, the bishops, the priests, etc.? It takes no profound knowledge of history to see in the present hierarchy the lineal descendants, in a spiritual sense, of the apostles and their immediate successors. In each successive age we find the hierarchy of the time safely anchored in the past. Each diocese could exhibit the unbroken line of its spiritual rulers from the beginning. In the earlier centuries heresies were triumphantly refuted by the application of the touchstone of apostolic succession. "We have it in our power," said Irenaeus in the second century, "to enumerate those who were by the apostles instituted bishops in the churches and the successors of those bishops down to ourselves." The same boast is repeated by Tertullian in the third century, and by others in successive ages down to the present. It is conceded by all that the present hierarchy of the Catholic Church is in a direct line of descent from the apostles.

The acknowledgment of this fact is a matter of the first

importance; for undoubtedly if the question is, which of the churches is the one true Church of Christ, a church whose succession of teachers and rulers can be traced to apostolic days must possess an immense advantage in the discussion as compared with any church not possessing such perfectly visible links connecting it with the beginnings of Christianity.

And now let us apply the test of apostolicity to the other churches. How can they possibly establish any connection with the apostolic age? Lutheranism began with Luther, a self-commissioned preacher, who succeeded for a time in making his opinions acceptable to his followers. A similar origin is that of all the Evangelical religions that have sprung up since the first half of the sixteenth century. We gather from the sacred writings that a preacher must have his credentials. He can not preach unless commissioned to do so. "How shall they preach unless they be sent?" asks St. Paul, writing to the Romans (x. 15). No one can preach in Christ's name unless commissioned by Christ Himself, as the apostles were, or by those who have received their authority from Him. Hence the necessity of a succession of commissioned preachers, each receiving his authority from another, and all tracing their commission back to Christ Himself.

How shall they preach unless they be sent? What answer then can be made to the crucial question, *Who sent Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli to preach?* And above all, who could have sent them to preach *a doctrine at variance with that universally taught in the Church of Christ?* Is there any meaning in being "sent" if the one sent preaches what he pleases?

The truth is that the whole doctrine regarding the necessity of the preacher's being sent was virtually repudiated by the self-constituted reformers of the sixteenth century. They took the bold stand of preaching a doctrine opposed to that of the Church, although *it was only from the Church they could have received a commission to preach at all.* Did they fancy they were sent directly by the Holy Ghost? If so, what manner of credentials did they bring with them? St. Paul was sent by the Holy Ghost, but his credentials were well certified. His mission was revealed to the Church, he conferred with the other apostles about his teachings and taught the same doctrines as they. 'The Reformers'

commission from the Holy Ghost had no such certification.

Furthermore, the idea of apostolic continuity *includes much more than the bare fact of succession in office*; otherwise the occupant of an episcopal see, though he turned Mohammedan and preached Mohammedanism, might still claim to be a successor of the apostles! The *faith and practice* of the apostles must also be handed on to posterity by the occupants of sees. If the rulers of God's Church in the twentieth century do not stand for all that the apostles stood for in point of teaching and ministry the note of apostolicity is gone.

It is conceivable that a bishop duly consecrated and given local jurisdiction should lapse from the Faith and use his office in the interest of heresy. In that case apostolic succession would be a body without a soul. Jurisdiction, no less than orthodoxy, would necessarily cease, and true *internal* succession would be no more than a name. And if such a bishop should consecrate another to be his successor and to propagate his heresy, the status of the latter would be like that of his predecessor. This is plain common sense, as well as the teaching of the Fathers. Now if this be the case there must be in the Church of Christ a *criterion* of genuine internal apostolic succession; and our contention is that the only church possessing any such criterion is the Church which acknowledges the jurisdiction of the See of Rome.

It is precisely by and through this universal jurisdiction, wherever it has been acknowledged, that orthodoxy has been preserved and the faithful have been given a security that they were under the genuine successors of the apostles. It is not our purpose at present to establish the claims of the Roman primacy—that we have done elsewhere in this volume—(see "The Pope II—Christ's Vicar"); and after all, we are dealing only with the phase of apostolicity which constitutes it a *mark* or *sign* of the true Church, *easily discernible by the many*. *The Roman Church is the only one that has any recognized criterion of apostolical succession*, whilst the other churches have absolutely none.

According to the Anglican view, apostolicity in the Church consists of a number of separate streams of apostolic succession, each flowing in its own channel and never, unless accidentally, brought into conjunction with the others; whereas from the apostolic age onward the mind

of Christendom has conceived of the Apostolic Church as an organic whole, symbolized, according to St. Paul and the Fathers, by the living human body, whose members are made one with the head. What possible criterion can Anglicans have in the matter of teaching and jurisdiction? Even if Anglican orders were valid, do orders confer local jurisdiction? If so, where is the proof of it? When the first Anglican bishops forced themselves out of the framework of the ecclesiastical polity in which their predecessors had been for ages, what guarantee could they give their flocks that they wielded apostolic authority? The voice of all Christendom was against them—as it is to-day; the Pope, whose supremacy their predecessors had acknowledged, repudiated them; there was no foundation in Scripture for their anomalous position; and henceforth the veriest of heretics, if he succeeded in getting some genuine bishop to place his hands upon him, might usurp the government of a diocese in the name of Christ and His apostles. If opposed by the Anglican authorities and required to answer the question, “Where did you get your jurisdiction?” he might with justice ask them in turn, “Where did you get yours?”

Historically, the Anglican system has borne its natural fruits in its evolution of doctrine and worship. Anglicanism embraces to-day every form of teaching from Roman Catholicism (or something akin to it) to the veriest Zwinglianism, and from Zwinglianism to Unitarianism, or worse; but its formularies and its Prayer Book are sufficiently elastic to be made to cover every vagary of the Anglican mind.

The case of the schismatical churches of the East is scarcely better than that of Anglicanism. For more than eight centuries their standing before the rest of Christendom was assured by the one bond of union which united them with all the other churches—the primacy of the See of Rome. To-day, severed from the center of unity, they seek in vain for a rallying-point of orthodoxy. What is to be thought of apostolical teaching and jurisdiction in churches which for centuries acknowledged the supremacy of the Pope, then renounced it, again on two separate occasions embraced it, once more renounced it, till finally they lapsed into a state of bondage to the secular power which has been the latest stage of their downward course?

It is evident, therefore, that the Church presided over by the Pope is the only one possessing the note of apostolicity. It is apostolic because its bishops are the true successors of the apostles and because it has a principle of unity which is the only guarantee of apostolic succession.

UNITY.—Unity and apostolicity, though differing in idea, are nevertheless so intimately connected that the one can not exist without the other. As true apostolicity includes the transmission of the doctrine and practice, in all essential matters, of the apostolic Church, and as that Church was one and undivided, a church which possesses the note of apostolicity must be one and undivided in its teaching, its worship and its form of government.

Perfect unity was an essential element of the design which our divine Lord carried into execution when He instituted the Church. For this unity He prayed and *the prayer of the Son of God could not have been made in vain*. "Holy Father," He prayed, "keep in Thy name those whom Thou hast given Me, *that they may be one, as We also are*" (John xvii. 11). "And not for them only do I pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe in Me; that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in Us; that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me" (xvii. 20, 21).

As the prayer of Christ must have been heard, there still exists a Church which exhibits such unity, a unity the model of which is that which subsists between the Eternal Father and His only-begotten Son, a unity the possession of which by the Church is a sign that it was founded by One who was sent by the Eternal Father: "*That the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me.*" There must be in existence at the present moment a church which is one and undivided in belief, in worship and in corporate life.

The one Church possessing such unity is not far to seek: the only Church which exhibits this triple unity is the Church properly called Catholic—the Church in communion with the See of Rome. Its unity is, indeed, the despair of its enemies, many of whom, unable to copy it, have imitated the fox in the fable by decrying it as pernicious, as shackling human liberty and as an obstacle to human progress. The Roman Catholic Church possesses a unity which is the necessary consequence of its having a center of au-

thority, from which radiate a power and an influence which unify the exceedingly varied human elements of which it is composed; a unity which is at once inimitable and indestructible; and both of these qualities proclaim its divine origin. If it were of human invention it would have been overthrown long before to-day; but this principle of unity is as strongly intrenched as ever and continues to win adherents to the Church from the ranks of those whose forefathers, a few centuries ago, abandoned it. If it were of human invention the human mind could produce some imitation of it; whereas the unity of the Catholic Church is simply inimitable. It has no parallel in any human society, religious or secular.

The unity of the Catholic Church is, of course, incompatible with absolute freedom of thought in matters religious. When a point of doctrine is explicitly set forth by Holy Writ, or when it is clearly defined by divinely constituted authority, the only rational course to be followed by the human intellect is to bow in submission to a higher authority than itself; just as in purely mundane matters one mind will accept the judgment of another better informed. But outside the circle of truth thus revealed or defined there is a vast field opened to human speculation, one, indeed, in which the brightest intellects have ranged untrammelled for centuries.

In this connection, however, there is one essential difference between the Catholic Church and all other religious bodies: controversies may arise about matters as yet undefined, but the parties in each dispute acknowledge the Church's power to settle the question at issue and accept beforehand, with full interior assent, any decision which the Church may deem it advisable to give. The recognition of such authority is the one great condition for the realization of the unity for which Our Lord prayed to His Eternal Father.

It is all but needless to show how this truly Christian unity contrasts with the imperfect unity, or rather the absence of unity, that characterizes the sects. No sooner has any part of God's Church discarded the principle of unity and severed itself from the main body than, at once, discord begins to appear and sooner or later reigns supreme. Authority is superseded by opinion and opinion varies with the individual mind. We must leave it to the impartial

judgment of our readers to say whether such a state of things was contemplated by the divine Founder of Christianity.

And yet it is not rare to hear Protestants maintain that among themselves there is unity in essentials and disagreement in non-essentials; but if you ask them which doctrines are essential and which are not, you will find that few Protestants will give the same answer. Even doctrines once regarded as essential by all Christians—the divinity of Christ, for instance—have in recent times lost their hold upon countless minds within the Protestant pale. Religious belief has been left to the chance working out of human opinion; and gradually opinion diverges and sects multiply. The very cornerstone of Protestantism, the Bible, has lost its place of honor and the crumbling of the fabric erected over it is proceeding apace. Catholics, on the other hand, are fully entitled to use the distinction between “essential” and “non-essential,” for they have in their midst an *ever-living voice of authority*, which decides to-day, as it decided in the first assembly of the apostles in Jerusalem, which teachings are essential and which are not.

CATHOLICITY OR UNIVERSALITY.—The mission of the apostles was to the entire world, and the mission of the Church is the same. Hence she can place no limit, geographical or racial, to the exercise of her ministry. “You shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria, and even to the uttermost part of the earth” (Acts i. 8). These words are at once mandatory and prophetic: they enjoin the universal preaching of the Gospel and predict the fulfilment of the injunction. In penetrating to every part of the earth the Church is, of course, dependent on time and on geographical discovery, but she would be unfaithful to her mission if she did not strenuously endeavor to extend her field of action; and Christ’s promises would be unfulfilled if the Church were not actually found in every inhabitable and accessible place on the earth.

The term “Catholic” or “Universal” was variously applied by the Fathers of the early Church, but the meaning most commonly attached to the word was that of universality of place. Such ubiquitous presence was always regarded as a test whereby the true Church of Christ was to be distinguished from its counterfeits. Heretical bodies

were identified with particular localities, and against them appeal was made to the Church that was known the world over, and also, be it added to *the one unvarying doctrine* which it everywhere taught.

For this oneness of doctrine is an essential element of Catholicity regarded as a note of the Church. If the Church, whilst extending itself geographically, changed its teaching, extension would be a virtual multiplication of churches. The greater the extension the greater the number of the sects. What we shall look for, therefore, is a *world-church*—a church which is actually spread throughout the world and a church which is everywhere the same. Now which of the churches answers this description?

Can there be two possible answers to the question? Of the missionaries of the Catholic Church it may be said, as was said of the apostles, "Their sound hath gone forth into all the earth and their words unto the ends of the whole world." At no period of its existence has there been a known part of the earth unvisited by them. They have followed hard upon the footsteps of the explorer; nay, not unfrequently has the apostolic man been in the very van of discovery. Columbus, the greatest of discoverers, was no less an apostle than a man of the sea.

The labors and the success of our missionaries have won the enthusiastic praise even of our enemies. The "Black Robe" among the North American Indians, the Jesuit of the South American reductions, the Xaviers and the Riccis of the Orient, have become household words among ordinary readers of history. In comparatively recent times seven million Filipinos have been won to Christianity and civilization. Even in China, where the spread of the Gospel has met with almost insuperable obstacles, the success of the French missionaries is the despair of their Protestant rivals in the same field. And who has not heard of the work of Cardinal Lavigerie and his "White Fathers" in preaching Christianity and aiding in the destruction of the slave trade in the wilds of Africa? The significance of these facts is that the Catholic Church has the same universality of outlook as the divine Master when He sent His disciples to preach the Gospel to every creature, and that in every age she endeavors more and more to realize the ideal of absolute universality which every true Christian must have at heart.

And if we ask the further question, which of the churches is actually established everywhere and *is the same* everywhere, the same answer is supplied by facts which all the world knows. If any one wishes to realize the ubiquity of the Catholic religion let him place himself in imagination in the Vatican, and endeavor for a moment to look abroad upon the world with the eyes of the present sovereign pontiff, Benedict XV. His children are found in all the countries of the globe. There is not a corner of the earth to which his jurisdiction does not extend. There is not an island in the remotest seas from which some ecclesiastic may not be wending his way *ad limina Apostolorum*, to lay the burden of his cares at the feet of the common father.

St. Paul's "solicitude for all the churches" (*i.e.*, for the various parts of one and the same Church) was necessarily great, considering the number of foundations that claimed his care; but what would be his solicitude if he were at the head of the entire Church to-day? And what glowing descriptions of the kingdom of God on earth would he give in his letters if he could look beyond the Pillars of Hercules and see the countries of a new world whose teeming populations looked to him for guidance and assistance!

If the extent of the Pope's dominion be expressed in numbers of souls subject to him it is no less impressive. Nearly three hundred million human beings, belonging to every clime and speaking every human tongue, and yet a *unit in loyalty and obedience* to a common father! The more varied the membership of the Church Catholic the greater is the wonder excited by its perfect unity in belief and practice. Such perfect unanimity can not have a human origin. Any attempt to explain it by any purely human or other natural cause must prove utterly futile. The only valid explanation is to be found in the promise, "Behold, I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world."

And now let us apply the test of Catholicity to those bodies of Christians which have separated themselves from the See of Rome. The sterility of the Eastern churches is almost proverbial. Schism and heresy have produced their effect in paralyzing apostolic zeal. The churches of the East will always be the churches of the East: the local brand will always distinguish them, until one day, as we

may hope, they will range themselves among the loyal subjects of Christ's Vicar on earth.

And what shall we say of the Reformed churches? After four hundred years' existence the barrenness of Protestantism in the field of missionary labor is only too evident. With unlimited resources, what has it accomplished in the newer countries of the world? What are its conquests? What nation has it brought within the pale of Christianity?

The geographical extension of Protestantism has been due almost entirely to the migration of Protestants from their ancestral homes in Europe. In an age in which anything that may be transported on wheels or by water may be given some sort of universality it is not surprising that Methodism or Presbyterianism is in some manner represented in the four quarters of the globe; but in many places the sects are little more than represented. Protestant missionary enterprises as compared with Catholic have been egregious failures. Even where Protestantism has extended itself by reason of the accidents of time its unity, such as it is, has been proportionately impaired. When Anglicanism or Methodism or Presbyterianism transplants itself to a new country its new habitat will sooner or later give it a new name and a new creed.

In the beginning of its history, Protestantism, securing the patronage of certain potentates in Northern Europe, succeeded in forcing its creed upon whole countries, but its native feebleness was demonstrated wherever it was brought fairly into competition, on anything like equal terms, with Catholic zeal. In the first years of the Reformation Protestantism was in a fair way to possessing the whole of Europe; but soon an army of saintly and energetic Catholic missionaries entered the field, and "the work of conversion," says Ranke, "advanced with resistless force," and vast provinces were recovered to the Faith. "Fifty years after the Lutheran separation," says Macaulay, "Catholicism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Mediterranean; a hundred years after the separation Protestantism could scarcely maintain itself on the shores of the Baltic." Even to-day, in every country in which Protestantism once dominated, the tide of Catholicism is steadily advancing and the forces of Protestantism are steadily retiring.

But the decline of Protestantism is not due solely to

the progress of Catholicism. In the northern countries of Europe and in America a species of internal decay has been consuming the religion of the masses of the population. Over the entire world, it is true, a wave of irreligion has been passing in recent years, but the Catholic Church is the only power that effectually opposes its progress. The other churches can scarcely get a hearing from the multitudes who are infected by it. In the United States alone *between fifty and sixty million* people own allegiance to no religion and seldom or never cross the threshold of a church. Of this enormous multitude the majority are of Protestant antecedents.

And yet Protestants can still boast of large numbers, but their numerical strength, such as it is, loses all its significance when their numbers are severed from unity. Who can estimate the real strength of Anglicanism or of Calvinism when any Anglican or Calvinist may in his secret heart believe as he pleases. With Catholics it is different; outward profession and numerical strength need comparatively little discounting when taken as an index of genuine Catholic faith. All this being the case, the actual numerical strength of Catholics in the world possesses no little significance. The Catholic population of the world, which before the advent of Protestantism was about 100,000,000, is to-day close upon 300,000,000;* and of this number a large percentage is the fruit of apostolic zeal either in civilized or in barbarous countries; and, what is more, this numerical strength has been developed during a period which has been mostly one of persecution.

We have said more than enough to show that the Church in communion with Rome is the world-religion which the religion of Christ was intended to be; that everywhere in the world it is found to be the same and always true to itself; and that it exhibits an unequalled vitality of apostolic zeal which constantly tends toward the realization of that perfect and absolute universality which was in the mind of Christ when He sent the apostles to preach the Faith throughout the world. It is the only Church, therefore, entitled to the name of Catholic.

HOLINESS.—As the Church is the creation of the Son of God it should partake of the holiness of its Founder. It

*292,787,085 is the number given by Fr. Kroese, S.J., an expert in religious statistics. Catholic Encyclopedia, "Statistics."

possesses a guarantee of holiness in the promise of Christ, "Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20), and in the assurance that the "gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 18), for if it were not holy it could not withstand the attacks of the evil one. The Church must be holy in its teaching, in the means it employs to sanctify its members, and in its actual sanctification of them.

As regards personal holiness in the members of Christ's Church, it is evident from the Gospels that Christ foresaw that many would not respond to His generous designs in their regard. Men's wills would be free, and many would abuse their freedom of will and refuse to avail themselves of the means of salvation so bountifully provided for them. "It must needs be that scandals come," He said to His disciples. He foretold that iniquity would abound and that the charity of many would grow cold (Matt. xxiv. 12). Nay, before the close of His own life two of His twelve apostles—*one-sixth of the whole number!*—sinned grievously, the one through weakness, the other through overruling passion. And afterward, even during the lifetime of the apostles, the beauty and the glory of Christ's Church were marred by schism and the grossest of vices.

The inquirer must not, then, be misled by a false criterion. He must not be surprised if he finds tares among the wheat and vice in the near neighborhood of holiness. He must distinguish between the Church as a divine institution and the Church as an aggregate of individual men. Once we have mastered this distinction we can turn to the Church as a divine institution, and as intrenched in the divine promises, with the expectation of finding in it a reflection of the holiness of Him who founded it. We shall expect in particular to find in the Church: 1. A loyalty to moral standards and principles; 2. An effectiveness in teaching and enforcing the divine law; 3. A preservation of the channels of divine grace; 4. A sanctification of souls on a large scale.

Now what church can stand a comparison with the Roman Catholic touching the first two of these points? There is no need of going far afield to discover what lies at our doors. Our own country furnishes an object-lesson on the moral influence of Catholic teaching. Here in the United States, in the present perilous condition of morals,

what power or influence, or if you will, what public institution, can be thought able to cope with the moral corruption that is advancing upon us like a deluge? Will some faltering voice suggest "Methodism," or "Presbyterianism," or "Anglicanism"? The weak influence these institutions have upon individual consciences in the present augurs ill for their influence in the future. What we need is not sermons or Bible lectures only, but an institution that shall retain a firm hold on the traditional principles of Christian morality, and at the same time use effectual means of promoting morality.

What Church can bear comparison with the Catholic in the guardianship of principles making for the moral welfare of society? *The peace of families, the sacredness of the marriage bond, the religious education of the young, religion as the foundation of morality*—where will any of these vital interests find in future generations an uncompromising defender except in the Church of Rome? After three centuries or more of competition between the two rival systems of religion, the American public may now judge of the practical worth and the true intrinsic character of the system based upon private judgment, and compare it with the religion which speaks and acts with a consciousness of divinely given authority and refuses to surrender its principles to the "spirit of the age."

More than half of the effectiveness of the Church's ministrations lies in what is called the sacramental system, which the Church teaches is of divine origin. In the sacraments there is a special embodiment of the truth uttered by Our Lord, "Without Me you can do nothing" (John xv. 5). God's grace is absolutely necessary as a means of salvation. Without grace it is impossible to overcome any grievous temptation, or even to persevere for any considerable time in the practice of the purely natural virtues. Hence Our Lord, through the Church and by means of the seven sacraments, meets every human need in the moral order and is ready with His assistance at every important turn in the journey of life. Through the sacraments a divine power is infused into the soul, and with it the germ of stability and perseverance.

It was a bold step that was taken by the Reformers when, by their simple fiat, they destroyed what from time immemorial had been regarded as divinely appointed chan-

nels of grace. The destruction of the system was followed by its natural consequence—a lack of religious vitality in the great mass of Reformed Christians. The divine nutriment once supplied the soul was now withheld and spiritual depletion was the result.

Some of our Protestant readers whose surroundings may be exceptionally edifying will doubtless be offended at our implying that in point of vital religion Protestants are inferior to Catholics; but with all due regard for Protestant feeling the belief is not an unfounded one. *We are not to judge by the few, but by the multitude.* It was to the multitude that Christ preached, and a church's influence on the multitude must be one of the tests of its Christlike character. Will it be maintained that the sects have a hold upon the multitude here in America? Are they aware that we are confronted with a nation of indifferentists and agnostics? Are they ignorant of the influence of godless schools on practical morality? And all this, and much besides, in a country that was once the paradise of Protestantism!

In contrast with this state of things, of the *fifteen or sixteen millions* that make up the solid Catholic phalanx the great majority are effectually and practically influenced by their vital connection with the Church, and especially by their reception of the sacraments. There is absolutely no comparison between the religious devotion of Catholics and that of non-Catholics. Their churches are filled, not only when attendance at religious services is of strict obligation, but frequently when it is not; and in nearly every church hundreds are seen at dawn assisting at the sacrifice of the Mass, and again, on week-day evenings, attending the services of their sodalities or other such associations. Thousands are active promoters of the Apostleship of Prayer, a really great instrument for the sanctification of souls.

As regards the ordinary duties of life, the influence of the sacraments can not, of course, be brought home to the mind of any one outside the pale of the Church. Catholics know it and feel it; non-Catholics often see its effects but are unable to trace them to their cause. In the case of the sacrament of Penance, however, of the effects produced, one at least is fairly well known. A condition for the reception of the sacrament of Penance is the renounce-

ment of every species of dishonesty and the restitution of ill-gotten gains. Indeed the renouncing of every vicious habit of a serious nature is a condition for receiving absolution from one's sins and admission to the reception of the Holy Eucharist. As regards the interior effects of the sacraments, which are best known to those who experience them, the most effective appeal we can make is to the testimony of those innumerable converts who have felt a new light and strength entering their souls with the grace of the sacraments.

One of the ripest fruits of sacramental grace is the desire to embrace what is known as the way of the divine counsels, or the way of complete renunciation. Readers of the New Testament must remember how on one occasion a young man came to Our Lord and asked Him what he must do that he might have life everlasting. Our Lord, naturally enough, bade him observe the commandments; but when the young man said he had observed the commandments from his boyhood and asked what was still wanting to him, the Lord answered: "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come follow Me." Such is the way of the counsels—the giving up of all, to follow Christ the more perfectly. Are *all* our readers aware that this life of special renunciation has flourished in the Church in every period of its history?

Are they aware that to-day those who follow this manner of life may be numbered by the hundred thousand? They have heard of the Religious Orders of the Catholic Church; they have heard of their work of charity; perhaps they have heard of their apostolic zeal; the great bulk of the work of converting the heathen has been accomplished by the Religious Orders; but not all who are acquainted with this particular phase of the religious life are aware that the success of Religious in external labors is rooted in the most absolute self-renunciation, consisting, not only in the sacrifice of material treasure, but also in the immolation of the flesh and the will by the vows of chastity and obedience.

It is needless to descant on the contrast between the Catholic Church and the other churches in the matter of the counsels. Attempts have indeed been made to naturalize the conventual life among non-Catholics, but they have only

emphasized the need of its being planted in more congenial soil; and of this the latest proof has been given in the accession of whole communities of Anglican Religious to the Roman Catholic communion. It is plain that one important feature of Christian holiness is lacking in non-Roman religions.

And this brings us to another, though not essentially different, aspect of the holiness of the Church. In the Church of Christ, which, appearing as it did after the twilight of type and prophecy, might be supposed to exhibit the noon-day brightness of the reign of grace, one would expect to find some souls, nay, even very many in the course of ages, whose lives would show forth the transforming power of divine grace in an extraordinary degree. And who are these but the actual saints of the Catholic Church?—not only the canonized saints, but many besides whose memory will never be thus publicly honored. No age of the Church has been without them. Even in the sixteenth century, when the general decline in morals gave some color to the revolt against the Church of God, the number of canonized saints alone would be a surprise to our separated brethren. What has Protestantism, or what have the sects of the Orient, to show in comparison with this galaxy of saintly men and women?

Far be it from us to belittle the virtues—in many cases the superior virtues—of those who do not share our faith; for the realm of grace is, after all, not strictly commensurate with the limits of the Catholic Church. Even pagans and infidels are not totally deprived of the divine assistance. But were we to ask for a list of men and women of world-renowned sanctity, it is difficult to see from which of the Reformed religions it would be forthcoming. Let them endeavor from the worthies of the sixteenth century—or from those of any century, or from all the centuries and from all the sects—to match a list which comprises such names as those of a Xavier, a Philip Neri, an Ignatius of Loyola, a Pius V, a Charles Borromeo, a Francis Borgia, an Alphonsus Rodriguez, an Alphonsus Liguori, a John Berchmans, a Peter Claver, a Stanislaus Kostka, an Aloysius Gonzaga, a Cajetan, a Theresa, a John of the Cross—or, to come closer to the present generation, a Perboyre, a Vianney (Curé of Ars), a Dom Bosco, a Clement Hof-

bauer. But the attempt will, of course, never be made by any one who knows what is meant by a Catholic saint.

But there is yet another feature of the Church's holiness, which is the most distinctive of all, though it shows itself more rarely than the others. The special presence of the Holy Ghost in the Church is attested by the miraculous power conferred on at least a few in each age, and in the wonders wrought in places hallowed by the devotion of the faithful. When Our Lord commanded His apostles to preach the Gospel in the whole world, He made the following predictions: "And these signs shall follow them that believe: in My name they shall cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they shall drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them; they shall lay their hands upon the sick, and they shall recover" (Mark xvi. 17, 18). That these signs did follow we are told in the Acts of the Apostles. That miracles have been wrought since the days of the apostles is the testimony of reputable historians.

But we are not wholly dependent on the witness of past ages for our belief in the continuance of this mark of divine favor in the Church of God. Miracles are worked probably on as grand a scale as ever before in the history of the Church. Miraculous healing of the most astounding kind has been wrought at the famous Grotto of Lourdes, in France. Diseases pronounced incurable, diseases of an organic nature, fractures, lesions, tumors, cancers, have been cured, often instantaneously and under the eyes of numerous witnesses. Official records of these events have been kept and have been submitted to the scrutiny of medical experts. There is nothing in nature to account for these wonders, and they are all connected with devotion to the Blessed Virgin under the title of Our Lady of Lourdes. There is an extensive literature bearing on these wonderful occurrences and information on the subject is within the reach of all inquirers. (Cf. "Lourdes: A History of its Apparitions and Cures," by Georges Bertrin,—also "Miracles" in the present work.)

But our aim just at present is not precisely to prove that miracles are actually performed. Our contention is that, as Our Lord promised this mark of His favor to the preaching of the word, as He did not, apparently, place any limit

to the period of its continuance, and as it is probable that signs of His presence and power which He bestowed even upon the Jews of old would be continued in the Church which He came on earth to found, the Church which can present at least so much *prima facie* evidence of miracles and still believes in miracles, is more likely to be the true Church of God than any church which shows no signs of miraculous intervention and even discards a belief in miracles. The question here is: Which of the churches bears the greatest resemblance to the Church of Christ and His apostles, in this as in every other indication of holiness?

And now we have almost brought to a close this exceptionally long article on a very important subject. We have endeavored to describe the marks by which the Church of Christ is to be recognized. These marks, we have contended, should be of the most conspicuous kind in the case of a religion that was to be preached to the entire world, and these marks are found only in the Church which acknowledges the supremacy of the See of Rome; in the Catholic Church, rightly and distinctively so called. Any church which fails to present the same credentials is not the Church of Christ, and consequently not the Ark of salvation, even though it preserve, as many churches do, some elements of ancient faith and piety.

It is possible that one or other point in the above argumentation may not at once produce conviction in the mind of the inquirer. We would ask him, in that case, to look at the argument as a whole, and then ask himself in all sincerity whether any such case can be made out in favor of any church but that of Rome. If none can, there is no doubting the conclusion that a Church that exhibits so many signs of divine favor and of divine preservation must be the Church of Christ, and the one only Church of Christ, and that consequently, as Our Lord made the acceptance of the true Gospel, or, in other words, membership in His one and undivided Church, a condition of salvation, the practical step to be taken will easily suggest itself to any logical mind.

CHURCH, THE, AS MEDIATOR

Objection.—The Church thrusts herself between Christ and mankind; and yet Christ is our one Mediator with God. None the less the Church has lost the world-subduing power she once possessed.

THE ANSWER.—The Church does indeed stand between Christ and mankind; *but she has not thrust herself into that position*; she has been assigned it by Christ Himself. It is not in the power of man or of the Church herself to change that which Christ has established.

Christ appointed St. Peter the visible head of His flock (John xxi.), and hence Peter stands between Christ and the sheep of Christ's fold. Christ, sending forth His disciples to preach, said to them: "He that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth Me" (Luke x. 16). "If thy brother shall offend against thee . . . tell the Church; and if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican" (Matt. xviii. 15-17).

Plainly, then, the Church is in the place of an intermediary between Christ and mankind. Christ is our Mediator with the Father, undoubtedly; but the Church is our mediator with Christ. It is from the Church of Christ that I must receive the teaching of Christ as well as the means of grace which He has provided. Such was the intention of Christ. "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. xxviii. 19). "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned" (Mark xvi. 16).

It profits nothing, therefore, to be willing to adhere to Christ if one be not willing to adhere to the visible Church of Christ and to be led to Christ through the Church. The capital error of Protestantism is that it denies the necessity of adhering to the visible Church of Christ.

But there is another objection to be met. It is a superficial one, however. The Church, we are told, has lost her world-subduing power. She once converted whole nations in a comparatively short time. We hear of no such conquests nowadays. Meantime the nations are falling away from her.

The objection is superficial because it is based on a few striking passages in history, such as the story of the conversion of the Franks under Clovis. The objector, looking in vain in modern times for a parallel to such events, concludes that the Church no longer advances on her triumphant march through the nations. Yet the Church's work proceeds apace, now as in former days. The conversion of nations in the past was, as a rule, slower than is sometimes supposed. It took centuries to convert any one of the northern nations. To-day there is no apparent diminution of zeal in the Church's missionaries, and in all probability it is attended by no less success.

The Catholic missionaries in China have enormously distanced their Protestant rivals in the same field. According to the "China Year Book" for 1914 the Catholics of the Empire number 1,363,697 baptized Christians and 390,985 catechumens, or those preparing for Baptism, whilst, according to the same authority, the *ninety societies and agencies* engaged in Protestant mission work in China report only 167,075 baptized and 157,815 catechumens (cf. "The Month," Jan., 1914). In British India and Ceylon there were in the year 1911 as many as 2,226,449 Catholics. The figures for British India are furnished by the Indian Government Census (cf. "The Month," Sept., 1913). The most significant fact in connection with these missions is that in twenty-four years there was an increase of 1,102,022. Few records of missionary success in the old days can match those of the Catholic missions of Uganda, in Africa, where the number of the catechumens in five or six years rose to 200,000. The conversion of the Filipinos to the number of 7,000,000 has been the work of Catholic missionaries in recent centuries.

In many of the more civilized countries of the world the Catholic Faith has been making steady progress. This is true even of Germany, the birthplace of Protestantism. The Catholics of the Empire form considerably more than a third of the population, and their steady numerical increase is a source of dismay in the Evangelical camp, which can not help noticing the gradual decay of religion among the Protestant masses. But dismay should not, at least for one reason, be the feeling engendered by Catholic success; for if it were not for the Catholic Center Party in the imperial parliament the socialists, with their atheistic and

materialistic tenets, would to-day be the rulers of Germany. Socialism, we may add, is recruited chiefly from the Protestant working-classes.

Among the educated classes in England it is no longer a reproach to a man to be a Catholic. The past seventy years have marked a return on a large scale of the people of Great Britain to the Faith of their fathers. During that period the Catholic population has more than doubled its numbers, showing a total at the present date of more than 2,000,000. In the United States there are more than 15,000,000 Catholics, and a large percentage of the number is made up of converts from Protestantism. The instruction of Protestants applying for admission into the Church is a well-known feature of parish and city-mission work.

Can it, then, be true that the nations are falling away from the Church? Even if it were, it would be no new experience to a Church that has reached the good old age of nineteen hundred years. Centuries before to-day she lost large populations in northern Africa and in the East, but then, as ever afterward, she turned to new fields of conquest. Since the revolt of Luther she has trebled her numbers: four centuries ago there were 100,000,000 Catholics; to-day there are close upon 300,000,000.

But is it not true that the Church is losing her hold upon the Latin countries of Europe? No one can regard with more concern than Catholics the extent to which unbelief and the neglect of religion have spread in those countries (though the same is true of Protestant countries—Germany and the United States, for instance);—but there is one feature of the situation in the Latin countries which must not be forgotten: religion in those countries has in it a *principle of self-renewal*, which is at work to-day, as it has been in the past, resuscitating what is dead and putting new life into what is decaying.

Religion has passed through more than one great crisis in France; and that it is passing successfully through its latest crisis is evidenced by the astonishing growth of Catholic activities which has recently appeared and which is noted as significant by the secular press; and that, too, notwithstanding, nay partly in consequence of, persecution suffered at the hands of an infidel government.

During the past four hundred years, and notably during the nineteenth century, we might say without much

fear of exaggeration that scarcely a decade has passed in France but some choice fruit of Catholic zeal or piety of world-wide value and importance has been produced by this good old Catholic stock. To-day more than half the religious institutes whose members are daily seen wending their way through our streets on some mission of charity, or are devoting their lives to the training of the young in our schools, have sprung up in the Catholic soil of France.

In Protestant countries, on the other hand, it is precisely *the absence of any self-renewing source* in their religion that casts a gloom even upon the social and political prospects of those countries, in which a license of unbelief and an atheistic form of socialism are so rampant. Is it not true, and are not rulers of countries like Germany aware of it, that the one great barrier against atheism and anarchy in those countries is the solid phalanx of the Catholic body?

The Catholic Church still lives. It shows no signs of decay save to those who are ignorant of the real facts of modern history.

CHURCH, THE, AND SALVATION

Objection.—Catholics are taught that outside the Church of Rome there is no salvation. It is a poor recommendation of the Roman religion that it sends the majority of men to eternal perdition.

THE ANSWER.—The formula "Out of the Church there is no salvation," is indeed familiar to Catholics and, moreover, has a recognized place in Catholic teaching, but for the most part it is misunderstood by non-Catholics. Certainly, from the earliest Christian ages the truth has been enunciated in the Church of God that membership in the visible Church established by Christ is a necessary means of salvation, and according to Catholic teaching the one true Church of Christ is the Church which is in communion with Rome. This is the *appointed* way of salvation, and no other has been revealed. But is there no way of salvation open to those who through no fault of theirs are not convinced of the claims of the Church of Rome? That we dare not assert. God's providence extends to all His rational creatures; He has given them the light of reason;

He has written the precepts of the natural law upon their hearts; He does not leave them unassisted by His grace; and under Providence no one will be lost for not knowing truths which he has had no means of learning.

If a direct and categorical answer be required to the question, Is it possible for one not in communion with Rome to be saved? our answer is: Yes, it is possible. But it is possible only in cases in which the persons concerned may be said, in some sense, to belong to the Church, though not consciously and avowedly in communion with it. Catholic theologians draw a distinction between an *explicit* and an *implicit* adherence to the Church of Christ; between what one explicitly holds and professes, on the one hand, and what is implicitly contained in his disposition of mind and heart in regard to the necessary means of salvation. Persons who have no means of learning the truth but are living according to their lights and are willing to use all necessary means of salvation, may be truly said to participate, according to their needs, in the grace communicated by Christ to mankind through the Church. In this sense they are members of Christ's Church and to them the dictum, "Out of the Church there is no salvation," does not apply.

Many non-Catholics are known to feel a keen personal interest in the question we are discussing; and of this number perhaps the majority, finding themselves in a state of mental unrest regarding the means of salvation, take comfort from the thought that, after all, one may be saved without entering the Catholic Church. Now persons of this class can not afford to be indifferent to the *conditions* on which they may be saved, especially as set forth by a Church which dates from the apostolic age and which, as they themselves acknowledge, opens a way to salvation. These conditions are clearly stated in an encyclical letter addressed by Pope Pius IX to the bishops of Italy, August 10, 1863. Whilst insisting on the necessity of seeking salvation through the Church, the Pontiff says:

"It is known to us and to you that those who are in invincible ignorance [*i.e.*, ignorance which they have no means of dispelling] of our most holy religion, who observe the precepts of the natural law, which God has written in the hearts of all men, and who in their willingness to obey God live an honest and upright life, may, by the aid

of the divine light and grace, attain to eternal life; for God, who beholds, searches and knows the minds, the hearts, the thoughts and habits of all men, in His sovereign goodness and mercy, does not permit any one to suffer eternal punishment who is guiltless of a wilful transgression of His law."

Here it is distinctly taught that it is possible for a non-Catholic to be saved, but saved *conditionally*. The conditions are these: 1. That one has no means of knowing and recognizing the true Church of Christ. In our day it is to be feared that many seek a refuge in ignorance when ignorance might easily be dispelled by inquiry, study, and prayer. 2. That one shall not have offended God by any grievous sin, or, we may add as implied, that having so offended God he shall have duly repented. Acceptable repentance in this case must be based on perfect contrition; that is to say, on a sorrow for sin which has for its motive the love of God for the sake of His infinite perfections. Any one who turns from his sin and turns to God by an act of love may be saved, provided he does not afterward turn away finally and forever from God.

After what has been said it ought to be quite unnecessary to remark that non-Catholics ought to be much less concerned with finding or inventing reasons for remaining where they are than with honestly and earnestly inquiring after the truth; being determined at the same time to embrace the truth, wherever or whenever found. If they think they *may* be saved outside the Catholic Church they should be careful to ask themselves, "But *how?*"

If one who has not the truth is bound to seek it, those who have it are bound to impart it to those who do not possess it. It is possible for a non-Catholic to be saved, but nevertheless it is God's will that the truths of the Catholic faith should be made known to him. If a non-Catholic has neglected to find the truth he will be lost; and hence every opportunity of enlightening him should, with all due discretion, be improved.

Moreover, although a man may be saved in honest ignorance of the truth, nevertheless his salvation is endangered by the absence of the many graces he would obtain through a knowledge and practice of the true religion. Protestantism has impoverished the spiritual lives of its adherents by drying up the wells of sacramental grace, which are filled

to overflowing in the Church of Christ and from which all its members may draw according to their needs. Among Protestants the holy sacrifice of the Mass is abolished, Christ is banished from the Tabernacle, the souls of men are no longer nourished by the true body and blood of the Lord, grievous sin no longer finds a healing power in the sacrament of Penance, the dying are no longer comforted and strengthened in their last journey by the Holy Viaticum or by the Last Anointing. In their struggle with the world, the flesh, and the devil non-Catholics find their spiritual nourishment reduced to the minimum, and no wonder that so many of them give up in despair. Add to this that so many Protestants are living in a state neither of light nor of darkness, but in a sort of twilight of doubt and uncertainty which they have it in their power to dispel. This unenviable condition of our separated brethren it is our bounden duty to relieve.

COMMUNION UNDER ONE KIND

Objection.—"The cuppe of the Lord is not to be denied to the laye people. For both the parts of the Lord's Sacrament, by Christes ordinaunce and commaundement, ought to be ministered to all Christian men alike."—Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, Art. 20.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic Church would be the last institution in the world to deny the people anything in her gift that would conduce to their spiritual profit. If she gives the faithful the Eucharist only under one kind it is because she is obliged by circumstances to withhold the chalice from the laity; but at the same time she neither infringes any ordinance of Christ Our Lord nor deprives the faithful of any essential benefit which the sacrament was instituted to confer upon them.

But what are these prohibitory circumstances? They are, in general, circumstances connected with the reverence due a sacrament in which Our Lord Jesus Christ is as really and as substantially present as He is in heaven at the right hand of the Father. If our non-Catholic readers would appreciate to the full what we are going to say on the subject they must endeavor to realize that Catholics sincerely be-

lieve that under the appearance of wine is present, in the most real and literal sense, the precious blood of our divine Saviour. If the contents of the chalice were given to the laity they could not be given, at least as a rule, in a manner consistent with reverence. Hence the partaking of the chalice is permitted only to the priest, during the Holy Sacrifice, which is offered in the name of both priest and people. As we shall see later, communicants are not thereby deprived of any essential benefit conferred by the sacrament.

But what are the circumstances in question? Catholics, certainly, can easily imagine them. Fancy a parish of ten thousand souls, for whose Sunday worship provision is made through six or eight Masses, rapidly succeeding one another from dawn to midday. At each of these Masses, when the signal is given, an army of communicants is seen approaching the altar-rail. Time is precious and holy communion must be given expeditiously, though with decorum and according to fixed rubrics. Imagine a chalice filled and refilled and filled again out of some common receptacle on the altar, with constant danger to its precious contents, or at least to some small portion of them. The danger of accident or of irreverence increases, of course, with the number of the communicants, among whom there are so many whose oddity of manners makes it difficult to administer communion even under the species of bread.

Like enough, some portion of the sacred blood would remain unconsumed and would have to be preserved in the tabernacle amidst the other sacred vessels, which are used daily. How it would tax the priest's care to preserve that chalice, with its contents, from all manner of accident; and meantime the sacred species would be growing vapid or sour. Furthermore, many of the communicants would have a natural aversion to the taste of wine, others would not be able to retain it. Not a few would feel a repulsion to drinking from the same cup as others, in some cases from a reasonable fear of infection.

These apprehensions are not fancy-bred; they are the fruit of the actual experience of the Church in the administration of the Eucharist under both kinds. They have been felt even in non-Catholic congregations, where they have been the subject of very serious discussion. An additional difficulty is experienced by some in our day, arising

from the fear that the use of wine in the communion service may beget the habit of intemperance.

Leibnitz, the distinguished philosopher and theologian of the seventeenth century, who labored long but unsuccessfully for the reconciliation of Protestantism and Catholicism, says of his own time, "There are some Protestants who admit that if a person have a natural abhorrence of wine, he may be content with the communion of bread alone"—"*System of Theology*," p. 121. Doubtless some of the Protestant denominations of to-day would abolish their present practice if it were not for the fact that communion under one kind formed the subject-matter of some of their original articles of protest against the Church of Rome.

When the Reformers first came upon the scene communion under one kind was in actual possession. Why did they abolish it? They retained so many other things which they had on the sole authority of the Church, and without a word of authorization in Scripture, that we ask with a natural curiosity and surprise why they did not retain communion under one kind, on the same authority.

Leibnitz reminds his co-religionists of their inconsistency. "I have no doubt," he says, "that those who are in authority have power to make laws in such matters as these; and that the faithful are bound rather to obey them than to give rise to a schism, which St. Augustine shows to be almost the greatest of all evils. Indeed, the Church's power of defining is very extensive, even (though this is only in a certain way) in things which belong to positive divine law; as appears from the transfer of the Sabbath to the Lord's Day, the permission of 'blood and things strangled,' the canon of the sacred books, the abrogation of immersion in baptism, and the impediments of matrimony; some of which Protestants themselves securely follow, solely on the authority of the Church, which they despise in other things"—*Ibid.*, p. 124.

They abolished communion under one kind and gave the chalice to the laity. One of the principal reasons alleged for the change was that communion under both kinds was a matter of divine "ordinaunce and commaundement." But where do they find the ordinance and commandment? Surely not in the famous sixth chapter of St. John's gospel, whose bearing on the Eucharist Protestants as a body will

not acknowledge. For the sake of the comparative few who do acknowledge it let us remark that although in v. 54 Our Lord does say, "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you," a rigorous interpretation of the words in favor of the utraquists would logically require a like rigor in interpreting another verse a little lower down: "He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me." Here the effect produced by the sacrament is promised to those who eat His flesh: the drinking of His blood is not mentioned. Surely then the substance of the ordinance (formal or implied) would be observed by receiving communion under the species of bread.

But perhaps there is a general ordinance in the words, "Do this in remembrance of Me." But not even here is the practice enjoined upon the faithful in general. The words are addressed to the apostles and through them to the priests of the Church, but not to the people. As the priests were to offer the sacrifice, and as this required the species of both wine and bread, both were to be consumed by the priest.

The principal, indeed the one essential, reason why communion under one kind is deemed sufficient for the faithful at large is that Christ Our Lord is present, whole and entire, under the species of bread just as He is under the species of wine. *There is not, nor can there be, any physical separation of the blood from the ever-living body of Christ. Consequently, Christ, whole and entire, must be present under either species;* and as it is He that is our sacramental food and drink, we receive the whole of our spiritual nourishment by receiving the sacrament under the appearance of bread.

So much for the Eucharist as a sacrament. As a sacrifice, on the other hand, both elements are necessary for the full significance of the sacrificial rite. Hence the apostles and their successors in the priesthood are obliged in the sacrifice of the Mass to consecrate both elements, and, as the communion is an integral part of the Mass, to receive both.

Finally, the present practice of the Church has the sanction of ancient usage. Although, very naturally, it was primitively the custom to give holy communion under both species, still there is abundant evidence of the fact that in the first centuries the faithful were allowed at times to

receive under the species of bread alone. They were in some cases permitted to take the consecrated species home to their houses, to be there preserved and received. The sacred Host was also sent to the prisons of the martyrs. Infants were also allowed to receive holy communion, but only under the species of wine—a custom still surviving in the Greek Church. These facts of ancient usage are not denied, nor can they be denied, by any one who has even an imperfect acquaintance with early Church history. One would suppose they were entirely unknown, so little impression do they make, even upon those who profess a reverence for the primitive practice of the Church of God. / According to the opinion of the Protestant Leibnitz, the question of communion under one species is a typical case in which authority is needed to decide what is of divine ordinance and what is matter of ecclesiastical discipline.

CONFESSION DIVINELY INSTITUTED

Objection.—It is not in the power of the creature to forgive offenses committed against the Creator; hence confession, in which the priest presumes to pardon sins, can not be of divine institution.

THE ANSWER.—The power of absolving from sins was conferred by Christ on the apostles and on their successors in the priesthood. This doctrine is based on Scripture, and both the doctrine and the practice are as old as the Church of God. The doctrine and the practice of the Reformers were a novelty when first introduced; and that fact alone should awaken deep reflection in every sincere and open-minded adherent of the Reform. Novelties in religion are always to be suspected; and as regards the religion of Christ, novelties in doctrine are necessarily errors when condemned as such by the teaching authority of a Church which received so many promises of divine aid.

Luther, it is true, retained confession in his new system of religion, but repudiated the pardoning power of the priest. His denial of this power was an innovation, was condemned by the Church, and, as we shall see, was contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the very words on which Luther could base any doctrine on confession.

In these words Our Lord plainly tells His apostles that they have the power of forgiving sins, and Luther had no warrant for destroying the literal and obvious meaning of the words, especially on the inspiration of his own private and personal experiences. For, after all, were not Luther's personal experiences—his *Heilserfahrungen*, as they have been styled—the origin of the new doctrines? (See "Justification.")

A direct proof of the Catholic doctrine on the remission of sins is found in the twentieth chapter of St. John's gospel (21-23), where the evangelist is narrating a vision of Our Lord after the Resurrection: "As the Father hath sent Me I also send you. When He had said this He breathed on them; and He said to them: Receive ye the Holy Ghost. *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained.*"

Still ampler powers, including the remission of sins, are conferred by the following words (Matt. xviii. 18): "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."

The first of these passages furnishes a demonstration of the principal points of the Catholic doctrine. This we shall endeavor to show in the following comments:

1. "Whose sins you shall forgive." The word "forgive" can have but one meaning, and the meaning should be obvious. The word can not mean, as the Lutherans maintain it does, merely to *declare* that the sinner is forgiven in heaven, in virtue of his renewing the faith of his Baptism. When we say that a person forgives we do not mean that he declares that some one else forgives. The act is his own. In the present case, it is true, the act of forgiveness on earth must be ratified by an act of forgiveness in heaven; but that is guaranteed by the promise and institution of Christ: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," which is equivalent to saying, "The sins forgiven by you are in very truth forgiven, because they are at the same time forgiven by God." In other words, God graciously regards the act of His minister and representative as though it were His own.

The word "forgive," moreover, must have the same meaning in the two clauses of the sentence, "Whose sins

you shall *forgive*, they are *forgiven* them;” and as true forgiveness is meant in the second clause, it must be meant in the first; but in so far as the forgiveness is the act of God’s minister it derives all its efficacy from divine institution and divine ratification.

Most Protestants are turned from the Catholic doctrine on confession by the strong repugnance they feel to the idea of a man’s wielding powers which can belong only to God. But they should remember that the power to forgive sins is only a *delegated* power. The confessor really and truly forgives sin, *but always in the name of God*. This appears in the very formula of absolution pronounced by the priest in the confessional: “I absolve thee from thy sins *in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost*.” It is not in his own name or by his own underived authority that he absolves, but in the name and by the authority of God. He absolves in virtue of a commission received from God. Just as a king might commission a high officer of his realm to pardon outlaws whenever he found the offenders repentant and ready to make satisfaction for their crimes, so God can appoint the priests of His Church to dispense His mercies to sinners when they are found to be in good dispositions.

It can not be denied that God *can* delegate one of His creatures to extend pardon in His name to his fellow-creatures. His absolute power to do so is not repugnant to our Christian idea of God and His attributes. The absolving power does not raise man to a level with God, since man absolves only in virtue of a commission from God. It does not make a man the absolute judge of the dispositions of his fellow-men, for God alone knows the heart; but it does empower him, when he sees the ordinary signs of contrition in the penitent, to dispense the grace which God has attached to the sacrament. In this, as in other matters, he is one of the “dispensers of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. iv. 1). If the sinner who confesses does not truly repent for his sins, the absolution of the priest is not ratified in heaven.

The wisdom of God in bestowing such power on His priests is manifest in the results produced by its exercise and in the way in which it responds to the cravings of the human heart. The effects of confession have been acknowledged by many of our separated brethren. (See “Con-

fession and the People.'') Not, of course, that they have had any experience of such confession as is practised in the Catholic Church, but in those who have had such experience they are aware that such effects are produced; whilst the great gap in Protestant life caused by the absence of confession is brought painfully home to them.

The divine wisdom is shown in the provision made for the unburdening of the heart—especially in regard to matters which are the heart's own secrets and will not be communicated to any one except under circumstances guaranteeing peace of mind and perfect security. It is shown also in the fact that God has associated the reconciliation of the sinner with an external rite of religion, and one, too, that bears a special stamp of divine authority. Repentance, however sincere, if locked up in the heart, can not breed the peace and tranquillity experienced by the penitent when he hears words of absolution which fall upon his ears as though they had descended from Heaven itself. The divine wisdom is manifest also in the restraint put upon the sinner by the obligation of confessing his sins.

2. The power to forgive sins extends to *all* sins. "Whose sins you shall forgive, etc." No sins are excluded, and by the force of the words all are included. If any sins confessed with the proper dispositions could be denied forgiveness, Our Lord, it must be presumed, would not have worded His solemn commission to the apostles in so general a form. Hence His words can not refer to the remission of sins in Baptism and consequently only to sins committed before Baptism, for as sin would be committed after Baptism, that, too, must fall under the powers of the keys.

The Church from the earliest centuries has taught that no sins were excepted when the general power of absolving was conferred on the Church. The Montanists of the second century were condemned as heretics for maintaining that the Church had not the power of absolving from grievous sins. The Novatians, in the third century, fell under the same ban for restricting the power of the Church as regards grievous sins. Moreover, on this as on other essential points relating to confession, the Oriental sects agree, and have always agreed, with the Catholic Church; a fact which proves that in the early centuries, before East and West were divided, the present Catholic doctrine was that of the universal Church.

3. The power conferred upon the apostles was to be transmitted to their successors in the priesthood. The immediate recipients of the power of absolving and retaining sins were the apostles alone, for to them alone were the words of Our Lord addressed; but the power conferred on the apostles was to be perpetuated in the Church. For, when Our Lord, in granting this power to the apostles, uttered the words, "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you," He could not have had in mind a merely personal favor bestowed upon the apostles. The mission which Christ had received from His Father and in virtue of which He sent forth His apostles must bear fruit in the Church to the end of time, and the powers conferred in the act of sending them forth must be perpetuated in the apostles' successors.

It would seem strange indeed that Our Lord should so solemnly assure His apostles that He was now executing the great mission He had received from the Father by conferring a personal privilege which was to last only during the few short years of the apostles' lives. The mission of the apostles was to be the mission of the Church; and as the Church was to endure to the end of the world the powers conferred on the apostles must be the lasting possession of the Church.

We would ask any one who holds that the power given to the apostles was a personal and exclusive prerogative to consider the practical bearings of such a prerogative. The twelve apostles, let us suppose, possessed the personal privilege of absolving from sin, just as an ecclesiastic of our day may possess certain personal powers received from the Pope during a visit to Rome—powers of which his friends at home, say in America, are glad to avail themselves. A discipline of penance would thus have been established; and although the apostles could not be everywhere, many Christians, thousands, no doubt, would seek and obtain the privilege of being absolved by one of the Twelve; and just so far as it was a privilege it is conceivable that God might confer upon the apostles the power to grant it. But is it likely that in so important a matter as the reconciliation of the sinner with God and his eternal salvation some would be given the peace and security consequent upon this apostolic act and others deprived of it?

But what shall we say of the alternative power of "re-

taining," or refusing to pardon, which was given the apostles together with that of pardoning? The apostles would be empowered to refuse forgiveness on seeing improper dispositions in the sinner. Is it possible that this element in the discipline of penance was to cease upon the deaths of the apostles? that the rigors of the penitential system were to be held over the heads of obstinate sinners during the lives of the apostles, and then suddenly cease? How sinners would rejoice at the disappearance of the last vestige of apostolic power! How helpless would that poor sinner be who should happen to be under an apostolic ban when the last of the apostles died!

4. But the power of forgiving and retaining sins was not to be exercised without any act proceeding from the sinner. Absolution on the part of the priest supposes self-accusation (of course with true sorrow) on the part of the sinner. Let us not forget that the power conferred was twofold. It was not only a power of forgiveness, but also a power of retaining, i.e., of refusing to forgive. If the power were only a pardoning power, it is perhaps conceivable that absolution could be granted without confession. The power of forgiving sins might be such that the priest, after exhorting one or more persons to repent in their hearts, might without more ado pronounce a formula of pardon. But the words, "Whose sins you shall retain, etc.," change the whole nature of the case. *The priests are evidently constituted judges.* They are to decide whether the sinner is worthy of absolution or not. But how can they do so unless they know the state of the sinner's soul, unless they know the specific character of his offenses, the view he takes of them, his resolutions for the future, his willingness to make reparation for the harm done the person, the character or the property of his neighbor? But all this supposes self-accusation on the part of the sinner. As regards sins committed entirely in the secrecy of the heart, it is plain that the priest can have no inkling of the state of the soul except through the confession of the sinner.

5. But confession is not only a condition for receiving absolution; it is a condition for eternal salvation, in regard to grievous sins, or sins that cut one off from salvation. In other words, there is a universal obligation of confessing grievous sins. This obligation is implied in the powers granted to the apostles and their successors. A little reflec-

tion should suffice to show the absurdity of a situation in which the priests of the Church would be equipped with the power of binding and releasing in matters bearing on eternal salvation, whilst the faithful would have it in their power to evade their jurisdiction. Many would doubtless choose the easier way, and many, still held in their sins by the refusal of the priest to absolve them, could and would nullify the action of the priest at pleasure. The binding power conferred upon the priests of the Church would be rendered perfectly nugatory. Confession must then be an obligation for all or for none.

The obligation of confessing has been inculcated and insisted upon in the Church from the earliest ages. The records of the councils and the writings of the Fathers abound in testimonies to that effect. Among others, St. Basil says: "We must confess our sins to those who are appointed the dispensers of the divine mysteries"—"*Reg. Brev.*, 286." And St. Augustine, the great Doctor of the West, writing as though he were addressing our modern Reformers, says to the people of his time: "Let no one among you say: 'I do penance in secret and before God—God who knows that I repent in my heart will forgive me.' Was it said to no purpose, then: 'Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven'? Was it to no purpose that the Church received the keys of the kingdom of heaven?" "*Serm.* 392, al. 49." Testimonies of the same kind might be multiplied from St. Cyprian, St. Irenaeus, and others.

It is only too evident that the Reformers in their discussions on confession have confined their attention to the absolving power, and have shut their eyes to the binding power. The absolving power they have either diluted or reasoned away, except when they have regarded it as a personal prerogative of the apostles. The power of binding is an idea which has not fructified in their minds. It would seem to be a seed dropped into uncongenial soil, whereas in the Catholic Church both ideas have germinated to the full in the penitential practice that has been handed down through the ages.

CONFESSION AND THE PEOPLE

Some Common Accusations.—Confession—at least private confession—is an invention of the priests. It is the secret force by which the Roman Church enslaves the consciences of the people. One of the worst features of auricular confession is the practice of questioning penitents about their sins.

THE ANSWER.—Any one who either utters or accepts the above statement about the origin of the confessional would be cured of his error by a slight taste of a confessor's experience. So far as the interests of the priests were concerned it would have been the height of folly in them to have invented confession. Let us see what is involved in this supposed invention of the priests. To have to sit in a narrow box hour after hour, often in a stifling atmosphere, listening to story after story of spiritual misery; to be ever in readiness, night and day, to answer a call to the sick-chamber, where not unfrequently one must expose himself to danger of infection; to be committed to the obligation of secrecy, by which one may forfeit all right of self-defense (there have been many cases in which priests have incurred the severest penalties by a refusal to betray the secrets of the confessional); these are only a fraction of the pains and discomforts and dangers brought upon themselves by the priests in their supposed invention of sacramental confession. Let us realize all this, and then ask ourselves whether the game was worth the candle.

An invention of the priests! When or where was confession invented? Has it not been in use in the Church from the earliest ages? (See "Confession Divinely Instituted.") That it was an invention of the priests was not the persuasion of some of the early Reformers. Confession has been retained in Lutheranism, and the absolution of the priest has a place to this day in Anglican formularies, though it stands for very little in the practice of the Anglican Church, except in High-Church circles. Does not the accusation against the priests sound like a party shibboleth?

And then the fell motive of the invention—the enslaving of the people! Who, or what, can these slave-drivers be?

Whence are the priests recruited? Do they form a caste? or is it a family interest they are serving, and with a hereditary family spirit and policy? Is it not preëminently true that the *priests are of the people*? No system of enslavement could last even half a century if the enslavers were entirely recruited from the ranks of the enslaved.

If by enslaving the people is meant getting a hold upon the conscience which tends to strengthen the Catholic cause and perpetuate the Catholic religion, then, admitting for the sake of argument that confession operates toward that end—which it does to some extent—the question now turns upon the merits of the Catholic religion. If it teaches the truth, the mind is not enslaved: “the truth shall make you free.” If it teaches error, the mind is indeed subjected to the servitude of error; but how many of those who brand Catholic teaching as error and as a species of enslavement have taken the trouble to inform themselves of what genuine Catholic teaching is? On the other hand, who better than Catholics can give a reason for the faith that is in them? If confession is an enslavement, is it not strange that in the course of each year tens of thousands in English-speaking countries show themselves, by their return to the faith of their fathers, decidedly enamored of the state of slavery?

Neither are Catholics enslaved nor do they feel they are enslaved. A sinner who comes to his confessor under the galling yoke of sin steps forth from the confessional with a delicious sense of breathing the air of freedom. Peace and a sense of renewed hope and strength are the invariable feeling of those who have laid their burden at the feet of God’s representative and have come away with a moral assurance of reconciliation with their Maker. The feeling of a Catholic after confessing has not altogether escaped the notice of our Protestant friends. Longfellow, in his “*Evangeline*,” after describing the natural graces of the Acadian peasant girl, adds:

“But a celestial brightness—a more ethereal beauty—
Shone on her face and encircled her form when, after confession,
Homeward serenely she walked with God’s benediction upon her.
When she had passed, it seemed like the ceasing of exquisite music.”

Goethe, who is universally known as a poet, but who was no less distinguished as a thinker and as a man who pos-

sessed a large acquaintance with human life, has some apposite remarks on the subject of the confessional: They are reported by Henry Boss the younger, who tells us in a letter on Goethe written in February, 1805: "[After an illness] he soon resumed his habit of having something read to him. I brought him Luther's 'Table-Talk' and read some of it to him. He listened with interest for a full hour." He here quotes some invectives of Goethe's against Luther which do not concern us just here; after which he continues: "This led up to a fine discourse on the comparative advantages of Catholicism and Protestantism. I agree with him in his strictures upon the Protestant religion, for placing too heavy a load on the shoulders of the individual man. Formerly a burden might be taken off the conscience by the help of others, but now the soul must endure it, and endure it alone; and it has not strength of itself to restore equilibrium to its powers. *Auricular confession should never have been taken away from men.*"

Goethe, as a young man, had had some experience of the Lutheran confessional, which he had found anything but a haven of peace. We shall cite a few sentences from his "Dichtung und Wahrheit" on the subject of particularizing in one's accusation in the confessional, premising that Catholics are obliged to confess *specifically* all their grievous sins; that is to say, sins by which they would forfeit their eternal salvation.

"We were taught," he says, "that we were much better than the Catholics for this very reason: that we were not obliged to acknowledge anything in particular in the confessional, nay, that this would not be at all proper, even if we wished to do it. This last did not seem right to me; for I had the strangest religious doubts, which I would readily have had cleared up on such an occasion. Now as this was not to be done, I composed a confession for myself, which, while it well expressed my state of mind, was to confess to an intelligent man, in general terms, that which I was forbidden to tell him in detail. But when I entered the old choir of the Barefoot Friars, when I approached the strange latticed closets in which the reverend gentleman used to be found for that purpose, when the sexton opened the door for me, when I now saw myself shut up in the narrow place . . . all the light of my mind and heart was extinguished at once, the well-conned confession-speech would not cross

my lips; I opened, in my embarrassment, the book which I had in hand, and read from it the first short form I saw, which was so general that anybody might have spoken it with quite a safe conscience. I received absolution, and withdrew neither warm nor cold; went the next day with my parents to the Table of the Lord, and, for a few days, behaved myself as was becoming after so holy an act." Engl. Transl. I, p. 248 f. He then goes on to describe a habitual state of trouble and doubt from which any prudent and experienced priest might have relieved him, but which as a fact led him to abandon the church altogether. There is small need of pointing the moral which will here suggest itself to many of our readers.

Another eminent Protestant, Leibnitz,¹ famous as a philosopher, a jurist, and a theologian, discourses, in his "*Systema Theologicum*," on confession in a strain which might easily be mistaken for a chapter from Bellarmine.

"Assuredly," he says, "it is a great mercy on the part of God that He has given to His Church the power of remitting and retaining sins, which she exercises through her priests, whose ministry can not be despised without grievous sin. Nor can it be denied that this is an ordinance in every respect worthy of the divine wisdom; and if there be in the Christian religion anything admirable and deserving of praise, assuredly it is this institution, which won the admiration even of the people of China and Japan; for by the necessity of confessing, many, especially those who are not yet har-

¹Leibnitz (born 1646 at Leipzig, died 1716) will perhaps be a puzzle to the general reader if his habitual attitude toward Catholicism is not explained. He labored strenuously to bring about a reconciliation between Rome and the Reformed churches, and in many parts of his writings he expresses distinctively Catholic views on the most important questions. His "*Systema*," from which we shall quote occasionally, was his genuine production, but it was not published till about a century after his death. It is a thoroughly Catholic work, so much so that Protestants have doubted his sincerity, or have regarded the book as an attempt by an able pleader, who could argue the two sides of a case, to make out a case for Catholicism, though still siding with Protestantism. But the antecedents of the writer make it highly probable that the "*Systema*" is the natural culmination of the writer's well-known Catholic tendencies. In the chapters from which we shall quote there is not the smallest trace of the special pleader. In any case, his arguments have an intrinsic value, quite apart from his personal authority.

dened, are deterred from sin, and to those who have actually fallen it affords great consolation; in so much that I regard a pious, grave, and prudent confessor as a great instrument of God for the salvation of souls; for his counsel assists us in governing our passions, in discovering our vices, in avoiding occasions of sin, in making restitution, in repairing injuries, in dissipating doubts, in overcoming despondency, and, in fine, in removing or mitigating all the ills of the soul. And if in the ordinary concerns of life there is scarce anything more precious than a faithful friend, what must it be to have a friend who is bound, even by the inviolable obligation of a divine sacrament, to hold faith with us and assist us in our need? And although of old, while the fervor of piety was greater than it is now, public confession and penance were in use among Christians, nevertheless, in consideration of our weakness, it has pleased God to make known to the faithful, through the Church, the sufficiency of a private confession made to a priest; and on this communication the seal of silence is imposed, in order that the confession thus made to God may be placed more completely beyond the reach of human respect"—*Engl. Transl., by Dr. Russell, p. 135 f.*

The questioning of penitents has been no less unfairly represented by our critics than other aspects of confession. As a matter of fact, there is very little questioning of the ordinary penitent. Ill-disposed or ill-prepared penitents are questioned in order that the true state of their souls may be ascertained and proper direction given them; but over-curious or dangerous questioning is neither customary nor permitted. In the entire preparatory training of a priest special care is taken to cultivate in him habits of prudence and reserve in the performance of so delicate a task as the directing of human consciences.

CREATION

See "God's Existence."

CREEDS AND DEEDS

Erroneous View.—Right conduct does not seem to depend much upon formulas of belief. There are good and bad men in all religions. The great thing, after all, is to do what is right.

THE TRUTH.—The great thing, you say, is to *do* what is right, whether you *believe* what is right or not. But suppose for a moment that one of those things you are obliged to *do* is to accept certain articles of belief, or, in other words, to accept a creed—what then? Can you be indifferent to *all* creeds? There is no Christian creed that does not profess to embody a divine revelation—an expression of God's own mind. *The mind of God revealed to those whom He has created can not be a matter of indifference.* What if one of those creeds should be a correct exponent of God's revelation: could you then be indifferent to *all* creeds, including the right one?

True it is that creeds differ and are mutually contradictory, and that consequently they can not all be right. Indeed there is only one true creed, as there is only one true revelation; but, though creeds are so different, we are not left without a clue to the right one. But it is not our purpose just here to point to the path leading to the one true creed—that we have done elsewhere. (See "The Church of Christ—How to find it" and "Indifferentism.") We are anxious to come to close quarters with our indifferentist friend as regards his criterion of right and wrong actions.

You say that our one great concern should be to *do* the right thing, whether we *believe* the right thing or not. Evidently, then, you regard some acts as good, others as bad; and in this we agree with you. But *why* do you so regard them? You answer that every one has an instinctive feeling that some things are morally right, others morally wrong. But I reply that we are rational beings, and if we can plead no more than instinct we do not act according to reason. You will rejoin that it is rational to judge of things by their results, and that the results of the practice of the virtues of honesty, sobriety, and chastity are happiness for the individual and general order and prosperity for society. In other words, the moral virtues *work* well. But that is not morality—it is only expediency.

At any rate, you will say, there is a certain charm about right actions—which proves them to be right, and perhaps constitutes them such. Again, this is not the morally right, but the esthetically pleasing. Neither the expedient nor the esthetically pleasant answers to that conception of the morally good with which every child of Adam is gifted, and which it is the object of scientific ethics to bring into the foreground of consciousness. Morality implies a *law*, in the strictest sense of the term—a law which impresses itself on the conscience and tells me the right that *must* be done and the wrong that *must* be avoided.

If there is no strict law back of the dictates of conscience there should be no sense of guilt when one does wrong; but it is precisely because before acting I feel the force of a just command, which is the expression and application of a law of morality, that after acting I feel guilty for having gone counter to it. On the other hand, I know of no command to do what is merely expedient or merely pleasing. It may be *desirable* to do the one or the other, but I don't feel *bound* to do either. But where it is a question of the morally right or the morally wrong, I feel that I am bound by the moral law to do the one and avoid the other. This is the only rational interpretation of that universal impression which men have of a right and a wrong in their actions. There is a *law*, and a law that binds, beneath the dictates of conscience.

But if we once admit a law of morality we must also admit that it has its ultimate origin in that which is the source of all law—the *will of God*. All obligation in the moral order must be traced to the ultimate source of all authority, for authority is implied in the very notion of law. If I can not trace a reputed obligation back to the ultimate source of authority, I may feel it pleasant or profitable to do the thing in question, but I can not feel bound to do it.

What we have said applies to moral action in general; but it is plain, of course, that when God's will is manifested by means of positive divine laws, as in the case of the Ten Commandments and the divine ordinances promulgated by Christianity, the connection between human obligation and the divine will is more directly evident than in the case of the natural law impressed by the divine will upon the human reason.

But the connection thus established between morality and the will of God has important consequences. My notions of morality, or my application of the principles of morality, will vary according to what I know or believe about God and His law. They will vary, in a word, *according to my creed*. I can not, therefore, be indifferent to creeds. If my creed is a deistic one I reject many truths revealed by God, which I am not at liberty to do. If I have a creed which is Christian, but faultily Christian,—if, for instance, it takes a lax view of the marriage tie and permits divorce,—it opens the door to countless moral evils. If it is a creed that does not recognize a principle of authority to which one may look for an absolute decision in matters of faith and morals, it throws its followers back upon their untutored private judgment in matters of the first moment. If it is a creed (or a church) whose general spirit breeds an indifference to the religious education of the young, it is destined to reap a harvest of misdeeds beyond the reckoning of men and angels.

Illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely, but they will easily occur to yourself if you once get seriously thinking on the matter. But even though you observed the whole of God's law externally, the interior motive, which is the very soul of the moral act, would be a matter of the first importance. God as our Creator and sovereign Lord has a right to control our thoughts and feelings, which are the springs of outward action, for our whole being belongs to Him. But the effect of indifference to beliefs is to shut God out of our thoughts in reference to the morality of our actions and to fall back upon motives of pleasure or utility,—which is nothing short of denying the interior allegiance we owe to our Maker.

A parody of Cardinal Manning's on a couplet of Alexander Pope's may serve as a rallying-point for future thoughts on the subject of deeds and creeds. The poet had written:

"For forms and creeds let graceless zealots fight:
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right."

Manning retorts as follows:

"For charts and compasses let graceless zealots fight:
He can't go wrong who steers the ship aright."

(See "Indifferentism.")

CREMATION

Objection.—What is to prevent a Christian—Catholic or non-Catholic—from directing that his body be burned after his death? There is nothing intrinsically wrong in cremation and it may be made an important factor in public sanitation.

THE ANSWER.—We grant that in the bare idea of cremation there is nothing necessarily sinful. The burning of a human corpse is not necessarily or essentially wrong from a moral point of view. But this one consideration will not settle the practical question. Cremation can not be considered apart from its associations or from its bearings upon Christian thought and usage. It is this relative significance of cremation that justifies the Church in forbidding the practice; and in forbidding it she has the sympathy and concurrence of the great mass of Christians of all denominations.

The reader need not be reminded that the practice of cremating human corpses which is now getting into vogue was a general pagan custom at the dawn of Christianity and that it was the Church that brought about its general abolition. With the advance of Christianity the funeral-pyres disappeared and human remains were reverently laid away in tombs. The Jews had never practised cremation, and the fact that the Chosen People and the Christians, their successors in the Faith, were at one on this point is very significant. It seems to indicate what estimate of the human body is the natural one to believers in the true God.

The early converts to Christianity had been accustomed as pagans to seeing the bodies of their deceased friends enveloped in flames, and then—nothing but a handful of ashes to be carried away for a remembrance; but now that they were Christians, they felt their natural affection awakened by their supernatural faith, and the human forms that were dear to them were left untouched save by the destructive forces of nature. But, what is more to the point, the Christians regarded the bodies of their friends as having been the temples of the Holy Ghost and as awaiting the day when they should be glorified by being united with their souls in glory. Hence, nothing more natural than a rev-

erent guardianship of the remains of the dead who had died in the Lord.

To-day the Church has a fresh motive for insisting on the perpetuation of Christian burial and the exclusion of cremation. Enemies of the Church who are bent on destroying every vestige of ancient Christianity are in the forefront of the movement in favor of cremation. The free-masons in conjunction with certain cremating societies are making this a part of their propaganda against Christian beliefs and practices. The Church, as might be expected, is all the more zealous for her traditional mode of treating the remains of the dead, and she forbids her children to give any help or encouragement to a movement whose inspiration is anything but Christian.

Many eugenists also, regarding cemeteries of the prevailing type as a menace to the health of large communities, have been no less zealous advocates of cremation. Now the Church is alive to the necessity of guarding against infection arising from this or any other such source; and we may say with confidence that if the need for a change in the direction of cremation were sufficiently urgent, and if the evil complained of could not otherwise be removed, the Church would not object to cremation, where needed, any more than she has objected to the burning of human beings in certain plague-stricken cities; but these dangers are often exaggerated, or at least can be met by expedients short of cremation. The proper location of cemeteries and the rigorous enforcement of sanitary laws will doubtless be a sufficient solution of the problem for many a day.

It will be well for Catholics to know the positive prohibitions of the Church in the matter of cremation. We would ask our Catholic readers to note well the following regulations:

1. It is unlawful for any one to order or direct that his own remains or those of another be cremated. It is unlawful to join any society whose object is to aid in the spread of the practice of cremation; and if any such society should be affiliated to masonic organizations members of the society would be under the same ban as the Masons themselves.

2. It is never allowed to coöperate in the cremating of a body by giving orders, direction, or advice concerning it. There may be reasons in some cases why officials, servants, etc., may be permitted to be present and even to participate

in the transaction, but they should ordinarily not do so without the consent of their confessors, who will be able to determine whether their mere material presence or coöperation is justifiable under the circumstances.

3. No Catholic who has given orders that his body be cremated after death can receive the sacraments of the dying unless he is willing to cancel the orders.

4. No one can be buried with the rites of the Church who is known to have decided, of his own free choice, to be cremated after death and to have persevered in his decision. Ignorance of the law of the Church or inability to reverse orders given for cremation may, however, be a just plea for indulgence at the hands of the Church.

DARWIN

A Misapprehension.—Darwin was “the incorporated ideal of a man of science”—Huxley, as quoted by President Schurman. Darwin was not a Christian, and the weight of his authority must help considerably to tip the balance in favor of unbelief.

THE TRUTH ABOUT DARWIN.—“The incorporated ideal of a man of science.” The phrase is not a happy one; but it is probably meant to convey the idea that Darwin realized to the fullest the ideal of a man of science. We are not in the least disposed to underrate the real achievements of Darwin; but, as his fame rests chiefly on his theory of natural selection, and as that theory does not now seem likely to prove an adequate explanation of the development of species, the halo about Darwin’s head has lost much of its luster.

In natural selection Darwin lighted upon what seemed to him a bright idea; and the idea was striking enough to arouse the enthusiasm of a generation; but it was too sweeping and too imperfectly supported by evidence to be permanently regarded as a key to one of nature’s great secrets. Natural selection is regarded to-day by leading scientists as a *factor* in the evolution of species, but not as the dominant one. Darwin started the scientists on the path of research, but put them on the wrong scent. Consequently, men of science are now seen retracing their steps in the endeavor

to regain the highway of true scientific progress. (See "Evolution.")

In the present article we are chiefly concerned with Darwin's personal mentality, a study of which will prove highly instructive.

Charles Robert Darwin was born at Shrewsbury, in England, February 12, 1809. He made his higher studies at Edinburgh and Cambridge. From 1831 to 1836 he held the post of naturalist on Her Majesty's ship the *Beagle*, during a government surveying voyage. These years marked the beginning of his labors in the collecting of specimens and in the study of facts upon which he afterwards based his evolutionary theory. In 1842 he entered upon a life of retirement and scientific labor, which finally issued in the theory of natural selection.

His thoughts on the subject were, however, a matter of private speculation and would perhaps not have been published so soon had he not been aware that another investigator, Alfred Russel Wallace, was on the same trail. This determined him to make the results of his researches public. It is gratifying to know that Darwin and Wallace published the theory of natural selection conjointly, in essays read before the Linnæan Society, July 1, 1858. In 1859 appeared from Darwin's pen the "Origin of Species," a book which in some important matters revolutionized the study of nature, and gave the theory of natural selection an ascendancy which it retained for several decades. Among evolutionists of the present day there is a growing tendency to reject natural selection as a full and adequate explanation of facts.

Whatever may be said of Darwin as an evolutionist, it would be a grievous mistake to attribute to him the character of a philosopher, and especially to regard him as a man of large philosophical outlook or of keen logical acumen. He himself disclaimed the possession of any such qualities (with a humility, by the way, which is not a little to his credit), and there is nothing in his life which indicates their presence. The following extracts from his "Life and Letters," edited by his son, Francis Darwin, will illustrate some of his intellectual peculiarities, and at the same time, we may add, prove that he was far from being of the class of rampant atheists who so often appeal to his name and authority.

"I feel," says Darwin, "in some degree unwilling to express myself publicly on religious subjects, as I do not feel that I have thought deeply enough to justify any publicity." Vol. I, p. 304.

"I have never systematically thought much on religion in relation to science or on morals in relation to society"—*Ibid.*, p. 305.

"Whether [the argument from causality for the existence of God] is an argument of great value I have never been able to decide. I am aware that if we admit a First Cause, the mind still craves to know *whence it came and how it arose*" (italics ours. *Ibid.*, p. 306).

The last sentence furnishes the best possible portrait of one side of Darwin's mentality. His mind is so deeply imbued with the notion that *everything* that exists must have been produced by something else that when his reason brings him to the first—absolutely first—cause in a series of causes and effects, he fails to see that the first cause would not be the first if it could spring from any other; or, not to press dialectics with what may seem to be over-severity, he fails to see that when the mind reaches an absolutely first cause it is brought into contemplation of a Being who is necessarily self-existent and eternal. Now this Being is precisely the God whom we Christians adore. But it must be admitted that Darwin's mind oscillated on this subject, in response to sound logic on the one side and a deep-seated evolutionary bias on the other. In the following extracts from the "Life," we would call special attention to the sentences we have italicized.

"When thus reflecting [on the argument from design] I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the 'Origin of Species'; and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, *Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?*" !! (p. 313.)

"I have no practice in abstract reasoning, and may be all astray. Nevertheless you have expressed my inward conviction, though far more vividly and clearly than I could

have done, that the universe is not the result of chance. But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. *Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?*" (p. 316.)

Open-eyed wonder is the feeling which the reader doubtless shares with the writer in lighting on these unexpected traces of the mind of Charles Robert Darwin. Here we have the extraordinary spectacle of a man who arrives, by the use of his reason, at the verge of the Eternal and the Infinite and gets a glimpse of the divine perfections, when lo! in a moment all is changed—it is all an illusion! How can an ape know God?

If at such critical moments of his life Darwin had been able to steady his wits and reason thus: My mind has reached beyond the bounds of sense and caught a sight of the eternal First Cause; therefore my mind could never have been evolved from the mind of an ape; or, if he had been consistent enough to transfer his intellectual fears to another object, the very evolution theory on which he was working, and had asked himself: Can the mind of man, which was once the mind of an ape, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions about the origin of species? he would have escaped the state of utter confusion that settled upon his mind in regard to the real *ultimate* origin of species.

No, Darwin was not a philosopher. Even as a naturalist he reached distinction by reason of these three facts: 1. He made a brilliant guess, but the thing guessed was, after all, not the real truth. 2. He was a prodigious delver for data on which to build conclusions. 3. He succeeded in correlating the data to some extent; though he was obliged to leave it to some comprehensive intelligence, or intelligences, to make a synthesis of the myriad particulars.

It is in no unfeeling spirit that we have exhibited the uncultivated side of Darwin's intellect. We do so in order to supply one notable illustration of a fact which in the past two or three generations has forced itself upon the notice of observing men; to wit, the partial mental paralysis exhibited by many men of science who have never undergone a rigid training in mental philosophy. A second object we

have had in view is to show how in the case of Darwin as representing a class, his "spiritual powers," as President Schurman says of them, "were atrophied by his absorbing preoccupation with the phenomena of the natural world," and "like the domestic duck whose wings, he tells us, have become shrunken and useless from disuse, the pinions of his own soul, disabled for want of exercise, refused to soar above the solid ground of nature's familiar scenes and occurrences"—*Huxley and Scientific Agnosticism*, p. 76.

DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

Objection.—The Catholic Church is continually introducing new dogmas. Such innovations are not within the competence of the Church, which received the deposit of the Faith to be transmitted unchanged to the end of time. Papal infallibility became an article of faith only thirty or forty years ago. Did the Vatican Council receive a new revelation on the subject?

THE ANSWER.—The Vatican Council received no new revelation, for none was needed. No change was made in the body of doctrine deposited with the apostles. The decree of Infallibility was but an interpretation of a doctrine already found in Scripture. As a historical fact, the Primacy and Infallibility of the successor of Peter had been recognized in practice throughout the history of the Church. It was the one bond of union between the various parts of the Church, communion with the See of Peter being regarded as the touchstone of orthodoxy. (See "Pope, The," II and III.) All that was lacking was an explicit definition, which, however, was not necessary till controversy made it so.

When the prerogative of the Holy See was seriously called in question the Church deemed it necessary to define the true and full meaning of the Primacy which had always been recognized. The Faith was not changed but explained. But there is this difference in the situation between now and before the Vatican Council, that now, after the explicit definition of Papal Infallibility, to deny the doctrine would be plainly and directly heretical, whereas before the definition one might make bold to deny it because it was not explicitly defined and might therefore be re-

garded as not taught by the Church. To-day there is no excuse for not regarding the primacy as implying Infallibility.

The doctrine of Infallibility is a fair sample of a whole class of Catholic teachings which even to fair-minded persons outside the Church seem to be innovations. No declaration of the meaning and import of an old truth can be an innovation on the part of a Church which is appointed the custodian and interpreter of divine revelation. What seems to be a new doctrine is not new except in so far as it is an explicit declaration of what was contained in an older doctrine. In this sense there can be growth and development in Catholic doctrine.

The deposit of the Faith entrusted to the apostles and their successors must not be compared to a deposit of material treasure, which is to be locked away in a casket and to be inspected only occasionally by privileged eyes. The truths of revelation were to be received into human minds. They were to be subjects of meditation and were to grow into the thought and feeling of those who were to receive them. No large and comprehensive idea can remain wholly undeveloped. Reflections will necessarily make it yield more of its meaning than it did at its first enunciation.

Such development of doctrine may, of course, lead to error; and as men's reflections differ they may sometimes result in contradictions. Hence, if there were no criterion by which to test the correctness of individual reflection and deduction Christian teaching would degenerate into a medley of conflicting opinions. But a criterion there surely is; and the criterion is the ruling of a divinely constituted authority residing in the Church. There are times when the Church is obliged to exercise such authority and declare, as regards particular propositions, what must and what must not be accepted as truth. It must formulate the truth; and the truth thus formulated is a dogma of the Catholic faith. It is new only as regards its newly developed form.

The position we have been defending has been attacked in our day by a school of critics which maintains that at least in the early centuries so-called developments of doctrine were not developments at all, but importations of foreign elements, the pure stream of Christian doctrine being con-

taminated by an infusion of Greek philosophy. Even the fourth Gospel, we are told, which has been attributed to St. John, shows in its opening sentences the impress of Græco-Oriental speculation. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The "Word," we are reminded, was the *Logos* of Philo Judæus, a philosopher who made a sorry attempt to amalgamate his own Jewish beliefs with the pagan philosophy of Greece.

The charge thus brought against early Christian teaching is more superficial than might appear from the array of learning by which it is sometimes supported. Critics holding this view are misled as to the substance by confining their attention to the form. The truth is that when Christianity came into contact with Greek philosophy and was obliged to meet it on its own ground it used the language of philosophy to express Christian ideas. Frequently, when a Christian idea found what was more or less a counterpart of itself in any teaching of pagan philosophy, the pagan notion was first purged of what was false and then in its new form adopted as Christian truth. The old term was thus used with a new meaning.

It was thus that Christianity was made intelligible and acceptable to those whose thoughts had been running in the grooves of pagan speculation. Thus it was that the *Logos* of the later Greek philosophy was given its true meaning by St. John in the first sentences of his Gospel. The Word that was made Flesh, the Word that was *with* God and *was* God, was the real *Logos*, of whom only a distorted conception was familiar to Greek speculation. Among the Græco-Judæic philosophers and among the Gnostics, the Monarchians and others, the term conveyed the idea of a mediator, who was vaguely conceived as personal and divine, and yet not regarded as one in nature and identical in substance with the Deity. With this being the Word of St. John could never be justly confounded. The difference between the two is emphasized in the very passage in which the term is used—"*And the Word was God.*"

It is true that nowhere else in the sacred writings is the same truth set forth in such plain and explicit language; but that only proves that nowhere else was it natural or to be expected that such language should be employed. St. John wrote from out an environment that was rife with

theories concerning the Logos; and what more natural than that he should announce the *true* Logos?

The case of St. John's gospel is typical of the use made of pagan philosophy by the early Christian writers. There was always a standard of doctrine, derived from Scripture and tradition, which enabled those writers to separate the chaff from the grain. If they used pagan language and modes of thought, they were not indiscriminating in their use of them.

We are thinking, of course, of those who in the judgment of the Church were orthodox. The very distinction of "orthodox" and "heretical" is sufficient to show that the Church was not helplessly exposed to the inroads of a false philosophy. The principle on which that distinction was based was that any philosophical opinion not in agreement with Scripture and sound tradition was to be rejected. Dogmatic formulæ were framed with an eye to *what had been taught from the beginning*. This indeed is the most conspicuous feature of the teaching of the Fathers and the Councils. This principle was the very touchstone of orthodoxy.

No serious attempt has been made to prove that any elements of Greek thought built into the fabric of Catholic teaching is at variance with Scriptural or apostolical doctrine. Writers on the subject are often too much occupied with the external phenomena to penetrate to the substance. (See "Dogmas.")

DIVORCE

Objection.—The Catholic Church forbids divorce in all cases. This law is more severe than that taught by Christ Himself; for He tells the Pharisees (Matt. xix. 9) that at least on account of infidelity to the marriage bond a husband may leave his wife and marry another.

THE ANSWER.—The first part of our answer will be directed to the believer, who accepts the Bible as the Word of God, and the second part to the unbeliever.

It is on the text just referred to that the Reformed churches have built their doctrine on divorce. They acknowledge, most of them, that divorce is forbidden in the

Gospel, but assert that one case is excepted, that, namely, in which the wife has committed adultery. In that case, they maintain, the husband may dismiss his wife and marry another. To this is opposed the Catholic doctrine, *taught from the beginning of Christianity*; which is, that marriage can never be dissolved till the death of either of the parties to the contract. The two may live apart when there is a just reason for the separation, but until one or the other dies they remain husband and wife and can not remarry.

The Catholic doctrine may be established by the very passage in Scripture on which Protestants stake their whole case in favor of divorce. Let us see the passage in its context:

“And there came to him the Pharisees, tempting Him and saying: Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? Who answering, said to them: Have ye not read that He who made man from the beginning *made them male and female*? And He said: *For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh.* Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. *What therefore God hath joined together let no man put asunder.* They say to Him: Why then did Moses command to give a bill of divorce and to put away? He saith to them: Because Moses, by reason of the hardness of your heart, permitted you to put away your wives: but *from the beginning it was not so*” (Matt. xix. 3-8).

Nothing can be more evident than that Our Lord's intention was to make marriage what it had been from the beginning and to abolish every modification of the divine institution which had hitherto been permitted. The old institution was to be restored wholly and entirely. Therefore, to have a clear conception of what marriage ought to be to-day, we must go back to the period preceding the advent of Moses and the publishing of the Mosaic law; for Moses was the first to permit a dispensation from the full observance of the primitive law. Now in that earlier period, as is plain, the marriage contract bound the contracting parties during their lifetime and absolute divorce was not permitted. In other words, the present Catholic doctrine held full sway. Hence to-day, as before the time of Moses, in the most absolute sense of the words, what God has joined no man may put asunder.

This being the case, we are not prepared to encounter any expression in Scripture favoring a dissolution of marriage and undoing the reformation of marriage instituted by Christ. If any apparent expression of the kind occurs we may be sure that in the context there is enough to explain it in a way that will make it harmonize with the intentions of Christ.

This is the case with the one single passage in the New Testament upon which Protestants erect their doctrine on divorce. After Our Lord had uttered the words quoted above He added: "And I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and he that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery." (It should be needless to explain that it is not directly by putting away his wife that he would commit adultery, but by acts committed in a second marriage, which marriage would be simple concubinage as long as the first wife lived.) Here, the Reformers tell us, there is one case mentioned in which marriage may be dissolved, viz., that of fornication (or adultery) committed by the wife.

In reply we would remind the Reformers that in fixing their attention on one part of the text they have forgotten another. The last clause brings the text more clearly into harmony with the manifest intention of Our Lord to abolish all absolute divorce. "*And he that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery.*" Why "committeth adultery" unless the one put away is still the wife of the one who has put her away? Even when there is a just reason, as in the case of fornication, for dismissing one's wife, the marriage is not thereby dissolved. Our Lord's meaning would then be expressed by the following paraphrase of the verse: "Whosoever shall put away his wife (though a man may be permitted to put away his wife on account of fornication, without, however, re-marrying), and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and in any case he that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery, because she is still the wife of another."

Our Lord's meaning is no less clearly expressed in the fifth chapter of St. Matthew's gospel. Here, in what is known as the Sermon on the Mount, He contrasts the precepts and the spirit of the old dispensation with those of the new. Such expressions as "it was said to them of old,

etc., but *I say to you, etc.*," occur more than once. In regard to marriage we find the following: "And it hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce" (Matt. v. 31). Here, as in the case of the other contrasts, we should expect something different to be prescribed by Our Lord from what had been permitted under the old law. We should expect to see divorce disappear under the new dispensation. And this we shall see is the meaning of the following verse: "But *I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery; and he that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery.*" The meaning of the first clause in the above verse is that the husband that puts away his wife is responsible for the sin that may be committed by the woman through a second union, for she is still his lawful wife; but if he dismiss her on account of the sin of fornication, the husband is not responsible for what may happen afterward. She has deserved dismissal, and the blame is not her husband's if she incur the danger of further sinning. But Our Lord adds, without any exception or distinction, "*He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery,*" because she is still the wife of another. The contrast, then, is clear: Moses permitted a certificate of divorce dissolving marriage; Christ permits no dissolving of marriage and regards as adulterous any marriage contracted by a wife separated from her husband.

The Catholic doctrine is sustained by other significant passages in the sacred writers. In these there is no exception mentioned to the law forbidding divorce, even when it would have been important for any exception, if there were such, to be mentioned. In St. Mark's account of the incident we have been considering as related in the nineteenth chapter of St. Matthew, Our Lord's prohibition of divorce is *absolute and conditionless*. And when Our Lord after His discourse had gone into the house, His disciples, to whom He was accustomed to give exact explanations in private, questioned Him further on the subject of marriage. "And He saith to them: *Whosoever* shall put away his wife and marry another committeth adultery against her. And if the wife shall put away her husband and be married to another she committeth adultery." Note the universal expression "*whosoever*"—none are excepted (Mark x. 2-12).

Our Lord again in Luke xvi. 18 uses words of no less absolute import: "*Every one* that putteth away his wife and marieth another committeth adultery, etc."

And St. Paul inculcates the law of Christian marriage without any mention of exceptions. "The woman that hath a husband, whilst her husband liveth is bound to the law. But if her husband be dead she is loosed from the law of her husband. Therefore whilst her husband liveth she shall be called an adulteress if she be with another man, etc." (Rom. vii., 2, 3).

In the First Epistle to the Corinthians (vii. 10, 11) St. Paul says: "To them that are married, not I but the Lord commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband; and if she depart that she remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband." St. Paul here speaks in the name of Christ and consequently as interpreting the words of Christ; and yet he not only makes no mention of any exception to the law against divorce but positively excludes all exceptions; for he contemplates cases in which the wife would depart from her husband, whether on account of her husband's sins or from some other cause, but he declares that she must remain unmarried, because she has not ceased to be a wife by being separated from her husband! He adds, moreover, "*And let not the husband put away his wife,*" evidently by an absolute divorce, for the Lord Himself had permitted the husband to send away his wife on account of sin, though he would still remain her true husband.

Reviewing the texts we have been quoting, we find that it was Our Lord's intention to reform marriage root and branch. From the beginning matrimony had made man and wife one and had united them by a perpetual bond. In the course of time, owing to the hardness of men's hearts, Moses was directed from on high to permit divorce; but Christ, when He came, re-asserted the sacredness of the marriage tie and declared that now, in the new era of grace, marriage should be what it had been from the beginning. Evidently, then, to permit to-day absolute divorce is to reverse the law of Christ and return to the Mosaic dispensation. It is to turn Christians into Jews!

The interpretation we have given the scriptural texts in question is the interpretation given them *during the fifteen centuries of the Church's existence before the appear-*

ance of Luther. The re-introduction of divorce on the supposed warrant of Scripture was a bold innovation, reprobated by antiquity no less than by the living voice of the Church of God.

The laying of violent hands on so sacred an institution as Matrimony—and St. Paul tells us that it is sacred enough to have been made the symbol of the union between Christ and His Church—is a striking illustration of the lengths to which private judgment may go in dealing with the divinest of things. In the present case it is all the more impressive as the innovation has wrought such sad havoc in the relations of men. When self-constituted reformers presumed to make laws of their own for the government of the married state they were the authors, remotely and *in causa*, of the sin and disorder that have followed in the wake of divorce in our own day. Once an exception was invented to the law of divorce the door was thrown open to all manner of abuses. Absolute divorce, which was sought at first for more or less serious, though insufficient, reasons, has so utterly degenerated that to-day a discontented wife or husband can get a divorce from the courts almost on the asking.

But, to return to the genuine Christian conception of marriage, when the Son of God became man and inaugurated the new dispensation the imperfect was to be superseded by the perfect. God had for a time permitted marriage to lapse into an imperfect state, to prevent greater evils; but now, in an era of greater grace, and when the marriage contract was to be raised to the dignity and given the efficacy of a sacrament, the absolute permanence of the marriage tie was to be a law, admitting of no exceptions.

And indeed it is only under the dominion of grace that marriage can ever realize the beautiful ideal of the married state contemplated by the Saviour of the world. It is the supernatural element in the relations of husband and wife that confers on Christian wedlock its unique character and makes it an object of admiration to those outside the pale of Christianity. It is the supernatural element that solves all those problems (or rather leaves none to be solved) which agitate the unbeliever in his practical study of human nature; who, if he fails to solve them, fails because he eliminates a factor which is essential to their solution. *He knows nothing of sacramental grace.* Fixing his gaze

exclusively on human nature with all its imperfections, he considers a universal law of permanence for the marriage bond an unnatural and rigorous condition under which to live, and regards it as the source of so many evils that the possible enacting of it can not be worthy of the Divine Wisdom. He forgets that *it is precisely the Divine Wisdom that has supplied a remedy for human imperfections by a special sanctification of matrimony.* (See "Marriage a Sacrament.")

It may be objected that there are many who can not thus sanctify the married state. They know nothing of sacraments or of the effects, if such there are, of divine grace. Are these persons, when conjugal happiness ceases, to remain the victims of an unnatural union? Is there no means of escape from their unhappy lot?

To this objection we would reply that God's grace is not wanting to any class or order of human beings. True, the *fullest* influence of grace is experienced within the pale of the Church which Christ has made the dispenser of His mercies; but according to their absolute needs grace is given to all men without exception. The divine aid is always at hand to assist the wedded in overcoming the difficulties of married life; and to those who live according to their lights and observe the natural law, which is written on every human heart, grace is given in exceptional abundance. For no one, therefore, outside the Church is there any excuse for breaking the marriage bond.

But what about innocent victims of an unnatural or an unhappy marriage?

We answer, in the first place, that both divine and human law provide for *separation*, without divorce, in cases in which exceptional suffering, guiltily inflicted, is endured by either of the parties at the hands of the other. This should be a satisfactory solution of the difficulty to all right-minded persons. It secures the happiness of the innocent party and is no injustice to the guilty.

But, in the second place, it must be remembered that the divine law and all human law based on the divine provide, not only for the good of the individual, but also and still more for the good of society. The good of the greater number is more important than that of the few. The divine prohibition of divorce debars the discontented wife or husband from the pleasures, such as they may be, of a second

marriage, but the general good of mankind is secured—indeed, society is saved from the direst of evils. We may add, however, that it rarely happens that the individual is not saved from as great evils as society at large. What works for the general good works for the good of the individual.

We can not do better in this connection than quote a forcible passage from a French author whose high intellectual influence in his native country is well known; a writer of fiction, but of fiction based on realities. The words we shall quote are put into the mouth of a priest, and are addressed to a divorced woman who strangely wishes to be reconciled with the Church without separating from her second husband. The priest's refusal to admit her to the sacraments evokes a bitter complaint against the laws of the Church, which the woman declares are less merciful than the divorce laws of the Code. The priest's reply is a vindication of the marriage laws of the Church as preservative of the general good:

"Let me give you an illustration, commonplace it may be, but to the point. A ship has arrived at a port where a passenger wishes to land. It is of the highest importance for him; he wants, for instance, to see a dying father or to take part in a lawsuit upon which depends the welfare of his family—imagine anything you like. But a case of plague has broken out upon the boat and the authorities have forbidden that any passengers come ashore for fear of contagion. Would it be just, would it be kind, to give way to the entreaty of the one traveler at the risk of spreading the plague in a city of a hundred thousand inhabitants? Clearly not. Here, then, is a case in which justice and charity demand the sacrifice of the individual interest for the general good. This principle dominates all society. If we are called upon to decide between two courses, the first clearly beneficial to the whole community and painful to some individual, the second agreeable to him but hurtful to the whole, both justice and charity demand that we shall adopt the first course. This is indeed the test which we must apply to every institution, and, applying it to indissoluble marriage, what is the result? Society is composed of families, and the better the families the better will society be. Now think how much greater likelihood there is of healthy families where a system of indissoluble marriage prevails. If marriage is irrevocable it will be entered

upon only after the most serious reflection; there will be greater closeness of bond between grandparents, parents, and children, since the family comprises fewer alien elements, there will be chance of greater unity of spirit, of a common tradition. Marriage of this kind is the strongest pledge for that social permanence without which there is nothing but anarchy and perpetual unrest. And here history confirms reason. It teaches that all superior civilizations have developed toward monogamy. Now divorce is not monogamy; it is successive polygamy. I will not give you a course of sociology; but do you know what statistics show? Where divorce exists, the number of criminals, lunatics, and suicides is tenfold amongst divorced persons. Thus, for one who, like yourself and a few others, retains in his divorced condition the finer traits of heart and mind, the majority lose or debase them. To base social order upon the supposed needs of possible degenerates is to set up the abnormally low as a standard. We may call that progress, but science calls it retrogression.

“Note that we have been looking at the matter from the point of view of pure observation. Purposely, as I wished you to realize the identity there is between the law of the Church and the law of society, between the teaching of experience and the teaching of revelation. In its struggle for existence humanity has fallen back upon the very same rule of which the Church has made a dogma. Try to realize, in the light of these ideas, how seriously you have erred in availing yourself of the criminal law which the worst enemies of social well-being, the would-be destroyers of the family, have introduced into our code. You yourself have assisted in this task of destruction as far as lay in your power. You sacrificed society to your own happiness. You and your second husband have set up in a small way a type of the irregular home, one, too, all the more dangerous because your virtues enable you to set an example of decency in irregularity, and present an appearance of order in the midst of disorder. It is that which renders so dangerous the errors of the gifted; they retain their natural nobility even when they sin, they fall without becoming degraded. They cloak the deformity of evil and spread it all the more insidiously.

“Though it is but twenty years since that detestable law of divorce was passed, if you only knew how many tragedies

I have seen it produce already; into what catastrophes households like yours have been plunged through their failure to discern the truth, which is stamped on every conscience, that liberty contrary to the laws of nature engenders servitude, neglected duty entails misfortune. I have seen fratricidal hatreds between the children of the first and second marriage, fathers and mothers judged and condemned by their sons and daughters; here deadly antagonism between stepfather and stepson; there between second wife and the husband's daughter. Elsewhere I have seen jealousy of the past, of a past living because the first husband lives, torture the second husband. Again, hideous struggles between the first husband and his former wife over their children's sick-bed, or, where the children have grown up, over a young man's follies or a daughter's marriage. Nor have I mentioned the ever-recurring bitterness against the ill-will, open or dissembled, hypocritical or sincere, it does not matter which, of a world which, after all, retains intact its respect for Christian marriage"—PAUL BOURGET: *A Divorce*.

To sum up: The Catholic teaching is *not* more severe than that of Christ, since it is identical with that of Christ and His apostles. Nor is it more severe than is required by the general good of society. And for the most part the individuals directly concerned—they and their offspring as well—are saved from many evils. The wisdom of Christ in abolishing all divorce is seen, by contrast, in the evils that follow in the track of divorce. It is no less visible in His sanctification of the married state by a sacrament whose effects are experienced by parents and offspring alike.

DOGMAS

Objection.—The binding force of dogmas is an unendurable slavery for the human mind and an obstacle to scientific research. "Let us not forget that the manufacture of dogmas at the Vatican has not yet come to an end"—Tschackert.

THE ANSWER.—As well might one say: "Mathematics is an unendurable slavery for the human mind: it makes me swallow the statement that twice two is four; and it is an obstacle to scientific progress by forbidding me to say that

twice two is five." The case is exactly analogous to that of dogma in its relation to science. Dogma is simply the expression of absolute and undeniable truth. It is neither more nor less than what God has revealed; and for the truth of it God, who is Truth itself, has pledged His word.

Truth is the special and distinctive good of the human understanding. Therefore if, to some extent, the possibility of mistaking error for truth is removed from the understanding, that surely is not slavery but emancipation from error. Progress in science will never be hindered by truth, and therefore never by dogma; on the contrary, it will be stimulated and promoted. The acquisition of one truth can not prevent us from seeking and finding another truth.

"Manufacture of dogmas" is an excellent catchword, but the idea is rooted in misconception. It would not be surprising, it is true, if new definitions of doctrine were yet in store for us, as it would not be surprising if certain truths which the Church believes implicitly to-day were formally and explicitly defined to-morrow; or, in other words, if what is really contained in the original deposit of faith were clearly brought into view by dogmatic declarations. But it is only misconception or prejudice that can call such a defining of truth a manufacture of dogmas.

The remarks of a German writer, Dr. Mausbach, on this subject are well worthy of consideration. (Vid. *Scient. Suppl.* of the "*Germania*," June 12, 1902.)

"The Catholic Church," he says, "has always regarded the books of the New Testament, not as a system, or a complete and final course, of instruction, but rather as an outcome of the living preaching of the word, a compilation of various apostolic documents, originally issued as occasion demanded, but nevertheless possessing in their freshness, vigor and depth, as well as in their God-inspired dignity, a value that placed them far above all systems of human knowledge. But as the Gospel was to be, as Our Saviour expressed it, a good leaven that was to penetrate the whole life of man, the blending of the supernatural truths of revelation with those found in human systems of thought involved no sacrifice of the purity and simplicity of the Gospel message, but was rather a legitimate form of its development. As the germs of truth that lay dormant in the bosom of the early Church were, like the grain of mustard-seed, to expand later into the fulness of their life and growth,

so it has come to pass that the simple and germinal elements of divine truth that appeared in the teachings of the apostles have, at a later stage of the development of God's kingdom, been more fully differentiated and more definitely related."

These remarks will have thrown some light on the alleged influence of Greek philosophy on the teachings of Christianity. That early Christian dogma was a tissue of Greek philosophical ideas is a favorite theory of Harnack's. "The whole of Greek (*i.e.*, heathen) thought," he tells us, "in its fullest development, established itself in the Church." Now this notion, as entertained by Harnack and others, implies that the deposit of the Faith received by the Church was substantially modified by contact with Greek philosophy. The assertion is easily made on the basis of mere surface indications in the dogmas of the Church; and it can not so easily be refuted, at least fully and satisfactorily, in a few lines of print; but the burden of proof rests with the Church's accusers, and, what is more, the presumption is strongly against them. From the beginning, Christianity has been marked by a spirit of conservatism that is all its own. If there is anything that was characteristic of the early Pontiffs and Fathers it was the jealousy with which they guarded what had been taught since the foundation of the Church. Whenever they reached out to the future they first made sure that they were safely anchored in the past. The burden of their contention against every new heresy was that it was not borne out by apostolic tradition.

And this is the Church that is lightly and superficially accused of changing its message to mankind under the influence of Greek philosophy. (See "Development of Doctrine.")

EDUCATION

THE TRUE CHRISTIAN IDEAL.

Objections.—Let the priests attend to religion—the schoolmaster has nothing to do with it. The teaching of religion is the work of the church and the Sunday-school. The school hours are short enough for the acquiring of the secular knowledge needed to fit the pupils to fill their respective places in life.

THE ANSWER.—Such is not the Catholic ideal; nor is it the true ideal of any Christian denomination, whatever may be its actual practice. The church and the Sunday-school can do a great deal in the matter of religious teaching; but what if their influence be counteracted by that of the week-day school? The week-day school is a necessary adjunct of church and Sunday-school. The sovereign importance of religion and the difficulties attending religious training in our age make it imperative that religion should permeate the whole life of the child, and that whilst his mental powers are unfolding they should be constantly kept under the directive influence of religious motive.

It would be a narrow and baneful conception of school training that would confine its scope to the training of the intellect. The formation of character is no less, in fact it is much more, a part of its province. But character supposes a grasp of right motives and a holding to right standards of action. Now there is no rectitude of motive and conduct which is not ultimately rooted in religion, for religion alone—be it natural or supernatural—can teach the truths which are the basis of all right conduct. Eliminate religion, with its eternal truths relating to the Divine Lawgiver and His unchangeable laws, and morality becomes a matter of convention or of expediency. It stands upon a false and shifting basis, and will be powerless against the inroads of the worse than pagan naturalism that now menaces society.

A formation of character based on religious training must, therefore, go hand in hand with the training of the intellect. If school life were simply negative in its effect on character the case in favor of religion as an ingredient of education might lose something of its strength; but merely negative the moral influence of school life never can be. Contact with so many minds and with so many ideas must exert a positive influence on a boy's character. The books read, the example of teachers and fellow-pupils, the practical maxims embodied in the conduct of so many, the teaching methods with their incentives and sanctions, the conversations held in hours of relaxation, the friendships formed; none of these things can be without their influence on a boy's character; and as all these phases of school life have important moral bearings, it is necessary that religion be present as a faithful guide and helpmate on the thorny road of school life.

Religious training must, then, be combined with secular instruction. But how combined?

The ideal way of combining them is that which obtains in the Catholic parochial schools of the United States. In these schools religion is not merely taught in the abstract or in theory, but is, at the same time, in many practical ways inculcated. In the first place, there is frequent catechetical instruction, in which the pupil is made familiar with an order of ideas far transcending all others both in interest and in importance, and in which the specific duties of life are impressed indelibly on the conscience. At the same time the actual practice of religion is in many ways fostered.

The old Catholic maxim, *ora et labora*—work and pray—is here held in honor. Successive periods of school work during the day are begun and ended by prayer. Thus habituated to prayer, the pupil is not likely ever to regard prayer as an intruder come to disturb his peace. Reminders of the unseen world of grace and holiness meet his gaze at every turn in the pictures and statues that adorn the walls of the schoolroom. Frequent acknowledgment of faults in the tribunal of penance, followed by the divinely efficacious absolution of God's minister, renovates his soul and prevents him from becoming a prey to evil habits. The Bread of Angels often received at the Eucharistic table matures and develops in him the life of the spirit. In the annual retreat the great truths of religion penetrate his soul to the very depths. Not unfrequently the retreat marks a great moral turning-point in a boy's career.

Practical religion includes a great deal more than what are called pious practices. Good moral conduct, or the observance of God's law, is the best fruit borne by religion; and this the Catholic parochial school affords many an opportunity of promoting. In schools of this type an appeal can be made to religious motives, whereas in schools of the neutral sort such appeals would be considered out of place. "God," "Church," "Sacraments," are not considered alien ideas in a Catholic school. To appeal to a boy as a Christian and to remind him of his duties as a Christian is not outside a Catholic teacher's province. For a teacher to co-operate with a boy's parents in removing evil from his path and stimulating his good habits, to proffer a timely word of advice, to encourage acts of self-denial, to warn certain

of his pupils of the pitfalls which pride or sensuality may be preparing for them on the road of life; these and similar services to his pupils the Catholic teacher regards as within the compass of his essential duties. A zealous teacher in almost any school will find opportunities of enforcing a moral precept in the course of the daily recitations and readings, but in the Catholic parochial school he can do so without any restriction; and his illustrations may be drawn not only from profane history but also from Holy Writ and the lives of the saints.

We call this the ideal system because it brings the whole school life of the child into relation with religion. It is thus the natural complement of the home life in a typical Catholic household, where religion is paramount and all-pervading and where human conduct is continually viewed in the light of God's presence and God's law. The basis of the system is the principle that with the growth of thews and sinews religion should grow in the heart, and that from the dawn of reason the sense of moral obligation should begin to establish itself in the child's life. Thus religion and a sense of duty become a second nature in the child.

The system has, of course, been assailed. It has been asserted that such a system of training does not do justice to the secular education of the pupil, that the non-religious studies continually suffer from the intrusion of religion. The objection is not based on a knowledge of facts, but on some arbitrary notion of the actual working of the system. Thirty or forty years ago, it must be confessed, it was not so easy to overthrow the objection as it is to-day. At that period the majority of our parochial schools (not by any means all of them) found it difficult to compete with the State schools in the teaching of the secular branches; not because the pupils were overdosed with religion, but by reason of inferior equipment and organization. But things have greatly changed since then. The splendid organization and the superior training of teachers introduced in the past generation have produced results that have made the parochial schools the equals, in many cases the superiors, of those under State control.

Now this ideal system is placed within the reach of the great majority of Catholics, and its fruits are manifest. Many Catholics, we are sorry to have to confess, do not avail themselves of it. Some parents, it is true, have reasons

for preferring Catholic schools not belonging to the parish school system, but giving a no less efficient Catholic training. With these we have no quarrel; our affair is rather with those parents who are indifferent or careless in the matter of choosing a school for their children, or who affect to believe that one school is as good as another in its influence on moral behavior. We have in mind also a class of parents who fix their gaze solely on the supposed social or intellectual advantages possessed by non-Catholic schools (how often such estimates and the expectations built on them prove disappointing), or who are ready to seize pretexts for sending their children to the public schools because Catholic schools are looked down upon by their neighbors and acquaintances.

It is a rare thing for a child not to suffer in consequence of such preference for the public schools on the part of his parents. That his parents do not perceive that he has been harmed by his non-Catholic education is a sad comment on their own religious frame of mind, and in many cases on the low moral and religious standard prevailing in their households. The boy's ignorance of his religion and his general unfamiliarity with things Catholic should alone be enough to condemn his being sent to a school in which neither church nor religion can ever be mentioned. In matters of vital importance we are confident that in at least the majority of cases Catholic parents will not have to wait long to perceive the evil effects of their children's training in the public schools.

Every boy tends to become like his environment; and who does not know what a boy's environment is in the public schools? In point of morality the children of the public schools reflect the condition of the population from which they have sprung. Now, we are not going to draw a line between good and bad in the population of these United States and place the Catholics on the one side and the non-Catholics on the other. Both bad and good are found among our Catholic people; and yet there is a vast difference in the moral order between Catholics and their neighbors. Catholics are of one mind in matters of belief and practice. The same can not be said of Protestants, even within the limits of any single sect. There is no difference of opinion among Catholics regarding matrimony and the family. They are of one mind on the subject of

education, though the practice of a certain number does not square with their principles. Catholics have clear conceptions of duty, which stand out in bold contrast with the shifting notions of non-Catholics. Among Catholics the supernatural is more habitually and more intensely realized. Their consciences are more frequently and more effectually brought to the touchstone of divine law and ecclesiastical ordinance, and the necessity of repentance for sin is more intimately brought home to them. The distinctive Catholic doctrine of the soul's dependence on grace, especially on grace as conveyed through the sacraments, is one of the great vitalizing beliefs of the Catholic Church.

Over against the Catholic body we find a vast and motley multitude from which Christian influences are fast disappearing. In the first place, an immensely large part of the population of the United States is composed of indifferentists, atheists, and agnostics. *Some fifty or fifty-five million persons have no connection with any religious denomination.* Among those who profess any form of religion it is only too well known what small influence is exercised by non-Catholic churches on every-day practical life. Add to this that we are a commercial and industrial people; and a people of that description in which religion is fast waning must gradually lose its hold on the principles of common honesty. The actual fact is evidenced by many a news item in our morning journals.

A population that is rapidly drifting away from religion and is seized by the "get-rich-quick" fever will fill our public schools with children who, of course, are not yet as bad as their sires, but who are on the surest road to becoming so, children, certainly, who are not accustomed to hearing the maxims of Christian morality inculcated. It is not surprising, then, that the minds of so many children are imbued with a worldly, selfish, unreligious, and materialistic spirit. What is still worse, owing to the absence of religious influence in the life of the average child of the period, the sensual tendencies meet with little or no check, and the germs of vice are sown and nurtured in the soul even before the dawn of reason.

A Catholic child can be reclaimed from habits of impurity by the discipline of the confessional. Outside the Catholic Church there is no influence that can penetrate to the inner recesses of the soul and heal the disorder at its

source. The atmosphere of Catholicism is rife with influences tending to foster a love of purity. The familiar image of Mary Immaculate, the sight of so many who have consecrated their virginity by the vows of religion, the example of truly Christian mothers whose lives bear the impress of the grace received in the sacrament of Matrimony, the modesty and reserve which is one of the fairest fruits of Catholic training; these and many another feature of Catholic life tend to preserve the ideal of Christian purity in young hearts. And even when the young do not for a time respond to the inspiration of their surroundings the influence of that ideal is not wholly destroyed. What a contrast in all this to the average results of non-Catholic training; and what a difference between the moral atmosphere of a Catholic school and that of the schools conducted by the State.

No one who has any grasp of the principles we have been setting forth or who realizes the state of things we have been describing can be surprised at the uncompromising attitude of our bishops toward schools and school-systems from which religion is excluded. They do not deny the right of the State to open its own schools, but State schools of the type prevailing in the United States, whatever may be their merits in other respects, are not regarded by them as suitable places for the rearing of Catholic children. And Catholics should note well that the bishops not only look with disfavor upon such schools but positively forbid parents to send their children to them. There may be reasons in particular cases for allowing Catholic children to attend them, but the value of those reasons is to be estimated not by parents alone but also by their spiritual superiors.

But even apart from obedience to the bishops, the choice of schools for children is one in which the consciences of parents are intimately concerned. In an age when the rearing of children is beset with so many difficulties, the courting of new difficulties is hardly less than sinful, especially when the most vital interests of the child are endangered. Parents can not afford to take any chances with the faith and morals of their children in an age when temptation is so rife, when the world is so attractive, and when the broad road leading to perdition is crowded with the world's votaries. They should do for their children now what they will wish to have done for them in the evening

of life, when the complete results of their children's training will be clearly manifest.

What we have said of the lower grades of education is applicable to the higher education sought in the colleges. The peril to faith and morals is even greater in non-Catholic colleges than in the elementary public schools, especially when the students are entirely removed during nine or ten months of the year from the saving influences of church and home. If the history of Catholic students in non-Catholic colleges in America were fully and truthfully written it would exhibit many a defection from the Faith; and even where it did not record such sad disasters it would reveal many a seared conscience and many a poisoned mind. The least that may be said against the influence of such college training is that the *average* young Catholic educated in non-Catholic colleges is in some respects less of a Catholic at the end of his course than when he first crossed the threshold of what he calls his Alma Mater.

We are chiefly interested in the welfare of our Catholic children, but we can not be indifferent to the lot of those millions of children outside the Church who in the next few generations are doomed never to hear of God or religion either in school or at church or at home. These children will one day constitute the great majority of the adult population of the American commonwealth. Will the results of this modern paganism bring about a reaction in favor of religion? We are not prophets. We can only raise our feeble voice in warning against the approach of an era in which the great mass of the people of our country will have no reason or motive derived from their education for preserving even the externals of morality, and when no restraint can be put upon public vice save by brute force—so long as brute force can be enlisted on the side of public virtue. Even in the interests of our Catholic children we can not be indifferent to the moral condition of those with whom they must perforce live.

It is doubtless not easy to devise a practicable scheme by which religion, or at least what are sometimes called the common principles of morality, could be taught in, or in connection with, our public schools. Either the religion or the morality taught would have to be of one specific type, or all types would have to be represented. The one plan would not be acceptable for intrinsic reasons, the other

would not be feasible. Men are not agreed nowadays on common principles of morality. Catholics hold that divorce is in all cases immoral; most non-Catholics do not. This is but an instance out of many of diversity of opinion on matters of the first moment.

If the present public school system is destined to be permanent, and if there are children (we are thinking of non-Catholic children) who must go either to the public schools or to none, sooner or later the necessity of religious training, for all, outside the schoolroom will force itself upon the attention of society, and self-interest, if not conscience, will be roused to action. The religious denominations will be appealed to for the salvation of society. What they will be able to accomplish will depend on the amount of genuine Christianity left in them and on the amount of authority they are able to wield; but, unfortunately, they are dropping one ancient Christian dogma after another, and, notoriously, their authority is but ill acknowledged by the mass of their members and no less feebly and ineffectually exercised. We have no disposition to belittle the good done or likely to be done by non-Catholic religions; but imagine any one who is able to make an impartial survey of the situation regarding any of the sects, or all of them combined, as the future good leaven of society! The sight of much evil must therefore be endured till such time as the ancient Church, still retaining its ancient vigor, is enabled on a large scale to extend its salutary influence to the great masses of our people.

The saving of society even in such a country as ours is not beyond the power of a Church that has made conquest of whole nations under circumstances no less discouraging from a human point of view. True, the real enemies with which the Church will be confronted—modern indifferentism, worldliness, and vice intrenched in custom and all but sanctioned by convention—are of the most formidable kind; but, even these powerful solvents can not wholly destroy the germ of religion in the human heart; and with God, working with the Church, all things are possible. It may seem at times as if it were as much as we could do to preserve our own Catholic children from contamination, but, even for the sake of our own children, who must mingle with the rest of the world, all the spiritual and material resources at our command should be employed to spread

the true Faith, even among classes that are generally regarded as hopeless.

Yes, it is God and His Church that must transform society. Nevertheless, all human endeavor should be employed to create conditions the most favorable to the action of divine grace in the souls of men. The natural virtues must be fostered. Self-denial must be inculcated everywhere, in the schoolroom as well as at the fireside. If higher motives for practising this virtue do not commend themselves, let the utility of the virtue in building up strong and robust characters make it attractive. A people schooled in self-denial is always the best disposed for the reception of the Gospel of the crucified Saviour. Public morality must be promoted by the concerted action of the temporal and spiritual authorities. The press and the stage must be reformed. Upright men must interest themselves, practically, in the government of their municipalities and use every endeavor to prevent public authority from becoming an ally of Satan. If all the better members of society would busy themselves in promoting these objects, our modern world would be saved from an utter state of corruption which would make it quite inaccessible, save by the greatest of miracles, to the influence sought to be exercised upon it even by the purest Christianity.

EQUALITY AMONGST MEN

Objection.—All men are the same at their birth. Why, then, are they divided later into classes? Before God they are equal. God is no respecter of persons.

THE ANSWER.—We might as correctly say that all men are *not* the same at their birth; but the truth lies midway between the two propositions.

All men do indeed possess the same human nature—they all have bodies and souls. They have the same Creator and are made for the same eternal life in heaven. All are bound to observe the same commandments. All are children of the same heavenly Father. Hence their common obligation to behave as rational beings and their common right to be treated as such. But here equality ceases.

In many respects men are not the same, and that, too,

quite apart from any arbitrary distinctions created by human society. Some are sound in health, others the opposite; some are rich, others poor; one man is learned, another unlearned; one clever, another dull. They differ in point of race, character, dispositions, and needs. Some are industrious, thrifty, temperate, and honest; others possess the opposite qualities.

These facts must be accepted as facts by socialists and others who set about reconstructing society. The distinction between rich and poor is indeed in some measure due to the way in which men freely exercise their right of private ownership, some men squandering their money, others using it sparingly, but collective ownership will not mend matters so long as human nature is not radically changed. So long as two men have the use and enjoyment of anything—no matter what economic system they live under—they will use and enjoy it differently.

Private ownership is, moreover, a natural right and is implied in the moral code of Christianity. No Christian can advocate the abolition of it. Reason itself teaches us that a man has a right to what he has honestly acquired, be it food or clothing or money or land. To take it away from him is to rob him of his rights and his liberties. Socialism is therefore un-Christian and irrational and an enemy of human freedom. (See "Property.")

Notwithstanding the distinction between man and man, God does not judge men according to their talents or their wealth or their social position, but according to their deeds, for in very truth "there is no respect of persons with God" (Col. iii. 25). Sin is punished no less in the case of the rich and the educated than in the case of the poor and the illiterate, though it is no less true that, all things else being equal, it is easier to serve God in the humbler walks of life than in the higher.

EUCCHARIST, THE

I. THE REAL PRESENCE

Objection.—The Roman Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist cannot be deduced from the words of institution, "This is My body, etc.," for these

words may be understood figuratively or spiritually.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic doctrine may be proved, directly and indirectly, from the words of institution mentioned above—though this is only one of several ways of demonstrating it. Before presenting any of these proofs let us briefly state the essential points of Catholic teaching on the subject.

The Catholic Church teaches that Our Lord Jesus Christ—His body and soul as well as His Divinity—is as truly and as literally present in the Most Holy Eucharist as He is in heaven. His presence in the Eucharist is not, therefore, a mere spiritual presence (whatever this expression may really and logically mean in the mouths of the Reformers), but also a bodily presence. It is not the presence of the divinity alone, as Zwingli maintained, but also of the humanity. After the words of consecration have been pronounced upon the bread and wine, nothing remains of the bread and wine but the accidents. These are the appearances, or “species,” consisting of the color, taste, shape, hardness, and other qualities perceptible by the senses. The substance of the bread and wine has been converted into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. The appearances or accidents of bread and wine are preserved without the substance.

In this doctrine the Catholic Church differs from all the churches of the Reform, including the Church of England. The most general teaching of the Protestant denominations is that Our Lord is present in the Eucharist only spiritually, and is only spiritually received, and that the words of Our Lord, “This is My body,” are to be interpreted as meaning, “This is a symbol or representation of My body.”

The Lutheran differs from the other Evangelical bodies by teaching that the body of Christ is really and substantially present, but only at the moment of communion, but that even then the substance of the bread remains.

The institution of the Blessed Eucharist is narrated by three of the evangelists: St. Matthew xxvi. 26-28; St. Mark xiv. 22-25; and St. Luke xxii. 19, 20. It is again described by St. Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, xi. 23-25. St. Matthew’s version is as follows:

"And whilst they were at supper Jesus took bread, and blessed and broke, and gave to His disciples and said: Take ye and eat: This is My body. And taking the chalice, He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying: Drink ye all of this. For this is My blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins." In St. Luke's account, after the words, "This is My body, which is given for you," are added the words, "Do this for a commemoration of Me." The same injunction is found in St. Paul in reference to both consecrations.

PROOFS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE REAL PRESENCE.

The Catholic Church teaches that the words, "This is My body" and "This is My blood" are to be taken in their most literal sense. Words are to be taken in their plain and literal meaning unless the context in which they are found or the circumstances under which they are uttered require that they be taken figuratively. But there is nothing either in context or in circumstances that argues a figurative meaning in the words under consideration. Therefore the words, "This is My body, etc.," must be taken in their literal sense. When the words were uttered the body and blood of our divine Saviour were really, truly, and substantially present. Neither the context nor the circumstances can be shown to contain anything opposed to the Catholic doctrine. They contain, on the contrary, much that favors it, and this we shall endeavor to make clear in the successive stages of the discussion.

It will, of course, be urged at once by opponents of the Catholic doctrine that there was one very obvious circumstance connected with the institution which made it natural for the apostles to understand Our Lord's words in some figurative or spiritual sense. They saw the Lord's living body before them and knew that His blood was flowing in His veins; and hence when He took bread and wine and said "This is My body" and "This is My blood," they knew His meaning must be figurative or mystical, for otherwise His words would contradict the evidence of their senses.

Not so; the apostles were in a frame of mind which positively favored a literal interpretation of the Lord's words. They were already familiar with the idea of a literal partaking of His body and blood as food and drink. There is

a well-known passage in the sixth chapter of St. John's gospel in which the Lord speaks to the people of Capharnaum of the eating of His flesh and the drinking of His blood. Those who are not familiar with the chapter would do well to read it from beginning to end. Our Lord was understood literally, though very grossly so, for we are told: "The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us His flesh to eat?" The issue was clearly one of admitting or not admitting the plain and obvious sense of the words; and it was this issue that divided the believers from the unbelievers on that memorable day. There was a defection even in the ranks of Our Lord's declared disciples: "Many of His disciples went back and walked no more with Him. Then Jesus said to the twelve [the apostles, who were afterward with Him at the Last Supper]: Will you also go away? And Simon Peter answered Him: Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." It was the acceptance of Our Lord's words in their plain and literal sense that saved the apostles' faith.

The twelve were therefore prepared for a literal fulfilment of His words at the Last Supper. They knew, however, that He had it in His power to give them His body and blood without doing so in the shockingly carnal way imagined by the skeptics of Capharnaum. They knew that He who had wrought such wonders during the three years of His public life could give them His sacred humanity beneath the accidents of bread and wine.

Furthermore, had Our Lord meant to be understood figuratively He surely would have explained His words to His apostles, who on most occasions were only too prone to interpret Him literally. If it is true—and we have the word of St Mark for it (iv. 34)—that "apart He explained all things to His disciples," whilst He spoke to others in parables and figures, surely now, if ever, there was an explanation to be expected if any was needed. *A great Christian rite was being inaugurated*, which was in some way intimately associated with the sacred humanity of the Son of God. What the nature of that association was must certainly have been a matter of the first importance. What the apostles saw performed on that occasion they were to copy and perpetuate in the future worship of the Church. Was the supposed spiritual or figurative meaning of the

words to be a matter of conjecture? Were the words of Christ to be subject to the vagaries of interpretation which mar the Protestant theology of our day? Were we to accept the vague formulas of Anglicanism, which in practice have been made to cover every variety of belief, from that of the Real Presence of Catholicism to the opposite pole of pure Zwinglianism? Was ours to be the plight of the Calvinists the world over, of whom one school gravitates to the side of Zwingli, whilst the other feels irresistibly drawn to *some sort* of real presence, to the belief that there is *something there* more than the empty symbol? Common sense would seem to dictate that if there is anything in the sacrament besides the symbol it must be the reality as conceived by Catholics, and that if the reality is there it must be adored.

The confusion of the Protestant mind on this subject and the practical issues involved in it furnish an instructive object-lesson on the consequences of a departure from traditional teaching and practice.

A no less forcible argument in favor of the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence is found in the bearing of the institution of the Eucharist on the inaugurating of the New Dispensation. Let the reader reflect on the significance of these words: "This is *My blood of the New Testament*, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins" (Matt. xxvi. 28), or of these other words from St. Luke: "This is the chalice, *the New Testament in My blood*, which shall be shed for you" (xxii. 20), or, finally of these from St. Paul (1 Cor. xi. 25): "This chalice *is the New Testament in My blood*." Our Lord is here opening the new era of grace and establishing the New Covenant with His people. The words just quoted contain an allusion to a similar inauguration of the Old Covenant by the great Jewish lawgiver, a type of the Saviour of the world; for we are told in the Book of Exodus (xxiv. 8) that Moses, after reading to the people the Book of the Law, took the blood of victims and sprinkled with it the people and the Tabernacle, saying, "This is the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you." And this inaugural rite of sprinkling with blood was afterward perpetuated in the Jewish religion in many forms, till finally all such types were superseded by their one great antitype. This consummation took place at the Last Supper. "This chalice is

the New Testament in My blood." Is it possible, then, that the chalice does not contain the blood which is to be the seal of the new Covenant? Or at the very moment at which Our Lord is announcing the realization of ancient symbols, will He introduce a new symbol, and that, too, in language so expressive of the reality which had been symbolized?

If the apostles believed, as Protestants of to-day believe, that the contents of the chalice were but a symbol of the blood of the New Testament, they were careful to preserve an unbroken silence about it; for in no apostolic utterance is there any intimation of their understanding Our Lord's words in any but their literal meaning.

The case is made still stronger by the fact that as many as three evangelists give the same story in almost the same words and without a word of explanation; and that, too, in Gospels which were to be in the hands of Christians in all parts of the world. Not even does St. Paul, in a passage in which he warns the Corinthians to "fly from the service of idols" (1. x. 14), say anything in explanation of this supposed figure of speech, although his topic is the Eucharist: "The chalice of benediction which we bless, is it not the *communion of the blood of Christ*? And the bread which we break, is it not the *partaking of the body of the Lord*?"

In a famous passage in the same letter to the Corinthians (xi. 23-29), the writer admonishes them in words which would lose nearly all their force if Our Lord were not present bodily in the Eucharist. After reciting the history of the institution as taught him by God Himself, though in nearly the same words as the evangelists, he adds (27-29): "Therefore, whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of *the body and of the blood* of the Lord. But let a man prove himself [i.e., examine and prepare himself]: and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of the chalice. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, *not discerning* the body of the Lord."

Is language like this ever used in reference to mere signs and symbols? Can a mere commemorative or allegorical rite ever furnish a basis for warnings and denunciations couched in language so strongly expressive of a real corporeal presence? What would any honest Corinthian do after hearing this passage but strike his breast and acknowl-

edge that in very truth he was guilty of the body and blood of his Lord, which in his levity he failed to "discern," by faith, as really present. But if some Reformed friend—if Reformed there were in those days—had afterward succeeded in convincing him that in Paul's mind and in that of the Church the body and blood of Christ were only symbolized in the Eucharist, or that the Real Presence was only a "spiritual real" presence, as the Calvinists word it to-day, he would, at first, probably puzzle over the expression "spiritual real presence" as applied to a *body*, and then begin to mutter to himself: "Paul's language is very strong, very strange, and—very misleading." Then, too, he would probably feel that the obligation of "proving" himself was not of the most stringent kind, as the ceremony, though a religious one, was, after all, no more than the taking of a morsel of bread and a sip of wine. If he were of a thoughtful turn of mind he would fall to pondering the words, "not discerning the body of the Lord." "*Discerning*—seeing clearly—penetrating beyond the veil of appearances and seeing the reality with the eye of faith, and that reality no less than the body of the Lord. Ah, but I am forgetting—the real body of the Lord is in heaven, at the right hand of the Father. So that all I can 'discern' here is bread and wine. And yet that word 'discern' seems to imply that I must distinguish this bread from other bread. *This* bread is the body of the Lord—and yet it is only a symbol of the body of the Lord." And so, it is confusion worse confounded. Here we have an anticipation by nineteen centuries of the typical Protestant mind.

Thus far we find Our Lord Himself, three evangelists, and, in two distinct passages, the Apostle of the Gentiles, using the same language, and always without any explanation of its symbolism, if symbolism there be.

The argument furnished by the sacred writers is strongly reinforced by the clear and explicit testimony of the early Fathers of the Church, some of whom were taught by the apostles, others by their immediate disciples.

St. Ignatius of Antioch, who lived in the time of the apostles, writes concerning the sect of the Docetæ that they "abstain from the Holy Eucharist and prayer because they do not believe that the Eucharist is the flesh of Our Lord Jesus Christ, who suffered for our sins, and whom the

Father raised to life again" (Ep. ad Smyrn, n. 7). If this is heretical doctrine and practice the opposite must be the doctrine and practice of the true Church of God. And is it possible that the Docetæ objected to a figurative or spiritual interpretation of Our Lord's words? No heretic would be staggered by any such interpretation. The Docetæ must have objected to the literal or Catholic interpretation—which was consequently the right one.

St. Justin Martyr, who wrote not many years after the death of St. John the Evangelist, uses the same language in his first Apology, a vindication of the Faith addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius in behalf of the Christians. Surely, if the Eucharist could have been explained figuratively or spiritually the explanation would not have been withheld, as it would have presented a less startling doctrine to the pagan ruler. He says:

"We do not receive these things as common bread and common drink; but in the same manner as Jesus Christ Our Saviour, being made incarnate by the word of God, took upon Him both flesh and blood for our salvation, so have we been taught that the food which, being transmuted, nourishes our blood and flesh, is, after it has been blessed by the prayer of the word transmitted from Him, *the flesh and blood of the same Jesus who was made flesh*. For the apostles in their commentaries, called Gospels, have delivered unto us that they were so commanded to do, when Jesus, having taken bread and having blessed it, said 'Do this in remembrance of Me: this is My body'; and in like manner, having taken the chalice and having blessed it, He said, 'This is My blood'" (ch. 66).

What impression would these words convey to any reader, pagan or Christian, but that the transformation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ was as real and as literal as the Incarnation, or the assuming of human flesh by the Son of God?

St. Irenæus, who was born in the first half of the second century, and who had sat at the feet of St. Polycarp, a disciple of the apostles, writes as follows:

"Christ declares that the chalice, which is but earthly, is His own precious blood. Since then the chalice and the bread by the word of God become the Eucharist of the body and blood of Christ, how dare they [the heretics] deny that that flesh which partakes of the flesh and blood of Christ,

and is a member of Him, will receive the gift of God, i.e., life everlasting!"—Adv. Hæres., V. c. 2.

Our limited space forbids us to multiply quotations from the Fathers, but other valuable testimonies will be found in the article on the sacrifice of the Mass; and, besides, it is generally acknowledged that passages of the kind we have cited abound in the works of the great representative writers of the first five centuries, to say nothing of later testimonies. If we compare this great mass of evidence with a few doubtful utterances of the Fathers, which have been duly exploited by anti-Catholic writers, we are forced to draw the conclusion that Christian antiquity has spoken in favor of the Catholic doctrine in no doubtful accents.

It is remarkable with what tenacity—resembling that of a drowning man grasping at straws—the average Protestant controversialist clings to a few passages in the Fathers which seem at first sight to favor his view of the Eucharist. He makes the most strenuous efforts to capture the testimony of one or two Fathers who seem to tower above the rest, and meantime shuts his eyes to the foes multiplying about his path. That St. Augustine has been thus singled out is not a matter of surprise. It would be wonder if St. Augustine, who wrote so copiously and with so much originality, should not, like Cardinal Newman of our own day, be placed in the witness-stand by opposite parties in a dispute. St. Augustine has a passage or two which do lend themselves to a Calvinistic interpretation if viewed out of relation to their context and to the circumstances in which they were written; but fortunately we can afford to waive all contention about these controverted parts of his writings, for it is easy to find passages in his works which all must acknowledge to admit of but one interpretation, and that the Catholic one. In the following passage (Enar. in Ps. xxxiii. no. 10) we challenge any one to find a meaning different from that conveyed to every Catholic reader. He asks—and his mode of treating the subject, though familiar, is not irreverential: "Who can hold himself in his own hands? A man may be held in the hands of another, but no man can hold himself in his own hands." He answers: "Christ held Himself in His own hands when He gave His body to His disciples, saying, 'This is My body'; for that was the body which He held in His own hands." Evidently he understands "body" in its literal sense; for had he understood by "body" a symbol of a body he could

not have asserted that no one but Christ could hold his own body in his hands: *any one* could hold a symbol or representation of his body in his own hands. St. Augustine, therefore, undoubtedly believed that the Holy Eucharist contained, really and literally, the body of Christ. The passage we have cited is but one out of many such passages in the writings of the saint.

If we turn from the Fathers to the ancient liturgies we find a clear expression of the same Christian belief. In the Liturgy of Jerusalem, which in its essential parts dates back to apostolic days, we find the following words: "Let us dismiss all worldly thoughts from our minds, for the King of kings, the Lord of lords, Christ our God, is about to be sacrificed and to be given to the faithful as their food"; and in the Liturgy of St. Basil a prayer is uttered that God may "make of this bread the true and precious body of Jesus Christ, Our Lord, God, and Saviour, and from this wine His true and precious blood, which was shed for the salvation of the world." Again, these are but samples of much more in the same vein.

Add to this the testimony of the Eastern Churches which are not at present in communion with Rome but which received their Eucharistic doctrine from the Early Church, when there was no distinction between East and West. One and all they hold the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence.

There is no period of the Church's history in which the same doctrine is not asserted in language of the most explicit, emphatic, and realistic kind—in language which could never have been the expression of a faith which had robbed the Blessed Sacrament of all but a figurative significance, and had made of the Holy Communion a mere commemorative rite, signifying the death of the Lord and symbolizing His real presence elsewhere! Moreover, there is a fervidness of utterance, such as appears in the liturgies quoted above, which could never have harmonized with the comparatively cold and empty content of Protestant doctrine.

Now, the language of Christian antiquity is the language of the Catholic Church of to-day, and both present a broad contrast with the Eucharistic language of Protestantism.

So sacred was the doctrine of the Real Presence in the eyes of all true Christians just before the advent of Prot-

estantism that the first of the Reformers, Martin Luther, did not presume to deny it in its entirety. He taught his followers that the body and blood of Christ were really and substantially present, but only at the moment of communion—not before or after, though the substance of bread was also present. But the ball of private judgment was set a-rolling, and even this counterfeit of ancient doctrine had to make way for others. Zwingli, the next of the innovators, swept away the Real Presence of the body and blood in the Eucharist and taught that only Christ's divinity was present. A strange comment, this, on the words, "This is My body, etc." Calvin, the third great innovator, swung back to a real presence; but this, when explained, was found to be a real presence in heaven, whilst on earth there was a dynamic presence of the humanity of Christ: the sun was in the heavens, but its rays were felt on earth!

No wonder it has been difficult for Calvinists to "discern the body of the Lord." In our time Calvinism, which includes many types of Protestantism, has been vibrating between this dynamic real presence (doubtless with an uneasy, half-conscious suspicion that it must be more than dynamic) and the Zwinglian real absence. The Zwinglian tendency is combated by the conservative element; and what a surprise it must be to modern Presbyterians to be reminded, as they are by Dr. Briggs, quoting Bishop Davenant, who wrote in 1641 that "all Presbyterian churches are pointblank against all erroneous doctrines of the *bare representation* of the body and blood of Christ, parted from the true exhibiting of Him." Such is the strange language used by those who wish to avoid the symbol and yet are not willing to embrace the reality.

The primitive Protestant formulas have not, then, stood the test of time. They are too suggestive of the *old* Real Presence about which men were wont to think and "speak the same thing" (1 Cor. i. 10). The old Real Presence which, as we shall endeavor to show in another article, has nothing repellent about it, but rather everything that is attractive and elevating, is nevertheless, for the most part, the last of the interpretations of Our Lord's words to which doubting Protestants turn; and yet very many of our separated brethren have found in it at last complete satisfaction for mind and heart.

EUCCHARIST, THE

II. THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE RATIONAL

Objections.—The Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is repugnant to reason; for it is irrational to suppose that a body can be in two or more places at once, or that the body of the Lord can be contained within the compass of a host, or that the accidents of bread and wine, e.g., color, figure, taste, can remain without the substance of bread and wine.

THE ANSWER.—These things are indeed wonderful, but not too wonderful to be true, at least where God's omnipotence is concerned. "With God all things are possible."

We grant, of course, that when an effect is intrinsically impossible, that is, when the very notion of it involves a contradiction or an absurdity—it is no reflection on God's omnipotence to say that He can not produce it. Now, this intrinsic absurdity is precisely what is asserted by those who urge the above objection. The nature of bodily substance, they tell us, makes the wonders of the Blessed Sacrament impossible. When our critics come to this point we would advise them to move slowly, for they are treading on dangerous ground.

What is there in the nature of bodies incompatible with Catholic teaching? To say that the constitution of matter is a contradiction of the Real Presence implies that we know what the constitution of matter is. But do we really possess such knowledge? The revealed doctrine of the Real Presence does throw some light on the subject; but it must be acknowledged that the unaided intellect, whilst exhibiting a remarkable acuteness in investigating the *properties* of matter, is utterly baffled when it attempts to get at its inner *nature* or *essence*.

Is it possible, some one will query, that we are ignorant of the nature of bodies? Can we not resolve them into their elements? Have we no knowledge of atoms, or of molecules—to say nothing of electrons?

Granted the knowledge, such as it is, what is the ultimate constitution of these so-called elements? Is there no mystery in that quarter? No! Then, with all due respect to our critic, we must say that he has not begun to

philosophize in earnest. The first fruits of reflection on this subject should be the impression that we are dealing with a thing about which neither the chemist nor the physicist can say the last word. The question regards the nature and intrinsic constitution of those smallest components of material substances which the physical scientist has done with as soon as he has discovered them—if he has discovered them at all—and which he must hand over to the rational philosopher to be investigated, if they are to be investigated at all.

Now, what can the philosopher tell us about the nature of these ultimate elements of matter? The great scholastic authorities, so long as they follow in the wake of revelation, *i.e.*, so long as they teach what is implied in the doctrine of the Real Presence, can be followed with security when they discourse upon matter and extension, substance and accident. Their further speculations, deep and searching as they are, illustrate the impalpable nature of the subject they attempt to discuss.

The great scholastics, of course, teach nothing that gives a handle to unbelief. On the contrary, their writings are the great bulwark, on the side of reason, of the dogma of the Blessed Sacrament. Our concern is, therefore, chiefly with those more modern philosophers who have turned their backs on the old philosophy and are principally distinguished for their originality and the hardihood of their speculation—the Spinozas, the Descartes, the Leibnitzes, the Lockes, and the Kants, of more recent centuries.

The most important thing to be noted about this large group of philosophers is that they differ so much that we can not appeal to their views in the aggregate as to a philosophy which in the main is one, but differentiated in some particulars. Down to a few centuries ago there *was* a philosophy held by most thinkers in Christendom. To-day, even in regard to the most fundamental questions, we may almost say there are as many opinions as there are heads to carry them. There are philosophies, but no philosophy. If philosophy is a science, it must be one and not manifold. It is absurd, then, to appeal to modern philosophy against the doctrine of the Eucharist. Modern philosophy is a term without a meaning, except as designating a mass of divergent systems of thought.

Among the great bones of contention that divide our

modern philosophers, the notions of substance and accident, matter and extension, are among the more conspicuous. On these subjects the philosophers differ fundamentally. With some, extension is the very pith of bodily substance, with others, bodily substance, in its ultimate analysis, does not include extension at all; in fact, it is resolvable into unextended forces (Leibnitz and Kant). We may remark, in passing, that whatever be the merits of the latter system, those who adopt it should have no difficulty in accepting the dogma of the Eucharist, according to which, although the species of bread present to the senses the phenomenon of extension, the underlying substance of the Lord's body is without local or dimensional extension.

Whether one be willing or not to subscribe to Cardinal Newman's words when he asks, "What do I know of substance or matter?" and answers, "Just as much as the greatest philosophers, and that is nothing at all," one thing is certain, and that is that the philosophers can teach with certainty absolutely nothing that militates against the miracles of the Blessed Sacrament. They know, of course, that a body in its natural state has an external or local extension, requiring that it occupy a space of certain dimensions, and only one such space, but they can not demonstrate that the contrary is impossible, at least by miracle. Attempts to do so will resolve themselves into unreasoning appeals to common sense—and common sense was never a deep philosopher. Philosophers know that the accidents of a body naturally inhere in its substance. Concrete hardness, roundness, and whiteness are not found except in some concrete substance which is described as hard, round, and white. But, absolutely speaking, can not these sensible qualities be separated from their substances? Can not the phenomenon of hardness, roundness, or whiteness appear without the substance? Can not the species of bread, for instance, appear without the substance of bread? To this question common sense says, No. True philosophy says, I know nothing to the contrary.

The assertion, then, is quite gratuitous that the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is repugnant to reason; for, if it can not be proved to be contrary to sound philosophy, it can not be proved to be contrary to reason.

EUCCHARIST, THE

III. TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Anglican Position.—"Transubstantiation . . . can not be proved by Holy Writ, but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions."—Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church, Art. 28.

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—According to Catholic teaching, not only are the body and the blood of Christ really, truly, and substantially present in the Eucharist, but the whole substance of the bread is changed into the substance of the body of Christ and the whole substance of wine into His blood. After the words of consecration are uttered nothing of the bread or of the wine remains but the accidents or appearances. The accidents are the color, shape, taste, hardness, fluidity, and the other qualities perceptible by the senses. By the divine power these are preserved without the substance of bread or of wine.

This complete and entire conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ is called transubstantiation.

The doctrine of transubstantiation is an article of faith. It is denied by the Reformed Churches, most of which reject any real or substantial presence of the body or the blood of Christ in the Eucharist. The Lutherans, who believe in a Real Presence, but only at the moment of communion, hold, nevertheless, that the bread and wine remain after the consecration and are received together with the body and blood of Christ. According to the Lutheran conception, then, there is no *conversion* of one substance into another, whereas such conversion is the essence of the Catholic idea of transubstantiation.

In the present article we assume as already proved the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence. The question now under discussion is, *how* do the body and blood of the Lord *come to be present*. Our answer is, by transubstantiation, or by the changing of the bread and wine into the body and blood, nothing of the bread and wine remaining but the accidents.

THE DOCTRINE OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION PROVED

Transubstantiation is immediately deducible from the words used by Our Lord when He instituted the Eucharist. "*Jesus took bread, and blessed, and broke, and gave to His disciples, and said: Take ye and eat: this is My body*" (Matt. xxvi. 26). From these words two inferences are clearly established: 1. What was *once* bread is *now* the body of Christ. 2. Therefore, the Lord must have changed the bread into His body—and this is transubstantiation. The first of these inferences can not easily be denied; for when the Lord said, "This is My body," what He held in His hands was really and truly His body; and yet it was precisely what had been described in the same sentence of the evangelist as bread. Therefore, what was *once* bread is now the body of the Lord. The second inference is easily deducible from the first; for if a thing is now A and afterward B, it must have undergone a change or conversion from A into B.

It may be objected to this argument that although it may, at first sight, seem perfectly logical, it does not take into account the possibility of a figurative use of language in the case under consideration. A man might hand another a purse filled with money and say, "This is money," although in reality *two* things were present, the purse *and* the money. And just so, when Our Lord said those words, "This is My body," His body may have been really present, but the bread may have been present also.

The objection has a specious appearance, but it is hardly more than specious. The use of such a figure of speech is neither customary nor rational except when one of the two things has a necessary and intimate relation with the other such as certainly does not obtain in the case of bread and a human body. But such a relation does exist between a purse and the money it contains. The purse was *made* to contain money; and as the money is what the giver is almost exclusively thinking of, he would deem it trivial to mention the purse unless it happened to have a very exceptional value. But bread has no such relation to a human body.

In the second place, the apostles would have been deceived if anything had been present but the body of Christ: first, because the strict and at the same time the most obvious meaning of the words required the exclusion of the

bread; second, they knew He had it in His power to convert bread into His body. They had seen Him convert water into wine, and that, too, without leaving a drop of water in the excellent wine He had made. Why not a similar conversion of substance into substance at the Last Supper? Indeed, Our Lord would seem to have wished by the miracle at the marriage-feast to prepare His apostles for a miracle of the same order at the Last Supper.

Under these circumstances was it not the natural thing for the apostles to receive the words, "This is My body" in a purely literal sense? "This"—that is, *all* of this—"is My body." And why receive together with His precious body, which at that moment was receiving the incense of angels, common bread, infinitely inferior in value to that which accompanied it, affording no nourishment to their souls, and serving no purpose such as is served by the accidents, which veil the face of the Lord from human gaze? (The Anglicans have a way of answering this last question which we shall consider later.) Third, the apostles were witnessing at the Last Supper *the founding of a great Christian rite* which they were bid perpetuate in the Church of God, and in the institution of which words would naturally be taken in their strict and literal sense, no room being left for personal interpretation such as the words of institution have been subjected to these past few centuries. Had the apostles thought of the matter at all they would doubtless have deemed it perilous to interpret the words uttered on that memorable night in such wise as to admit of the presence of anything but the sacred body of their Lord, which was "delivered" for them.

The words, "This is My body," are therefore to be taken as meaning that the bread was simply and without any distinction converted into the body of Christ, and that nothing remained of the bread but the appearances.

Our separated brethren should be the last persons in the world to go back of the plain words of Scripture; and yet the Anglicans, whilst doing so quite notably in the case of the Blessed Sacrament, charge Catholics with doing the same thing. "Repugnant to the plain words of Scripture" is the indictment leveled at us by the Twenty-eighth Article. Which plain words of Scripture are alluded to? "This My body which shall be delivered for you"? or these: "This is My blood . . . which shall be shed for

many"? Perhaps they are these: "For as often as you shall eat this *bread*, etc.," which St. Paul used in writing to the Corinthians. If so, we Catholics use the selfsame words unblushingly, even in the sacrifice of the Mass and after the consecration; as for instance when we say, "The holy bread of life eternal," or "The heavenly bread will I receive and on the Lord's name will call"; but *we* understand one another, as St. Paul and his neophytes understood one another. We know how to discern in this "bread" only the body of the Lord.

The direct argument from Holy Writ receives remarkable confirmation from the writings of the Fathers of the early Church who commented on the scriptural texts forming the basis of our demonstration. When the Fathers are unanimous or nearly so, on any point of doctrine, their opinion has always been regarded as the common teaching of the Church. Here, as in the case of the Real Presence, there is no dearth of testimonies from the Fathers. Indeed, so abundant are they that, whatever may be said of the few passages sometimes cited against the Catholic doctrine, no impartial student of the ancient writings can escape the conclusion that there is a consensus of the Fathers on the subject of transubstantiation.

Not only do they tell us that after the consecration what *was* common food is now the body and blood of Christ (St. Justin Martyr and St. Augustine); that the bread and wine *become* the body and blood of Christ (St. Athanasius); that He took bread and *made* it His body (Tertullian); but many of them—as St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Damascene, St. Ambrose—make use of terms which are, in the strictest sense, equivalents of transubstantiation. Moreover, they illustrate the change of substance by comparing it to the changing of water into wine, the changing of the rod of Moses into a serpent, and the like.

The testimony of the Fathers is borne out by that of the ancient liturgies cited in the preceding article in favor of the Real Presence.

There can be no doubt, then, about the meaning of Our Lord's words as interpreted by the Fathers of the ancient Church.

But, overwhelming as the testimony of antiquity is in favor of the Catholic dogma, our Protestant opponents are not easily driven from the field. They have brought a search-light to bear on the writings of the Fathers, and they have succeeded in finding a few passages in which the writers do actually say in express terms that the *substance*, or *nature*, of the bread remains after the consecration of the host! And these passages are forthwith used as a key for the unlocking of the meaning of all other passages bearing on the same subject. But what a difficult task it must be to use the key thus furnished on any of the numerous passages alluded to above, in which transubstantiation is so strongly emphasized by the use of terms at once so varied and yet so identical in meaning and by the use of so many and such luminous comparisons.

Writers like Bingham and Pearson should have been led to suspect that unless the Fathers differed from one another or even contradicted themselves on so important a subject—and this they can not admit—the true meaning of the terms *substance* and *nature* may not have been grasped by the Protestant student, and indeed could not be grasped by any student who was not well acquainted with the linguistic usage of the times. And that the meaning has been mistaken has been demonstrated by the illustrious Franzelin in his treatise on the Eucharist. He shows that at a time when there was little fixity or uniformity in the theologians' use of philosophical terms both the Greek and the Latin words for "substance" and "nature" were occasionally used to designate the sensible qualities of things,—form, color, taste, etc.—and these are precisely what are understood by the Eucharistic accidents, which remain after the substance of bread and wine have disappeared.

These accidents are a reality; they are not deceptive phantasms; they are the sensible qualities miraculously preserved after the substance has departed. The Fathers quoted knew well the distinction between substance and accident, but they occasionally availed themselves of a customary looseness of terminology to express an idea which exact philosophy would have expressed otherwise. The fact of such looseness of language is established by Franzelin by quoting from St. Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius, St. John Chrysostom, and Tertullian. He shows, moreover, that some of the Fathers who in the clearest terms declare

their belief in transubstantiation have, in other parts of their works, by confining their attention to the reality of the outward sign of the sacrament seemed to be speaking of another possible reality, the substance of the bread, which, however, was absent.

He afterward remarks that the Fathers in question not only can but must be understood as speaking only of the sensible species, and not of the substance in the true philosophical meaning of the term; for otherwise they would be contradicting the common teaching, with which they can not have disagreed. And besides, in the context of the passages quoted, they say, on the one hand, that the bread is changed into the body of Christ, and that consequently not two bodies remain, namely the bread and the body of Christ, but only the body of Christ, and, on the other, that the nature of bread remains—which would be a plain contradiction if the expression “the nature of bread” were not understood as he explains it.

Some pertinent remarks of Leibnitz, the distinguished philosopher and theologian of the seventeenth century, will add not a little to the force of the Catholic argument.

“Often times,” he says, “as [the body and blood of Christ] are not distinguishable by the senses, the name of bread and wine is applied to the remaining species. Thus St. Ambrose declares the word of the Lord to be so efficacious that ‘they at once are what they were and are changed into another thing’: that is, the accidents are what they were, the substance is changed; for the same Father says that after consecration they are not to be believed anything else ‘but the body and blood of Christ.’ And the Roman Pontiff Gelasius insinuates that ‘the bread is changed into the body, while the nature of the bread remains,’ that is to say, its qualities or accidents; for in those times the forms of speech were not measured in strict accordance with metaphysical notions. And it was in this sense also that Theodoret said that in this conversion, which he himself calls a change (*μεταβολήν*), ‘the mystic symbols are not divested of their proper nature.’ These expressions may be worthy of notice, as bearing against those writers of the present day who hold that even the accidents of the bread do not really remain, but only the appearance of them, or an empty and dreamlike apparition.” *Systema Theol.*, Engl. Transl., p. 106 ff.

In a certain epistle to Cæsarius, attributed to St. John Chrysostom—a document which threw Protestants into an ecstasy when first brought to light—the writer speaks of the nature of bread as remaining, but immediately afterward he adds, “and there are not two bodies, but rather one, that of the Son (of God)” —which would certainly not be true if bread were present.

In another passage which is a favorite with Protestant controversialists the writer, Theodoret, explains that although the nature of the elements has not changed, the eye of the understanding sees what they *have been made*, and belief and adoration follow. He evidently means that the “nature of the elements” is unchanged only as regards the sensible appearances.

And now, as to the second accusation of the Twenty-eighth Article, viz., that transubstantiation “overthroweth the nature of a sacrament,” a few words will suffice.

Catholics and Protestants agree in this, that in every sacrament there must be an outward part—an outward sign—which by its nature is fitted to be a symbol of the interior grace bestowed. Now one of the stock arguments of the English Reformers against transubstantiation was that the outward part of the sacrament of the Eucharist must be nutritive bread; otherwise it could not signify the spiritual nutrition given to the soul; and therefore, as transubstantiation destroyed the bread, it destroyed the sacrament. But why, we ask, insist on the presence of nutritive bread? Will not the accidents of bread, which are an outward sign of the most impressive kind, suffice as a symbol of interior nourishment? But you will say there is no reality about them. Ah, but there is: they are the real accidental qualities of what once was bread. They seemed so real to Locke, whose philosophy has so profoundly influenced English thought, that they were called by him the nominal substance, of which we have some knowledge, as distinguished from the real substance, of which we have no knowledge.

As to the superstition which transubstantiation is charged with occasioning, we shall have a word to say in the last article on the Eucharist. (See “The Eucharist.—Its Con-
gruities” and “Superstitions.”)

EUCCHARIST, THE

IV. ITS CONGRUITIES

Objection.—The Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist is repugnant to all sense of fitness. We instinctively reject the notion that Christ's real body is given to us as food.

THE ANSWER.—The rejection of the doctrine is over-hasty and withal based on a misconception.

Catholics, for their part, have no sense of the unfitness of the Eucharistic banquet; and this, not because their sense of the fitness of things is dulled by custom, but because they realize the *meaning and spirit of the Incarnation*. Does not the Incarnation mean an infinite lowering of the Eternal Son of God? Does it not mean that He became an insignificant and despised member of the human family?—that He was mocked, spit upon, and nailed to a gibbet to be sacrificed for our salvation?

All this would have seemed repugnant to our sense of fitness if it had been broached to us before the event; and yet it is an accomplished fact. Who, then, will be incredulous at hearing of further acts of condescension? Can we be altogether unprepared for other striking manifestations of love from the same source? *Realize the Incarnation*, and a broader horizon will open upon your view of the divine condescension.

One who has not lived from childhood in the atmosphere of Catholic thought will not at once feel at home in it. Now, among other things, we would ask any such person to remember that the Eucharistic feast is, after all, a participation in a sacrifice. The victim is Our Lord Jesus Christ; for, according to Catholic doctrine, the Victim of the crucifixion is again offered on our altars in an unbloody manner; and the outward guise under which He is present is the "species," or appearances, of bread and wine, which signify the spiritual nourishment which His real presence ministers to the soul. Having once condescended to be sacrificed for us, He finds a means of renewing the sacrifice and enabling us perpetually to partake of the divine Victim. This is indeed a most ineffable act of condescension, but is it not in harmony with all the other manifesta-

tions of His inventive love? Realize what He has done for us, and you will not be shocked at His doing more.

The reader will doubtless welcome a passage in the same vein as these remarks of ours from a very unlooked for source. It is from the "Literature and Dogma" of Matthew Arnold. The author, though not of course admitting the Catholic doctrine, has this much to say in its favor.

"Once admit the miracle of the 'atoning sacrifice,' *once move in this order of ideas,** and what can be more natural and beautiful than to imagine this miracle every day repeated, Christ offered in thousands of places, everywhere the believer enabled to enact the work of redemption and unite himself with the Body whose sacrifice saves him? And the effect of this belief has been no more degrading than the belief itself."

And he quotes the following paragraph from the "Imitation of Christ," the little Catholic classic which contains so much of the aroma of Catholic devotion:

"To us in our weakness Thou hast given, for the refreshment of mind and body, Thy sacred body. The devout communicant Thou, My God, raisest from the depth of his own dejection to the hope of Thy protection, and with a hitherto unknown grace renewest him and enlightenest him within; so that they who at first, before this communion, had felt themselves distressed and affectionless, after the refreshment of this meat and drink from heaven, find themselves changed to a new and better man. For this most high and worthy sacrament is the saving health of soul and body, the medicine of all spiritual languor; by it my vices are cured, my passions bridled, temptations are conquered or diminished, a larger grace is infused, the beginnings of virtue are made to grow, faith is confirmed, hope strengthened, and charity takes fire and dilates into flame."

The author of "Literature and Dogma" has opened a fountain-source of right and profitable thinking for persons without the pale of the Church when he suggests that they "*move in this order of ideas,*" that they get into the orbit of Catholic thought and do not consider things apart from their general Catholic environment.

The same suggestion has a bearing on another phase of the aversion felt for the Catholic doctrine. One is repelled,

*Italics ours.

we are told, by the thought of the Real Presence in the case of hosts reserved in the tabernacle, carried in procession, or conveyed to the sick. The possibility—or more than possibility—of accidents, indignities offered, and the like, is especially shocking.

In the first place, it is not known, or is certainly not realized, outside the Catholic Church, that the most exquisite care is both prescribed and actually taken to prevent any accident, and still more any indignity, from befalling the consecrated host. And we would ask our critics to remember that one of the chief reasons, though not the only one, why the Catholic Church does not administer the Eucharist under the species of wine to the laity is that to do so would be to expose the sacred species to the danger of accident. (See “Communion under One Kind.”)

But even supposing the worst—supposing both accident and indignity, at least occasionally—we must again ask our friendly critics to consider the part in connection with the whole. If, as they conceive, Our Lord should fare so ill in the Blessed Sacrament, would not such experience of evil be but part and parcel of all He foreknew He would suffer in His earthly abode? During His mortal life was He not the object of indignities such as no other human being has endured? To say that He was struck upon the face, spit upon, clothed with mock insignia of royalty, nailed to an infamous gibbet between two notorious villains, or to say that His precious blood mingled with the dust which was trodden upon by His ruthless executioners, is to give a very inadequate description of this phase of Our Lord's passion, because although we can know, or imagine, what was done to Him by His enemies, we can never realize a thousandth part of what was felt by Himself.

Now when we consider that all this obloquy was voluntarily accepted and ardently embraced before the event, that it was, in a sense, pre-arranged by the Eternal Son of God Himself, can we be surprised that at the close of His earthly career He should have chosen to remain on earth and live a sacramental life which would unite Him most intimately with His children, even though it involved the risk of occasional accident or indignity? As a matter of fact, such untoward happenings are rare; but whether He endures much or little at the hands of men, He has thrown

in His lot with ours, and even now, as in His passion, He can in a manner bid us suffer in imitation of Himself.

We say "in a manner," because it must be remembered that His body and His soul are in a "glorified" state, and are consequently rendered impassible; which means that He is incapable of enduring either physical suffering or mental anguish. Hence, whatever accidents may befall the sacred species, they can not produce any physical effect upon His sacred body, and whatever irreverence He may experience His soul is unaffected by it. Now, no less than during His mortal life, He mingles with His own creation, and yet is as little affected by His evil surroundings as the rays of the sun are affected by mingling with the mire. He is offended, of course, as His Heavenly Father is offended, by any *culpable* irreverence shown His sacramental presence, but He is in a state which renders Him superior, in every sense of the phrase, to the accidents that may happen to the sacramental species.

A few additional observations on the *manner* in which Our Lord is present under the sacred species may be profitable to those who are repelled from the doctrine of the Eucharist by a false conception of what is implied in it. The *material* substance of Our Lord's body is really and substantially present, but its sacramental state is analogous, in some respects, to the condition of purely *spiritual* substances. It is not circumscribed by the dimensions of the host, nor is one part of His body in one part of the host and another in another. It is at once in the entire host and whole and entire in every part of the host, just as a man's soul in its entirety is in every part of his body.

This state of existence may be described as *really corporeal* but *virtually spiritual*. It is really corporeal because what is present is the real material body of the Lord; it is virtually spiritual because enjoying miraculously the prerogative of spiritual natures in relation to space and in the absence of resistance and impenetrability. It must be noted, too, that the accidents, or species, are not accidents *inhering in the body* of Our Lord. They are the veil concealing His presence from the senses. Hence the act of eating has no physical effect upon His sacred body, such as is produced upon ordinary food. Hence the absence of all that grossness or carnality which doubtless haunts the imagination of the unbeliever in the Real Presence. The

Eucharistic feast contains the minimum of anything suggestive of ordinary eating and drinking; and such is the spirit in which it is approached that the effect it produces oftentimes rises to the maximum of spiritual fervor. Many saintly souls by partaking of this heavenly food have risen to an all but angelic degree of union and love.

Once more then—view the part in connection with the whole. View the Blessed Eucharist but as an extension of the incarnate life of the Son of God on earth. And yet not even the Incarnation, with all its train of supernatural favors, is comprehensive enough to cover the entire range of God's designs in regard to the union of the divine nature with our souls. When our hopes are realized beyond the stars we shall possess Him even more intimately than we do in the sacrament of His love. Then shall we be made one with Him as perfectly as it is possible for a creature to be made one with his Creator. How touching, then, is the device by which He gives us a foretaste of that union at the Eucharistic table.

"Once move in this order of ideas," and the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist will not be repugnant to any *just* sense of the fitness of things.

EUGENICS

An Accusation.—Every human being should love his kind, and a love of his kind should awaken in his breast an interest in the future of his race. The improvement of the race is the object of eugenics, and a want of sympathy with the present eugenic movement betrays either selfishness or an unenlightened conservatism.

THE ANSWER.—With the *right sort* of eugenics we are in perfect sympathy. There is a sound species of eugenics which ought to be welcomed by every lover of his kind; but in the actual eugenic movement of the day there are elements of which no Christian, especially if he be a Catholic, can approve. The Church has made no pronouncement on the eugenic propaganda as such, but many features of the movement are at variance with sound Christian principles.

Eugenics (from the Greek *eu*, well, and *genos*, race,

birth, origin) may be said to have originated with Sir Francis Galton, an Englishman, who was born in 1822 and died in 1911. He had begun early in life to study the effects of heredity on the capacities of men and women of various classes and professions, and was ultimately led to an investigation of the conditions for improving the human species through heredity. The subject was taken up by others and studied and discussed with growing interest, till finally, of late years, something resembling a science of eugenics has begun to take shape and find practical application. To-day eugenists are so numerous and so energetic in their propaganda that the subject is at last brought home to men's business and bosoms.

Eugenics as defined by the Eugenics Education Society is "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally."

The object of the eugenist is to lay a foundation for the betterment of the human species. But he must not be confounded with the ordinary philanthropist. In the first place, he calls science to his aid and uses very special means for the furtherance of his object. Among other things his work is organized and depends for its success on the combined activities of many. In the second place, his efforts are directed, immediately and almost exclusively, to the bettering of the *physical* well-being of man. The intellect is an object of solicitude, but the condition of the intellect is supposed to depend on the condition of the body. This all but exclusive devotion to the human body reminds us rather too forcibly of the interest of the stock-raiser in the improvement of the breed of horses. Morality is not a matter of indifference to him, but he often subordinates it to the interests of the body; and, as likely as not, he will be found to have any but conventional notions regarding the very essence of morality. He will be found in many cases to be a disciple of naturalism, or of extreme evolutionism—anything but a Christian.

Such is the general aim of the eugenist. His more immediate object is to bring it about that only healthy children shall be born into the world. And as it is desirable that the right kind of children should be born, it is deemed no less desirable that only the right kind of men and women should wed. Hence the efforts of the eugenist to pre-

vent certain classes of persons from becoming fathers or mothers. Here indeed the chief stress of the movement is laid.

Certain diseases or certain undesirable propensities are either transmitted by the parent to the child or are acquired from early domestic environment. Persons possessing these defects must not be allowed to marry. Chief among these diseases are alcoholism, lead poison, venereal diseases, epilepsy, insanity, feeble-mindedness, deaf-mutism, and consumption. The eugenist is not content to use the art of persuasion, or indirect methods of any kind, to prevent persons infected by these diseases from marrying. Compulsion must be brought to bear upon them, and hence the State must interfere. Among other measures to be provided by State law the requirement of a medical certificate of health must be complied with by those desiring to marry. Already in several States of the Union laws to this end have either been passed or proposed for enactment.

But the eugenist does not stop here. He will make it physically impossible for the defective to become fathers or mothers; and here again State authority is invoked and the most drastic measures proposed. Criminals, lunatics, the feeble-minded and others, must be sterilized by means of surgical operations. Apart from calling in State authority, though partly in connection with it, one type of eugenist would cut into every usage or law, even when it is essentially bound up with religion, that interferes with the physical well-being of the race. Divorce must be resorted to as a means of preventing defective offspring. Marriage must be universal among the healthy and celibacy confined to the unhealthy. The size of families must be reduced by methods which every Christian knows are forbidden by the divine law.

Even the education of the young is to be brought under the influence of the eugenic propaganda. As the abuse of the sexual instinct makes for race degeneracy, children are to be taught to avoid it; but how? By instructing them in the most indelicate matters concerning the human body, but in ways, eugenists assure us, that will make them respect their bodies and consult for their future happiness by avoiding incontinence.

Such is the programme of eugenists; not that every eugenist advocates all the extreme measures we have been

describing, but that these are prominent and persistent features of the movement taken in the gross.

Now we are loath to oppose any movement that aims at improving the race; and in point of fact we are not opposed either to eugenics in the abstract or to any right form of eugenics in the concrete. We are eugenists ourselves, and as Catholics we stand for certain eugenic principles and methods which we believe will one day be recognized more universally as the only sound and practicable ones. What we are opposed to is *the spirit and the methods of the present movement* as embodied in the activities of many practical eugenists.

The greater number of eugenists lay themselves open to the following grave charges:

1. *They are over-hasty in the practical application of their principles.* Seeing that the science of eugenics is still in so crude a state, what right have they to influence our legislatures to adopt the most drastic measures in behalf of a problematical improvement of the race? The average politician who secures a seat in one of our legislative bodies is not a man who understands the significance of such enactments, affecting as they do personal, social, and religious interests of the most vital importance. What right have they to apply a half-digested science of eugenics to the immature minds of children—especially when they are aware of the widespread opposition to the procedure on the score of morality and religion? *Festina lente*—make haste slowly, is a maxim which eugenists ought to write, if not on the hems of their garments, at least on their sleeve-cuffs, for daily and hourly remembrance.

2. *They unnecessarily infringe the rights and sacrifice the good of the individual.* In all legislation, it is true, the good of the greater number claims the first consideration, but there are certain individual rights that must not be sacrificed by human law to *any* prospective good of the greater number. Take, for instance, the right of the individual man or woman to enter the wedded state. It is desirable, as every one will admit, that parents should not be breeders of children having a predisposition to consumption; and if it were a question here simply of a superior form of stock-breeding consumptives should be forbidden to marry. Even as it is, there may be cases in which persuasion might effectually be used without indiscretion; but

the use of compulsion is quite another matter. The breeding of children is not the only end of marriage. The divine institution of matrimony contemplates also the happiness of parents, and at the same time provides for the satisfaction of the sexual instinct under the regulation of law. *An unruly satisfaction of the instinct will often-times be the result of a prohibition to marry.* And what right-minded eugenist can view with complacency the spread of incontinence among so large a number of the unmarried?

Let us add to this consideration the fact that the children of consumptives and of other defectives often inherit the best of *moral* tendencies from their parents and are bred, under parental care, to habits of virtue which certainly ought to be reckoned as assets for the community in which they live. That the parents in question should be systematically instructed and directed—possibly, too, as a matter of State law—in the early physical rearing of their children, and that the children should be secured special hygienic and medical aid, is a proposition to which few would object. In our day, in consequence of the advances made in practical medicine, many a young man or woman infected by organic diseases has been saved by medical care for many years of usefulness.

Another point, one which bears on medical operations performed on defectives, is worthy of serious consideration. Vasectomy or any other such operation is indeed effective for the attainment of its immediate end. Criminals and imbeciles operated upon can never become fathers or mothers; *but the prevention of parenthood will not bring with it a cure of incontinence.* The sexual instinct will be left and will crave satisfaction. Procreation will be impossible; but who does not see that the very absence of what is often regarded as an inconvenient consequence of sexual indulgence will be an inducement to incontinence?

The instruction of large groups of children in the secrets of nature is another instance of harm done under the inspiration of the eugenist movement. The professed object of such instruction is to instill into young minds a love of purity, to warn them of the dangers that threaten them and of the consequences of carnal indulgence. It is presumed that when a child is taught the nature and purpose of certain bodily functions he will begin to take a serious view of

matters which he now regards lightly and will develop a sense of self-responsibility.

Here again it is not the aims but the methods that we condemn. We are uncompromisingly opposed—as the great majority of mankind is opposed—to the teaching of any of these things to children in groups, and even to the individual child in private except with the utmost discretion.

It argues very little knowledge of child nature to suppose that a class of children hearing these things explained will not suffer moral taint. The appeal made to their intellects really affects their imaginations much more than it does their intellects—and that, too, at a time when their imaginations are liveliest and their intellects and their moral purpose weakest. And the presence of numbers will only intensify the evil effect which such instruction must have upon the imaginations of children.

We are not forgetting, however, that in the manner of conveying such knowledge all grossness may be avoided. One of the methods proposed or in use is that of leading up to a knowledge of human life by instruction on the analogies of plant life; but one thing is certain: either the ultimate knowledge sought to be conveyed will be too vague to be of any practical use, or, if it is clearly set before the children's minds, especially in groups, it will have nearly all the effect of knowledge suddenly and bluntly conveyed. As soon as *the* fact has been reached, the imagination is stored with images on which it is more than likely to ring the changes.

Instruction in these matters may in many cases be necessary and salutary, but no small amount of discretion is required to impart it without doing harm. Parents are the natural instructors of their children on these points, but even parents must be guided by what they conceive to be the necessities of their children and choose time and occasion with the greatest circumspection. Young children are to be guarded against incontinence chiefly by the inculcating of external modesty, the avoidance of idleness and vanity, and the shunning of dangerous companionship. We shall have a word to say later on the most important part of their education, that which has to do with the supernatural.

Older boys and girls may need to be warned against the

physical and moral consequences of acts of which they do not know the significance, but, again, with extreme circumspection. The most that can be done with children assembled in common is to instruct them, *in the least graphic way possible*, on what is forbidden and enjoined by the commandments, but in a way that will impress them no less than enlighten them. Among other things they can be impressed by the thought of the consequences, physical and moral, of sinful indulgence.

3. *Eugenists advocate extreme measures when moderate ones would suffice.* They favor, for instance, the mutilation of the feeble-minded and others when such expedients as segregation have proved by experiment eminently successful. The idea of segregation is to separate defectives from the rest of the community and place them under a régime that will contribute to their happiness and retain them in a state of unwedded contentedness. That the idea is not chimerical is proved by the success of actual establishments for the care of the feeble-minded, some of which have been in existence for many years. Typical institutions of the kind are the school at Waverley in Massachusetts, the establishments at Sandlebridge in England, and Ursberg in Bavaria, and the Gheel Colony in Belgium. A similar institution has been opened or is about to be opened in the Surrey House, in England.

In these institutions the inmates are provided with congenial occupations and attractive amusements. In the Gheel Colony considerable freedom has been allowed the patients, and without any frustration of the great aims of the institute. How far compulsory entrance into such institutions would be justifiable or feasible may be a question, but the satisfaction actually felt by the inmates of certain of these establishments begets the assurance that very many feeble-minded persons might be persuaded by an appeal to self-interest to place themselves under so pleasant and salutary a guardianship.

4. *Eugenists often ignore the best of all means of improving the race; those, namely, supplied by religion and the moral law.* We make this something of a charge against them, because, although many of them make personal profession of religion, they seem to make little or nothing of its practical efficacy or of its laws. Their absorption in the interests of physical well-being seems to make them

oblivious of the spiritual forces in human life, which if they were fully and universally developed would enable the world to solve many of the problems regarding physical well-being by which it is agitated to-day.

Eugenics would have smaller reason for existing if the spiritual and the supernatural dominated in the souls of men, for many of our racial distempers are the fruit, directly or indirectly, of sin. No true philosophy of health can afford to undervalue the spiritual element in man's nature. This being the case, any system of eugenics will be notably defective if it fails to bring these truly eugenic influences into the foreground of its propaganda. In point of fact they are very commonly ignored. We have already noticed instances in which the spiritual good of individuals and of the race is subordinated to the physical.

We Catholics are not indifferent to movements aiming at the extirpation of racial diseases; and this the history of Catholic charity abundantly proves; but we protest in the name of Christianity against any invasion of materialism (and much of the eugenics of the day is materialistic) into the domain of man's spiritual interests. At the same time we are conscious of possessing in our own system of practical religion the most effective means of preventing those racial distempers which are due to the abuse of the animal instincts.

The best fruit of true spiritual development is a *strong will*—especially a will fortified against mere instinct. A Catholic child's will is trained under Catholic influences in a way and in a degree that are unknown and unguessed in other religious systems. Early religious instruction, strict religious obligations involving much self-denial, the discipline of the confessional which applies the highest moral sanction to the renunciation of evil habits, the transforming power, in respect to the will, of union with one's Lord in the sacrament of His love; these and other sources of influence possessed by the Catholic Church, though ministering directly to her children's souls, are in the long run the best preservatives of their physical well-being.

If other religions can not bring to bear upon the problems of eugenics such powerful forces as these, let them at least employ such forces as they have at their command. Let them use all the influence they possess in favor of religious education and against all forms of public and private im-

morality. Let the followers of those religions set their faces against all new expedients for the improvement of the race which are essentially unchristian and which are characterized more by haste and only apparent thoroughness than by wise foresight or a knowledge of human nature.

EVOLUTION

An Evolutionary Boast.—"In the theory of natural selection we have the key to 'the question of all questions,' to the great enigma of the place of man in nature and of his natural development." "The possibility of giving a mechanical explanation of organic nature was not seen until Darwin provided a solid foundation for the theory of a descent."—Haeckel.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE.—Can the doctrine of evolution be accepted by a Christian? It depends on the kind and the amount of evolution he is asked to accept. *No Christian can accept evolution of the extreme Darwinian or Haeckelian type.* But these are not the only forms of evolutionary theory. Certain moderate systems of evolution have been adopted by scientists who are sincere Christians, and some of whom are Catholics. It is plain that any theory of evolution that denies creation or the spirituality and immortality of the human soul is directly opposed to Christian truth.

By evolution in general is meant a development or transformation, as when a seed evolves into a plant or a tadpole into a frog. But we are concerned here with the evolution of whole *kinds or classes* of beings into other kinds or classes. The reader need hardly be informed that plants and animals are brought under an elaborate system of classification. The animal and vegetable kingdoms are each divided into sub-kingdoms; these again into classes, classes into orders, orders into families, families into genera, and genera into species. The species has been more generally regarded as the unit. It may, however, have its sub-species, and the sub-species has been regarded by some naturalists as the unit.

In the present state of biological science the term "species" is a word of more or less vague import, and animals

have been divided into species in a way that can hardly be regarded as scientific; the species being determined mainly by some peculiarity of structure, as for instance in the teeth of quadrupeds or in the bills of birds, and the assigning of the species being often dependent on the peculiar knowledge of individual investigators. The results, however, of such unscientific classification need present no obstacle to our readers' getting at the gist of evolutionary systems.

The evolution controversy is chiefly concerned with the *origin of species*. Did all the known species of animals and plants exist as such originally? or have they been evolved from some primitive type or types? Did the dog, the wolf, and the jackal, which to-day are classified as distinct species of the genus *canis*, always exist as distinct species, or have they been all three evolved from one type of animal which was neither dog, wolf, nor jackal? Evolutionists hold that the present species have been evolved from primitive types; their extreme opponents deny that there is any evolution of species.

EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES.—The beginnings of evolutionary theories may be seen in the writings of Buffon, Treveranus, the poet and savant Goethe, and Erasmus (grandfather of Charles) Darwin; but Lamarck (born 1744) is generally regarded as the father of modern evolutionary science. He insisted much on the effect of environment in developing or destroying the habits and propensities, and even the organs, of animals. The variations thus produced were perpetuated by heredity. Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, a contemporary of Lamarck's, held the mutability of species, and among other points of his system was the theory that environment could produce sudden changes in the specific characters of the embryo. The theories of Lamarck and Saint-Hilaire made small impression on the scientific world compared with that produced by the theory of Charles Robert Darwin.

DARWINISM.—In 1858 Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, who had each been working independently on the same lines, agreed to present themselves to the scientific world as the joint authors of a new system of evolution. Each read a paper on the subject before the Linnæan Society on the same day. The following year, 1859, Darwin explained his theory at greater length in his "Origin of

Species." The distinctive feature of the system was the Law of Natural Selection. The phrase was suggested by what is known as artificial selection, a process familiar to cultivators and breeders. When a gardener wishes to develop some valuable quality in his roses or his chrysanthemums he selects for planting the best of the seeds from flowers possessing that quality. Following a like process for successive generations of the species, he will finally succeed in developing what is regarded as a new variety. Now according to Darwin something analogous takes place in nature. By a sort of *natural* selection certain peculiarities in animals and plants are propagated and developed, till after the lapse of ages not only new varieties but even new species are produced.

But how is this law brought into operation? It is brought into operation by the "struggle for existence." Animals and plants have a tendency to multiply much more rapidly than nature can supply them with the means of subsistence. Hence the struggle for life, which some individuals survive, but which others do not. In the case of the successful ones, what is the secret of their success? It must be, says Darwin, in the possession of some natural advantage, though it be slight—keener vision, for instance, or greater strength of wing—which makes them superior to their fellows. It must consist radically in some variation from the normal type of structure. Now these beneficial variations will be propagated by generation; and thus it comes to pass that as nature is always "selecting" from the best, the favorable variations will become more and more pronounced and the animal or plant will diverge more and more from the original type. Finally, after many generations, an entirely new species will have been produced.

Darwin's conclusions covered the whole range of animal and vegetable life. Even man, in his early origins, was not excluded from the operation of natural selection. Man, he tells us, is but a higher type of animal, which has arrived at its present superior condition by passing through a long series of transformations. He is, in fact, only a highly educated ape, whose superior intelligence is due to ages of experience acquired in the school of adversity.

Darwin obliterates the hard and fast line that has ever been drawn between human intelligence and animal instinct. With him it is a question of degree rather than of

kind. What we call instinct only needs development to be converted into intelligence. No pure Darwinist can consistently hold that man possesses a spiritual soul essentially different from the soul of a brute. How seriously Darwin took home to himself his theory that ape intelligence and human intelligence are not essentially different is illustrated by the sudden check always put upon his thoughts about the Creator by the reflection, "What can an ape know about such high things?" (See "Darwin.")

Natural selection, we must add, is not the entire content of the system as ultimately conceived by its author. Ideas borrowed from Lamarck and Buffon were eventually grafted on the original theory by Darwin as the result of reflection and observation. Nevertheless, natural selection is the great distinctive feature of the system by which it must either stand or fall. And now, what is the verdict passed upon pure Darwinism by natural science and theology?

Whatever services may have been rendered to the study of natural history by the principle of natural selection, it has been found to be notably defective as a key to the secret of the transformation of species, and many leading scientists now regard natural selection as only a subordinate factor in the process. The internal origin of useful variations tending to the realization of nature's designs is neglected in the theory, and the necessary accumulation of variations making for greater perfection of structure is not demonstrated. Darwinism can offer no explanation of certain elaborate formations which could never have passed through a great struggle for existence. The sight of a peacock's tail always gave a painful shock to Darwin's evolutionary creed. Darwinism made too little account of environment and isolation, as well as of possible changes in the embryo. It knew nothing of sudden transformations such as the Mendelian system has made us familiar with. These and other defects have shattered the faith of more than one devout Darwinian and, indirectly, have given a stimulus to inquiry in other directions.

The history of Darwinism furnishes one of the most impressive instances of usurpation in the domain of thought followed by reaction and rebellion. Encountering at first intense opposition from the older scientists, it soon won its way to favor among the young and enthusiastic. Its right

to preëminence was loudly and intolerantly asserted. Finally, within a decade or two after the appearance of the "Origin of Species," Darwinism was completely in the ascendant. Its influence was no longer confined to scientific circles but was felt in the popular lecture-hall and even in the elementary school. The phrases set afloat by it—"struggle for existence," "survival of the fittest," "the missing link"—had now become household words.

Such was Darwinism within the recollection of many of us, but to-day Darwinism is dethroned. Evolution, in some form, has possibly come to stay, but Darwinism and evolution are no longer regarded as identical by many of the leaders of scientific thought.

The gradual decline of Darwinism is neatly and pointedly described by Edward von Hartmann. "In the sixties of the past century," he tells us, "the opposition of the older group of savants to the Darwinian hypothesis was supreme. In the seventies the idea began to gain ground rapidly in all cultured countries. In the eighties Darwin's influence was at its height and exercised an almost absolute control over technical research. In the nineties, for the first time, a few timid expressions of doubt and opposition were heard, and these gradually swelled into a great chorus of voices, aiming at the overthrow of the Darwinian theory. In the first decade of the twentieth century it has become apparent that the days of Darwinism are numbered. Among its latest opponents are such savants as Eimer, Gustav Wolf, De Vries, Hoocke, Von Wellstein, Fleischmann, Reinke, and many others." (See *Literary Digest*, Jan. 23, 1904.)

For a confirmation of this testimony we need but turn to the partial list of opponents of Darwinism furnished by Father Gerard in his valuable work, "The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer" (p. 199), a list in which occur such names as De Quatrefages, Blanchard, Wigand, Wolff, Hamann, Pauly, Driesch, Plate, Hertwig, Heer, Kölliker, Eimer, Von Hartmann, Scilde, Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Nageli, Schaafhausen, Fechner, Jacob, Diebolder, Huber, Joseph Ranke, and Von Bauer.

As to the Darwinian derivation of man from the ape, not a few of Darwin's followers have parted company with him on that point. His colleague in the first propounding of the theory of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace,

was a steady adherent, on scientific grounds, of the doctrine of the spirituality and the divine origin of the human soul.

The overthrow of natural selection is not the overthrow of evolution, but still even the fate of natural selection is matter for rejoicing to all Christian believers. To those whose faith is easily disturbed by supposed scientific truths it is well that an object-lesson has been furnished showing how easily a scientific guess may pass current for a scientific truth, and how easily a timorous soul may be "frighted with false fire."

HAECKEL'S SYSTEM.—Darwin's theory, bold as it is, is in some respects tame compared with Haeckel's. And yet Haeckel's is only a revamping of ancient systems of philosophy which have had their day. It contains, however, one element of originality. According to Haeckel there is one universal all-controlling law of nature—the Law of Substance. How did he discover it? There was no need of discovery for a man of Haeckel's well-known ready invention. He simply took two laws accepted by the scientific world, the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy, and framed them into one. Why he should have called it a law, or why a law of substance, he would have found it difficult to explain. He sums up the universe and its history in two words—Matter and Energy—though energy is only a quality of matter. As the system reduces all things to one, it is a species of monism (from the Greek *monos*, single).

By the law of substance, we are told, all things have been evolved from the minute particles of matter that once constituted the then formless universe. The process has been a purely mechanical one. Nebulous matter has been shaped into revolving orbs; the mineral kingdom has sprung into existence, and then in succession the vegetable and animal, closing with man, who, with all his achievements, with his civilization and religion, is reducible like all things else to the one formula, matter and energy. God, providence, creation, spiritual and immortal soul, free will, moral responsibility—all this is swept aside, and in its place is erected a law of blind necessity whose operation is inevitable and irreversible.

The boldness of this doctrine is only surpassed by the reckless indifference of its defender—if defender he can be called—to the necessity of demonstrating what is so con-

fidently asserted. A certain species of quiet assumption is the policy of Haeckel and his school; and this is the secret of their success with the unthinking multitude. Problems before which the world's greatest minds have halted, from a sense of their inherent difficulty, are serenely ignored by these mystics of pseudo-science, who substitute a sort of "scientific" faith, or "scientific" intuition for bona-fide research and genuine scientific demonstration.

Such is the theory of evolution proclaimed as scientific law by Professor Haeckel in his "Riddle of the Universe," a work in which the author steps down from the professorial chair and appeals to the crowd; and that with no little success, notwithstanding the fact that his methods, his assertions, and his professional conduct generally, have been indignantly repudiated by a large number of leading German scientists. If our readers would like to see a sample portrait of the class of scientists who have thus degraded themselves before the crowd, we would ask them to turn to the article entitled "Haeckel." After reading it they will agree with us that the following verdict passed upon his pretensions by Professor Paulsen is comparatively mild: "What I purpose showing is not more, nor yet less, than this, that as a philosopher Haeckel is not to be taken seriously."

It would take a treatise on rational philosophy and another one on natural science to refute one-half of the assumptions and false assertions that abound in Haeckel's books. Many of them have been repudiated by leading scientists in their criticism of pure Darwinism. We have taken special pains elsewhere (see "Spontaneous Generation") to show that one essential link in the continuous chain of causes and effects required by Haeckelian evolution is wanting. The transition from the no-life period on the earth to the period of life can not be accounted for except either by creation or by spontaneous generation. By Haeckel and his school spontaneous generation is simply assumed as a fact, although there is no warrant for the assumption either in ordinary experience or in science.

In recent years evolutionists have followed very divergent paths. Some have not yet renounced their loyalty to the old ensign of natural selection. Some have been harking back to Lamarckism. Others have busied them-

selves with a study of the embryo, with a view to getting at the conditions for the transformation of species. Still another group are proving experimentally that new species may be produced suddenly, and hold that in the past nature has so produced them; not, however, capriciously, but by virtue of an internal principle and by fixed law.

EVOLUTION AND CHRISTIANITY.—As Evolution and Christianity meet on common ground, to wit, the origin of the material world and of man, it is desirable to know whether and to what extent they can dwell there in peace. In the first place, what should be the attitude of a Christian man of science toward the general idea of evolution of species?

Impartial investigators have found a mass of facts which they regard as evidence of at least a limited evolution of species. There is nothing to prevent a Christian from entering this field and exploring it to the utmost. The certain and solid results of scientific research will never be found conflicting with Christian truth, *for truth can never be at variance with truth*. Necessarily, Catholic theologians have been uncompromising in their hostility to pure Darwinism, and at first they looked with disfavor, to say the least, on any and every theory of evolution of species. But now that scientific thought has been showing a tendency to right itself after a period of storm and stress there is some prospect of a reconciliation between theology and evolution.

We have a typical example of the moderate Christian evolutionist in the distinguished German entomologist, Father Wasmann, S.J., who inclines to the theory that the present countless species of plants and animals have been derived from a comparatively small number of species; "natural species," he calls them, which were the direct product of creation. He thus leaves the Christian doctrine of creation untouched. To the believer in creation, he says, it is a matter of indifference whether the hare and the rabbit or the horse and the ass are related in origin. If the old idea of the fixedness of species should be supplanted by the new idea of derivation by descent, the power and wisdom of the Creator would not be the less glorified; rather, they would be the more glorified, by reason of the Creator's having implanted in organic natures

potentialities which enable them to unfold ever-new forms of organic life without the need of any further special intervention of creative power.

Whenever there is question of accepting or rejecting any evolutionary theory, we must, of course, draw the line at every point where the theory clashes with unmistakable Catholic teaching. An evolution that entirely excludes creation is both unchristian and unscientific. A theory that denies that the world was made in six days is to be rejected; and yet we are not forbidden to interpret the "six days" of the Bible as six very long periods of time. The original text of Genesis does not exclude that interpretation; and in case science succeeds in demonstrating that long periods of time must have elapsed between the formation of the earth and the creation of man, there will be nothing in the Bible to contradict the demonstration. Even the postulate of millions of years, which has so often been put forward, could be safely granted. The opposite extreme in the interpretation of the "six days" is illustrated by St. Augustine's opinion (or at least by the view that he inclines to) that God created all things at one and the same moment, and that the "six days" only indicate six grades of perfection, or six orders of created things.

As regards the origin of man, we must, in the first place, distinguish between body and soul. Catholic teaching and sound philosophy require us to hold that man's soul is spiritual, and is therefore essentially different from the soul of a brute. Hence, no evolution of the soul of an animal can produce intelligence, in the right sense of the word. Hence, no Catholic can admit the evolution of the human soul.

As to the body of man, Catholics are bound to accept the inspired statement of the Book of Genesis (ii. 7), "The Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth." As to the manner in which He formed his body, perhaps some latitude of opinion is permitted. St. Augustine, whilst regarding the question as wrapped in mystery, is very loath to consider the Almighty as fashioning the body of man in the way in which an artist models his figures in clay. In one passage he speaks of something like a preparation and predetermination of the human body, before the formation of the complete man, in what

he calls the primordial forms or elements (*in rationibus primordialibus*).

Certain Catholic authorities do not see any repugnance, so far as Christian doctrine is concerned, in the idea that the body of the first man should have passed through a number of stages of development, *viz.*, inorganic, vegetable, and finally animal, life. On this view we shall not presume to pass judgment. It seems to be as far removed as it safely can be from the more natural and obvious interpretation of the text, "The Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life"; but it may, none the less, be defensible. It, of course, excludes the rational soul from the range of evolution, for that every Christian theory of evolution must do.

To return, in conclusion, to Professor Haeckel's views, it is *not*, after all, so evident that in the theory of natural selection we have the key to the question of all questions, to the great enigma of the place of man in nature and of his natural development.

FAITH

A Misconception.—Faith is a groping in the dark. It is unreasonable to admit anything without evidence. "To make an act of faith in the experiences of another is a thoughtless act, which afterward comes home to one in the shape of pestering doubts."—Harnack, "Dogmengeschichte," I, p. 74 f.

THE TRUTH.—To believe a thing is to accept it on the authority of another. If I should meet with a friend whom I knew to be truthful and should be told by him that he had seen a certain person in a certain place and at a certain time, I should accept his statement without any hesitation. His honesty and his means of knowing the fact in question are a sufficient guarantee for the truth of his statement. This is an act of faith of the purely human kind.

This human faith is as widespread as the human race. Credence is given to the assertions of trustworthy wit-

nesses, and reasonably so; for a sincere and honest man who possesses a good pair of eyes and ears and who tells me that he has recently seen a third party, conversed with him and dined with him, may surely be believed, and would undoubtedly be believed by serious men. A judge receives the testimony of trustworthy witnesses without incurring the charge of thoughtlessness or levity.

Religious faith holds as true what God has revealed. God, who has created human beings and conferred upon them the gift of speech, surely has it in His power to reveal a truth to one of their number. Should that man inform his fellow men of the revelation received, they will naturally require him to show his credentials. Should he confirm his teaching by genuine miracles, reasonable men will believe him, because they know that God will not confirm an untruthful statement by a miracle. What is taught is held as true because it is revealed by God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. This is surely a reasonable basis for supernatural faith.

If I admit nothing without intrinsic evidence I repudiate all human faith. There is not a line of written history in which I can put any faith. The teaching art, especially as applied to the young, must be thrown aside, for it rests on the principle that the young can not be taught unless they have an implicit reliance on the word of the teacher.

As a rational being, I accept, in the first place, whatever is supported by intrinsic evidence; in the second place, I admit what another tells me if I am sure that my witness is truthful and possesses a knowledge of the fact. To do otherwise would be irrational.

By those who deny the possibility of miracles, supernatural religious faith is, of course, regarded as folly. The real folly lies in the denial of miracles; for if there is a God He has the power of intervening in His own creation. Professor Harnack repudiates religious faith because he repudiates miracles; he repudiates miracles because he fails to see all that is implied in the idea of an omnipotent God. He holds that God made the world out of nothing; but, surely, One who has made the universe by the simple fiat of His almighty power can just as easily give sight to the blind, or raise the dead to life, or feed four thousand men with five small loaves. Consistency is

a jewel which we can hardly congratulate the Professor on possessing. (See the article entitled "Miracles," in which the question both of the possibility and of the fact is fully discussed.)

FREE LOVE

A Socialist's Plea.—The only true marriage is marriage founded in love. When love ceases it is immoral for the parties to remain united. Marriage is a private compact, in which no one but the married couple should have any say.

THE ANSWER.—Such is the socialistic idea of marriage as defended by Bebel. How the leaders of socialism can presume to describe any act as either moral or immoral is beyond our comprehension. Socialist leaders are atheists and materialists (see "Socialism," II, III, IV), and being such they have no basis for their so-called morality. But we can let that pass: it is convenient for socialists to use a respectable old term with a new meaning.

Socialists affect to regard as a calumny the accusation that they wish to abolish marriage; but here, again, they are using an old word in a new meaning. In all civilized countries the word marriage has conveyed the idea of a permanent union between man and wife. Even the non-Catholic sects that permit divorce on account of grave sin regard marriage as permanent in the intention of the parties before the contract is made. "Till death do us part" is the phrase used at the marriage ceremony. Socialists may apply the term to the transient and evanescent thing which they are fain to establish in the place of genuine marriage, but they can not expect us to follow suit.

It is plain from the objection placed at the top of the page that a socialist marriage and a Christian marriage have little in common and are in many points opposed. Christian marriage is permanent; a socialistic marriage may be dissolved when love has vanished. Christian marriage is a divine institution, the conditions of which are fixed by divine law; socialistic marriage is subject to the arbitrary control of man. In Christian marriage the wife is subject to the husband (Eph. v. 22); in the above objec-

tion the independence of the wife is implied. The genuine Christian idea of marriage makes it one of the seven sacraments of the Church and thus places it under the Church's jurisdiction; socialism makes it a private affair in which no one is allowed to interfere. The dominance of socialism would, therefore, mean the destruction of Christian marriage, and withal the destruction of the Christian family. All family life would, indeed, be more than imperiled.

But the evil would not end here: marriage under socialism would be nothing short of the reign of free love, with little or no restraint placed upon its tyranny. In the first place, under socialism, marriage, being a purely private affair, would have no legal status; it would be wholly dependent on the caprice of human passion; and human passion would feel itself free to go foraging wherever it pleased. There would be no force of public opinion or public sense of decency to keep it within bounds. On the contrary, public opinion would encourage a change of partners when affection had changed. No effectual obstacle, in a word, could be interposed to prevent love from seeking and finding its object. If this is not free love, differing but little from the promiscuous pairing of birds and beasts, the term has no meaning.

Even if a socialist marriage had a certain legal status and the marital union, as long as it lasted, were protected from invasion by a third party, none the less the way would be thrown open to an invader through the affections, which would reign supreme in all such matters in the socialist commonwealth. Imagine a concrete case. Tom and Lizzie have taken a fancy to each other. It is only a fancy, but that doesn't matter; they are socialists and are willing to try their chances; and straightway they join hands in wedlock, agreeing to remain together as long as they like one another. A month or two later Lizzie meets with a pair of eyes more attractive than Tom's, and her liking for Tom begins to wane. But Tom's liking for Lizzie remains unchanged. When the crisis comes he pleads his heartfelt affection and argues against a separation. But the matter is soon arranged; they are both true socialists and they part in the true socialistic spirit. Lizzie, meantime, has felt small commiseration for Tom, as she knows he will soon be within reach of recovered happiness.

Evidently, love's freedom has been little hampered by the insignificant legal status of matrimony.

Is society willing to inaugurate this state of things? We think not. Certainly if it once had a taste of it, it would soon rebound from the tyranny of free and untrammelled sensual passion. It is not a question of free love among angels, but of free love among human beings possessed of strong animal instincts, the unrestrained indulgence of which would sink man to the level of the brute.

The principle that marriage should cease when love ceases is unfortunately held by many who are not socialists; and, indeed, for one who has lost sight of the divine origin of marriage, and who is at the same time capable of seeing only one aspect of a situation, it may be quite natural to advocate the separation of man and wife when mutual affection has ceased and the seeking of marital happiness by either of the parties through a second alliance; but one does not need to be much of a social philosopher to see the evil effects that would be wrought upon society by making the permanence of marriage depend upon the vagaries of human affection; to see, among other things, how the family would be destroyed, how offspring would suffer, how populations would diminish, and how all the nobler aims and activities of life would be paralyzed.

The perfection of marriage does, it is true, depend on the perfection of love; and conjugal love, under obedience to divine law and under the best Christian influences, is made as perfect as anything can be made in this life. It is not only intensified, but purified and placed upon a firm supernatural basis. And even where love has cooled conjugal amity can by the aid of sacramental grace be preserved. Where much suffering is endured by one of the parties in consequence of the guilty acts of the other, both human and divine law has provided for separation, whilst the best interests of society, as well as of the individuals concerned, forbid the complete severance of the bond of Matrimony. Even those who are beyond the reach of sacramental grace can by the aid of the ordinary graces vouchsafed to all classes of men overcome the difficulties incident to the married state, especially if they live according to their lights and observe the natural law.

FREEMASONRY

Objection.—Why is the Church opposed to freemasonry without any distinction? Whatever may be the aims of masonry on the continent of Europe there is certainly nothing hostile to the Catholic Church or to religion generally in Anglo-American masonry, whose object is mutual aid among the members of the fraternity and the promotion of the spirit of brotherhood throughout the world.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic Church is opposed to freemasonry because there is a solidarity between Masons of all countries. Freemasonry is international in the sense that there is a mutual recognition of Masons among themselves as belonging to one general fraternity; that there is a systematic maintenance of correspondence between the masonic lodges; that the Masons of the world meet in international convention; that they have a common literature, and common signs, passwords, and symbols. But what is more to the point is that Anglo-American masonry has long since been either absorbed or dominated by masonry of the Scottish type, which is essentially naturalistic and anti-Christian, has a religion of its own, and is, in general, one of the worst forms of freemasonry.

This solidarity is openly acknowledged by leading masonic authorities. Brother Pike, for instance, who is an American oracle of freemasonry, writes "*Off. Bull.*," 1885. VII 29: "When the journal in London, which speaks of the freemasonry of the Grand Lodge of England, deprecatingly protested that the English freemasonry was innocent of the charges preferred by the Papal Bull (*Encycl.*, 1884) against freemasonry, when it declared that English freemasonry had no opinions political or religious, and that it did not in the least degree sympathize with the loose opinions and extravagant utterances of part of the Continental freemasonry, it was very justly and very conclusively checkmated by the Romish organs with the reply: 'It is idle for you to protest. You are freemasons and you recognize them as freemasons. You give them countenance, encouragement, and support, and you are jointly responsible with them and can not shirk that responsibility.'"

(Quoted by Gruber, Cath. Enycl. V, IX, p. 778.) What is said here of English masonry would be generally regarded as applicable to American masonry. Pike is only one of the many authorities that acknowledge the oneness of freemasonry throughout the world.

American freemasonry was at first comparatively innocent, but the Scottish Rite, since its importation into the United States at the close of the American Revolution, has gradually made its way to supremacy. Its hostility to the papacy and to monarchy is acknowledged by masonic writers. Its thirtieth degree is distinguished by its practice of trampling on the Pope's tiara and the royal crown. It professes a belief in the great Architect of the world, but discards all received modes of worshipping Him. It has, in fact, a religion of its own, a religion which is paraded as antedating all the religions now in vogue, the primitive religion practised by Noe and others long before the advent of Moses and the Mosaic Law!

That freemasonry has a religion of its own was rather strangely and surprisingly acknowledged in 1903 by the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the State of New York. A certain Robert Kopp, having been expelled from the fraternity, appealed against the action of his brethren to the civil courts of the State and received an unfavorable judgment, first from the Supreme Court and afterward from the Appellate Division of the same court. One of the strong points made by the grand lodge was that a masonic society was a religious body, possessing all the privileges of any religious association. The following is an extract from the "Brief and Points" presented by counsel for the grand lodge at the second trial:

"The right to membership in the masonic fraternity is very much like the right to membership in a church. Each requires a candidate for admission to subscribe to certain articles of religious belief as an essential prerequisite to membership. Each requires a member to conduct himself thereafter in accordance with certain religious principles. Each requires its members to adhere to certain doctrines of belief and action. The precepts contained in the 'Landmarks and the Charges of a Freemason' (see pages 92 to 100 of the 'Book of Constitutions,' edition of 1900) formulate a creed so thoroughly religious in character that it may well be compared with the formally ex-

pressed doctrine of many a denominational church. The masonic fraternity may, therefore, be quite properly regarded as a religious society, and the long line of decisions, holding that a religious society shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine matters of membership, should be deemed applicable to the masonic fraternity."

There is so much trumpery speculation on religious subjects in masonic writings, so much is made of the meaning of arbitrary symbols which only a few adepts are supposed to be capable of understanding, so strong is the tendency to go back to ancient superstitions which to a great extent disappeared at the dawn of Christianity, that the plain man of sense is tempted to regard it all as moonshine or as the purest humbug. But whatever may be said of the sanity or of the sincerity of masonic "science," it is, after all, only one phase of a tendency, so marked in our day, to return to paganism in thought, sentiment, and action. The masonic conception of the architect of the universe is anything but the Christian conception of God, and is distinctly pagan. And yet how many has it not deceived outside the ranks of the fraternity. Though, even within the order, as we shall see later, the interpretation of words, symbols, and allegories given in the lower degrees is part and parcel of a system of deception practised on the initiated themselves.

The following clear statement of Brother Pike is enough to show the attitude of freemasonry toward Christianity and all other forms of religion. The italics are ours.

"Masonry," says Pike, "propagates no creed, *except its own most simple and sublime one* taught by nature and reason. *There has never been a false religion in the world.* The permanent one universal religion is written in visible nature and explained by the reason and is completed by the wise analogies of faith."—GRUBER, *ibid.*

In the masonic view, no religion is false because the rites and dogmas of all religions, Christianity included, are at least the symbols of the real truths of which freemasonry is the fortunate, perhaps the sole, possessor. Christianity, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, are but husks enclosing the precious kernel of masonic truth. Surely there is enough in this to repel any Christian who has the smallest knowledge of his faith.

If, therefore, any reader of this book should light upon

a member of the craft who approaches him in that politely cautious way which is learned among the brethren and assures him that there is nothing in English or American masonry that ought to shock a Christian, he may set it down as certain (supposing the Mason's veracity) either that he, like Brother Pike, is speaking in some transcendental masonic sense or that his assurances are based on ignorance. He may not be enough of an adept to know what any one may know by consulting the acknowledged authorities of the order. As likely as not, he belongs to the class of "Blue" Masons, or low degree Masons, who pride themselves on initiation in some Grand This or That without knowing whither they are going to be led in their possible ascent toward the top.

"The Blue Degrees," says Pike, "are but the outer court or portico of the Temple. Part of the symbols are displayed there to the Initiate, but he is intentionally misled by false interpretations. It is not intended that he shall understand them; but it is intended that he shall imagine he understands them. Their true explication is reserved for the Adepts, the Princes of Masonry."—(Quoted by Preuss in "A Study in American Freemasonry.")

Masons, says Brother Oliver, "may be fifty years Masters of the Chair and yet not learn the secret of the brotherhood."—GRUBER, *ibid.*

"It is for the Adept," says Pike, "to understand the meaning of the Symbols."—*Ibid.*

And Oliver adds: "Brethren high in rank and office are often unacquainted with the elementary principles of the science."—*Ibid.*

It is a common pretense of Masons in their discourses on masonic science that they are the successors of the ancient adepts in pagan mysteries.

Such is freemasonry in its attitude toward religion. Masons themselves acknowledge that the sympathies of Anglo-American masonry go out to the anti-Catholic and anti-Christian revolutions of Continental Europe. In countries like Great Britain and the United States representative Masons may detest the Church as much as their European brethren, but they either can not or dare not give expression to their detestation in overt acts of hostility. But they are in perfect sympathy with all the plots

of masonry in European countries against the freedom of the Church, against the Religious Orders and against Catholic education.

The aims and machinations of freemasonry on the continent of Europe are well known, and no very extra pains seem to be taken to conceal them. Father Gruber, from whom we have been quoting and who is a master of the subject, furnishes an abundance of evidence from the *Bulletin* and the *Compte-Rendu* of the Grand Orient of France, showing the extent and character of masonic anti-religious activities in France. It is clear from these sources that French freemasonry aims at getting every one and everything under its control (*que personne ne bougera plus en France en dehors de nous*). "I said in the Assembly of 1898," says Massé, one of its official orators, "that it is the supreme duty of freemasonry to interfere each day more and more in political and profane struggles. . . . Success [in the anticlerical combat] is in a large measure due to freemasonry; for it is its spirit, its programme, its methods, that have triumphed. . . . If the *Bloc* has been established, this is owing to freemasonry and to the discipline learned in the lodges. The measures we have now to urge are the separation of Church and State and a law concerning instruction. Let us put our trust in the word of our Brother Combes. . . . We need vigilance and above all mutual confidence, if we are to accomplish our work, as yet unfinished. . . . The Republic must rid itself of the religious congregations, sweeping them off by a vigorous stroke."

Even worse aims than these are manifested by Senator Delpech, President of the Grand Orient. "The triumph of the Galilean," he tells his brethren, "has lasted twenty centuries. But now he¹ dies in his turn. The mysterious voice announcing [to Julian the Apostate] the death of Pan, to-day announces the death of the impostor God who promised an era of justice and peace to those who believed in him. The illusion has lasted a long time. The mendacious God is now disappearing in his turn; he passes away to join in the dust of ages the other divinities of India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, who saw so many deceived creatures prostrate before their altars. Brother Masons, we rejoice

¹We have reproduced the capitalization of the author, although contrary to the canons of good taste and general usage.

to state that we are not without our share in this overthrow of the false prophets. The Romish Church, founded on the Galilean myth, began to decay rapidly from the very day on which the masonic association was established."—GRUBER, *ibid*.

The declarations of Italian freemasonry are no less clear as to the aims of the brotherhood. The *Revista Massoneria Italiana*, an official organ of Italian masonry, has made repeated avowals of the ultimate intentions of the order. It tells us that the end it has set before it is the destruction of monarchy and of all thrones, and that the means to the end is the annihilation of the Papacy and of all revealed religion (1889, p. 4; 1886, p. 378), a thorough secularization of the state and of the schools, as well as the destruction of the Christian family and of all authority (*ibid*). It informs us that all revealed religion is poison to the people (1890, p. 159), that all instruction in any kind of catechism in the schools should be prohibited (1892, p. 231), and that to the noble task of bringing all this about freemasons *the world over* are devoting their energies (1892, pp. 222, 241).

The platform of freemasonry is clearly set forth in the masonic publication entitled "The Papal Church and Freemasonry: A Masonic Answer to the Papal Encyclical" (Leipzig). Its aims are these: the demolishing of all church authority, the entire separation of church and school, the abolishing of religious instruction, the de-christianizing of family life, and the emancipation of woman.

This is the sort of thing to which Anglo-American masonry lends its sympathy. Freemasonry is one and united throughout the world, and everywhere it is under the same ecclesiastical ban. Catholics need hardly be told that for them membership in any masonic organization means ex-communication from the Church.

Freemasonry, therefore, whether it be British or American or Continental, is not simply an institution whose object is mutual aid and the establishment of a true brotherhood among men. Its purposes are deeper and more important than these. It aims at universal dominion; it aims at crushing out supernatural religion and paganizing what is left. Even the benevolent purposes it makes profession of are anything but benevolent as regards the higher interests both of individuals and of society. Mutual assis-

tance among Masons is not confined to their helping one another to get on in the world. It has a wider sphere and extends to acts that involve a betrayal of honor and an infringement of duty. The claims of country in the hour of strife are little regarded by the Mason when opposed to the interests of a member of the Craft. So at least the following promise of the thirtieth degree would seem to imply: "I pledge myself never to harm a Knight Kadosh [thirtieth degree], either by word or deed. . . . I vow that if I find him as a foe in the battle-field, I will save his life, when he makes me the sign of distress, and that I will free him from prison and confinement upon land or water." "The inexorable laws of war themselves," says an official orator of the Grand Orient of France, quoted by Father Gruber (*ibid.*) "had to bend before freemasonry, which is perhaps the most striking proof of its power. A sign sufficed to stop the slaughter; the combatants threw away their arms, embraced each other fraternally and at once became friends and brethren, as their oaths prescribed." The Royal Arch Mason swears: "I will assist a companion Royal Arch Mason when I see him engaged in any difficulty, and will espouse his cause so as to extricate him from the same *whether he be right or wrong*"—GRUBER, *ibid.* The fraternal spirit in masonry is plainly that of a close corporation devoted to self at the expense of right and justice.

Another aspect of masonic brotherhood should make it contemptible to the initiated themselves. Have we not seen Masons confessing that those in the lower ranks are the dupes of those in the higher? that the secrets of this happy brotherhood are known only to a very few? Absolute obedience, solemnly sworn and extending to every possible command, is not the condition of a brother making a covenant with brothers. It is the condition of a slave who has placed himself under the yoke of tyrannical masters.

And yet Masons are proud to exhibit the badges of their servitude, as though these were the insignia of a privileged class of mortals. Privileged they certainly are in the opportunities afforded them for material gain and social advancement—advantages, however, which most men of honor would scorn to purchase by associating themselves with a narrow clique, ruled by a still narrower one at the

top, to say nothing of the sacrifice involved of things that ought to be dearer to them than any temporal advantage whatsoever. (See "Secret Societies.")

FREE THOUGHT

A Freethinking Reverie.—A freethinker is the only one who knows what freedom means. He has burst the fetters of religious servitude, the most galling of all fetters, especially such as the Roman Church binds upon her subjects.

THE TRUTH.—There is a sort of superstition attaching to the use of the expression "free thought." Is freedom the one thing necessary in thought? The great object of the mind's craving is truth; the possession of truth is the end and aim of all its activity. Freedom is but a condition for the exercise of its activity in the pursuit of truth. An aimless exercise of its activity is mental recklessness. On the other hand, the possession of truth, whether it be the result of free thinking or not, is the mind's one and only source of contentment. There is a healthy freedom of thought, but it can never be identified with that freedom which deliberately sets to work to change the conditions which nature and truth have set for the acquisition of knowledge.

Truth is not a thing that starts into existence at our bidding. It is not dependent on us; rather we are dependent on it. Our declarations of independence do not extend to the realms of truth. There we are subjects, not sovereigns. This is the first lesson impressed upon us without our knowing it, when reason begins to dawn. The youth must learn, and not kick at the goads by way of asserting his freedom of thought. Imagine a schoolboy refusing to submit his mind to the truths of the multiplication table!

And yet a similar independence in maturer minds is sometimes considered wisdom. The truths of the multiplication table, though simply worded, are absolute and eternal truths. *But may there not be other truths equally absolute and eternal?* truths bearing on our origin, our destiny, our relations to a Supreme Being? And may there not be a means of getting at those truths? Is there

not a presumption in their favor—nay, more than a presumption—when so many of the world's greatest minds have admitted them?

It is notorious that nearly all freethinkers begin their thinking with the assumption that all these truths are myths; or that if they are more than myths there is no way of reaching them. Thus *they actually restrict their freedom* and throw away a clue to the discovery of truth. They may be likened to a man who makes a long and fruitless search for an object he has mislaid; and all because he has too lightly assumed that there is no use in searching for it in a certain place—the very place where it happens to be.

And yet the truths thus lightly set aside are of tremendous importance, bearing as they do upon eternity.

True freedom of thought begets an open-mindedness that excludes from its consideration no possible source of truth. It, furthermore, makes an effort, as a leading apologist remarks, to remove from the mind all influences that do not make for genuine knowledge, either because they are not fact, or have no basis in fact, or because they are mere imaginings, or habitual but erroneous impressions, or false or superficial interpretations of the perceptions of sense or of other sources of information.

If by freedom of thought is meant a freedom from assumptions and preconceived ideas, it is one of the conditions for arriving at the truth. The precise opposite of this healthy freedom of thought is the besetting sin of most of the anti-Christian scientists of the day. Materialism, especially that of the Haeckelian stamp, deliberately shuts out one possible source of truth by assuming that nothing exists but what can be perceived by the senses, that all things are either matter or energy, and that energy is only a quality of matter. What possible ground can be alleged for such an assumption?

Neither observation nor experiment can furnish any foundation for it. Must we conclude that the wish is father to the thought? No one can read the works of the free-thinking Haeckel and not notice, on the one hand, what a tissue of reckless assumptions they are, and on the other with what relentless hatred the author assails the notion of a soul, a God, a hereafter, without perceiving that he is a hater of religion first and a scientist after.

GALILEO

See "Scientific Freedom."

GOD'S EXISTENCE

An Atheistic Gibe.—Theism (a belief in a personal God) would have us divide the world into earth and sky. Men run about the earth and God is seated in the skies, whence He rules the earth. But astronomy steps in and removes the sky, and with it the God who dwells in it. Astronomy has pushed the limits of the universe so far as to leave no room for a God.—Schopenhauer.

THE ANSWER.—Schopenhauer has not said the last word on the subject. God is not the subject-matter of astronomy or of any other physical science. It is not by the telescope that God is discovered, but by an instrument of a different order. The *human mind*, by means of reflection, can penetrate beyond the stars and discover the ultimate cause of all things.

In maintaining the existence of God we must remind the atheist of our day that we are not holding a brief for the existence of some obscure being whose worshippers are of yesterday and whose worship is being obtruded upon the intelligence of the world. *A belief in God is the earliest and most constant fact in human history.* Moreover, a belief in God has laid hold of countless intellects of the highest order; and yet to-day the shallowest of minds brush it aside as though it were one of those empty hypotheses that rise and disappear in a generation.

Ah, but remember, says the atheist, those highly intellectual believers of the past weigh little in the balance to-day. They were ignorant of the science of our day, which is fatal to the doctrine of a personal God.

But not so fast: a glance at another article in this work—"Science and Faith"—will reveal the fact that *most of the great leaders* of science in the nineteenth century were believers in a personal God. Science and atheism have indeed met in the same mind, but in our own age, considering the influences at work producing atheism and agnosticism, the fact that a man of science is without faith is

neither more nor less surprising than that a merchant, or a lawyer, or an artist should be an unbeliever. The fact proves nothing as regards the necessary bearing of science on religion. The neglect of practical religion, lack of instruction, the dominion of passion over reason and grace—any of these facts in a man's life may account for his lapsing into atheism.

The kind of science for which the present generation is mostly distinguished is that of the experimental sort. But what has experimental science produced that tells against the existence of a personal God? Experiment can never land us in a knowledge of ultimate causes. As soon as it reaches the outer confines of experience it must hand over the work of investigation to rational philosophy; and who is not aware of the chaos that reigns in the philosophy of the day?

Geological science has thrown some light upon the history of our globe, but it knows nothing of what went before. History and archeology in the hands of the atheist have been wielded against a belief in God, and an attempt has been made to bring the infinite and eternal God down to the level of the national and tribal gods of the Gentiles; but the result has been to throw into greater relief the immense contrast between the one invisible and omnipotent God of the chosen people and the countless anthropomorphic figments of the pagan mind. The fact that so spiritual a conception of deity was carried down through the long ages of its history by a people surrounded on all sides by carnal-minded idolaters is itself no small proof of the existence of a God whose providence is the key to this historical anomaly. As to astronomical science, it has only exhibited a wider domain of creative power than was known to the ancients. God's world is larger than we had thought, but astronomy has not proved that He does not still hold it in the hollow of His hand.

In a word, there is no science or other branch of knowledge that lends any support to the denial of a personal God. Atheism is generated either in minds that have never seriously and patiently examined into the evidence of God's existence or in minds that have been warped by moral delinquency. Superficiality and narrowness of outlook are the dominant qualities of much philosophizing on the subject. The shallowness that begets atheism was well

discerned by one of the wisest of modern minds. "*A little philosophy*," says Bacon, "*inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion*; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity."—*Essays*: "Atheism."

We shall now proceed to unfold some of the arguments by which human reason has demonstrated the existence of a Supreme Being. As we are not writing a treatise the argumentation can not be exhaustive, but it will serve to show how by reason and reflection "the invisible things of Him," as St. Paul expresses it, "are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. i. 20).

PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

I. The universe must have had a beginning. Therefore it must have got its beginning from a Being who Himself had no beginning.

Let us endeavor to bring out the force of this reasoning.

First, as regards the material universe, things have come to their present condition by a series of changes. These changes are still observable on the largest scale. We see them in the processes of growth and decay. We notice, too, that one thing produces another, and that other a third; and there is evidence that such has been the case for ages. Hence a series—or rather many series—of causes and effects coming down from a remote past. Now my reason tells me that such a chain of causation must have had a beginning. Such a series of causes and effects without a beginning is inconceivable. There must have been one first cause, and therefore one not caused by another but subsisting in and through itself.

Let us throw a little light upon this conclusion by an illustration. My eyes are at this moment resting upon an oak-tree. Let us designate it by the letter A. Now A is the offspring of another oak, B, which in turn owes its origin to C, and so on, back to D, E, and the rest. Is the series infinite, that is to say, endless? Or is it composed of a finite number—one that can be counted? We assert

that it can not be infinite—it must have had a beginning. And our reasons for the assertion are these:

1. If it were infinite the series would never have come down to A. Let us prove this. Let us go back to E, familiar to the eyes of our great-great-grandfathers. Was the series infinite when it reached E? There is as much or as little reason for saying that it was infinite then as for saying that it is infinite now. But if infinite then, not a single oak could have been added to it; for an infinite number can not receive any addition; and therefore E could not have propagated its kind, and we should not now be contemplating A, which nevertheless stands before us in all its beauty. Therefore the series was not infinite—there must have been a first oak, unproduced by any other.

2. Again, if the series were infinite, A would be the last of its race—and hence, by the way, would be an object of the greatest curiosity; but what an absurdity to suppose than an acorn falling from A might not produce a tree of the same species. The series of oaks was, therefore, not endless, and there was one tree that began the series.

The reader will remember that we are dealing with the genealogy of oaks only as an illustration of a principle; and the principle is that no chain of causes and effects is possible unless there be a first cause—one unproduced by another. But if this principle is once fairly established the conclusion is irresistible that if we trace the numerous series of causes and effects that have made the world what it is to-day back to their beginning, we must arrive at a *first cause*, which has not been produced by another.

And now, having arrived at a first cause of things, we must evolve the idea of a first cause and exhibit what is logically contained in it. We shall see ultimately that the First Cause is identical with the sovereign God whose existence it is our purpose to prove.

The First Cause was not produced by another. How, then, are we to account for its existence? Did it produce itself? Or did it start out of nothingness of itself? Both questions are too absurd to be considered. If, therefore, the First Cause was not produced either by itself or by anything else, we must conclude that it was not produced at all. Its existence is due to no manner of causation whatever; and hence we are forced to the further conclu-

sion that it *must have its reason for existing in its very nature*. Its nature requires it to exist. But if its nature requires it to exist it can not be conceived as non-existent. In other words, it is *eternal*. This, by the way, is an answer to Darwin's feeble question, Whence came the First Cause, and how did it arise!—(See "DARWIN.")

And now a few further deductions. The First Cause, as we have seen, exists by a necessity of its nature. But if a thing exists at all it must have some determinate form or mode of existence. A thing does not exist in general, but as *this* or *that* in particular, and with a definite nature and definite attributes. Hence when we ascribe essential and necessary existence to a being, we ascribe it to that being such as it is, and as having a certain nature and certain attributes. Hence its nature and attributes—or *all* that it is and *whatever* it is—partake of the same necessity as its existence. Therefore such a being is immutable; for any change would make it different from what it necessarily and essentially is. Later on we shall see other reasons why any change, whether in essentials or in accidentals, is impossible.

At every step we are getting a better glimpse of the wonderful ideas which are wrapped up in the one idea of the First Cause. There are more to come.

The next deduction is the most important of all. It is, that the First Cause must possess unlimited being or unlimited perfection—it must be *infinite*. We shall not rehearse here the more abstruse metaphysical proofs of this thesis. A few simpler considerations will suffice to show that the First Cause is infinitely perfect. First, the very fact that it is a self-existent being is proof sufficient. What higher perfection is conceivable than that the very nature of a thing requires it to exist? or, to put it somewhat differently, "what higher grade of existence can we conceive than that in virtue of which a thing possesses its being of itself from eternity?" (Wilmer.) Among created beings we admire a person who is in some degree independent of outside influences in the development of some personal perfection; when, for instance, he adds to his knowledge by thinking out for himself the solution of the most intricate problems. And the higher the perfection evolved the greater our admiration. What, then, shall we say of that being which has, *by a necessity of its nature*, not any

mere power of self-development, but that which in any case is *the basis and groundwork of all actual perfection, even the highest, viz., actual being or existence?* Any specific perfection, finite or infinite, in any being, supposes the existence of that being; and hence existence, or actual being, must be the basis and condition of any perfection, even though it be infinite. Therefore *self-existence* must itself be an infinite perfection. But no infinite perfection can exist in a finite being. Therefore the First Cause is infinite.

In the second place, we can deduce the infinite perfection of the First Cause from the nature of the act by which it brings things into existence. The First Cause simply *creates*, or produces things out of nothing. This may be argued from the very fact that it is the First Cause, but the deduction will be made clearer at a later stage of the discussion. Now, *any single act of creation is a proof of infinite power.* For, by infinite power we mean power so great that no finite thing, no matter how perfect, and no degree of perfection in a thing, are beyond its range. But the First Cause confers upon the thing created *its very being*; and to create the very being of a thing argues greater power than to create any specific perfection in it; for the perfections or attributes of a thing are but modes of its being. Hence no conceivable perfection in a thing exceeds the creative power of the First Cause, and therefore its power is unlimited.

Furthermore, if we limit the creative power of the First Cause we imply that some things are *too great* to be included within its range; but a little reflection will show that in this connection greater and less are virtually one thing. No greater exercise of power is involved in the creation of greater things than in the creation of lesser. As to create is to produce out of nothing, there is no process to be gone through; there is no existing matter to work upon; and hence *creating is simply willing*: "Let there be light; and light was made"; and consequently so far as the creating agent is concerned it is as easy to will a universe as to will a grain of sand. And on the side of the object to be created the task of creating can not be greater in one case than in another, as all things created are simply drawn from nothing, and are thus reduced to the same level.

Therefore there can be nothing so great or so perfect as to be beyond the creative power of the First Cause. Therefore its power is *limitless or infinite*. And here again we can argue from an infinite attribute to an infinitude of being or of perfection.

In the process we have been following thus far we have traced all the series of changes that have taken place in the universe to their beginning and have arrived at a First Cause in which all things have their origin. Now there is a class of atheists—certain materialists—who admit that there must have been a beginning of all change, but who are pleased to find the ultimate cause of all change in matter. They assume, without proof, that material substance existed from all eternity, uncaused and self-subsisting, needing no God to have created or preserved it or unfolded its energies, and having in itself the germ of all its future activities. But it will not be difficult to show that self-subsisting and self-evolving matter is an impossibility.

First, it is impossible that matter could have evolved its own energies. For, primeval self-existing matter must originally have been either in a state of rest or in a state of motion. If in a state of motion, there must have been a beginning of the motion; for motion from eternity involves all the absurdities included in the notion of an infinite series of causes and effects. Hence our supposed primeval matter must have been originally in a quiescent state. Let us realize what this implies. Imagine a particle of primitive matter suspended in space—quiet but capable of motion. *What will set it in motion?* The law of inertia is there to forbid it to move a fraction of an inch unless acted upon by some outside force. Primeval matter would therefore stand in need of some external cause of motion. And what we say of local motion is true of every form of activity and of every exertion of energy. It must have a beginning, and the beginning must originate from without. For, in the first place, no exertion of energy in matter is possible without some local motion. But the local motion can not be spontaneous, for the law of inertia forbids it. In the second place and apart from the law of inertia, there is nothing in the attributes of matter that could enable it to exert its energies. Imagine a particle of quiescent matter *a moment before* its first display of

energy. What can possibly determine it to act in the next moment rather than five minutes—or, for that matter, five centuries—later? Is it in the power of matter to choose the moment of its awakening from its eternal slumber? It would be puerile to suppose that matter was predetermined to act in some such way as the hammer of an alarm-clock is predetermined to act by the winding and setting of the clock. In the case of the alarm-clock the alarm-bell displays its energy at a certain moment, but its action supposes a *continuous* mechanical movement *preceding and leading up to it*; and even that would be impossible without the action of the human hand that wound up the clock. There is nothing in matter that can give the first impulse to its activities. The impulse must be imparted by One in whom *mind and will make Him independent of time*—or, to put it more accurately, enable Him to make a beginning of time by setting things in motion.

Matter, therefore, depends for its activity upon a Sovereign Artificer. But does it depend upon Him also for its existence? May not matter have had an eternal and independent existence of its own?

We answer, No; because self-existence would be incompatible with its nature and its attributes. Self-existent matter must have had some determinate state or condition of existence. To begin with, it must have been either in a state of rest or in a state of motion. But we know that of itself matter can not determine its existing in either state. It is indifferent to either and must be set in motion or be brought to a state of rest by outside influences. But as it must be in either of the two states and yet can not of itself be in either, it can not exist at all unless existence be given it by some external cause. It requires, in a word, to be *created*. And thus the First Cause appears under the aspect of a Creator. And what is true of rest and motion is true of other conditions of matter. Matter must be either in a solid or in a liquid or in a gaseous state. It must also be in a definite place. But matter is of itself indifferent to all these conditions taken severally, though by external causes it may be made to pass from one condition to another. Therefore, as self-existence would argue self-determination as regards these conditions, matter can not be self-existent and must have been created.

In the second place, if matter were self-existent it would be incapable of change; and yet we know it to be changeable from one form or condition to another.

It must now be evident that the First Cause possesses the nature and the attributes which we ascribe to God. It (or rather He) is self-existent and eternal. He is infinitely perfect, and is therefore infinitely powerful and infinitely wise (or intelligent), though His infinite wisdom and power may be deduced also from the creative act. He is the Creator of the visible universe, and is therefore its sovereign Lord and Master.

That there can be only *one* such Being is evident from the fact that He is infinite. The Infinite must comprehend *all* being, and hence there can be but One who is infinite. In saying, however, that the Infinite embraces all being we must distinguish between two senses in which the proposition may be taken. To use the language of theologians, God contains all things in Himself either *formally*—that is to say, as things are in themselves—or *eminently*; that is, in some higher or more excellent sense. Formally, He possesses all His own essential and infinite attributes; eminently, He possesses the perfections belonging to created beings. If those perfections are of the spiritual order, He possesses them in an infinite degree and in a way that makes them one with His divine essence, which is not true of created things. Goodness, wisdom, and power, which may belong to created things, are possessed by God in an infinite degree and without any admixture of imperfection. The qualities of matter He can not possess formally, as that would argue limitation and imperfection; but even these qualities, as well as all other attributes of finite things, may be said to be in God eminently inasmuch as the eternal exemplars of things are conceived by the divine intelligence and His omnipotence enables Him to bring them into existence.

There is only *one* God, therefore, and only one Creator, and consequently only one source of finite being, whether of the spiritual or of the material order.

II. But the argument from causation is not the only one by which God's existence is proved. The argument from design, as it is generally termed, is no less cogent. It is based on the order and beauty of the universe. Order, especially on a large scale, can not be a result of chance,

nor can it be produced by a blind and purposeless combination of forces. Order supposes a *mind* at work, and a mind working according to plan. Now the presence of order in the world is easily observed. It is noticed, for instance, that many things work together for a common end—as, for example, in the orderly recurrence of the seasons—a fact that includes so many interesting phenomena connected with the preservation of animal and vegetable life. Everywhere we see in things the purposes for which they were made. A study of the human body, for instance, reveals a wonderful adaptation of means to ends; every organ being most aptly designed to serve a distinctive purpose of its own. The human eye alone furnishes overwhelming evidence of the presence of design. But *a design supposes a designer*.

And here, too, we find that the Great Designer is not merely an artist working in materials ready to His hand. He gives things their very natures and all their properties. For in all the operations of nature that furnish evidence of design there is a dependence on the natural properties of things, and the natural properties of things must be rooted in their natures. It is indeed by reason of the natural essences and qualities of things that nature works out her grand exhibitions of design. It is because the natures of things conspire so perfectly and so intimately with the general plan that they must be pronounced to have the same origin as the plan itself. The origin of all things and of their attributes must therefore be the Great First Cause whom we call God.

So much—and indeed much more which our limited space must exclude—does our reason tell us about the existence and the attributes of the Supreme Being. But reason is not our only teacher. God Himself has deigned to teach us by direct revelation. He has made Himself known to man from the very beginning; and the history of His revelation, carefully preserved, contains within itself its own credentials. The long but consistent narrative of the career of the chosen people given in the Bible—a people marvelously preserved in their purity of belief and worship amidst pagan surroundings, till led finally to the fulness of revelation in the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth—possesses an irresistible power of conviction to those who will take the pains to read it and ponder it

in its entirety and compare it with any other history, sacred or profane.

The parts of that wonderful narrative are all of a piece; one idea and one spirit dominate the whole: God revealing Himself by degrees and divine promises fulfilled at the appointed time—this is the prevailing note heard in every part of the grand symphony, which finally reaches its climax in the wonderful life of the GOD-MAN. The life of Jesus, taken in its entire compass and properly related to all that had gone before it and to all that has happened since, has thus become the key to the world's history and has confirmed in the minds of untold millions their faith in the existence of the infinite and eternal God.

GOOD WORKS

Objection.—Good works are not necessary for salvation, for St. Paul says: "We account a man to be justified by faith alone, without the works of the Law" (Rom. iii. 28).

THE ANSWER.—That is not what St. Paul said, but what Luther represented him as saying, in his German translation of the Bible; for in the original text the word "alone" is not found. The word was introduced to give support to Luther's new doctrine on Justification. Besides, St. Paul is here speaking, not of the good works of the Christian religion, but of the ceremonial observances of the Jewish Law—the various forms of purification, bloody sacrifices, and the like.

Objection.—But man is perverted and sinful, and therefore can perform no genuine good works.

Answer.—Man can perform no good works, at least works availing to salvation, without Christ; but with Christ he can; for in the Gospel of St. John (xv. 5) we are told by Christ Himself: "I am the vine, you are the branches. He that abideth in Me and I in him, the same beareth much fruit." (See "Justification.")

GRACE

Objection.—Catholics are forever speaking of the necessity of grace. "Without grace I can do nothing," is the common formula; and yet I can

do many a good deed without feeling the need of God's help.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic teaching on the subject is that without divine grace I can do *nothing that avails to salvation*; that is to say, that although I can do many things that are good without grace, I can not do that kind of good that merits heaven. The kingdom of heaven, as Christ teaches, is promised as the reward of our labor in this life. (Cf. the parable of the workers in the vineyard, Matt. xx.) Heaven must be fixed as the goal of our present existence; we must so live in this life as to be entitled to possess God in the next.

The end set before me is a supernatural one. The faith by which I apprehend it is supernatural, as my natural powers could never have brought me to a knowledge of it; and hence the need of grace; and the faith planted in the soul by grace is made a living faith by the further action of grace and produces the ripe fruits of hope and charity.

The giving of an alms by an unbeliever is a good work of the purely natural order, and God may deign to reward it, but it has no merit as far as heaven is concerned. The motive is not supernatural, nor is it the fruit of supernatural faith. It is God's will that I should live by faith. "The just man liveth by faith" (Galat. iii. 11). "Without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb. xi. 6).

There is a good deal of truth in the assertion that Catholics are forever speaking of the necessity of grace; and would that non-Catholics knew more of its necessity and felt more of its power. Grace would then be the solution of many problems which to-day are not even half solved. Divorce, with re-marriage after divorce, is not even a half-solution of the problem how to secure a happy union in wedlock, for it brings worse evils than it is designed to prevent; whereas the sacramental grace of a truly Christian marriage works miracles of harmonization between otherwise discordant hearts in the married state. The grace of the sacraments has vastly helped us in the solution of the problem regarding the formation of the Christian character in the souls of the young.

Catholics can not say too much about the need and the power of divine grace. The consequences of the ignoring of grace are only too evident.

HAECKEL

On the Tripod.—The development of the individual life from the embryo form is but a representation in little of the development of the entire species from a primitive form. This is that "irrefragable law which is the heaviest piece of artillery made to do battle for the truth. Under its repeated assaults the magnificent fabric of the Roman hierarchy will tumble like a house of cards."—Haeckel.

THE TRUTH ABOUT HAECKEL.—Possibly some of our readers will ask, who, or what, is Haeckel? Others will doubtless have heard of him as a German professor of some notoriety whose books have had no little vogue in English-speaking countries. Some few years ago a cheap edition of one of Haeckel's books entitled "Welträtsel" (English title, "The Riddle of the Universe") sold by the hundred thousand in England, and many an unknowing reader had the pleasure of tasting a sample of what he was told was German science—the genuine article, from the workshop of the best producer of the commodity to be found in all Germany.

Haeckel, it must be admitted, has done some very meritorious work in his own special department of natural history, but for many years he has been impelled by an irresistible impulse to step out of his own legitimate province and play the rôle of philosopher. This has been the mistake of his life; for not only has he disgraced himself in the field of higher speculation, but even among his brother scientists, by reason of his charlatan spirit and his daring frauds (recently confessed by himself), he has covered himself with well-deserved obloquy.

In his "Welträtsel" he attempts to solve what he calls the riddle of the universe—that is to say, to account for the world as we find it and trace all things back to their origin and to their ultimate elements. His philosophy is materialistic. All things consist of matter and all have been evolved out of primitive forms of matter by virtue of a certain energy, which is an inherent quality of matter. The spiritual, in any right sense of the word, has no place in the system. God, soul, immortality, are all relegated to the region of myths.

The style in which the subject is treated by this would-be philosopher is of the quietly oracular kind. His treatise, so to style it, is a continuous stream of placidly self-confident assertion. He argues or discusses as little as a prophet. Viewed under another aspect the book is an undignified appeal to the crowd. We may confidently assert that any other man of science who had a reputation to make or unmake would resent the imputation of being considered its author. For our part, we should never have mentioned his name in these pages had not the powers of darkness made use of his reputation as a German scientist to poison the minds of thousands of unwary readers in English-speaking countries.

Some lines above we alluded to certain frauds associated with the name of Ernst Haeckel. They belong to the category of deadly sins which are never forgiven the man of science. They consisted in a deliberate misrepresentation of facts. The ordinary student depends on the original investigator for a knowledge of facts; and facts are the very basis of all physical science. Hence a professor who knowingly distorts the facts presented to his pupils saps the foundation of science. This in a flagrant form is the offense of Ernst Haeckel. The circumstances were as follows:

Haeckel is a Darwinist of the extreme type. He holds with Darwin that man has been evolved from the ape. In his search for arguments to prove his thesis he has been for some years pursuing an idea to which he attaches much importance. If he could show from the actual pre-natal life of man that the individual man is evolved from an embryo which at an early stage of its growth can not be distinguished from the embryos of certain other animals—the ape, for instance—an actual case of evolution would be furnished having an analogy with the evolution of the entire human species in the lapse of ages in the past.

The reader will have perceived that so far as the argument could have any force at all, it would simply present an analogy between an actual case and a merely possible one. But even to effect thus much the actual fact would have to be produced. Haeckel was equal to the task. In a pamphlet published in 1907 and entitled “*Das Menschen-Problem*” he exhibited some drawings of embryo men and apes, supposed to be taken from nature. In these repre-

sentations men and apes were shown to be exactly alike; and doubtless Haeckel rubbed his hands with Barnum-like glee at the success of his little venture. This was the first act of the little drama; in the second came the dénouement.

In 1908, Dr. Arnold Brass, after a careful study of the diagrams, proved conclusively that many of them were inaccurate and worthless and others *purposely and deliberately falsified*. The scientific world was soon in a ferment and a war of words ensued. It was brought to a close in 1909 by Haeckel himself in the following statement made in the "Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung":

"To put an end to this unsavory dispute, I begin at once with the contrite confession that a small number (six to eight per cent.) of my embryo diagrams are really forgeries in Dr. Brass's sense—those, namely, for which the observed material is so incomplete or insufficient as to compel us . . . to fill in and reconstruct the missing links by hypothesis and comparative synthesis. . . . I should feel utterly condemned and annihilated by this admission were it not that hundreds of the best observers and most reputable biologists lie under the same charge. The great majority of all morphological, anatomical, histological, and embryological diagrams . . . are not true to nature, but are more or less doctored, schematized, and reconstructed . . ."

The controversy now entered a new phase. The scientific world had to defend itself against the sweeping charge under which Haeckel had sought shelter for his own poor head. Its defense was, to say the least, of a very dubious character. The following statement signed by forty-six professors representing twenty-five German and Austrian universities and scientific schools was published in the "Allgemeine Zeitung":

"The undersigned professors, directors of laboratories, etc., herewith declare that they do not approve of the method of 'schematizing' which Haeckel has in some instances made use of. At the same time, in the interest of science and professional freedom, they condemn in the sharpest manner the warfare waged against Haeckel by Brass and the members of the Kepler Bund. They declare, moreover, that the evolutionistic idea can suffer no detri-

ment from some few inaccurately reproduced embryo-diagrams."

The evolutionistic idea suffers just as much as is involved in the loss of Haeckel's argument from analogy. Fraud has failed to bolster it up, and fraud was its only resource. Moreover, it should suffer considerable detriment from the last sentence of the document just quoted.

The Kepler Bund, a scientific society of the highest standing, felt itself bound to reply. A declaration was issued over the names of twenty-five scientists who were members of the Bund and eleven who were not members. Nineteen learned institutions of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria were represented by the signatures. The declaration read in part as follows:

"We are in agreement with the Kepler Bund when it demands that henceforth as in the past German scientific research shall rest on an uncompromising love of truth and on the strictest personal sincerity. . . . What should we say of a historian who should alter the letters of an inscription in order to push through a preconceived personal opinion? Haeckel's want of conscientiousness in popularizing scientific facts and philosophic speculations has been shown up by others besides Dr. Brass. We refer particularly to Wilhelm His, who in 1875 exposed the arbitrary manner in which Haeckel modified his scientific data. To declare as unimportant such arbitrary mutilations of the diagrams of others workers as Haeckel has been convicted of, by Rutimeyer, His, and Brass, manifests a laxity of opinion to which we can not assent."

Haeckel is thus "discredited by the signed verdict of eighty-two of the foremost German authorities," though to forty-six of them it was evidently a sore task.

And this is the man whose miserable travesty of science has been sapping the foundations of men's faith! And what a revelation does not the whole transaction make of what is going on in scientific circles in Germany, a country to which, for the rest, the world is so deeply indebted for its scientific knowledge.

We may note, by the way, that Haeckel began his scientific frauds much earlier than the year 1907. In 1868, wishing to illustrate the identity in appearance of man, the dog, and the ape in their embryonic condition, he made

three copies of one and the same drawing and labeled them respectively man, dog, ape!

Haeckel has noticed, and no doubt with keen regret, which he manages however to fob off with a smile, the large exodus from the ranks of the ultra-evolutionists occurring in the past few decades; but what will our readers think of a man who attributes the change of opinion that has taken place in the case of so many eminent scientists to the influence of age and increasing mental decrepitude (the diagnosis rebounds upon himself), and who fancies that the young and enthusiastic are more likely to lay hold of the truth than those who bring to their studies the ripe fruit of experience?

Our readers can judge for themselves with what degree of success Haeckel has wielded the terrible piece of ordnance which is destined to make the Roman hierarchy tumble down like a house of cards.

HELL

Objection.—God is good and merciful; but a good and merciful God would not condemn a soul to eternal torments; therefore the eternity of hell is a contradiction of our belief in His goodness and mercy.

THE ANSWER.—God is good and merciful; but He is also just, and punishes sinners as they deserve to be punished; and a grievous offense against God deserves eternal punishment. God's loving-kindness, on the other hand, is shown by the fact that He supplies, even superabundantly, the means of salvation, and by the fact that He bestows upon those who make a good use of those means a reward immeasurably greater than the absolute merit of those who receive it.

Those who argue against eternal punishment or against God's mercy in connection with the eternity of punishment have the habit of *fixing their gaze on one side of the picture* and forgetting the other. The idea of eternal punishment so preoccupies their minds that they are well-nigh incapable of thinking of the causes and circumstances of the punishment; and yet of all subjects the punishment of

the damned is the one that most requires to be considered in all its aspects; and that for the following reasons:

1. It is a matter concerning the supreme Lord of heaven and earth, the infinite, eternal, and all-wise God. Of that Supreme Being we know, after all, so little that we should not turn the little knowledge we have of Him into a weapon of offense against any of His attributes.

2. Of all the aspects of God's being known to man that of His loving-kindness and mercy is the one that is the most conspicuous in His dealings with mankind, and it is one that fills the human mind with inexpressible admiration. *The abyss of His goodness and mercy is much more unfathomable than His motives for inflicting punishment.* There is, it is true, a rigorous side to God's dealings with men, even during their mortal lives, that fills us with terror; but of that rigor we can, in some measure, divine the reasons. The pains and inflictions meted out both to individual men and to nations have often been the temporal punishment of crimes that have made the earth groan with the weight of the iniquities that have oppressed it; and the temporal punishment, in many cases, may have brought men to their senses and saved them from eternal punishment.

Then, too, many of the temporal afflictions which men are all too prone to attribute to God as their source are not really attributable to Him except in the sense that He has permitted them—that is to say, has not prevented them—but always for man's ultimate good. In cases in which a severe temporal punishment—only temporal, and not eternal, so far as we have any means of knowing—has been given for what seemed a comparative trifle, as when Oza was rash enough to lay his hand upon the Ark of the Covenant, the punishment was intended to inspire the people with a sense of awe in dealing with sacred things. In the case of the chosen people there was often need of a signal example of the divine displeasure following an act of irreverence—and the example often proved salutary for many a generation.

Thus we can always find a reason for the severities of God's temporal rule—a reason that squares with our human sense of justice. But who will ever sound the depths of His loving-kindness and mercy? Taking the divine bounties either singly or in their entire range, from

creation to the beatific vision, who can ever say why or wherefore God should have conferred them at all? Why should He have created us when He had no need of us? for He was infinitely perfect, infinitely happy. Who will ever discover a reason except in His ineffably mysterious goodness?

And creation is but the beginning of an endless train of blessings, temporal and eternal. His creating us to His image, and thereby endowing us with intelligence and free will; the natural and supernatural gifts lavished upon the first two of our race; the rich rewards of virtue He bestowed upon the patriarchs—upon Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph; the care He bestowed upon the chosen people, in Egypt, in the desert, in the promised land; the abundant temporal rewards conferred upon the virtuous observers of the Law—these are the unmerited and spontaneous outpourings of goodness which mark only one-half of God's dealings with men.

The other half must be sought in that new dispensation which is the fulfilment of the types of the old. The prophecies had teemed with descriptions of a new era in which the favors of the Almighty would be showered down in untold abundance as the dowry which the Eternal Father was to send into the world with His Divine Son. "God so loved the world as to give His Only-Begotten Son." Here we have a new abyss of mercy which is more unfathomable than the first. The very life of the Saviour, apart from the innumerable blessings that came with Him, would be sufficient of itself to prove that His merices are the least comprehensible of all the things we know about God.

But if we add to His life its superabundant merits, which when turned into graces form the inexhaustible treasury of God's Church; if we add the graces and consolations and the foretaste of heaven which is received with the sacraments which our divine Lord instituted—we shall obtain even then but a faint conception of the love of the Creator for the work of His hands. The climax is reached when the joys of heaven are added; joys springing from the possession of the infinite God Himself, and for eternity. Is it not true, then, that the abyss of His mercies is more unfathomable than His motives for inflicting pain?

If, therefore, a God whose mercies are unspeakably great visits some of His rational creatures with eternal punish-

ment, there must be motives for punishing which are worthy of His infinite attributes. The thought of hell necessarily awakens deep reflection: let not such reflection issue in an impeachment of the divine mercy. Let it rather issue in *a deeper sense of the enormity of sin*, of the ingratitude of the sinner and of the perversity of one who not only adds sin upon sin but sets at nought the divine warnings heard in the depths of his soul. Let it also open to view that unseen world of grace in which God fairly besieges the soul with His merciful inspirations. We know not the number of the reprobate, nor can we presume to pass judgment on any sinner who has left this world, no matter how great his sin; but one thing we know, that no one was ever lost who was not lost in spite of God's merciful designs in his behalf.

HUMAN RACE, THE

HOW OLD IS IT?

A Modern Objection.—In the mud of the Mississippi skeletons have been found that must have been there at least 60,000 years. Hence the Bible's reckoning of four thousand years from Adam to Christ is discredited by physical science.

THE ANSWER.—It is anything but certain that the Bible reckons four thousand years between Adam and Christ. There are varying texts and different versions of the sacred writings. If the genealogies given in the Latin Vulgate are to be regarded as determining the age of the human race, the successive generations of men do indeed make up a total of some four thousand years; but according to the Greek Septuagint more than a thousand more must be reckoned. And yet both versions are in use in the Church. Ecclesiastical authority leaves it undecided which of the two accounts is the correct one, or whether both are not wrong and a third, that of the original text, right.

But a more important point still to be noted by students and readers of the sacred books is that even if the Vulgate (or the Septuagint, as the case might be) should be proved to be in all respects authentic and substantially trustworthy, the Bible need not necessarily be regarded as de-

termining the age of the human race. Catholic biblical scholars whose orthodoxy can not be questioned admit this view and support it with solid arguments. True, the names and ages of successive patriarchs are given in the Bible, and a plain reader of the text might consider it a simple problem in arithmetic to figure out the total age of the human race from Adam to Christ. But as scholars view it the problem may be a more intricate one—not only because we have no certainty of the number of years in the original text of pre-Mosaic genealogies, but also because there are grave reasons for thinking that there may be gaps in the genealogies of the Bible—not, however, of a kind to detract from the Bible's inerrancy.

The reasons in detail the reader will find in the articles in the "Catholic Encyclopedia" entitled "Chronology (Biblical)" and "Genealogy (in the Bible)." Our only concern here is to state that there is nothing either in Catholic scholarship or in the pronouncements of Church authority obliging us to hold that the Bible fixes the age of the human race as four or five thousand, or, indeed, any definite number of years. If neither scholarship nor authority can read an exact and complete chronology into the Bible, much less can the average skeptic who lightly, and for the most part ignorantly, appeals to the results of scientific research.

Apart from what we know from the Bible, the insignificance of our knowledge of primitive man is indicated by the meager collection of prehistoric human remains preserved in our great museums. There is indeed an immense collection of implements, such as tools and weapons of flint, and a certain number of carvings and drawings, all of which give evidence of the manual skill and the mental capacity of the men belonging to the Stone Age—a period deriving its name from the use of stone implements before the use of metals was known; but the search for human remains, such as skulls, jawbones, or thighbones, and especially for whole skeletons, has been much less fruitful.

The following is almost a complete list of really important finds of prehistoric human relics:

A human skull found in the Neanderthal Valley, near Düsseldorf, and a few others of the same peculiar type; an under jaw found at Naulette, in Belgium; a skeleton discovered at Kanstatt, Germany; a jaw-bone found in the

Schipka Cave in Moravia; the complete skeletons of a man and a woman found at Spy, in Belgium; a skeleton found at Olmo, in Tuscany; a skull discovered at Egisheim, in Alsace; a skeleton found at Galley Hill, in Kent; a jaw-bone found in a sand-pit at Mauer, near Heidelberg; a jaw-bone and fragments of a cranium discovered at Piltdown, in Sussex.

These remains are in some cases the merest fragments of human skeletons, and much difficulty has been experienced in the task of reconstruction, that is to say, in the attempt to present an idea of the whole from indications supplied by the parts. In the case of the Piltdown remains it is doubtful whether the jaw-bone and the imperfect cranium belonged to the same individual and whether they are both human.

What is the value of these human remains? They would possess a considerable value to the student of prehistoric man if they bore any indication of their age; but their age is a matter of conjecture. Supposing they belong to the Stone Age, do they belong to the earlier periods of that epoch or to the later? As regards the Neanderthal skull, Professor Virchow, whose authority will not be questioned, assures us that there is no proof that it dates from the Early Stone Age, but admits that it may possibly belong to the Later Stone Age. "Its age is undetermined," he says, "and it may be of a much later date." (Quoted by Ranke, "*Der Mensch*," II, p. 484.) So speak the really great men of science about the significance of these remains, generally, as bearing on the age of the human race. They simply do not know at what interval the present generation stands from the time when those human relics were deposited in the places where they were found. They can guess, they can hazard calculations in which a number of *if's* must be understood; but this is not exact science, and it should never be quoted as such against the Bible. The reader can form an idea of the present state of science in this connection when he is told that estimates of the age of the race vary from 10,000 years (perhaps much too low a figure) to 10,000,000! The estimates that mount highest are generally those of evolutionists who assume without a particle of proof that man was gradually evolved from the ape and that the evolution required an enormous lapse

of time. But evolutionary theory is one thing, well-authenticated fact quite another.

But our opponents have another stone in their wallet. They appeal to the astronomical tables of the East Indians; but, happily, modern astronomy enables us to lay the objection to rest. The eminent astronomer Littrow is surely entitled to be heard on the subject. He says: "The astronomical tables of the Indians, to which they themselves attribute so high an antiquity, show clearly that they were drawn up at a time when the motion of Saturn was slowest and that of Jupiter fastest; and this circumstance enables us to determine with some certainty the time at which these tables were composed. If the eccentricities which they assign to several of the planetary orbits be combined, it becomes very probable, as Laplace has shown, that the tables, so far from having been composed four thousand years before the beginning of our reckoning, really date from a period as late as the beginning of the sixteenth century after Christ, and were made after the model of European tables."—*Wunder des Himmels*, p. 831.

Science has really nothing to say against the comparatively recent origin of man, and the Bible is in possession of the field.

(See "Apes and Men" and "Evolution.")

INDIFFERENTISM

The Plea of the Indifferentist.—Religious creeds are a matter of personal preference, and a search for the right creed, if there is any such thing, can not be expected of the average man. On the other hand we all have a grasp of certain principles of morality which are the mainstay of society. With these society may well rest contented.

OUR ANSWER.—We have dealt in another article with the watchword of the indifferentist, "Deeds, not creeds," and have endeavored to show its absurdity. In the present article we aim at being more helpful to the indifferentist by enabling him, if possible, to realize the gravity of the

situation in which he finds himself, and by furnishing him with a positive clue to the discovery of the truth.

The indifferentist believes, or tries to make himself believe, that the motto "Deeds, not creeds" is the embodiment of common sense. Let us sift it a little. Ask a man of this way of thinking what deeds he means. Ask him to draw up a list of those deeds which he thus sets over against the creeds, that is to say, of the acts and habits which he deems morally right. Ask a second and a third, and so on indefinitely, to do the same. You will find that no two such lists will in all points tally, and some will be much longer than others. One man's list of honest deeds will include no more than honesty, sobriety, obedience to the laws (when they can not be evaded), and a care of one's family, with perhaps a bit of philanthropy and public spirit thrown in by way of giving a sort of halo to the rest. These are only the deeds and duties without which even pagan society could not get on at all, and without which the individual would come to grief.

Another vaunter of deeds as against creeds would add a few more virtues to his list. His moral sense is of a finer sort, and hence he adds to the catalogue meekness and patience, charity in words (mere thoughts would be under no moral restraint), and chastity, as a matter of outward behavior. Another would add sincerity (an approach to humility) and a restraint upon thoughts and desires.

One would like to know, in dealing with such persons, where the line is to be drawn between good and bad deeds. Why should one man's list of virtues be longer than another's? Have they any criterion by which to discover whether any one of them is complete and exhaustive? And then, what is their criterion for deciding whether *any* deed deserves to be called virtuous? Most men who are indifferent to positive creeds are quite at sea on these points. As to prayer and worship, well—they may have some vague notion of the fitness and reasonableness of the thing, but they would seldom think of entering it on a list of moral duties.

And then the very notion of *duty* and *obligation* which underlies all their ideas about virtue and vice—upon what is it based? The basis is either a rational or an irrational one. If it is a rational one it will resolve itself into a judgment that certain things are right and *ought* to be done,

whilst other things are wrong and *ought* to be avoided; in other words, into a dictate of conscience. But conscience must be based upon a belief (implied at least) that there is some higher power than our own wills, one to which our wills are subject; for there can be no duty or obligation unless it be imposed by a will which has a sovereign right over ours—the will of a personal Deity. Any other basis for the notion of duty is irrational. You may see the expediency or the utility of doing certain things which you consider right, but that it is a duty for you to do them—that you *must* do them—you would regard as absurd unless you admitted a higher will to which yours was subject.

The existence of this sovereign power is frequently a matter of doubt, or even of denial, to the one who is a vaunter of deeds and a contemner of creeds. Formally or virtually he is an atheist or an agnostic. What, or how much, do you believe, we would ask the indifferentist, concerning the existence of a God who has brought you into being and has a claim on your obedience? And what bearing do you suppose obedience to God has upon one's eternal destiny? You have drawn up a brief list of essential duties: what if obedience to God requires you to extend the list?

Whatever be the present state of your mind regarding that subject, the question is one of tremendous importance to you, personally. Your eternal destiny must far outweigh any possible amount of difficulty involved in a search for light on the subject. If the duty of knowing and serving God were but a fancy engendered in weak and ignorant minds it might be set aside as undeserving of attention. But if the brightest and noblest minds in history have accepted it and acted upon it, it surely possesses a special claim to your attention. Even though it had no such high recommendation, the fact that eternity is at stake should be enough to induce you to make an honest inquiry after the truth.

Such an inquiry need not be a hopeless one. It is not a matter of traveling into some unknown region of speculation in which there are no landmarks for the guidance of the traveler. These nineteen hundred years a power has been at work in this world which has wrought for the ennobling, elevating, and purifying of the human soul, and which bears upon it the seal of its divine origin. Impeded

in its action, at times, by the human instruments which it must employ, nevertheless, by reason of the divine element in it, it has won its way to human hearts and has gradually embraced the greater part of the world within the sphere of its influence. Christianity is the first subject to be studied by any one who is setting about a search for the truth—the more so as Christianity has sprung from and is the perfecting of the oldest, the most consistent, and the noblest tradition of religious teaching in the history of the world—that of the chosen people of God. *Tolle et lege*—take up the book of the Gospels—as the angel said to St. Augustine, whose giant intellect was for a time held captive by one of the false philosophies of his day, read with the unbiased mind of an Augustine, and pray with but one-tenth of his fervor, and sooner or later light will succeed darkness.

We have been thinking in the above passage of the type of indifferentist who makes light of all religious knowledge, who knows nothing and cares to know nothing about God, revelation, or immortality. But there is one of another type who is something of a Christian and who respects the authority of Christ and the Bible. Bred in childhood to the teaching of one or other of the Christian sects, he has allowed the cares or the pleasures of the world to draw him away from religious worship—or, it may be, he attends religious services intermittently, though he brings to them a set of Christian or half-Christian beliefs of his own making. In either case, when the claims of the one true religion are urged, he takes refuge behind a sort of half-conviction that, after all, it matters little which of the creeds he adopts provided his deeds are in harmony with the Christian code—whatever that may mean to him.

An indifferentist of this class should be reminded that the first and foremost of those good deeds of which he makes so much account is to *believe*—and believe *in its totality*—what Christ has revealed, and what He has enjoined upon all to believe. That revelation is one and unchangeable, and constitutes a definite body of teachings, placed in the keeping of a Church—*one only Church*—which is “the pillar and ground of truth” (1 Tim. iii. 15)—against which “the gates of hell shall not prevail” (Matt. xvi. 18)—to whose teachers the promise was given:

"Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20).

That this definite teaching of a visible Church must be accepted by all is plain from the words of Christ: "Go ye into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned" (Mark xvi. 15, 16), or, as the Protestant Authorized Version has it, "shall be damned."

If a rejection of Christ's teaching deserves eternal damnation, an indifference to *all* creeds must deserve the same penalty. Therefore an effort to find the one true creed is an imperative duty.

But, replies the indifferentist, as things are to-day how is it possible to discover the true faith of Christ? Must I examine the claims of seven hundred sects, each asserting its own exclusive possession of the truth?

The difficulty you fear is, in the first place, exaggerated. Yet, even if it were much greater than it is, the importance of the object of your quest would far outweigh the difficulty involved in searching for it. It is a matter of obtaining the "pearl of great price" and of providing for eternity. If you were given seven hundred keys of all shapes, and were told that one of them, by a certain number of turns to right and left, would unlock the door of an apartment containing untold treasures, all of which would be yours if you lighted on the right key and discovered how to use it, would you not spend whole days—nay, even months and years—searching for the key and applying it to the lock? Most men would; and not unreasonably, for the treasure would be worth the trouble. But the search for the truth is not of so intricate a nature. It is true that but one of the seven hundred keys is the right one, but there are ways of simplifying the search. There are tests that may be applied, by means of which you may in a short time eliminate all but the right key. By the use of these tests countless inquirers have, as a matter of fact, been led to the truth.

Some have applied to the various Christian sects the *historical* test, or that of origin: the Church that could trace its history back to the apostles must have superior claims to those churches that have existed only a few centuries, and which were repudiated and cut off from

communion by the Church which has undoubtedly existed since the time of the apostles.

Others have applied the test of *universality*: the Church of Christ must be a *world-Church*—it must be confined to no single country or race, and above all must not derive all its authority from the secular government of any particular country.

But there is one test which is perhaps the most obvious and the most easily applied—the test of *unity*—and to this we would ask the special attention of the indifferentist.

It needs but little reflection to see that unity should be one of the chief attributes of the Church to which Christ committed the preaching of the word. In the first place, the doctrine He commanded it to preach was to be one and unchanged forever. This, from the nature of the case, should be obvious. No one, not even an angel from heaven, St. Paul admonishes us, was authorized to change it. It is no less clear that perfect agreement should subsist among those who accepted the teaching of the apostles; otherwise it would have been useless for one only doctrine to have been preached to all.

Moreover, oneness of doctrine was to be rooted in oneness of authority—the divinely constituted teaching authority of the Church. Our Lord did not simply exhort His followers to unity of doctrine, but gave them a body of accredited teachers, who were to go forth “teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you” (Matt. xxviii. 20). “He that believeth [your teaching] and is baptized, shall be saved; he that believeth not, shall be condemned” (Mark xvi. 16). “He that heareth you, heareth Me; he that despiseth you, despiseth Me” (Luke x. 16). “If he will not hear the Church let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican” (Matt. xviii. 17). Such is the visible teaching authority established by Christ. This, and no other, can be the source of all right doctrine, and consequently of all unity of doctrine in the Church.

In any church professing to be Christian and yet not teaching with authority, unity of doctrine is left to chance, or rather is exposed to certain disruption. The Jews said of Our Lord that He spoke as one having authority, and not as the Scribes and the Pharisees; and a consciousness of divine authority showed itself in every word He ut-

tered. The same note of authority rang through the discourse of St. Peter on the day of Pentecost. No less authoritative were the utterances of the Apostle of the Gentiles. And if there is a Church to-day that perpetuates the mission of Christ and His apostles, its teaching must bear the same stamp of authority. Oneness of doctrine and oneness of authority are, therefore, a characteristic note of the true Church of Christ.

Take unity as your criterion, we would say to the indifferentist, and you will find that the problem of finding the one Church of Christ is rendered comparatively easy. Your seven hundred religions will at once resolve themselves into two classes: those that possess unity and those that do not. In the first class you will find the Catholic Church, and no other. (Catholic and Roman Catholic are the same.) The unity of the Catholic Church is so conspicuous as to force itself on the notice and excite the jealousy of its enemies. Every single Catholic in a grand total of nearly three hundred million believes the same doctrine as every other member of the Church.

True, in matters that have not been defined as of faith considerable latitude is permitted to personal opinion, and on these points there has been divergence of opinion; but, on the other hand, there is a tribunal which is competent to decide, in the first place, what is of faith and what is not, and, in the second place, which of the parties to a controversy is in the right. The unity of the Church consists, then, in the universal acceptance of what is taught as of faith and the readiness to accept the decision of the Church in matters of controversy. With human minds constituted as they are this is the most perfect unity conceivable—and, indeed, there is no parallel to it in human society.

Outside the Catholic Church we find an enormous number of sects all bearing the name of Christian. Taken as a body, and to a great extent taken singly, these Christian sects are confessedly and notoriously disunited. *Their one common ground is their opposition to the only Church that possesses unity.* Even the Bible, which has always been their one rule of faith, has fallen from its once high place in their estimation and is gradually sinking to the rank of an ordinary history containing a large admixture of the mythical. All the world knows that many of the leading

lights of Protestantism deal with the Bible in a purely rationalistic spirit. But even when the Bible ruled supreme it was the very fountain-source of disunion, for it was on the alleged authority of the Bible that every new dissenting sect based its separation from the older ones.

This tendency to disunion has been the most striking trait of Protestantism from the beginning. Not even the potent influence of such characters as Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli could reduce their followers to unity. Seeing, however, that their teachings must be backed by an assertion of authority, they ruled the conduct and consciences of their subjects with a rod of iron. But private judgment was not to be stifled. Who is this Luther? Who Calvin? Who Zwingli? Are we not as good interpreters of the Bible as they? So queried their followers; and hence the numerous divisions that sprang up even during the infancy of Protestantism.

"It is of great importance," wrote Calvin to Melancthon, "that the divisions that subsist among us should not be known to future ages; for nothing can be more ridiculous than that we, who have been compelled to make a separation from the whole world, should have agreed so ill among ourselves from the beginning of the Reformation." Melancthon wrote in answer that "the Elbe, with all its waters, could not furnish tears enough to weep over the miseries of the distracted Reformation." Beza makes moan in a similar strain. "Our people," he says, "are carried away by every wind of doctrine. If you know what their religion is to-day, you can not tell what it may be to-morrow. There is not a single point which is not held by some of them as an article of faith and by others rejected as an impiety." "Each individual is a free and fully authorized judge of all those who wish to instruct him, and each one is taught by God alone."¹

The divisions of Protestantism have not been healed by time. It is no paradox to say that disintegration is the law of its being. Temporary union is the result of the accidents of time and place. Where every one may think as he pleases there may be as many religions as there are heads to invent them.

¹See Janssen's great work, "The History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages," vols. III and IV.

We have endeavored to furnish the indifferentist a clue that may lead him out of the labyrinth into which he has been driven by the sight of the multitudinous sects whose claims are so confused and so confusing. The clue we offer him is neither new nor untried, for it has been used by many in the same situation. Moreover, testimony of the strongest kind has been rendered in its favor by a class of thinkers who, though not embracing the truth themselves, have lost nothing of their logical acumen. It is a well-known position of many unbelievers of the skeptical and critical schools that *if* Christianity were true, there would be no choice for them between Roman Catholicism and any other form of Christianity. Unity and consistency are naturally looked for by logical minds in the teaching of a God-Man and His true representatives. The strength of this testimony lies in the fact of its coming from so independent a source.

For any one who is convinced by the above reasoning there is but one practical course open: he should seek instruction in Catholic doctrine.

INDULGENCES

Erroneous Views.—1. Indulgences are an easy means of obtaining pardon for sin—even future sin—without repentance. They have been applied to the releasing of souls from purgatory, and for that purpose they might be bought for money.—2. “In theory [indulgences] always presupposed repentance; but as the business was managed in Germany [before the Reformation] it amounted in the popular apprehension to a sale of absolution from guilt, or to the ransom of deceased friends from purgatory for money.”—Fisher, “*Outlines of Universal History*,” p. 397.

THE TRUTH.—An indulgence is neither a pardon for sin nor a license to commit sin. It supposes repentance for sin. In this matter the practical belief of Catholics has never been at variance with the theory as set forth by Catholic theologians.

Old prejudices die hard, especially in matters religious; but the collapse of the old prejudice against indulgences

has already begun. The two sets of objections placed at the head of this article, which are not in entire agreement, are intended to exhibit the turn of the tide of popular opinion regarding indulgences. Our opponents are gradually getting nearer the truth. The author of a popular text-book informs us that indulgences are *not*, in theory, a pardon for sin, but that the people of Germany once *thought* they were, and bought them as such. Let us hope that the editor of some future edition of the book will advance a step further and tell his readers that indulgences neither are nor have been thought to be anything but a remission of temporal punishment, after repentance.

What is meant by an indulgence? An indulgence is the remission or canceling of the temporal punishment due to sin after the sin itself has been forgiven. The punishment is to be suffered either in this life or in the next. In this life it may take the form either of voluntary penance or of penance enjoined by the Church. It *supposes sincere repentance for sin*, and in many cases is given only on condition of contrite confession.

Such is the technical and ecclesiastical meaning of the word "indulgence." It differs somewhat from its ordinary meaning. In common parlance it means an easy, yielding, and forbearing disposition toward those who are subject to us, and does not necessarily imply repentance or atonement for offenses committed. In ecclesiastical usage it signifies a favor granted to those who are already friends of God by the possession of sanctifying grace. A soul stained by grievous sin must first be reconciled with God before receiving any such favors at the hands of the Church.

The definition we have given implies that even when God forgives sin there may still be some atonement to be made for it. The idea is not a familiar one to persons outside the Catholic Church, but it is none the less scriptural. Moses, though a friend of God and forgiven his transgression, was nevertheless punished by not being permitted to enter the promised land. David was pardoned by the Lord for his double crime of adultery and murder: "The Lord also hath taken away thy sin," the prophet Nathan told him; "nevertheless," he added, "because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, for this thing the child that is born to thee shall surely die"—a plain case of punishment inflicted after the forgiveness of

the 'sin. Now it is precisely the canceling of such punishment that is meant by an indulgence.

But is it possible that the Church has it in her power to release the sinner from such atonement for his sin? Such power has undoubtedly been conferred upon the Church. The idea of a Church that wields the power of the keys has unfortunately faded away from the minds of our separated brethren, and yet it stands out in strong relief upon the pages of Scripture. "Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 19). These words were addressed to Peter, but the same powers were afterward conferred upon all the apostles (Matt. xviii. 18). "By reason of their generality we must understand these words to refer to every bond or obstacle which bars heaven against the faithful, consequently to the outstanding temporal punishment of sin."¹ Even greater power than this was given the apostles. "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (John xx. 23). What wonder, then, if, possessing a power that can open or close the gates of heaven to sinners for all eternity, they should possess the lesser power of retaining or remitting the mere temporal punishment due to sin?

Objection.—The remission of such temporal punishment by indulgences should be a comparatively rare occurrence and should not be granted on such easy terms as they are in the Church of Rome. Punishment becomes a byword when it is frequently canceled on merciful considerations.

Answer.—Indulgences are frequently given, it is true, but not on such easy terms as fancied. Some of the smaller indulgences are granted for the recitation of short prayers, but the greater the indulgence the greater the exaction. In all cases good works of one kind or another are enjoined; such as fasting, almsgiving, confession and communion, visits to churches, pilgrimages, and the like.

But even supposing that all indulgences were granted on the easiest possible conditions, it must be remembered that, though punishment is demanded by justice and may be salutary to the penitent, nevertheless there may be something better than punishment. A prudent parent will easily cancel a child's punishment when such indulgence will lead to the child's improvement. Now there is one thing the Church never loses sight of in granting indul-

¹Wilmer's "Handbook of the Christian Religion," p. 361.

gences—the spiritual good of those who receive them. As a matter of fact, the discipline of indulgences produces a great increase of piety among the faithful. The good works required bring the sinner nearer to God. Prayer, confession of sins, the receiving of the Bread of Life, anticipate the salutary effects of punishment and render the soul more pleasing to God.

The power conferred on the apostles, and consequently on their successors, was exercised by them from the beginning of the history of the Church. Witness St. Paul's treatment of the incestuous Corinthian (1 Cor. v. 3-5 and 2 Cor. ii. 6, 7). In the name and by the power of Jesus Christ he punishes the sinner, but afterward, as representing the person of Christ, he remits the punishment. The binding and the loosing were evidently regarded by St. Paul as ratified in heaven.

In the early days of the Church it was customary to impose severe public penances for the more grievous offenses. These canonical penances might last for years. They were intended partly as an expiation for sins committed; and on account of their being imposed by the binding powers of the Church they were regarded as though imposed by God Himself; and when the Church exercised her power of loosing by remitting a portion of the punishment, or, in other words, granted an indulgence, the punishment was believed to be canceled by God Himself. The power of binding and loosing given by God would be recognized by Him in its actual exercise.

In times of persecution those who were imprisoned for the Faith, especially those who were about to suffer martyrdom, could obtain for well-disposed penitents a shortening of their terms of canonical penance. St. Cyprian bears express testimony to the belief that such favors bestowed by the Church were ratified by God. In one of his epistles he expresses confidence in the belief that sinners who are on their deathbeds and have not had time to complete their canonical penances are "helped before God" and "will come to Him in peace" in consequence of the indulgences of the Church granted at the solicitation of the martyrs. The writings, generally, of St. Cyprian, Tertullian, and many other authorities of the first five centuries throw a clear light upon the belief and practice of the early

Church in the matter of indulgences. Both the belief and the practice were the same then as they are to-day.

As to the application of indulgences to the souls in purgatory, it must be noted that the Church lays no claim to jurisdiction over souls in the other life. Hence if indulgences are applied to the souls of the dead, it is only *per modum suffragii*, i.e., by way of petition. The Church presents her offering or ransom to the Almighty, and it is doubtless accepted, *though we can not know with certainty how much any particular soul is benefited by it.*

And now a word or two about the abuses, real and imaginary, in the actual administration of indulgences, out of which the adversaries of the Catholic Faith have made so much capital—especially the alleged traffic in indulgences which roused Luther's ire and was the immediate occasion of his onslaught upon the Church. In the first place, there is nothing too sacred to be free from abuse; but the abuse of a good thing furnishes no argument against its proper use. Just before Luther's revolt there were undoubtedly some abuses connected with the preaching of a notable indulgence published by Pope Leo X, but they were committed contrary to the explicit instructions of ecclesiastical superiors; and they were condemned in that day, as they are condemned to-day, by all right-minded Catholics. But, granting that there were certain extravagances attending the preaching of this indulgence, we must deny that they were such as to justify the sweeping assertions placed at the head of this article. And yet these are typical of the attacks made upon the Catholic doctrine and practice.

Recent historians¹ have thrown some light upon the facts of the case. In the year 1514 Pope Leo X published an indulgence to aid in the completing of St. Peter's Church in Rome. It was to be gained, partly, by the performance of some of the usual good works—confession, communion, and a fast. But the well-to-do were to add an alms for the completion of the church, whilst the poor, instead of giving an alms, were to say extra prayers. The indulgence obtained under the grant might be applied, or transferred, to the souls in purgatory. There is nothing absurd or unchristian in supposing that God deigns to have regard to good works, including almsgiving, performed for the bene-

¹We refer the reader particularly to Janssen's "History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages," vol. III, pp. 89-95.

fit of souls in the other life—only we can not know, as we have said, whether or how much any particular soul is benefited by such acts.

Nevertheless, there was at that time an opinion held by some theologians that a plenary indulgence applied to a particular soul was certain to release it from the fires of purgatory. It is easy to imagine how a doctrine like this *might* be exploited by a zealous preacher whose heart was set upon large money returns. That it was so exploited, at least by some and to a certain extent, we must frankly admit as an historical fact, though we are not bound to accept the traditional Protestant account of the matter, which is inspired by prejudice against the Church. For well-nigh four centuries Protestants have made merry over real or imaginary extravagances in the preaching of indulgences in the sixteenth century. Why, in the name of justice, why this constant taunting of us Catholics for such religious abuses of the Middle Ages? Why the constant endeavor to shame us in our Catholic ancestors? Were they not equally the ancestors of our Protestant antagonists? And do not we as well as our separated brethren condemn these abuses? The real difference between our Protestant friends and ourselves is that we have discarded the abuses but clung to the old Faith, whilst they have rejected all in the lump.

The fact of primary importance is that no abuse connected with indulgences in the sixteenth century—or indeed in any century—ever met with the approval of the Church, and that every such abuse was visited with express condemnation. The utterances of Cardinal Cajetan, says Janssen, prove that the sentiments of the preachers in question were not those of Rome. "The preachers," says Cajetan, "come forward in the name of the Church in so far as they proclaim the teaching of Christ and the Church; but if they teach out of their own heads, and for their own profit, things about which they have no knowledge, they can not pass as representatives of the Church, and one can not wonder that in such cases they fall into error."

And yet it was such accidental abuses, which never had the Church's approval, that furnished a pretext for the unspeakable scandal of a revolt against the Church itself by the founder of Protestantism. Efforts to correct the abuses in question had been made before Luther's time.

The Church ultimately succeeded, as only the true Church can succeed, in ridding itself of any such ugly excrescence. The Catholic Church is indeed the only religious body possessing the power of correcting abuses within its pale without disrupting itself.

It is not true, then, that indulgences are an easy means of obtaining pardon for sin. They have nothing to do with the *guilt* of sin, and the remission of temporal punishment due to sin can not be obtained except by the contrite of heart. As to the statement that at least in the popular estimation indulgences were a sale of absolution from guilt, such assertions are easily made, but where is the proof? When was there a time in the history of the Church when the essential conditions for obtaining specific indulgences were not clearly set forth in official documents addressed to the multitude? These conditions always included interior dispositions, especially sorrow for sin. As to the alleged popular persuasion that particular souls in purgatory could be ransomed by money, is the *possible* effect upon the ignorant of indiscreet preaching by a certain class of preachers on a certain occasion to be erected into evidence of a general popular perversion of belief?

INFALLIBILITY OF THE POPE, THE

See "Pope, The.—His Prerogative of Infallibility."

JESUS OF NAZARETH

HIS EXISTENCE

A Bold Assertion.—It is not historically certain that Christ ever existed; and yet the whole of Christianity is based on the life of Christ.

THE ANSWER.—Is there another personage in history whose existence is so well vouched for as that of Christ? As well might Cæsar, or Cicero, or even Frederick the Great, or Napoleon, be regarded as mythical, for the existence of these historical characters is not more authentically established than that of Christ. Clear and positive testimony of the life and work of Christ is found in the writings of those who were almost His contemporaries, such as Sue-

tonius, Tacitus, and Pliny the Younger. It is found even in the writings of the eminent Jewish historian, Flavius Josephus.

But there is not the smallest need of going beyond the four Gospels for a complete authentication of the life of Jesus of Nazareth. If the four Gospels are pure fiction, the production of such a piece of fiction was a miracle of the first order. There is nothing in the creative genius of man that could ever have reached such an altitude of conception or of execution. And yet in the Gospels we have four distinct portraits of a man of transcendent greatness, differing in detail, yet each bearing unmistakable signs of being true to the life. And then what strong sidelights are thrown upon the Gospels by the other books of the New Testament. To think that this whole mass of writings, almost contemporaneous with the life of Him who is their one great subject, should be occupied with a purely imaginary character is to be capable of harboring in one's mind the veriest of chimeras.

Read the New Testament, we would say to any one who is disposed to regard the history of Christ as a myth, read the New Testament, or at least the four Gospels, from beginning to end, and then ask yourself honestly whether you can reasonably doubt of the existence of Jesus of Nazareth, the Founder of the Christian religion.

It is perfectly true that the whole of Christianity is based on the life of Christ. It is not less the truth that Christianity has been an undoubted factor, and one of stupendous importance, in the making of the world's history these nineteen hundred years. Now to attempt to explain the existence of Christianity without the existence of Christ would be folly no less pronounced than to attempt to build a house by beginning at the roof. Christianity did not simply drop from the clouds. It owes its origin to a personage who trod the earth and moved among men. No mere product of human fancy could impress his own image on the work of his hands as Christ impressed His upon the religion He founded. No imaginary character could have inspired thousands to suffer frightful torments, and even lay down their lives, solely for his sake.

No, Christ was no myth. He lived, preached, and wrought miracles in what is now the Holy Land. He was crucified at the demand of the Jews; on the third day after

His death He rose from His tomb. These facts are so well established that no one unless he closes his eyes can fail to see them. Christ, moreover, was the eternal Son of God. Therefore Christianity rests for support on the incarnate life of God Himself. (See "Christ's Divinity.")

JUSTIFICATION

Lutheran View.—"The doctrine of justification by faith alone is the new experience of salvation [Heilserfahrung] first enjoyed by Luther and then transmitted to the Church."—Leimbach's "Hilfbuch."

THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—A Catholic reader might easily conclude from the above quotation that if this "salvation experience" was first felt by Luther, Christ and the apostles must have known nothing about it; but Herr Leimbach has a theory about the history of this Protestant doctrine of justification. He informs us that "the Church, even in the early days of its history, fell into error and ceased to teach the doctrine about the appropriating of salvation." If that be the case we can only say that Christ failed to guard His Church from error, despite the fact that He had promised to enlighten it through the teaching of the Holy Spirit. "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come He will teach you all truth" (John xvi. 13). In giving His apostles their commission to preach He said to them: "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations . . . teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and behold I am with you all days, *even to the consummation of the world*" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). He sends them forth to teach and promises to be "with" them; but *how* "with" them except by aiding them in their work and preserving their teaching from error? And the aid He promised them was to endure to the end of the world.

The common Evangelical position is that we are justified without any merit of ours and by faith alone, whilst according to Catholic teaching we are justified by faith and by good works. The Evangelical doctrine has no warrant in Scripture. The phrase "by faith alone" does indeed occur in Luther's translation of the Bible (Rom. iii. 28), but it is not in the original text, and was inserted by Luther.

The Catholic Church teaches, and has always taught, that we must distinguish between a *living* and a *dead* faith. A living faith—faith animated by charity—justifies, whilst a dead faith, or a mere believing in the truths taught, does not justify. If Luther meant a dead faith he was in error; if he meant a living faith he had no reason, so far as justification went, for separating from the Church. Even if Luther meant by faith the act of believing what is revealed, coupled with a confident surrendering of the soul to God and His grace, neither is this sort of faith a living faith, nor can it produce justification. St. James expressly tells us that “even as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead” (ii. 26). By works is meant the observance of the commandments, and the observance of the commandments is not a mere act of confidence of any sort.

If since the Augsburg Confession of 1530 the Reformers have emphasized the necessity of good works also, as springing from the true faith, then, again, the Reformation had no reason for existing. If we are obliged, 1. to believe what God has revealed, 2. to trust in the grace of Christ, 3. to love God, which implies the observance of His commandments—this is precisely what the Catholic Church required of its members long before the Reformation, and it is what it requires to-day. Each and all of the commandments must be fulfilled if we would be saved.

As to the text of Rom. iii. 28, “For we account a man to be justified by faith without the works of the law,” very little need be said to set it in its true light. In the first place, the word “alone” which Luther introduces after the word “faith” is, in some sense, implied by the context, but Luther had no right to insert it, as it would be misleading; for he misinterprets both the word “faith” and the phrase, “works of the law.” By “works of the law” St. Paul means the works of the Mosaic law—circumcision, bloody sacrifices, and the like. By “faith” he means a living faith, which necessarily includes the observance of God’s commandments, or good works.

As Christians since Luther’s time have been disputing with one another on the question. *How is the sinner justified before God*, and as each of the numerous parties in the strife appeals to Scripture for proof of its position, the question naturally arises, *Whom has God appointed to*

settle so vital a question? The answer can be no other than this: *Questions of doctrine are to be settled by the Church established by Christ*—by the Church which He commissioned to preach the truth, the Church which is the “pillar and ground of truth.” “He that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth Me; and he that despiseth Me despiseth Him that sent Me.” “Go ye into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned.”

Peter and the other apostles were the teaching body appointed by Christ. So long as Protestants fail, not to understand, but to realize, this truth, and fail to recognize in the successors of Peter and the apostles the inheritors of the teaching office in the Church, so long will it be impossible for our separated brethren and us to come to an agreement on other questions.

Where the Bible does not decide a question there yet remains a tribunal that can decide it. A part of that Bible to which Protestants appeal as to a final arbiter in questions of faith—the New Testament—is a creation of the Church, and owes its existence to the teaching office of the Church. It is indeed the work of God, but of God as inspiring the teachers of the Church; and the inspiration that guided the Church as to what it should teach in script must be supposed to guide the Church in its interpretation of what it has written.

Hence it is often quite unprofitable to dispute with Protestants on such questions as Justification, the Sacrifice of the Mass, the Veneration of Saints, Purgatory, Indulgences, Celibacy. The paramount question is this: Where is that teaching authority whose utterances must have no uncertain ring, but must be a certain guide to salvation and must be listened to and obeyed? Where is that Church which was founded on Peter—that Church which is the “pillar and ground of truth”? If that question remains unsettled it is difficult, for the most part, to arrive at a solution of others. Once it is settled, I have an infallible guide on the subject of Purgatory, Indulgences, and other points of controversy. The Church must be infallible since I have Christ’s command to believe it and obey it. Now the Catholic Church is the only church that even lays claim to possessing such infallible authority. Therefore

the Catholic Church is the only one whose teaching can be accepted as authoritative and as decisive in matters of controversy.

LABOR UNIONS

A False Principle.—Strikes, boycotts, and other such expedients employed by labor unions, are the only weapons they can wield in their defense. Why may they not be used in the most effective way possible? In time of war one can not be overnice in his choice of means to attain his end.

THE TRUTH.—We are not going to write a dissertation on labor unions. We are only anxious to guard our workmen against pernicious principles, which are not always enunciated as plainly or as boldly as they are above, but which are nevertheless embodied in outward acts. There is danger of all democratic movements of our day being guided by the principle that everything is right that succeeds—that the great thing is to “get there,” no matter by what way. But there is a right and a wrong in collective action as well as in individual action, and, fundamentally, both are to be governed by the same moral principles.

STRIKES.—The assumption that there is a state of real warfare between employers and employed is, unfortunately, in our day an actual factor in the working out of the problems of industrial life; so that we are dealing here with no chimera. When a strike is ordered it is often taken for granted that the strikers are at liberty to do pretty much as an army does in invading hostile territory; and yet not even the laws of civilized warfare are observed. No laws of any kind govern the action of a mass of men whose principle is, “Get what you can, no matter how.”

A strike is not a war. A war is the extremest of measures used to attain human ends. Violence is its very essence. Its immediate object is to kill, capture, or starve as many of the enemy as possible. Nothing can justify it but an evil threatened or endured as great or greater than the evil inflicted by the war. Now in the judgment of saner minds the present posture of affairs does not justify

anything in the nature of strict warfare, even on a small scale. The classes are not separated by any line of demarcation that places them in opposite camps. The workingman has sincere friends in the higher classes. The real grievances, such as they are, result from conditions that can not be changed in a hurry. Pacific methods have wrought all the beneficial changes that have affected workmen; and, although there is still a great deal to mend in the present situation, workmen, as a body, have made steady progress in bettering their condition.

It is not, therefore, or at least should not be, a matter of two opposing forces, each bent on the destruction of the other. The fact is that each of the two classes is indispensable to the other. Socialists have dreams of a state of things in which all distinction of classes will be abolished, but, as the reader may see from other parts of this book, they are no more than dreams.

A strike has in it, of course, an element of hostility. Harm is done to the employer, and harm is intended. It is through the harm done to his business by the strike that the strikers hope to compel him to be just. Nevertheless, though harm is done and intended, a strike is justifiable under certain conditions. Justice forbids me to do harm to my fellow-man, but justice to myself may sometimes warrant me in coercing my fellow-man into being just in his dealings with me. What form and what measure of coercion I am allowed to use must depend on circumstances. Reckless violence can never be permitted; violence of any kind or degree should be the very last resort.

In cases in which coercion is needful and allowable a strike is regarded with favor by the moralist for the following reasons: 1. It is the form of coercion furthest removed from turbulence and anarchy. 2. It is, after all, only the exercise of the workingman's natural right to work or to refuse to work for any particular employer. But let us not be misunderstood on this point. From a moral point of view there is, of course, a great difference between the case of a *single workman* withdrawing from the service of any particular employer and that of a *combination* of workmen doing the same. In the first case, at least ordinarily, no harm is done the employer, and the workman exercises his natural right; but the combination inflicts an injury, and the injury is intended—though pre-

sumably not for its own sake; and although each member of the combination has a natural right to leave the service of his employer he has no right of any kind to conspire with others in the adoption of a measure entailing injury to his employer, unless the common grievance of the workmen outweighs the right of the employer to the peaceful pursuit of his calling. In a just strike the grievance of the employees has, as a matter of fact, such preponderating importance, and hence it justifies the workmen in availing themselves of their natural right.

A strike may be just or unjust, and it is just only when it is in harmony with the common laws of morality. The chief part of the responsibility for unjust strikes rests with those who issue orders for them in the labor unions. But the men of the rank and file are not machines. They have minds of their own and consciences of their own, and the moral law forbids them to pay blind obedience to orders on the pretext that the responsibility is not theirs but their officers'. The following rules should be carefully kept in mind:

1. *A strike should not be resorted to when milder expedients are available.* Arbitration is a means of settlement that has been successful in many cases. Why can it not be so in all cases? Things have come to a strange pass when the decision of three, five, or seven men chosen as arbiters by the mutual consent of the contending parties can not be trusted. A refusal to accept arbitration usually gives rise to the suspicion that the party refusing has little reliance on the justice of its cause and is determined to impose its will on the other party.

2. *The demands of the strikers should be reasonable.* When wages are unreasonably low, when negotiations on the subject have resulted in nothing, and when more pacific measures are not within reach, a strike would ordinarily be justifiable. When wages are reasonably high, and especially when they procure for the workingman some of the comforts of life, a strike would very seldom be justifiable. It is often difficult to decide in particular cases whether or not wages are unreasonably low; but surely the principle would be a false one that should hold the workingman down to a wage that secures for him only the bare necessities of life. Every manual laborer is entitled to a moderate share in the simplest comforts of life and should be

able to lay aside a little for a rainy day. Hence any refusal of wages necessary for the procuring of these advantages would justify a strike, unless, of course, other circumstances in the case forbade one.

The same rule applies to the demand for shorter hours of work. To have to toil the livelong day is unreasonable. The workingman is entitled to a moderate amount of leisure. How much can or ought to be allowed him must depend on circumstances. There can be no fixed rule, and the insistence on a fixed rule, especially for all workingmen, irrespective of circumstances, may easily be unjust to employers. A demand for eight hours' daily labor for all classes of workingmen is probably quite arbitrary.

3. *Strikes should not be accompanied by violence or by any form of physical coercion.* When violence is added to abstention from labor a strike ceases to be a strike and becomes a state of war. If even a peaceful strike can be resorted to only for grave reasons, the added element of violence and disorder, including as it does injury to person and property, can be justified only by exceptionally grave reasons. Under ordinary circumstances the use of destructive violence, even on a small scale, is not allowable.

Even the milder forms of personal violence or coercion, such as the preventing of a non-striker from entering the workshop, or the driving him from his work, are an invasion of personal liberty which can rarely be justified and should rarely occur. There may be cases in which the non-striker acts a very selfish part and is bound in charity to coöperate with the strikers, but the latter are as a rule bound to respect his independence. The necessities of his family may oblige him to work, or he may have conscientious scruples about engaging in the strike; but in anything like ordinary circumstances he has a right to decide whether he shall work or not, and it would take a very strong reason based on the common good to justify his being coerced into abstention from work.

4. *Probability of success is necessary for the justification of a strike.* It stands to reason that when the chances are considerably against the success of a strike, a measure entailing so much loss to employer and employed can not be defended.

5. *A sympathetic strike is less easily justified than a primary one.* A sympathetic strike is one in which the strikers

have no grievance of their own but quit work in order to help on a strike by another set of workmen, either under the same or under another employer. If sympathetic strikes are defended on the principle that a man may help his fellow-men in their just contests, it must be remembered that helping the oppressed is one thing, injuring the innocent another. If I help A against B, who is injuring him, it does not follow that I can injure C, who is not concerned in the affair. In some cases it would be lawful for one class or set of workmen to help by a sympathetic strike another set or class of workmen in the same establishment engaged in a just strike; for if the strike is just in the case of the primary strikers their grievance may be taken up by their sympathizers; but it is very difficult to find a reason justifying a strike directed against an employer who is fair in his dealings with his own workmen. The fact that he furnishes material to an employer against whom a just strike is being maintained is not a sufficient reason for a strike, except in those very rare cases in which charity would oblige him to help the oppressed, to his own detriment, and in which pressure might be brought to bear upon him to bring him to a sense of his duty.

BOYCOTTS.—The moral bearings of boycotts are much the same as those of strikes. A boycott is an agreement among several or many to abstain from dealing with a person in business or from having intercourse with him in professional or social life. As it consists in simple abstention but yet entails an injury, it falls under the same moral rules as the strike. It is rarely allowable; and all the more rarely as the common good is seriously threatened by the tendency to anarchy begotten of such practices. The secondary boycott, as it is called, is less rarely justified than the primary, or ordinary, boycott. It is directed against one who refuses to break off intercourse with a person who is primarily boycotted; against a tradesman, for instance, who continues to supply material for manufacture to an establishment that is under a boycott. The secondary boycott is an invasion of personal liberty which none but the very gravest reasons can justify.

A practice akin to boycotting is the refusal of union men to work in the same shop as non-union men. It is a restriction of the opportunities of non-union workingmen which it takes a great deal to justify. Ordinarily, no one

is obliged to join a labor union, and there may be cases in which conscience forbids; and although the union may be considerably hampered by the fact that non-union men are very numerous, the interests and principles of the latter are nevertheless to be respected. There may, possibly, be very exceptional cases in which all workingmen in one trade are in duty bound to join the labor union, but they are not the ordinary cases. The dictation of how many apprentices shall be employed in one establishment has the same moral bearings as most of the other practices of unionists. An overplus of apprentices may be an evil, but it is one that must be borne with, except when it has reached the extreme of severity. The opportunities of those who aspire to learn an honorable trade must not be restricted without any great necessity. Attempts to limit the output of individual workmen in a manufactory can be excused only under exceptional circumstances. The injuring of machinery and the destruction of goods is a piece of barbarism which all civilized unionists ought to endeavor to block out of industrial life.

In the course of these remarks it must be evident to every reader that we have not condemned without any discrimination the practices of strikers and boycotters. The more weighty the grievance, and the more removed the tactics from injustice and barbarism, the more easily is the use of so extreme a measure as a strike or a boycott allowed. The cause for which strikers or boycotters contend in any particular case may be a just one, and a strike or a boycott may be the only available means of contending for it. *But who will decide the justice of the cause or the rectitude of the methods employed?* Even the trained moralist and the expert in economics would often find it difficult to decide whether a strike was justifiable. Shall, then, the decision be intrusted to the untrained judgments of a promiscuous mass of workingmen, who are all interested parties and who are not disposed to enter into the views of their opponents? And is it not well known that some of the leaders in such affairs are indifferent to the methods they adopt and consider that all is grist that comes to their mill?

These considerations should make it evident that, although in the abstract a strike may be a perfectly lawful procedure, strikes in the concrete should be looked at as-

kance, seeing that they foster such pernicious tendencies and occasion so much material loss.

Hence it is the duty of the citizens of a country to do all in their power to get rid of strikes, boycotts, and the tyrannous element in labor union procedure. Direct governmental legislation in the matter of the minimum wage, or of the maximum price of commodities, or of the length of a laborer's work-day, may be considered by some as a last resort in any country of acknowledged free institutions, but things are drifting in that precise direction, and we, for our part, can not see the un wisdom of subjecting such legislation to the test of experience. Little or no objection can be urged against indirect legislation; such, for instance, as would oblige the parties in a dispute to submit their case to arbitration and abide by the decision given.

Strikes contain a comment on the times which every man of reflection should take to heart. Sharp opposition between the classes is rooted partly, it is true, in the conditions of social and industrial life, but it is no less deeply rooted in the perverse tendencies of the classes themselves. Ultra-democracy on the one side and ultra-aristocracy on the other, both aggravated by the rapid decrease of religious influence, are accountable at least for the fact that the mutual opposition of the classes has reached so acute a stage; and it is only by a reversal of these conditions that things can be thoroughly and permanently righted. We do not despair of the power of governments to mitigate the social distemper, but governmental remedies rarely go to the heart of such diseases. Each of the two great classes must be taught, by every means available, its own proper ideals; and this education of the classes must be begun in the schoolroom and at the altar. Writers of our day frequently point to the guilds of the Middle Ages as teaching an object-lesson on the conditions of labor and the relations between employers and employed, but writers and readers alike should remember that the guilds were religious to the core and that religious charity was the ultimate principle of their inner life and of their external influence.

LATIN IN THE LITURGY

Objection.—Why use Latin in the liturgy? Why may not English-speaking nations use their own language, as the Greeks and Syrians use theirs? Latin is a strange tongue to the vast majority of worshipers.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic Church is *not a national church*; it is a Church for all nations under the sun. Universality is one of the marks by which it is distinguished from all other churches bearing the name of Christian. Hence *a universal language is necessary* in its public worship. In modern business life the absence of a universal language is much deplored, and various attempts have been made to invent one. For the Catholic Church, in which the necessity of such a language is much more urgent, a universal language has been providentially supplied. The possession of a common language is essential, not to the existence of the Church, but to its well-being. Let us try to realize what this means in the actual life of the Church.

In the first place, the words of the Mass are fixed, stereotyped, and in the more essential parts of the Mass are as ancient as the Church itself. They remain unchanged because they are so intimately connected with the unchangeable sacrifice. Now the greater the tendency to multiply vernacular versions the greater the danger of departing from the meaning of the original, and the Church, for the best of reasons, has always been jealous of any change in her consecrated formulæ. In the case of Greeks and Syrians the danger is reduced to the minimum, as the Eastern nations are proverbial for their conservative spirit.

In the second place, the use of one language in the Mass is a matter of convenience amounting almost to a necessity. There is scarcely a single passage in the text of the Mass that is not a subject of rubrical legislation. The decisions of Roman congregations (standing committees of cardinals) and the writings of rubricists on the language of the Mass are voluminous. Now, suppose they had to deal, not with one language but with hundreds: difficulties would multiply indefinitely.

Furthermore, in the case of bishops and priests travel-

ing in foreign countries the offering of the sacrifice of the Mass would be attended with the greatest difficulty. The travelers would have to know the language of every country they passed through, unless they carried their Mass-books with them, which would be very inconvenient; and even if they did so they could not be understood by the servers, whilst the people would be surprised, perhaps shocked, by the strange sounds accompanying the sacred rites; and they certainly would not understand the words any better than our English congregations understand the Latin. A Catholic priest can celebrate the Holy Sacrifice in nearly every part of the world in which he happens to be traveling; and, we may add, a Catholic layman on a foreign strand can have the delicious feeling of being at home once he enters a church to hear Mass.

The stock objection against the use of Latin is that it is not understood by the congregation. This objection was never made by any one who was familiar with Catholic life and devotion. Did the objector ever see a Catholic congregation hearing Mass? Did he ever see the people approaching the altar-rail to receive holy communion? If he did he must have been convinced that language was an insignificant thing compared with the great Action that was being performed. Our separated brethren have lost their grasp of the idea of sacrifice as connected with religion. They know nothing of the great Action by which the sacrifice of the cross is perpetuated in an unbloody form. To them *language is everything*, and consequently the linguistic objection appeals to them with double force.

And yet Catholics might stake their case upon the assertion that they *are* accustomed to an intelligible language in the services of their Church. The writer of the present article has never known a day from childhood, and after he had learned to read his English prayer-book, when he did not know the meaning of every sentence the priest uttered at the altar. The meaning of the Latin was given in the English equivalent; and besides the English rendering there were indications at intervals of what was going forward at the altar, whilst in some prayer-books there were explanations of the several parts of the Mass considered as commemorations of distinct parts of Christ's passion. At solemn Masses he had the additional pleasure and advantage of hearing a language musical in itself rendered

doubly musical by the alternate chant of sanctuary and choir.

If all this is true the language difficulty is a mere abstract or *a priori* one, and is easily dissolved by the application of one or two facts. What we have said of the Mass is applicable to the Vespers and the Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. But it must not be forgotten that apart from the prayer-book the vernacular is not by any means banished from our churches. Not only are the Gospel and Epistle read to the people in English and the sermon or instruction given in English, but there are many public devotions, both on Sundays and on week-days, which are exclusively in English. There is probably more English heard in Catholic churches in a week than in Protestant churches in a month.

LOURDES

See "Miracles."

MARRIAGE A SACRAMENT

Ultra-Protestant View.—"Marriage is an outward, material thing, like any other secular business." "Marriage, with all that appertains to it, is a temporal thing and does not concern the Church at all, except in so far as it affects the conscience."—Luther.

CATHOLIC TEACHING.—Language like the above, held by the founder of Protestantism, brings the sanctity of marriage very near to the low-water mark of degradation. Fancy St. Paul writing in that strain—especially after the extraordinary passage occurring in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians (22-33).

"Let women," he says, "be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord: because *the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the Church*. He is the saviour of his body. Therefore as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church and delivered Himself up for it; that He might *sanctify* it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life: that

He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing, but that it should be holy and without blemish. So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church, because *we are members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones*. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. *This is a great sacrament*; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

St. Paul is using no mere figure of speech. He is speaking of a fact, on which he is basing most important precepts. The union of husband and wife is here represented as having a special mystical relation to the union between Christ and the Church; that is to say, the union by which Christ sanctifies the Church by the grace of the Holy Spirit and makes it in some degree like to Himself. The intimate union between husband and wife is made a sort of counterpart of the sublime mystical union subsisting between Christ and His Spouse the Church. And "*this is a great sacrament*" (or "mystery," as the Greek version has it) in its likeness to the union between Christ and His Church.

Now this is not an invention of St. Paul's. He could teach nothing but what was revealed. Nothing short of revelation could have justified him in raising Matrimony to so high a level of sanctity. There is indeed a sacredness about marriage even as a natural contract, and its obligations are no less sacred; but nothing less than a divine ordinance could have exalted it to the level at which we find it in the text of St. Paul, wherein it is a holy thing, a mystery, a sacrament—bearing a special resemblance, though inferior, to the union between the Son of God and the members of His mystical body.

The special sacredness of marriage is clearly conveyed by the text; but that it is also a sacrament in the ecclesiastical meaning of the word is no less clearly and forcibly implied. A sacrament in this stricter sense is not a mere symbol; it does not merely stand for or represent a grace communicated; it also *confers* the grace which it symbolizes. It is a direct sanctifying medium itself. A little reflection will show that St. Paul understood Matrimony to be all this and nothing less. "Because the husband is the

head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church." Let these words be weighed, and let them be considered in connection with the rest of the passage quoted and it must be plain—especially to any one who knows how St. Paul speaks in other places of Christ's connection with the Church—that Christ is here conceived as the head of the mystical body of which the faithful of His Church are the limbs or members, and which He as the principal and life-giving part of that body makes holy and like to Himself by the infusion of *the grace of the Holy Spirit*. Now, if the union between husband and wife is likened to that between Christ and His Church, it follows that Matrimony sanctifies and enriches with divine grace, and is therefore one of the sacraments of God's Church. Add to this that it is hardly possible that St. Paul would call the marriage union a great mystery of the new dispensation if it were not raised to a level with the great channels of grace in the Church.

Such was the high conception of marriage entertained by the Apostle of the Gentiles; but similar testimony to the sacramental character of Matrimony is borne by the Fathers of the Church. "Amongst all men and in all nations," says St. Augustine, "the blessing of wedlock is in the possessing of offspring and in the fidelity of chastity; but as regards the people of God it is also in the *holiness of the sacrament*."¹ That this holiness has the same source as that indicated by the above text of St. Paul is plain from what the same Doctor says in his work on "Marriage and Concupiscence," c. 17, n. 19. Speaking of such fidelity as heathens observe in their marriage relations, he says that in such marriages "there is indeed a *natural* good, yet carnal," but he adds that "the member of Christ" or the member of His mystical body, has supernatural motives for cherishing conjugal fidelity. He evidently understands marriage to be a special and specific participation in the union between the divine Head and the members of His mystical body of which St. Paul so often speaks, which union is cemented by divine grace.

In the same work, c. 10, n. 11, still speaking of Matrimony as a sacrament, he compares its effect to that of Baptism. The effect of the sacrament is permanent, he says,

¹De Bono Conj., c. 24, n. 32.

and its binding force remains even after either party has proved unfaithful, "just as the soul of the apostate from the Faith, though untrue to his nuptials with Christ through his loss of faith, does not lose the sacrament of faith which he received through the laver of regeneration." Both sacraments are here described as vehicles of divine grace. The saint in his work "*De Bono Conjugali*," c. 34, n. 32, compares the effect of Matrimony to that of Holy Orders; and St. Paul tells us that Orders are a vehicle of grace when he bids Timothy to "stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands."

St. Cyril of Alexandria, speaking of the presence of Our Lord at the marriage feast at Cana, says that "it was befitting that He who was to renew the very nature of man and to restore all nature to a better state should not only bestow a blessing on those who had been already called into life, but also prepare beforehand *that grace* for all those not yet born, and make their entrance into existence holy."¹ In other words, it was fitting that as God had provided in Baptism a means of sanctification at the birth of the child, so in Matrimony the future progeny of the married couple should be sanctified in its origin, which is the marriage contract. What can this mean but the specific grace conferred by the sacrament of Matrimony?

It is not surprising, then, that the Church, which is at once the heir and the interpreter of its own teaching, should have declared, when occasion arose, the true meaning of these utterances of the Fathers. In the Second Council of Lyons, in the Council of Florence, and in the Council of Trent, the bishops of the Catholic Church solemnly defined that Matrimony is one of the seven sacraments of the Church of Christ. Moreover the same doctrine has always been held, not only by the Latin, but also by all the Eastern churches; and in the Second Council of Lyons, in which for the first time a reconciliation was effected between the Latins and the Greeks, the latter signed the declaration that there were seven sacraments and that one of the seven was Matrimony.

No one who realizes the significance of the sacramental character of Matrimony can fail to see how divinely wise was the provision made for the hallowing of a union which

¹ Comm. in Joan., 1, 2.

is so easily degraded and deformed. It is made a holy thing, reflecting as it does the holiest conceivable union, which is that subsisting between Christ and His Spouse the Church. Those who are united by it are made sharers of the grace of that higher union, and the grace that descends upon them overflows, as it were, upon their offspring. How admirable a means is supplied in true Christian wedlock for neutralizing the effects of human imperfections in the persons so united and for perpetuating the fidelity which they have pledged to one another on entering that holy state. Who can fail to see that the one great hope of society, as such, lies in the Catholic conception of Matrimony?

MARRIAGE INDISSOLUBLE

See "Divorce," "Free Love," and "Marriage a Sacrament."

MASS, THE

Protestant View.—"The popish sacrifice of the Mass, as they call it, is most abominably injurious to Christ's one only sacrifice, the alone propitiation for all the sins of the elect."—Westminster Confession of Faith (Calvinistic).

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—Christianity without a sacrifice would be an anomaly in the history of religion; for never before the advent of Protestantism was there a religion without a sacrifice. Without a sacrifice the Christian religion would be strikingly defective, as it would lack the most perfect form of worship.

A sacrifice is an act of divine worship which consists in the destroying, wholly or partially, of a sensible substance, and thus offering it to God in acknowledgment of His sovereign dominion over all things. Of all acts of homage sacrifice is not only the most excellent but the only one offered exclusively to God. All others, such as bowing, kneeling, or incensing, may be offered to God's creatures, but sacrifice is offered to God alone; signifying, as it does by its very nature, the acknowledgment of God as the sovereign Lord of all things.

The sacrifice of the Mass, so far from being injurious to

the sacrifice of the cross, is really one and the same sacrifice as that of the cross. The victim is the same; the priest is the same, being no other than Christ Jesus Himself, though as victim He is offered ministerially by the hands of His creatures. In the sacrifice of the Mass, however, instead of a real shedding of blood there is a mystical separation of the precious blood from the sacred body; and the Mass, instead of purchasing redemption for us, as did the sacrifice of the cross, rather *applies to our souls* the merits of the sacrifice of the cross.

It is not Catholic teaching that once Christ died for us we were saved without any coöperation on our part. A free coöperation with the grace of redemption is indispensable. Now, Catholics are taught that in this coöperation we are aided by the sacraments, and that in one of the sacraments Our Lord has found a means of remaining in the midst of His creation, offering Himself as a perpetual victim, and enabling us to coöperate with His redemption by our partaking of the victim from off the altar of sacrifice.

Where, then, is the injury done "to Christ's one only sacrifice?" Is there any implication of its inefficacy in the fact that the sacrifice of the Mass *applies its merits* to the individual soul? A Calvinist should not censure such application if he holds to the declaration of the Westminster Confession that, although Christ died for the justification of the elect, "nevertheless they are not justified until the Holy Spirit doth, in due time, *actually apply Christ* unto them." The efficacy of the sacrifice of the altar does not exclude, but rather includes, the action of the Holy Ghost, and neither the one nor the other is injurious "to Christ's one only sacrifice." Still less is it "abominably" injurious to it.

But the best proof that the sacrifice of the Mass does no injury to the sacrifice of the cross is found in the fact that the sacrifice of the Mass is the fulfilment of prophecy and that it was instituted as a sacrifice by our divine Lord Himself.

In the sacrifice of the Mass are verified the memorable words of the prophet Malachy. In the first chapter of his prophecy he reproaches the Jewish priesthood for the manner in which they offer sacrifice and announces the abolition of their sacrifices and of their priesthood in favor of

a sacrifice and priesthood which shall no longer be confined to the Jewish nation but shall be offered by the Gentiles and throughout the world. "For," he says, "from the rising of the sun even to the going down My name is great among the Gentiles, and in every place there is sacrifice and there is offered to My name a clean oblation: for My name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts" (v. 11).

The prophet here predicts a sacrifice that shall be offered after the coming of the Messias, for he is evidently speaking of a time when God shall be known and His name be magnified by the Gentiles. But what sacrifice can be meant if not the sacrifice of the Mass? It is the only religious rite in Messianic times that has ever been associated with the idea of sacrifice; and certainly to-day from the rising of the sun to the going down, *i.e.*, from East to West, or "in every place," or throughout the world, is offered the sacrifice of the Mass.

The Eucharistic sacrifice also fulfils the prediction of the Royal Prophet: "Thou art a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech" (Ps. cix. 4). For a priest according to the order of Melchisedech would be expected to offer a sacrifice in some way resembling the sacrifice offered by Melchisedech. Now we are told in Genesis xiv. 18, that the sacrifice peculiar to that priest consisted in the oblation of bread and wine. Hence we should expect to find Christ offering a sacrifice which, at least in its outward aspect, would be the same. But where can we find any realization of this idea but in the institution of the Eucharistic sacrifice at the Last Supper?

We may add that the idea of Christ's priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech was so often repeated and enlarged upon by the writers of the New Testament that the way in which the words of the Royal Prophet were verified could have been no secret to them: they must have associated the priesthood and sacrifice predicted by him with what they saw daily upon their altars. They must have seen in what was offered daily to God under the species of bread and wine an oblation which was the fulfilment of the typical sacrifice of Melchisedech.

A study of the various narratives of the institution of the Eucharist as given by the sacred writers will show that a rite was inaugurated at the Last Supper which must

have been of the nature of a sacrifice. The passages bearing on the institution are found in St. Luke (xxii. 19, 20), St. Mark (xiv. 22-25), St. Matthew (xxvi. 26-29), and St. Paul (1 Cor. xi. 23-25). The sacrificial character of the act is evidenced especially by the Greek text of St. Luke, particularly in the twentieth verse, which may be translated as follows: "In like manner the chalice also, after He had supped, saying, This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood, which [chalice] is being poured out for you." The chalice was being drained, or its contents were being poured out, at the very moment when those words were uttered, and consequently the words must refer to the action. The significance of the action is shown in the words which reveal its end or purpose: "for you," as in St. Luke, "for many," as in St. Mark, and "for many unto the remission of sins," as St. Matthew has it.

Here, then, we find Our Lord giving His apostles His precious blood and telling them that it was being poured out for them unto the remission of sins. This, moreover, He bade them do in remembrance of Himself. Is it not clear that He is instituting a sacrifice? We find all the requisites of a sacrifice in the pouring out of His life-blood for the remission of sins. If such words as these were found in any part of Scripture which was not a battleground for controversialists we venture to say they would have but one interpretation. This interpretation of St. Luke's text is borne out by the wording of the Greek texts of the other two evangelists.

Protestants necessarily take a different view of the meaning of these passages. The words which we have translated literally, "This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood, which chalice is being poured out for you," they interpret as meaning, This is the chalice, etc., which shall be poured out on the cross—an interpretation that will hardly bear close scrutiny. For, although "chalice" may be figuratively used for "contents of a chalice"—as we frequently use "cup," "glass," or "bottle" for the wine or spirits contained in them—the figurative application of the word would be strained beyond reasonable limits by a reference to the shedding of blood on the cross, which could have no possible relation to a chalice. And besides, the present tense used in the Greek texts of three evangelists, which we have rendered by "is being poured out" can

not easily be given a future meaning, as it would naturally be referred by the apostles to the actual draining of the chalice which was taking place before their eyes.

True, the words could have a secondary meaning, or reference, in harmony with the exclusive Protestant interpretation. Whilst referring directly and primarily to the sacrifice that was being instituted, they could have referred secondarily and indirectly to the shedding of the Lord's blood on the cross, which was on the eve of taking place. To this distinction between primary and secondary reference no Catholic theologian can object. According to Catholic teaching the two sacrifices are substantially identical, though the one is a mystical anticipation of the other.

Add to the above arguments the following consideration, which to some minds may be more convincing than any argument based on grammatical interpretation. Our divine Lord was establishing the New Covenant which was to replace the Old. "This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood" (St. Luke), or "This is My blood of the new testament" (SS. Matthew and Mark). He tells us, in other words, that His blood is contained in the chalice which He holds in His hands, by which is signified the New Covenant He is making with His people. Herein there is an allusion to the words of Moses, who was the intermediary between God and the children of Israel for the establishment of the Old Covenant. "This," Moses said to the people, "is the blood of the covenant which the Lord has made with you"—words to which St. Paul alludes in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 20). The moment at which Our Lord uttered those words at the supper table marked the change from the Old Covenant to the New. Moses, who was the type, is superseded by Him who has been typified. The time of figures and of figurative ceremonies is past. The blood of calves and goats which Moses, after reading the Law to the people, sprinkled upon the Book of the Law and upon the people and the Tabernacle, and the blood of victims which was similarly sprinkled afterward in imitation of this initial rite, is now replaced by the blood of the Lamb of God. "This is My blood of the new testament," "This do in commemoration of Me."

Is it possible that the great religious rite at this moment instituted—one that had to do with the precious blood of the Son of God—had no more significance than the empty

types of an age of symbols and figures? Were not the religious rites of the Jews figures of the realities to come? Was the real blood of the Old Covenant to be followed only by a symbol of reality? Certainly not, is the Protestant answer: it was to be followed by the shedding of the real blood of the Son of God on the cross; and of the sacrifice on the cross He was now only instituting a commemorative ceremony which is our present celebration of the Eucharist. But if this be the case why did He choose this moment when He was performing a rite to which the apostles would naturally think He referred—especially as the grammatical force of His words seemed to confirm them in that impression? “This is My body which is *being given* for you” (at this moment, of course)—or which “is being broken for you” (at this moment, and as bread might be broken). “This is the chalice . . . which is being poured out for you.” And why does He so explicitly say “*This* is My body”—“*This* is My blood” and thus seem to indicate a mystical separation of the body and the blood and consequently a mystical though real sacrifice? And then, too, at this solemn moment, when He repeats the words of Moses in their new sense, “This is the blood of the covenant which the Lord has made with you,” what a comparatively insignificant ceremony is supposed by our Protestant friends to have been instituted, one consisting in the eating of a piece of bread and in the taking of a sip of wine, which ceremony is strangely supposed to remind one of the crucifixion! It is true that in the Catholic conception of the Eucharist the rite performed is a memorial of the passion, as Our Lord intended it should be; but in the Catholic rite the act performed does of its nature symbolize the event of which it is a memorial. In the sacrifice of the Mass a real change takes place. What a moment ago was bread and wine is now the body and blood of the Lord. And although He is present whole and entire under either species, and although no intrinsic change has taken place in the living and impassible humanity of the Saviour, nevertheless what is called a mystical separation of the body and blood takes place, inasmuch as by the words of the first part of the consecration, “This is My body,” only the body is present, and by virtue of the other words, “This is My blood,” only the blood is present. The act itself, therefore, by its very nature recalls the actual sepa-

ration of the precious blood from the sacred body of the Lord during the passion.

In the Anglican and Calvinistic ceremony no change of any kind, physical or sacramental, occurs, and hence there is nothing but the intention of the communicant to make the partaking of bread and wine different from any ordinary repast. This, surely, is little in harmony with any other divine institution of a commemorative kind, in which the ceremony instituted is a *natural* reminder of the thing commemorated and symbolized.

Then, too, in the Catholic view of the Eucharistic rite, the perpetual offering of the real blood of the Lamb of God is an act of worship which is a fitting and natural realization of the types embodied in the shedding of the blood of inferior victims under the old dispensation. The type should not be more real or in any sense greater than the thing typified. The sacrificial worship of the Old Law, which was a type of the worship of the New, should not be followed by a form of worship which is inferior as such to its type. No mere memorial service can follow that which was the most perfect form of worship, namely, sacrifice.

Finally, the teaching of the Fathers of the early Church, whose united testimony on any question of Christian doctrine should be decisive, is so manifestly in agreement with the Catholic teaching that it is difficult to see how any impartial mind can fail to be convinced by it. The teaching of the Fathers is so explicit, so clear, so varied in expression, that no loophole is left for special pleading regarding the interpretation of their words.

"It is certain," says Grabe, a learned Evangelical divine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "that Irenæus and all whose writings we possess, the Fathers who lived, some in the time of the apostles, others shortly after them, regarded the Holy Eucharist as the sacrifice of the New Law." Further on he says: "That this was not the private teaching and practice of any particular church or doctor, but those of the universal Church, which that Church received from the apostles, and which the apostles received from Christ Himself, is taught expressly by Irenæus, and before him by Justin Martyr, whose words as well as those of St. Ignatius, Cyprian, and others there is no need of transcribing."

He does, however, transcribe one passage from Clement of Rome, a pupil of the apostles, and adds in comment: "And now, as the writer of this epistle seems to be the very Clement whose name St. Paul says (Phil. iv. 3) is in the Book of Life, and as he wrote two or three years after the martyrdom of Peter and Paul and twenty years before the death of St. John, there is scarcely any room for doubt that the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Eucharist has come to us from the apostles, and should therefore be held as the true doctrine, even though we were unable to quote a word in its favor from the prophets and apostles." He further describes the Protestant doctrine as the "error of Luther and Calvin," and hopes that the leaders of Protestantism, seeing the error of their teaching, will restore to public usage the old liturgy of the Christian Sacrifice. (See FRANZELIN on the Eucharist, p. 320 f.)

The celebrated Leibnitz also, distinguished no less as a theologian than as a philosopher and a mathematician, a Protestant, though laboring for many years for the reconciliation of his co-religionists with the Catholic Church, makes an earnest plea for the acceptance of the Catholic doctrine as resting on the authority of the Fathers. "Nothing appears to be clearer," he says, "than that in [Melchisedech], when according to the prophetic allegory of the Scripture he is said to 'have offered bread and wine,' the Eucharistic sacrifice is prefigured." Much more to the same purpose will be found in his "System of Theology," in the section on the Eucharistic sacrifice.

We scarcely need inform the reader of that far-reaching movement in England and America which has sent back thousands to the works of the early Fathers, to find therein the genuine Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. The Oxford Movement, which began in the first half of the nineteenth century and virtually continues to-day—what was it but the recovering of long-lost Catholic truths by the aid of those beacon-lights of the early Church? Among the doctrines thus recovered the Catholic teaching on the sacrifice of the altar is not by any means the least prominent.

It is needless to select passages for quotation from the rich stores of patristic doctrine on the subject. For Catholic readers it is unnecessary; for non-Catholic readers we hope it will be sufficient to say that if we filled a book as large as the one they are reading, or even larger, with quo-

tations from the Fathers, every quotation might be acknowledged as genuine by Protestant experts, although a means would be found of escaping from the conclusion based upon it. Although in the description of the Eucharistic sacrifice every variety of expression is used, as though the writers wished to arm their readers against the caviling methods of modern controversy—although they explicitly assert that the very body and blood of Christ are offered in sacrifice for the remission of sins—that the sacrifice of the altar can not be offered by any but priests, thus distinguishing it from religious rites which are less properly called sacrifices—although they employ words in their description of the Christian rite which usage confines to the designating of a sacrifice in the strictest sense—nevertheless our Protestant friends are never at a loss for an interpretation favoring the diluted form of belief introduced by the innovators of the sixteenth century. Once the Reformers had cast aside the authority of a teaching Church, which is the perpetual witness for the true meaning of Christian forms and ceremonies, they did not hesitate to interpret the Fathers as they had never been interpreted before.

This state of things suggests the following questions:

1. What kind of language in the Fathers *would* bring conviction to our Anglican and Evangelical friends? As it is, the Fathers have exhausted the language of plain, direct, and even realistic description.

2. If the Fathers held the same *doctrine* as modern Protestants why did they use a language so utterly different from the language of Protestant theology and devotion? How did they avoid lapsing into forms of speech which would be recognized to-day as Anglican or Evangelical? Here and there, as is quite natural in so large a mass of writings, there are passages which are more or less obscure, or which to the untrained reader may seem to favor modern Protestant views; but there is scarcely an instance in point in which the passage can not be matched by a clear and explicit statement of Roman Catholic doctrine from some other part of the author's writings; and in point of number the dubiously worded passages are perfectly insignificant compared with the numerous, clear, and explicit declarations of Roman Catholic doctrine.

3. Why does the Eucharistic language of Protestants dif-

fer from the traditional language which began with the apostles, was used by the Fathers, and was handed on unchanged to the present hour? What average Anglican or Presbyterian of the present day, if he had to compose a document on the Eucharist, would word it after the model of the famous *Didache*, or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, which was almost contemporaneous with the apostles? In the fourteenth chapter of the *Didache* we find the following precept:

“On the Lord’s Day you shall assemble and break bread and give thanks, after confessing your sins, in order that your *sacrifice* may be pure. Let no one who is at enmity with his friend join you in your assembly till the two be reconciled, lest your *sacrifice* be profaned. For this is the *sacrifice* spoken of by the Lord: ‘In every place and time offer to Me a pure *sacrifice*: for a great King am I, says the Lord, and wonderful is My name among the Gentiles.’ ”

Here the Eucharistic breaking of bread is repeatedly called a sacrifice, and a sacrifice of the strictest type (*θυσία* in the original Greek); and the prophecy of Malachy is appealed to, just as it is in an earlier part of this article: “For this is the sacrifice spoken of by the Lord, etc.” This is the sacrifice which was to be offered in every place, and always, and among the Gentiles.

Language like that of the *Didache* is intelligible to Catholics because it is the language of present Catholic usage; and no matter how far back we trace its history we find it always the same. Has this traditional language changed its meaning in the course of ages? If not, then the doctrine of the early Church is the doctrine of Rome. If it has changed its meaning, when did the change take place? If I observe that the Church of God has spoken always in the same way of its one great act of worship, but am reminded by some Protestant friend that the Church, whilst using the same language, has in the course of time changed its meaning, I naturally ask, when, how, and under what circumstances? If I am told that the change was too gradual to enable us to fix the date, I feel that I am being trifled with. If in the case of our literatures, ancient and modern, we can trace with considerable accuracy the history of words back through a variety of meanings to the primitive meaning and determine approximately the time at which any given word began to acquire a new signification, why

can not the same be done in the study of Eucharistic language? The answer is obvious: there are no signs of a gradual evolution of meanings; we find the writers of the first centuries at pains to explain themselves in a Roman Catholic sense no less than the writers of the Roman Catholic Church of to-day. The truth is that the first change, whether in language or in doctrine, was introduced by the Reformers. Taking their stand on the Bible and cutting themselves adrift from the ever-living witness of the truth which Christ intended His Church to be, they soon found themselves beyond hailing distance from the thought and the language of the rest of Christendom.

If all the Reformers had had the consistency of Luther the state of the controversy would have been simplified. Confronted with the testimony of the Fathers of the early Church, Luther took the bull by the horns and declared in his treatise on the abolition of the Mass that he cared not what the Fathers *said*, but what they *ought* to have said! And in his treatise on private Masses he said of the testimony of the Fathers: "The words and deeds of *men* we reck not of in matters of such moment; for we know that the very prophets fell, yes, and the apostles. By the word of Christ we judge the Church, the apostles, and even the angels themselves!"

He can give us no assurance, however, that the "word of Christ" had not become the *word of Luther* before it reached his audience.

MATERIALISM

A Comfortable Error.—The only practical philosophy of life is materialism. Teaching as it does that all things are matter—that there is no soul, no immortality, no virtue, no vice, no heaven, no hell—it gives a man his first feeling of being released from bondage. Materialism is, then, the real redemption of man.

THE BASELESSNESS OF MATERIALISM.—It certainly does give a man his first keen sense of being an animal. For the first time he knows what it is to give full rein to his senses and to indulge the fancy that he is rid of all responsibility and all liability to punishment.

The wish is often father to the thought; and materialism does appeal strongly to those who are eager to live the life that materialism logically leads to—the life of the animal, a life in which all the sensuous appetites are freely indulged. It appeals to those who would fain be rid of all authority, human and divine, and consequently to anarchists and socialists. It is favored by those who are imbued with liberalism and free thought, and whose morbid craving for emancipation from restraint leads them to discard every notion or principle that implies human responsibility.

Materialism is the grossest and crudest of errors. It carries a man no further than the direct evidence of his senses. It is a child's philosophy. No philosophical acumen is required to formulate without proof the proposition: All things are matter. And what materialist ever attempted to do more? The history of philosophy these past three thousand years exhibits periodically the cropping up of materialistic systems of philosophy—if philosophy it can be called—but who ever heard of anything that pretended to be a *demonstration* of any such proposition as the following: There is no reality but matter—Everything that exists must have dimensions, and must be capable of being either felt or seen or smelled or heard or tasted—The notion of soul or of spirit is intrinsically absurd.

If, then, the reader should light upon any one who says he is a convinced materialist, let him ask him what has convinced him. He will answer by appealing to common sense. It is absurd, he will say, to suppose that you could not touch and feel whatever had any reality, if you could get at it. He will add, doubtless, that all the talk one hears about immaterial being is either inane philosophizing or sheer superstition. On the other hand, if any well-instructed Christian is asked to prove the existence of spiritual being—as in the case of the human soul—he will give what any well-educated person will regard as at least a serious attempt at a demonstration. He will argue from spiritual *acts* to the spiritual *nature* of the soul that elicits them.

Even the small amount of feeble reflection which the materialist brings to bear on the subject should convince him that, as he is capable of *reviewing* his sense impressions and *drawing a conclusion* (though a false one), he has a faculty within him that raises him *above the sphere of sense*—an intellectual, or spiritual faculty, which argues a spiritual soul.

The subject of mind, or soul, has been explored in our day through a new medium of research by the students of physiological psychology. The task they have set themselves is to observe and experiment upon every outward manifestation of consciousness. Now this science, in the hands of impartial investigators (from whom we have quoted in other parts of this volume), has shown that when experiment has reached its last stage it encounters an *impalpable something* that can not be explained in terms of nerve quiverings or brain secretions—something that transcends the conditions of matter. We can let this new science run its course. It will never be able to get away from the spiritual element that works with so much subtlety in the midst of the material. (See “Mind and Matter” and “Soul.”)

MESSIAS, THE

A New Error.—The Messias can not be a definite person, or a real person of any description. The promised Messias is nothing else than the blessing that rests upon the Jewish race. Hence the Messias has already come.

THE TRUTH.—Such is the view entertained by many Hebrews of the present day. It looks like a desperate shift to elude the evidence of the actual coming of the Messias, which took place nearly two thousand years ago. Any Jew who believes in the sacred writings of his nation and has not permitted himself to be infected by the rationalistic spirit of interpretation which is so rife in our day should need only to read the prophecies with ordinary attention to be convinced that the Messias was to be a person. And we shall add that any Hebrew who has the courage and the open-mindedness to step out of the groove of traditional belief in which his education and environment have placed him, and who gives a moderate amount of reflection to the Scriptural evidences for the actual coming of the Messias, will, at the very least, be made to feel the dubiousness of the traditional Hebrew position.

We shall now group together the texts from the Old Testament on which the Christian dogma is based. Each and all of them indicate the personal character of the Messias and the Messiasship of Jesus of Nazareth.

Jacob prophesied on his deathbed: "The scepter shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till he come that is to be sent, and he shall be the expectation of nations" (Gen. xlix. 10).

In the eighth verse Jacob had said to Juda: "Juda, thee shall thy brethren praise; thy hands shall be on the necks of thy enemies; the sons of thy father shall bow down to thee."

The whole Jewish nation once accepted the rendering of the tenth verse as given above. It is that of the Septuagint Version, which was accepted and used by the Jews. Jacob is here prophesying, as all Jews admitted, the leadership of Juda among the tribes of the children of Israel. Its leadership is a historical fact, and it lasted till the coming of Jesus of Nazareth. At that period the leadership of Juda together with the whole Jewish commonwealth came to an end; and since the dispersion of the Jews all distinction of tribes has been obliterated. But this was not to happen till the Messias came. Therefore the Messias has long since come.

"And there shall come forth a rod out of the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise up out of his root. The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him. . . . In that day the root of Jesse, who standeth for an ensign of the people, him the Gentiles shall beseech" (Isaias xi. 1, 2, 10).

"Drop down dew, ye heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just. Let the earth be opened and bud forth a saviour" (Isaias xlv. 8).

"The Lord Himself shall give you a sign. Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son. And His name shall be called Emmanuel [*i.e.*, God with us]" (Isaias vii. 14).

"For a child is born to us and a son is given to us, and the government is upon His shoulders: and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace" (Isaias ix. 6).

Isaias speaks of the Messias as the servant of God (xlii) and describes Him as the man of sorrows (liii). The second psalm speaks of the Messias as the "Anointed One." The one-hundred-and-ninth describes Him as the Son of God and the King of the world. The appellations "servant of God" and "God the Mighty" are reconciled in the mys-

tery of the Incarnation, in which Christ is both God and Man. (See "Christ's Divinity.")

The Jews at the time of Christ were expecting the Messias—a definite person, undoubtedly. The prophet Daniel predicted (ix. 25-27) that from the time of the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem, or from the year 453 before Christ, to the public appearance of the Messias 69 weeks of years, and to the death of the Messias $69\frac{1}{2}$ weeks of years, would elapse. By a "week" of years is meant a period of seven years. If 69 be multiplied by 7 we have a period of 483 (or $453 + 30$) years. Therefore in the thirtieth year of the Christian epoch the Messias should have shown Himself publicly, and "in the half of the week" following, i.e., three and a half years later, by reason of the sacrifice in which He Himself would be the victim, "the victim and the sacrifice" of the Old Law should "fail," or cease to be acceptable to God. The dates prophesied were precisely those of the public appearance and the death, respectively, of Jesus of Nazareth. The Jews, though not recognizing Jesus as the Messias, expected the Messias to appear at that time—evidently understanding the prophecy, as regarded the dates, as Christians understand it to-day.

Even supposing a possible flaw in the calculation we have just rehearsed, *the sixty-nine weeks of years must long since have elapsed and the Messias must have come.*

The prophet Aggeus (ii. 8, 10) predicted that the Messias would enter the Temple. In the year 70 after Christ the Temple was destroyed by Titus. The Messias is mentioned as being the Son of God (Ps. ii. 7). He shall be God and Man (Is. ix. 6),—a great wonder-worker (Is. xxxv. 5),—a priest according to the order of Melchisedech (Ps. cix. 4),—sovereign of the world (Jer. xxiii. 5; Dan. ii. 44). The Messias is to make His entrance into Jerusalem seated on an ass (Zach. ix. 9). He is to be sold by the friend of His table (Ps. xl. 10) for thirty pieces of silver (Zach. xi. 12). He is to be mocked and scourged (Ps. xxi. 7; lxxii. 14). His hands and His feet are to be pierced (Ps. xxi. 17). In His sufferings He will be as meek and patient as a lamb (Is. liii. 7).

All these prophecies were accepted by the Jews as pointing to the Messias. Jesus of Nazareth came at the very time when the Jews were expecting the Messias, and the

striking resemblance between Him and the one described in the prophecies can not escape the most incredulous of Hebrews in our day. If the Messiah has not appeared the prophecy of Daniel can never be verified. If He has appeared He must surely have appeared in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. If Jesus is the Messiah the religion of Jesus is the only one acceptable to God.

MIND AND MATTER

Erroneous View.—Mind is only a phosphorescence of the brain. Hence mind—to call it by that name—is but a state or condition of matter. Spiritual mind or soul vanishes under the light of analysis and experiment.

THE TRUTH.—Such is the pronouncement of the materialist; but it is not the teaching of sound philosophy, which tells me that man possesses, besides a body and bodily senses, a spiritual mind, and that it is mind that renders him superior to the rest of visible creation and enables him to subdue all things to his power.

The root of this power lies in the mind's capability of attaining to knowledge, as distinguished from mere sense impressions; and the beginning of knowledge is *abstract thought*. By abstract thinking we mean the withdrawing of the mind from the particular object we happen to be contemplating and fixing it on the *kind* or *species* to which the thing belongs. Instead of thinking, for instance, of this or that particular horse I think of the kind, or class, or species known as the horse—the horse in general. It is by the mind's power of abstracting that it is enabled to free itself from the conditions of matter and soar above the domain of sense. Science is man's greatest achievement, and science is abstract thought.

The proof that mind is an immaterial or spiritual faculty lies in its immaterial or spiritual functions: *If the acts of the mind are spiritual the mind itself must be spiritual.*

Take any abstract idea; analyze it, and at once the superior power of mind will be manifest. One class of abstract conceptions is that of relations. Let us take one of these relations—ownership. The idea of ownership can

not be conceived by any faculty that is not spiritual. An illustration: I see before me a piece of money, a gold coin belonging to a friend of mine. There is nothing in the coin itself declaring who is its owner; and yet if I should appropriate the coin and spend it for my uses I should be guilty of an act of injustice. If my friend should take it and make a good use of it he should be acting within his rights. And yet no one can discover by sight or by touch that the coin bears a relation to my friend which it does not bear to me—the relation of a thing owned to its owner. Ownership is not a material thing; it is immaterial, and therefore can not be apprehended by any but an immaterial faculty; or, in other words, by mind. The same may be said of all other abstract conceptions, such as truth, justice, virtue, vice, and the like, and of abstract conceptions of energy, gravitation, quantity, dimension, and other material qualities.

These ideas are realities, for they are the very subject-matter of science, which deals only with realities. Regard them as fictions, and science becomes a bundle of unrealities.

There is need of little reflection to see that science has to do with abstract and general truths. A physicist writing on the conservation of energy is not concerned with any particular instance of energy, unless incidentally, but with energy in general. The moralist in treating of justice is thinking of justice in the abstract, and not of justice as exercised in this or that particular case. Thus the whole of science is made up of abstractions. Its definitions, its axioms, its laws, its principles, are all abstractions. Now all these abstractions are realities; otherwise they could not be the subject-matter of science. But they are not realities of the material order; they rise above matter and material conditions into the domain of the immaterial and spiritual. *Therefore the mind that conceives them must be of the same order.*

But is it not the brain that thinks? Do we not call a good thinker a man of brains? And is not the brain matter that can be weighed and measured?

No, it is not the brain that thinks. Nevertheless the brain *has something to do with thinking*. It acts the part of a servant to the mind. It supplies what may be called the raw material of thought—the images or phantasms from

which the mind abstracts its general or universal notions. The action of the brain is needed, but in some such way as the stoker is needed in the running of an engine. The brain supplies the material and the mind transforms it.

And yet there are those who think otherwise and assert that the brain has *all* to do with thinking, and that thinking is a purely material operation. This capital error is due to the fact that those who have fallen into it confine their attention to the mere physiological accompaniments of mental operations. They see the working of the intricate machinery which nature has supplied in the nervous system and the brain and jump to the conclusion that this is the sum and substance of thought and emotion. Every mental act is accompanied by a movement in the nervous system and the brain. Man being composed of body and soul, there is a blending of the functions of the body with those of the soul in all his acts. Neither soul nor body acts alone. Each has its own distinct processes, but the two factors work harmoniously together.

Let me suppose I am sitting at a window overlooking a fine landscape. I note, one after another, the beautiful features of the scene and am filled with admiration. Finally, I resolve to go out into the open air, to explore some part of the landscape to which I have been specially attracted. Afterward, on reviewing all that has occurred, I notice a series of mental or intellectual operations—reflection, admiration, volition (the willing of something). But accompanying these, though silent and unobserved, are a number of operations belonging to the material part of my nature. First, the eye receives its impressions of the scene and transmits them, by means of a set of nerves, to the brain. Finally, the brain, by means of another set of nerves, sends a return message to the external muscles, and the body is soon in motion.

Now there is not one of these last-mentioned operations which bears any resemblance to thought or to any intellectual phenomenon whatever. The vibration of a nerve is neither thought nor feeling. No readjustment of the molecules of the brain would ever be described by any sensible man as an act of willing. And yet these physical operations are needed as a basis for mental operations. The mind is thus dependent *extrinsically* on the senses and the nervous system, whilst its own *intrinsic* operation is of a

totally different nature and belongs to the order of things spiritual.

It is obvious that if A always accompanies B the fact may be significant, but we can not conclude that the two are identical; yet this is the mistake into which the materialist falls; mind is matter because the two invariably go hand in hand. The head and front of his offense against sound science is that he confines his attention to the material side of intellectual operations and then concludes that there is no other side. He thus reduces all the power of mind and will that has shaped the destinies of the human race to the action of a bundle of quivering nerves.

The study of these two sets of phenomena in their mutual relations is the object of a science which may be said to have sprung into existence in our own day—Physiological Psychology, otherwise known as Experimental Psychology or as Psycho-Physics. Its first task is to observe and coördinate all the outward manifestations of mind. It measures, or attempts to measure, the duration and intensity of mental acts and states—thinking, desiring, resolving, and the like. Delicately constructed instruments record, for instance, the time elapsing between the first stimulus given the outward sense and the voluntary motion of the muscles resulting from it. The psycho-physicist has his apparatus and his laboratory and has devised an intricate system of experiments on living subjects. The ultimate aim of Experimental Psychology is to obtain a knowledge of mind itself. This final purpose it can not safely discard; for psychology, to be worthy of its name, should tell us something of the nature of soul, or at least of such manifestations of soul as mind.

What has Physiological Psychology accomplished? We mean, of course, principally as regards the nature of mental acts and of mind itself. Directly and by the use of its peculiar methods, *it has accomplished absolutely nothing*. It has, it is true, brought to light a number of curious facts *connected with* mental phenomena, but these are not part and parcel of the mental acts themselves, *i.e.*, of thought, emotion, volition. The most distinguished representatives of the science have had to acknowledge that there is a something that lies beyond the reach of their experiments and which is totally different from what is observed. The most distinguished of them all, Professor Wundt, tells

us that if the brain were ransacked to the utmost and all its processes exposed to view, it would still be brain and nothing more. "As to the psychical import of these processes we should learn nothing." If this view be correct the psycho-physicist is doing business under false pretenses. His business is physiology, not psychology.

However, the mere work of observing and endeavoring to synthesize the sensible phenomena connected with thought is a perfectly legitimate pursuit. It may be hoped, too, that for the well-intentioned student one good result may be produced which has already been produced in the case of more than one psycho-physicist, *viz.*, that experiment and reflection will have added fresh emphasis to the fact that what is observable by means of physical apparatus and visible experiment is utterly different from and inferior to what are properly called mental or psychic phenomena, and that the difference is precisely that which subsists between the material and the spiritual.

Perhaps, too, as regards the mind itself as distinguished from its acts, some will be brought to the conviction of a very distinguished psycho-physicist, Professor Ladd, *viz.*, that mind is not only a reality distinct from its material habitat, but a spiritual reality as well. "The only way," says Professor Ladd, "of maintaining the materiality of mind would then appear to be that of denying its real existence at all, and of attributing its phenomena to the material molecules of the brain as their real and material substratum or basis. But the untenable nature of this view has already been sufficiently indicated. . . . The negative conclusion that mind is non-material is quite inevitable for every one who admits that mind is a real being with any nature whatever. . . . It is not difficult, also, to show that we must make the corresponding positive statement and affirm the *spirituality* of mind."—"Elements of Physiol. Psychol.," p. 682.

The materialist has frequently exploited the work of the psycho-physicist for his own purposes, but evidently in doing so he parts company with the distinguished masters of the science. (See "Materialism" and "Soul.")

MIRACLES

Objections.—1. The universal experience of mankind, as Hume reminds us, is a proof of the impossibility of miracles. 2. Reported miracles can not be proved to be real ones. 3. If miracles are possible science has no meaning, as science has established the constancy and uniformity of natural laws, and miracles are violations of natural laws.

THE ANSWER.—Experience has to do with the past; it can tell me nothing with absolute certainty about the future. It can tell me what *has* taken place, but it does not assure me that the opposite *can not* take place. Universal experience tells me that water quenches fire, but it can tell me nothing as to whether on some particular occasion water will not fail to quench fire. Experience is the besetting idea of the whole school of philosophy of which Hume may be regarded as the progenitor; but here the idea is run into the ground. In the course of the present article we shall see how a *special* experience may report a class of facts beyond the range of ordinary experience

A miracle is an effect that can not have been produced by any natural agency and must be attributed to the direct power of God. It is produced in nature but not by nature. The definition as thus understood excludes the act of creation, as creation does not work in nature, but gives nature its origin. In a less strict sense of the word the power exercised by an angel over matter may be called miraculous. The moral effect produced by either kind of miracle may be the same, as in either case intervention from on high is manifest. A miraculous event is always of a kind to excite wonder; hence its name, which is from the Latin *miraculum*, "a wonderful occurrence." The wonder is aroused by the striking contrast between what is witnessed and what happens in the ordinary course of nature.

In reference to natural laws miracles may be divided into three classes. Some are *above* natural laws, as when a dead man is restored to life. Others are *contrary* to natural laws, as when a stone remains suspended in the air without any support. Others, again, are simply *apart* from, or independent of, natural laws, as when a fractured limb that might be healed by a physician is healed by the

touch of a saintly man. In all these classes of miracles either the *substance* of what occurs or the *manner* in which it occurs makes it impossible to attribute it to any natural agency.

Miracles Are Possible.—Granted the existence of an omnipotent God who is the author and preserver of all finite things, it is inconceivable that He should not be sovereign master and controller of that which is the work of His hands. If a human inventor can modify or interfere with the working of a piece of mechanism which is the product of his own brain, much more easily can God interfere with the mechanism of the universe. This simple demonstration must be convincing to any one who believes in an all-powerful God; and, as to the atheist, he must at least admit that if there is a God He can interfere in His own creation.

But it may be objected to this reasoning that although, absolutely speaking, God can interfere with the action of natural laws, nevertheless it would be inconsistent with His infinite wisdom to do so. Nature's laws are of God's own making and are sufficient for the purposes of His creation. Why, then, should He interfere with their working?

Our answer to the objection is that nature's laws are sufficient for the *ordinary* purposes of creation, but that higher purposes may be served by miracles. By means of miracles God impresses upon us the truth that nature's laws proceed from Him and are subject to Him. By miracles He can put the seal of His approbation on the words and deeds of those whom He has commissioned to preach His revelation. By miracles He can show forth the merits of chosen souls whom He has set up as beacon-lights in the Church. By miracles He can give a striking proof that He still abides with His Church and is exercising a continual providence over it. We are more impressed by what is unusual and exceptional than by what is ordinary and commonplace; and hence it is by extraordinary supernatural events that God accomplishes the higher and more special purposes of His providence.

The stock objection against miracles in our age is made in the name of physical science. But we must distinguish between *science* and *scientists*. Certain scientists have used science as a weapon in attempting to overthrow a belief in miracles, but they have never advanced beyond their first

line of attack. They argue against miracles chiefly by repeating, almost by rote, one and the same hackneyed formula. They tell us that nature's laws are constant and uniform in their operation; that water quenches fire and stones fall to the ground by virtue of fixed and unchangeable laws; and that miracles are a contradiction of this principle. But an answer has long since been given to the objection, to wit, that the laws in question are uniform and constant in their action *so far as the purely natural order is concerned*, but that we have no warrant for concluding that the natural order may not be subject to interference from a higher order.

To this the feeble rejoinder is made that if exceptions to natural laws be once admitted science can never be sure of its conclusions. Certainly, we answer, it can never be sure of its conclusions if there is no means of distinguishing exceptions from the rule; but a miracle, of its very nature, points to and emphasizes an exception, as such, to natural laws. Its very name, in fact, arises from the astonishment felt at a departure from natural law. Here, preëminently, the exception proves the rule. The rule remains intact and science is saved. The scientists with whom we are dealing may not believe in a supernatural order. In that case, let them spend their endeavors on disproving its existence; in which task, however, they can derive no possible aid from physical science. But that is the crucial question; for, once a supernatural order is admitted, the possibility of its interfering with the natural order must be evident.

Science, after all, has added nothing to ordinary knowledge that tends to make a miracle more astonishing or, at first sight, less credible. From the days of Adam it has been known that a stone released from the hands falls to the ground. If by a miracle the stone should be suspended in the air, the fact is not more astonishing to-day because science has given a name to the law by which the stone falls, or has discovered more about the extent of its empire, or has defined the mode of its behavior. And even where science has discovered a law hitherto unknown, exceptions to the law are no more astonishing than if the law had been known from the beginning of time. Why, then, invoke with so much solemnity the name of science against a belief in miracles, as though science had imported a new element into the controversy.

Miracles Can Be Known and Recognized as Miracles.—In the first place, they can be known and recognized simply as *extraordinary events*, whether their true cause be known or not. As they commonly appeal to the senses, it is only necessary that the senses be in a healthy condition. As a matter of fact, in the history of Christianity, many such events have been observed by numerous witnesses, by sober-minded, unimaginaive, nay, skeptical observers, and their wonderful character has been acknowledged. It is a profound mistake in our opponents to assume that all reports of miracles are old wives' tales.

In the city of Naples there has occurred many times a year for centuries a miracle that has baffled every attempt to explain it by natural causation. We refer to the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius. It has occurred in the sight of immense throngs and has been witnessed and even investigated by distinguished scientists. Naples is in the track of modern travel, and hard-headed Northerners, as well as enthusiastic Southerners, have been drawn to the scene of the miracle by curiosity. If not all who have come to scoff have remained to pray, certainly a profound impression has been made upon the more thoughtful.

Lourdes, in France, another splendid theater of the miraculous, has furnished hundreds of cases of cures that have arrested the attention of men of science. These wonders have been acknowledged as facts for which no explanation could be found in nature. The sifting and recording of evidence of miracles at the Grotto of Lourdes is not left to haphazard, but is organized in the hands of a permanent body of experts, whose work is open to the inspection of all comers. Sudden and complete cures of diseases pronounced incurable by the medical profession are recorded by the hundred. We shall have more to say about the Lourdes miracles presently.

In the second place, miracles may be known and recognized *precisely as miracles*, and not merely as wonderful events brought about by some unknown cause. To be able to pronounce an event miraculous I must be sure that no natural cause has produced it and that it has been caused supernaturally. It does not follow, however, that I must be acquainted with *every* law of nature. It is sufficient to know that *one* law has been contravened and that, at least, the *circumstances* connected with the event exclude

the action of all other natural laws. This is the kind of process gone through by official appraisers of miracles in the Catholic Church.

But, it will be objected, how is it possible by a consideration of any circumstances to eliminate all the *unknown* laws of nature? Our knowledge of nature is limited; and when we see a thing happen that is contrary to all the known laws of nature, is it not reasonable to suppose that if we knew more we should have no difficulty in explaining the event by purely natural causation?

Let us endeavor to do full justice to this objection, which is urged by some scientists of our day. The scientific habit of mind necessarily prompts one to seek a natural cause for any interference with a known law of nature; and it is intelligible that a non-believing scientist, though dumb-founded at the sight of a miracle, should not easily surrender to evidence in favor of the supernatural. But in our generation there are many scientists who need to broaden their horizon. It is desirable, in particular, that all men of science should be acquainted with the processes followed by those whose business it is to determine the genuineness of alleged miracles. These processes would be found to be as strictly logical as any that physical science can boast of.

Within the pale of physical science, when an inquiry is set on foot to determine the cause of a given mysterious phenomenon, the process of elimination is one of the first steps taken; the next is the seeking of positive evidence in favor of one cause in particular, of whose action and presence there are *prima facie* indications. A brilliant example was witnessed in the series of experiments made by Pasteur to test the conclusions of another distinguished scientist in favor of spontaneous generation. The one alleged cause was eliminated and the true cause positively demonstrated. Such experiments bespeak the true man of science; and we mention them because an analogous method of inquiry, and one no less thorough, is employed by the authorities of the Catholic Church in investigating the genuineness of miracles. (See page 463.)

The first stage of the process results in the establishment of the fact that the cure, if it be a case of that kind, can not be accounted for by any *known* natural agency; and this conclusion is based on the testimony of medical

experts. The next step is to determine whether the circumstances of the case are of a kind to warrant the elimination of *all* natural causation from the inquiry and the attributing of the effect to a supernatural cause.

At the famous Grotto of Lourdes the systematic investigation of cases of miraculous healing is a typical illustration of the first part of the process. If our scientific skeptics would take the trouble to acquaint themselves with the work of the Medical Office, or *Bureau des Constatations*, a permanent body of experts at Lourdes, the whole subject of miracles would be seen under a new aspect. The function of the Bureau is to examine into the circumstances of the cures in their purely medical bearings. Both its work and the records kept of it are open to inspection; and physicians in great numbers, many of them leaders in their profession and members of distinguished medical bodies, have availed themselves of the opportunity to observe phenomena which had been making so great a stir in the world.

In a period of fourteen years, from 1890 to 1904, as many as 2712 medical men visited the Bureau, and many of them were present at the moment when those who had been cured instantaneously at the Grotto had hastened to present themselves for examination at the Medical Office. As a matter of course, many of the doctors present on those occasions ignored the supernatural, but we are not concerned just here with their interpretation of the facts. It is enough for our purpose to know that the *facts were recognized as facts*—especially the fact of the naturally incurable nature of the diseases and the fact of their perfect cure.

An examination of the register of the Medical Office for which we are indebted to Georges Bertrin, "Lourdes: A History of its Apparitions and Cures," brings into prominence a number of distinctive features of the medical record which tell a wonderful tale of the mercies vouchsafed at the Grotto or otherwise connected with the devotion to our Lady of Lourdes. They are principally the following:

1. *The Immense Number of Records of Complete Cures.*—About five years ago (1910), the number had reached 3,962—though the actual number of cures was probably over seven thousand; for many wonderful cases had occurred before the Medical Office was established, and many

cases had not been reported; but, what is more notable still, many cures have been purposely excluded from the records, for reasons which we shall consider later.

2. *The Remarkable Variety of the Diseases Healed.*—Diseases nearly always at an advanced stage of development, and in numerous cases pronounced incurable. The list given by Bertrin must very nearly exhaust the category of human ailments. Diseases organic as well as functional, lesions and fractures, tumors and cancers, deafness and blindness, are examples of distempers that have disappeared in the twinkling of an eye. Medical skill has done wonders, but never in the history of medicine has any drug or any form of treatment cured indifferently all manner of diseases.

3. *The Exclusiveness of the Records.*—Not all genuine cures are registered. What the doctors in charge want most of all are cases which medicine is unable to heal; what they wish most to exclude are cases which the critical or the prejudiced might attribute to some known natural agency—especially that which is known as suggestion. Hence the small space occupied in the register by nervous diseases. And yet many such cases might well have been registered; for, if medical authorities rightly inform us, few serious nervous disorders are radically or permanently cured by medical treatment, even by the special devices of psychotherapy; and many such cures, though actually wrought at Lourdes, are excluded from the register. On the other hand, many that are recorded are among those which adepts in psychotherapy have declared to be beyond the reach of their art—among others, neurasthenia. (Cf. Bertrin's citations from Bernheim, the head of the famous Nancy school of hypnotizers, from Hoffmann of Düsseldorf, and from Brouardel.) On the Lourdes records we find as many as *seventy-eight cases of neurasthenia cured*.

The records thus dispose of the objection so carelessly and unscrupulously made, that the "so-called" cures of Lourdes are those of neurotics. But the objection has never been mooted by genuine medical authorities who have visited the Medical Office and have found themselves in the presence of actual cases.

The general reader should understand that the anxiety of the Lourdes doctors to exclude nervous cases from their registers is due to the reputation, mostly undeserved, of

hypnotizers and faith-healers, in regard to the cure of nervous disorders. Now these practitioners employ what is technically called "suggestion," and it has been persistently asserted that suggestion is the healing agency at Lourdes, and that consequently the cures can not be attributed to divine intervention. Suggestion might be described as a species of personal influence which exercises a sort of spell over the thoughts and feelings. No reasoning is employed, but reliance is placed upon the use of strong words of assurance or of command, or upon gesture, manner, or attitude. It is called auto-suggestion (self-suggestion) when one, even though unconsciously, produces by the same general means a certain state of mind in himself. An ardent desire or a much cherished idea is an example of the kind of agency that works in auto-suggestion. Suggestion, so far as it is successful, acts upon the nerves and has often been used even by non-specialists for the cure of nervous diseases.

It has been asserted, as we have said, that suggestion is the force that operates at Lourdes, and that the form it assumes there is that of an intense faith, often made more intense by the devotional enthusiasm of great crowds. It has been maintained that not only nervous ailments, but all the multitudinous forms of disease completely, permanently, and oftentimes instantaneously, healed at the Grotto have been cured by faith, and by faith acting directly as a physical agent; which amounts to telling us that faith, acting like some all-powerful drug, searches fractured bones and knits them together in an instant; searches a diseased tissue and heals up a gaping sore under the eyes of the spectators. It sounds like a Münchhausen, but it is a common refuge for many who flee from the supernatural.

Well-instructed Catholics will understand that we, too, attribute these miraculous cures ultimately to faith; for without faith devotion to our Lady of Lourdes would be an impossibility. But it need not, absolutely, be possessed by the person in whose favor the miracle is wrought. The miracle may be intended for his conversion, as was the case with Naaman the Syrian, who was healed by the prophet Eliseus (4 Kings v.). Even when faith is possessed by the patient it only disposes him to be the recipient of special divine favor. It acts as a *moral* force, not as a physical agent.

Those who presume to explain these extraordinary cures by the physical action of faith (and faith they consider a purely natural feeling with no admixture of the supernatural) sometimes proceed on the false assumption that what is done at Lourdes has been done by medicine, at least by psychotherapy, and that therefore there is no need of attributing the cures to the supernatural. Now, in the first place, even if such cures could be effected by medicine, it would not follow that the actual cures at the Grotto are not supernatural. If medicine can cure, God also can cure; and there may be signs, as indeed there are in abundance, that at Lourdes God has chosen to exhibit His power.

But the assumption is based on ignorance of the fact that the most experienced adepts in psychotherapy (Bernheim and others, mentioned above) confess their helplessness in the presence of organic diseases, and admit only partial success in the cure of nervous disorders. So that there is nothing in medicine to prove that the cures at the Grotto are possibly by natural agency. Others confess that Lourdes has beaten the doctors and that medicine can not hope to match the prodigies exhibited at the Grotto. But why? Because medicine does not possess the most potent form of suggestion. Faith (working, of course, as a physical cause) is the supreme form of suggestion, and its power may be unlimited. States of mind are known to influence the body in strange ways, and why may not faith wrought to the highest pitch of intensity produce such wonders as are witnessed at Lourdes?

To make it clear that the miracles of Lourdes are not a matter of suggestion or of mind-cure, we would observe, in the first place, that it is only by a misconception of things that the faith of a Catholic is put in the same category as the state of mind produced by a hypnotizer or by any professional healer. The latter is a state of surrender to the influence of the practitioner. It is a virtual resigning of the state of mind and feeling the removal of which is a condition for the restoration of health; and thus the cure, so far as it is successful at all, may be said to be in actual progress when the surrender is being made, and the patient, in a great measure, heals himself. With Catholic faith it is different. The faith that brings a sufferer to Lourdes is a belief simply in God's power to heal him. He can have no assurance of a cure—indeed, he sees many

about him who have failed to receive health at the Grotto—and he can contribute nothing to his own healing. It is commonly noted that those who seek the aid of Our Lady of Lourdes show nearly as much resignation as hope. One of the usual expressions on the lips of the sick is, "May God's will be done," or "If it is God's good pleasure, I shall be healed." This is not the mental exaltation of faith. Many whose faith has been of the deepest and purest and whose hope has risen almost to certainty have retired from the world-famed Grotto uncured—because God so willed it. In the second place, there have been cases at Lourdes in which the persons cured have been without either faith or religious feeling. A remarkable one is that of Gabriel Gargam, who, long after his miraculous cure, was a well-known attendant at the piscinas of Lourdes. He had no faith in miracles, and yet he was cured in an instant. Finally, there are cases registered of the *cure of infants*. The fact needs no comment.

4. *The Immense Number of Permanent Cures Recorded.*—Hundreds of cures known to be permanent were necessarily left unrecorded, but the record does not suffer very much by their omission. What a splendid record it is of health and happiness for many a one-time sufferer! The immense number of these particular records is due partly to the assiduity of the members of the Bureau, who have made it a point to follow up many cases after their cure, and partly to the fact that a large percentage of the cured have returned to render thanksgiving for their recovery and to witness to their complete and lasting health.

5. *The Record of Instantaneous Cures.*—The most remarkable feature of the Lourdes register is the instantaneous character of a large percentage of the cures. It has been no uncommon experience at the Medical Office to see men or women in the last stages of the most virulent diseases go to the Grotto and return in a short while in a state of perfect health. To touch the waters or to behold the Blessed Sacrament borne in procession has been enough; in an instant perfect health has revisited frames that were fit for little more than to be cast into the grave. This has happened in the case of the most deeply seated organic diseases—in cases of total blindness and of total deafness, and of other no less incurable maladies.

These events have happened in the open, and have often

been witnessed by hundreds or thousands of spectators. A most notable instance was that of Gabriel Gargam, mentioned above. Brought to death's door in consequence of internal injuries received in a railroad accident, and, indeed, thought to be dying as he lay upon a stretcher during the procession of the Blessed Sacrament, he suddenly rose to his feet after having been pinned to his bed for twenty months. He was cured. Every symptom of a frightful complication of diseases had disappeared in an instant.

The circumstance we have been noticing is by far the most important of all; for, whatever success medicine, general or special, has had in curing diseases, however remarkable the feats performed by surgery in our day, instantaneous cures are, of course, unheard of. The physician or surgeon does his part of the work and leaves the rest to nature; but nature requires a measurable time for the performance of its own task. At Lourdes there is frequently not a second's duration between a shattered frame and perfect health. In a larger number of cases the cure is not instantaneous, but its rapid progress is nothing short of marvelous—and all the more marvelous as medical science had pronounced the disease incurable.

And now to sum up the evidence supplied by the records of the Medical Office at the Grotto; we find an immense number of diseases in the most advanced stages of development cured completely, permanently, in many cases instantaneously—diseases for which medicine, including psychotherapy, has no resources—diseases the cure of which no scientific authority can attribute to any known natural agency. The facts have been too numerous and too public to admit of any denial. Indeed, they are so patent that many of those who shrink from admitting supernatural intervention are driven to the hypothesis that the cures are attributable to some unknown forces of nature. This hypothesis we shall examine later on.

But what about the water of the Grotto? May it not possess some natural qualities, wonderful in their effects, it is true, but still within the domain of nature? The question has been answered long before to-day. The water of the Grotto has been analyzed by the most competent experts and found to be without any medicinal qualities. There are those who regard water of any kind as all but

a panacea, but, if I mistake not, even they would draw the line at the cure of blindness and the sudden mending of broken bones by the application of water. In no case would the application even of medicinal waters effect an instantaneous cure, and yet patients have been cured at the Grotto with the suddenness of an electric flash. Besides, many have been cured without making any use of the waters, sometimes after praying, at other times when they found themselves in the near presence of the Sacred Host during the processions of the Blessed Sacrament.

And now a word or two on the hypothesis that some unknown law of nature is at the bottom of the Lourdes miracles. An unknown law of nature—let us endeavor to understand what the hypothesis implies. Let us consider it in its bearings on a specific class of cures, that of consumption. By virtue of one law of nature, the lungs under certain conditions decay; that is to say, the tissue of the lungs has been destroyed; corruption has invaded the material forming the cellular tissue which is the basis of all life. To restore life to the lungs new cells must be produced; but to produce them naturally would require a sort of natural miracle—indeed, more than a miracle, a real creation, a production out of nothing. Are scientists prepared to admit the idea of a real creative force in nature? a force that can produce something out of nothing? or even a force that can produce life in death?

Again, are they willing to admit that all their science may be thrown into confusion by the suspicion that secret agencies may be at work, making against the harmony and constancy of natural activities? Why, this is the very result which skeptical scientists contend would be produced by the miraculous: we could never be certain, they tell us, of the constancy of any natural law. And this certainly would be the result if miracles did not bring with them sufficient evidence of their being only a rare and momentary interference *from out a higher sphere* of activities—after which nature and the science of nature are allowed to proceed on their course; in other words, if miracles were not plainly *the exception that proved the rule*; whereas if *in nature itself* a number—and indeed an indefinite number—of perhaps all-powerful secret agencies be admitted—science is simply at their mercy. It has been well remarked that all new scientific knowledge—a knowledge, for in-

stance, of some hitherto unknown law—is supplementary, not destructive, of old knowledge, and that every new law discovered harmonizes with laws previously known. Such is nature as men have always known it.

But there may be those who are not so sensitive to the fate of science, but who cling tenaciously to the hypothesis of hidden laws because otherwise they would be quite at sea in attempting to account for facts which can not be gainsaid. Well, granting, for the argument's sake, the existence of such hidden laws, how does it happen that Lourdes enjoys such a monopoly of their effects and of their benefits? Is Lourdes one of their favorite habitats? And if they are real laws and are supposed to act like laws, why do they show so much caprice by refusing their favors to some and dispensing them to others, although the conditions are the same in all cases? Or if it is faith that gives a stimulus to their activities, why are not their blessings dispensed in proportion to the intensity of the faith, which they certainly are not? Indeed, there seems to be no law whatever in the matter, so varied are the circumstances under which cures are, or are not, effected. If there is one hidden law concerned there is at least a score of them, and they very accommodatingly permit one another to act by turns.

But the discussion is in danger of becoming too ridiculous for the gravity of the average reader. We must turn to the second stage of the process used in verifying reported miracles. Lourdes illustrates the first stage. There, as we have seen, a systematic professional study of reputed miracles has for many years been organized. The most liberal provision has been made for just that sort of professional scrutiny of the miraculous which certain scientists have been so loudly demanding; and we may remark in passing that, now that they can satisfy their scientific cravings to their hearts' content, we hope they will not fail to respond to the invitation first given by Philip to the incredulous Nathanael, "Come and see."

The value of the testimony furnished by the Medical Office can not be overestimated. *It proves beyond a doubt that the cures can not be accounted for by the operation of any known natural laws*; and thus the first part of the process we have been studying is aptly illustrated in actual practice.

The second part of the process is to seek for evidence of supernatural intervention. The process as a whole is as logical (nay, more so) and as rigidly scientific as any that can be shown in the sphere of the natural sciences. Facts are demanded, and the significance of the facts is carefully weighed. The Roman tribunals are almost proverbial for the care with which they sift the evidence for miracles when there is question of the canonization of a saint. Father Perrone, the distinguished theologian, tells us that once having shown the process for certain miracles to an eminent Protestant lawyer, the latter expressed himself as entirely satisfied and thought such evidence would not be rejected by an English jury, but was astonished when told that the evidence was not considered sufficient by the Congregation of Rites. A similar incident is reported by Alban Butler on the authority of Daubenton. The local commission appointed to inquire into the genuineness of the Lourdes miracles and into the events leading up to them showed an equal degree of care in its search for the truth. It spent four years in its investigations and left no stone unturned to come at the real facts.

The first circumstance to be noted about these extraordinary cures is that, directly or indirectly, they are inseparably associated with the Grotto of Lourdes. Whether they are wrought at the Grotto itself or a thousand miles away—whether they have followed upon the use of the water or have occurred after prayer for relief—whether they have taken place in the Lourdes basilica or in the out-of-door procession of the Blessed Sacrament—the Grotto is the moral center from which this salutary influence has radiated throughout the world. *What is there in the place, or what has happened in it, to make it such a unique source of blessings?* Is not this the first question to which the true man of science who admitted the cures would require an answer?

The history of Lourdes under this particular aspect is well authenticated. The period is little more than half a century, and during that time the eyes of the world have been upon Lourdes. Hundreds and thousands of witnesses have been available; investigations have been made and records kept; and facts so well certified are deserving of no less attention than the undoubted facts of natural science.

In the month of February, 1858, Bernadette Soubirous, a girl of fourteen, but younger than her years, simple, artless, and slow of understanding, was suddenly favored by a vision of a heavenly form, showing itself in a niche of rock which has since been known the world over as the Grotto of Lourdes. The apparition was that of a lady of ravishing beauty. The child felt drawn to prayer and recited her rosary. The lady also had a pair of beads in her hands, which she merely passed through her fingers in unison with the child, but without praying, except when she came to the "Glory be to the Father, etc.," at the end of each decade. The first apparition was followed by seventeen others on successive days.

The lady made herself known to the child as the Blessed Virgin, though she designated herself particularly as "the Immaculate Conception." The dogma of the Immaculate Conception had been proclaimed a little more than three years before, but the child knew nothing of the import of the phrase, as her after inquiries proved. She had been slow in acquiring a knowledge of her faith and had not yet been prepared for her first communion. The incident of the Lady's reciting only the "Glory be to the Father" in the rosary was, if we may use the phrase, true to nature—touchingly so—as the Immaculate could not recite prayers which imply sin, in some degree, in the one praying; *but the circumstance was quite beyond the child's own thinking powers.* She could report, however, what she had seen and heard.

The eighteen visions were, all of them, received whilst the girl was in the presence of witnesses, who came on the first days by the score, afterward by the hundred, later by the thousand. On one occasion there were fifteen or twenty thousand present. During her visions the child seemed to be praying at times, and again to be speaking to her wonderful visitor or listening to her. She had a message from the Lady that a church must be built in her honor and processions organized to the scene of the apparitions—both of which requests have since been amply complied with.

At times during her ecstasies the flame of a blessed candle which she held in her right hand was in contact with the fingers of the left, on one occasion for at least a quarter of an hour, but without affecting the fingers in the slightest degree. Persons in such abnormal states are

known not to feel pain from contact with such objects, but for the living tissue not to be affected is anomalous. Bernadette's fingers were not even singed.

Another visible occurrence witnessed by the assembled crowds and one that has brought Lourdes the greater part of its celebrity was the wonderful opening of the spring at the Grotto—a spring that now flows in a copious stream and from which thousands have drunk for the healing of their infirmities. During one of the visions the child was directed to pass from where she was standing to the left of the Grotto and told to drink from and wash in the water of a spring. There was no spring to be found, and none had ever been known to have been there. But the child scraped the soil and scooped some of it away, and immediately water began to flow. It increased daily in volume, and to-day, after many a long year of uninterrupted abundance, it flows in a copious stream, supplying many large cisterns, from which the water of Lourdes has been conveyed to the ends of the earth. The "water of Lourdes" is to-day a household word throughout Christendom.

There is another circumstance connected with these apparitions of quite a distinctive character. One day, as the child herself relates, "the Lady, for an instant did not look at me, but looked beyond my head, and then again at me. I asked her what made her sad, and she said: 'Pray for poor sinners; pray for the world which is in such trouble.' " On the occasion of another ecstasy, "for a moment the child turned toward the spectators; with tearful face and sobbing voice she repeated three times—'Penance, penance, penance!' She declared afterward that these were the very words she had heard the Lady utter." This circumstance is noteworthy as throwing light upon the moral purpose of the apparitions.

The spring at the Grotto, which grew from a tiny rivulet to a full-flowing stream, soon became famous as having miraculous powers of healing. It was tested, as we have seen, for medicinal qualities, but was found to possess none. But it was used, not as a newly discovered drug might be used or as a thing that possessed any healing virtue in itself, but as a natural element to which a supernatural efficacy had been given from above. Cures have been wrought, as we have seen, without the use of the water, but in all cases in connection with devotion to our Lady of Lourdes.

The extraordinary publicity of the events we have been narrating compelled the attention and the practical interest of professional men and of the public authorities, civil and ecclesiastical. The result was that the evidence for the apparitions and the miracles was sifted with a care that left no loophole of escape for the skeptical. Both in the beginning and for many a year after, Bernadette stood the test of all manner of professional scrutiny, which aimed at proving, if possible, that her experiences were due to hallucination, or to hysteria, or to an abnormal degree of suggestibility, or that she had been guilty of wilful deception. But her life, her temperament, and her manner of describing what she had seen and heard were conclusive against any such hypothesis. And was there not visible and public confirmation of what she had recounted? Fortunately, her life was preserved for many a year and showed no developments that tended to reverse the favorable verdict of her judges.

We have been endeavoring to illustrate the process followed in the determining of the true character of reputed miracles. In the case of the Lourdes miracles, having eliminated natural causes from the inquiry, we have weighed the evidence for the supernatural, and the result is that the possibilities of causation are narrowed down to one thing—devotion to our Lady of Lourdes. Now, *if under so great a variety of circumstances effects beyond the power of nature are seen to follow the acts of this particular devotion, and especially if these effects have a historical background of supernatural manifestations which are well vouched for—is it not in accordance with the strictest rules of scientific investigation to attribute the effects to the devotion as the instrument of supernatural power?*

When explaining at the beginning of this essay the nature of a miracle we distinguished between the stricter type of miracles, or those wrought directly by the power of God, and effects produced by finite beings in the other world, whose superior powers give them a dominion over matter. Now, in most cases it is impossible to know, except by revelation, to which of the two classes a proved miracle belongs; but to whichever of the two classes it must be assigned, it may in some sense be called supernatural and the same moral effect is produced. A wonderful event has taken place contrary to all the laws of nature,

and manifestly by intervention from on high. This, it seems to us, we have shown to demonstration to have been the case with the miracles of Lourdes.

To those who believe in a God and in a Providence the evidence for the supernatural in these miracles should be doubly convincing. For how could a provident God permit such multiplied signs of His special presence and power in a particular place, and that, too, with such evident increase of piety and of trust in His goodness and power, unless the reality were there no less than the appearance?

Critical as the age is, it is difficult to see where any of its tests can succeed in breaking down the evidence for these miracles in any one particular. If an investigator is so dead set against the supernatural as to have no patience in examining the evidence for it, it would be a miracle if he were convinced. The true man of science is supposed to be open-minded enough to accept any evidence of facts, no matter from what quarter the evidence comes. If certain men of science would make a study of the Lourdes miracles with even half the zeal with which they have studied spiritistic phenomena their pains would be better rewarded.

As an introduction to the study we would recommend a work already mentioned, "Lourdes: A History of its Apparitions and Cures," by Georges Bertrin (New York). Concerning this work the *Annales des Sciences Physiques*, "a skeptical review whose chief editor is Doctor Ch. Richet, Professor of the Medical Faculty of Paris, said in the course of a long article *à propos* of this faithful study: 'On reading it, unprejudiced minds can not but be convinced that the facts stated are authentic.'"—*Cath. Encyclopedia: Lourdes*.

Though we are chiefly concerned in this article with objections urged by the scientific skeptic, we can not close without having a word or two with our Protestant friends. The most general Protestant view of miracles is that, whilst they are possible and have actually taken place, they ceased to be wrought at the end of the apostolic age. What conceivable warrant is there for such an assumption? Neither history, nor revelation, nor anything in the nature of things, can make it even plausible. History furnishes, if anything, positive indications to the contrary. Revelation from the lips of Our Lord gave assurance of signs and won-

ders that were to accompany the preaching of the Gospel, whilst it placed no limit of time to their occurrence. And some little reflection should convince one of the unlikelihood of the cessation of miracles at a time when they seemed to be as much needed as ever. According to the Protestant view—at least in its implications—as soon as the last of the apostles died the need of such supernatural manifestations ceased; but, again, what warrant for the assumption?

The truth is that the Protestant tenet is a traditional prejudice rather than a reasoned opinion. It had its origin in that indiscriminating hostility shown by the first Reformers to many things, good and bad, which might with some degree of plausibility be set down as superstitions. Superstitions there were, and miracles, like many another good thing, might be counterfeited or too easily taken as facts; but good and bad are likely to be confounded when overtaken by such a whirlwind of revolution as lighted on the early sixteenth century. A tempest is a poor instrument for thrashing out the truth. Happily, after the storm had passed many sincere minds discovered that they had lost their true Christian bearings and hastened to recover them; and many in succeeding generations down to the present day have imitated their example. Let us hope that the continuous evidence of special divine favor enjoyed by the Church may prevail upon many in our day to review their whole mental attitude toward a Church which, unfortunately, they have been taught to regard as a patroness of superstition.

MISSIONS

See "Church of Christ, The, How to Find It," and "Church, The, as Mediator."

MIXED MARRIAGES

Objection.—The evils of mixed marriages are exaggerated, especially in a country like ours, in which there is a growing liberality of sentiment in matters religious. In a country in which "live and let live" is the prevailing principle, Catholic

husbands and wives have little to fear from the religious hostility of their partners in wedlock.

THE ANSWER.—By whom are the evils of mixed marriages exaggerated? By the bishops and priests? Surely not. They, of all men, ought to know whether the evils of mixed marriages are realities or fictions. Catholics who are partial to mixed marriages would have their eyes open if they had but a small part of the experience of any priest who has seen half a dozen years of service. They would acknowledge that the prohibition placed upon mixed marriages is amply justified—even though they may have known cases in which the evils were comparatively small. A few odd cases of mixed marriages unattended by serious evils constitute no argument against the general law prohibiting them. And yet there is scarcely any case in which harm is not done by the union of a Catholic and a non-Catholic; and if the harm is not recognized by the Catholic party the fact argues a small appreciation of things that should be dear to the heart of every true Catholic.

Marriage is the most intimate of unions, and in every well-assorted marriage the tendency of married life is to weld two hearts into one—to produce an identity of thought, desire, purpose, and action. Religion, on the other hand, is one of the most deeply rooted sentiments of the human heart. In the course of human history no other feeling has wrought so powerfully in uniting and in sundering hearts. The bloodiest of wars have had their origin in religious animosity. Now let us suppose that religious discord enters the sanctuary of wedded life: the more intimate the union might be on other accounts, the more bitter the estrangement ultimately produced by religious feeling.

If the two were not united so intimately by their state there might not be the slightest antipathy between them. The same pair, if unmarried, might be friends lodging under the same roof, and difference of religion might not affect their mutual relations in the slightest degree; but make them man and wife, and you will find that you are attempting to mingle oil and water. The state into which they have entered, instead of being a bond of moral union, is really a principle of mutual repulsion.

It is remarkable what a difference there is between courtship and marriage in regard to the predominance of religious feeling in either of the parties to a mixed marriage. It is only after the wedding that religious antipathy comes to the surface. During courtship Bertha is so charmed with Thomas as to fancy that the law of the Church could never have contemplated a case like his. Not only is his love sincere, but it is not cooled in the least by difference of religion. Indeed, he seems to be singularly liberal-minded, and it would be the most natural thing in the world that he should one day consent to be a Catholic; if not before, at least after marriage.

When courtship is approaching its term the religious question may be forced into prominence by Bertha's parents, and Thomas gives expression to sentiments which Bertha thinks ought to satisfy any Catholic. Before the marriage ceremony is performed, Thomas gives the solemn promise required that he will permit the offspring of the marriage to be brought up in the Catholic religion. He is doubtless sincere, but during courtship love has cast a glamour over his eyes and has given a roseate hue to things which might otherwise have caused repulsion.

The marriage is celebrated—if "celebrate" is the word to designate the simple ceremony which is permitted and which may not be performed within the walls of a church. Soon the honeymoon is passed, and then husband and wife begin to settle down into their old selves. Conjugal love has lost nothing of its depth or of its sincerity, but it has lost a good deal of its enchantment, and things begin to appear in their true colors. Thomas begins to realize that he is a partner for life to one who goes to Mass and is therefore an idolater, and that he has pledged himself to let his children be brought up idolaters. But he still loves his wife, he respects his obligations and endeavors to swallow his indignation.

But by and by children appear on the scene, and then the Protestant in Thomas begins to assert itself anew. The sentiments of his Sunday-school and Bible-class days are felt again in all their pristine vigor. The idea that now dominates his mind is that he is master in his own house, and he resolves that his house shall not be a hotbed of idolatry. The rest of the tale need not be told, for it is a well-known reality in thousands of households. The evil

results are, of course, incalculable. Unhappiness and domestic dissension would be deplorable enough if they were the only evils resulting from mixed marriages, but they are nothing compared with the loss of faith in the children of such unions, of which evidence is furnished us every day of our lives.

The case might be varied. Oftentimes the non-Catholic party is the wife, and in that case the influence of the mother is lost for the Catholic training of her children; or perhaps she instils into the children a hatred for the religion of their father. Occasionally there is a mutual compliance or a common indifference in matters of religion and the children grow up virtual pagans. The choice of a school for the children will be determined by the worldliest of motives. The secular interests of the children are the one absorbing thought of the parents.

But even putting the case as mildly as possible—supposing all promises are kept and the wishes of the Catholic party complied with—what an impassable gulf must separate the members of such a family when they can not join one another in the worship of God—when religion can not form the subject of conversation at the family table—when the children, who would fain speak out of the abundance of their hearts about the many beautiful things associated with their Catholic faith, know that a seal is put upon their lips by the presence of their father, who regards all such things as superstitious and idolatrous—or when a loving wife stands at the dying bed of her husband and knows how little she can do for him in his passage to eternity. Perhaps she can not even make him realize the necessity of contrition for sin as a condition for reconciliation with God.

Great are the burdens that must be borne by one who is a wife and a mother, even under the most favorable circumstances. How much more burdensome her life when freighted with the evils of a mixed marriage!

It is idle to talk of any change of conditions in our day by which mixed marriages are rendered less objectionable than they formerly were. *They are more dangerous to-day than ever before.* In the first place, the growing liberality of sentiment mentioned above is greatly exaggerated. There are still countless members of the sects who have imbibed a hatred of Catholicity which is no less virulent than that of their ancestors. The majority of our countrymen

have, it is true, deserted the churches and the Sunday-schools, but that only makes the case worse. Better Christianity in some form than no Christianity at all. In the old days the non-Catholic husband of a Catholic wife had more commonly a sense of obligation to God and the natural law; he had some appreciation of the necessity of a religious education for his children; he had some notion of the divine law governing the relations between husband and wife; he held the doctrine, though in an imperfect form, that marriage can not be dissolved except by the death of one of the parties. But what can be expected to-day of the agnostic, the atheist, or even the indifferentist? In their case there is no barrier set up between right and wrong except convention or expediency. In the case of many a non-Catholic husband to-day there is no telling what he thinks in his secret heart about the duties of the married state.

And now a few words of admonition to the young Catholic of marriageable age, for whom this article is chiefly written.

1. The Church does not merely advise you not to marry a non-Catholic: she *positively forbids* you to do so. When the reasons are sufficient she may grant a dispensation, but she does so with reluctance and frequently in order to prevent a greater evil. She gives her consent to the marriage in the same spirit in which the father of the prodigal son gave him his portion of the family substance and permitted him to wander off into distant lands.

2. If it is wrong to marry one who is not of your faith, it is also wrong to contract an intimacy that will probably lead to such a marriage. *Be resolute in the beginning* and you will save yourself a lifetime of misery. Suppress the tender feeling as soon as it begins to show itself. Seek other company, and trust that a heavenly providence will one day find you a suitable companion for life.

3. Remember that *love is apt to warp the judgment*, and that *an ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure*.

MONKS

Objection.—Monks and monasteries may have had a reason for existing in the Middle Ages, but in our day they have outlived their usefulness. The present age wants labor—social labor—and no praying or idleness. (Socialistic.)

THE ANSWER.—The rule *we* follow is: *Work and pray*. Work is not sufficient by itself; there is need of prayer as well. A good part of the modern world feels no need of prayer, because it feels no need of God. Praying is not idling, and if it is not idling, the present age, with its countless professions, all-absorbed in work, has need of another profession that shall devote itself principally to prayer.

But people who bear an invincible grudge against the monks for their occupation should be reminded that, after all, monks, in the strict sense of the word, *i.e.*, contemplatives, constitute a small minority in the ranks of religious. As regards the other Religious Orders, it must be admitted that they perform what is, in the best sense of the word, social labor. Witness the Benedictines and numerous other Orders which in Africa, Australia, and elsewhere have introduced Christian civilization, as the Benedictines of a former age civilized Western Europe. The same may be said of those who at home give missions to the people and thus contribute much to the preservation of religion and true civilization among them. The same praise is due to the teaching Orders and those that minister to the sick.

Strange that those who plume themselves on being champions of liberty should not allow each one to follow his bent. But the socialist is very naturally warped in his application of principles by one false principle which is at the root of his system, to wit, that all things receive their value—men as well as commodities—from the amount of manual labor they represent.

But the aversion of the socialists to prayerful lives is shared by many who bear the name of Christians. It is remarkable how a certain class of people shut their eyes when they light upon certain passages in the Gospels. For their benefit we shall simply transcribe a short passage from

St. Luke (x. 38-42) in which, not without a special divine purpose, two well-defined living types of action and contemplation, respectively, are sketched by the sacred writer.

"Now, it came to pass, as they went, that He entered into a certain town, and a certain woman named Martha received Him into her house. And she had a sister called Mary, who, sitting also at the Lord's feet, heard His word. But Martha was busy about much serving. Who stood and said: Hast Thou no care that my sister hath left me alone to serve? Speak to her, therefore, that she help me. And the Lord, answering, said to her: Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things. But one thing is necessary. Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her."

Is it not true that some of the most obvious features of the typical Christian life have been forgotten by a large number of Christians?

MORALITY AND ADENOIDS

A Modern Error.—Moral habit and action are traceable to the pathological condition of the body and the emotional state of the mind. Free will and divine grace have nothing to do with morality. Here is a schoolboy who but yesterday was dull and peevish and showed vicious propensities. He is sent to a physician, who discovers it is all a matter of adenoids! These once removed, he is a model of all that a schoolboy ought to be. Evidently, he had needed the divine less than the physician.

THE REAL TRUTH OF THE MATTER.—Few of our readers need to be told what adenoids are: they have had them removed—with the result, doubtless, that a bit of sunshine has been let into their lives and well-doing has become easier. God bless the physician! May his tribe increase—at least, within certain limits. But, whilst opening up a world of pleasure to his fellow-mortals, it were a pity that his own knowledge of the moral and religious world should be cabined, cribbed, and confined within the limits of his professional experience, or that in matters ethical or religious his mind should go no deeper than his scalpel.

The adenoids are gone and the boy is morally transformed! Well, *we* would not conclude so hastily that the boy is morally transformed. Outward good conduct is no infallible index of true interior virtue. But we can let that pass—the boy's outward conduct is changed, and we shall give him the credit of being morally transformed. But does it follow that the boy's morality is all a matter of adenoids?

Logic like this has been heard even in the utterances of believing Christians! Strange, but true. The real fact is that *only an impediment to virtue has been removed*; but neither has the *cause* of immoral action been removed nor has the cause of right moral action been induced. The real cause efficient of acts belonging to the moral order lies in the will; and in the case of moral action that avails to eternal salvation it lies in the will as aided by divine grace. Not all the surgery in the world, beneficial or injurious, can prove anything to the contrary. Simply one of the many impediments to virtue has been removed by the physician's skill. A duty which the boy shirked yesterday is performed to-day. Why? Because it is less irksome to-day. The uncomfortable or painful feeling of yesterday which sought alleviation or distraction is to-day absent, and with it the sin it occasioned.

The physician, like the philanthropist, does a good work in creating physical conditions favorable to virtue—may God reward them both—but neither the one nor the other touches the real *cause* of virtuous or sinful acts. We are not quarreling with results, but contending about the truth of things.

The physician, we have said, has removed an impediment to virtuous conduct; and yet it was not an absolute impediment. The boy could have resisted it and followed the leading of conscience. But he did not choose to do it, because at the moment it was more pleasant not to do it. And the proof that he could have done the right thing is seen in his sense of guilt. A sense of guilt is universal in the case of wrong-doing.

Unfortunately, most men, though in varying degrees, permit the impediment to become an effectual one, as if they had no will wherewith to oppose it. The prevalence of such weak surrender to circumstances lends no little countenance to the theory that moral action is not a matter

of will-power, assisted or unassisted by grace, but of a natural sense of pleasure or pain. Fortunately, there are many who rise superior to circumstances where it is a question of doing God's will. Providence has even brought it about that many servants of God—aided, of course, from on high—have exhibited an all but omnipotent force of will, both in resisting and in enduring.

The particular illustration we have been pursuing, that of adenoids, furnishes but a sample of the natural forces or influences which are *hindrances* to virtuous action, so far as the will permits them to be such, but which materialists and determinists quite arbitrarily set down as irresistible predetermining *causes* of moral evil. But the truth is that natural temperament, inherited dispositions, vicious environment, extreme poverty; these, and other such conditions, may *incline* the will to evil, but they can never deprive it of its native independence.

In the case of weak wills it is, of course, an act of mercy to remove the hindrance and supply the needed help; and to do so is the part of the divine, the philanthropist, and the physician; but the greater number, as well as the worst of life's moral maladies, are beyond the reach even of the indirect aid supplied by the philanthropist or the physician. They need the healing power of grace as administered by the divine.

MORALITY WITHOUT RELIGION

An Illusion.—As men will never agree on the subject of religion the one remaining bond of society is morality without religion. Most men are agreed as to the essentials of morality. In this common sentiment, therefore, must we seek the basis of the social life of the future.

NECESSITY OF RELIGION.—Is it true that all men are of one mind as regards the essentials of morality? We Christians believe it to be the most sacred duty of men to believe in God, to hope in Him, to love and to serve Him, whilst those who believe in morality without religion ignore all duties to God. A wide divergence, this, on the most essential of all points of morality. It is the common teaching of Catholic theologians that a lie is intrinsically wrong

and always sinful. Among non-Catholic authorities it is a very common opinion that certain kinds of lies are not sinful.¹ Catholics are taught that marriage can not be dissolved. Is that the teaching of Protestants and socialists? Catholics hold that a man's right to property in land is inviolable; socialists proclaim the recognition of any such right as one of the greatest evils of modern times.

These are but samples of the broad differences of opinion that exist regarding the essentials of morality. The truth is that *there is not a single point of morality on which all men agree.*

Morality without religion means morality without any basis of moral obligation. Apart from religion I can find no answer to the questions: Why *must* I do this? Why *must* I omit that? If I discard the idea of a God by whom I was created, and to whom I owe obedience, there is nothing that can strictly oblige me to be honest if I am inclined to be dishonest. Honesty becomes a matter of expediency, and where I find it expedient to be dishonest I will not be honest. There is no obligation where there is no authority; but there is no authority that is not either in God or derived from God. The One who made us is the only One who has absolute and unqualified authority over our wills. The obligations imposed by others—by one's parents, by the State—are valid only inasmuch as they rest on the authority of God. To sever morality from religion is to deprive morality of all motive and all sanction.

If the basis of all morality is God's will, we are bound to learn His will and know when, how, and where we are to observe it; and if He has revealed His will, we are to accept the revelation in its purest form and act upon it. This means the embracing of a definite form of religion, and, indeed, of the only one acceptable to God.

There are a certain number of acts—such as the observance of the laws and the paying of one's debts—which are generally recognized as necessary for the welfare of society; but for the general performance of such acts what motives will be effective? The good of society as a motive of conduct may influence the select few who are made of finer clay than the rest of men, but it will operate very feebly among the masses. The selfish instinct, reinforced

¹Paulsen, E. Hartmann, and others.

by poverty and suffering, or goaded on by greed or ambition, will surely overpower so shadowy a motive as the good of society or the progress of humanity. Perhaps a love of order will furnish the needed stimulus to civic virtue. No; for here, again, the select few will be the model citizens, whilst the great multitude of the uninspired will verge toward moral anarchy.

The one bond of society is conscience, and when conscience disappears it will be followed by anarchy. But conscience is the voice of God heard in the heart, and to hearken to God's voice is, at least implicitly, an act of religion.

A society that is gradually drifting away from religion may foolishly base its hopes of permanent existence on its present condition, in which, bad as it is, there is a public recognition of the moral law; but let it not forget that it owes its present recognition of the moral law, in the first place, to the actual influence of religion, which still has many loyal followers, and, in the second place, to that tradition of morality which is embodied in laws and usages inherited from a religious past. The further society drifts from the source of its morality, the more surely will moral principle disappear. Society has inherited much from religion, but it is fast running through its fortune and is menaced by moral bankruptcy.

MYSTERIES

Objection.—A mystery is either in accordance with reason or against reason. If the first is true there is no mystery at all. If the second is true mysteries must be rejected.

THE ANSWER.—Every proposition must, of course, be either in accordance with reason or against reason. But there are propositions that are simply *above* reason, such, namely, as I can not grasp with my reason, but are, nevertheless, not contrary to reason. Because my reason can not attain to them, they are not on that account contrary to reason. They are only beyond the reach of reason. There are mysteries in nature, such as the growth of plants, which are not contrary to reason because reason can not get at their secret. *They are facts*—mysterious facts, it is true—

but facts which may be known without being comprehended.

What is the nature of that force which is called gravitation, the force by which the universe is kept together? It is a mystery. Its laws may be known, but its nature is mysterious. What difficulty, then, in admitting mysteries in religion? Provided I have the testimony of *one who knows* and who *can not deceive*, my mind should be ready to give its assent. If there exists an infinite God, mysteries are inevitable, for the Infinite can not be grasped by the finite. (See "The Trinity.")

ORIGINAL SIN

Protestant View.—"Human nature, in consequence of Adam's sin, is utterly depraved." "As the Roman Church does not consider concupiscence sin, that is only another proof that she has an erroneous conception of sin."

CATHOLIC TEACHING.—The objection, though quite invalid, has at least the merit of taking its stand on Christian revelation. Our answer to it will have the same Christian basis. The doctrine of the total depravity of human nature in consequence of Adam's fall is certainly not grounded in Scripture. For, otherwise, as man can not rid himself of his nature, he can not rid himself of sin, and the Scriptures could not speak of the just and the unjust, as they do in so many places. Nor could Scripture require us, as it does most explicitly, to renounce sin; nor could St. Paul, after a long enumeration of grievous sins (1 Cor. vi. 11), place sin and innocence in such sharp opposition when he adds: "And such some of you were; but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the Spirit of our God."

The Catholic Church is right in regarding concupiscence as a different thing from sin—concupiscence being but an inclination to sin. Sin is a transgression of God's commands. Mortal or grievous sin is a deliberate renunciation of God and eternal salvation. Concupiscence, on the other hand, is not a matter of free and deliberate choice. The suggestions of concupiscence come unbidden, and it is

only by consenting to them that we sin. The purest and holiest are not entirely free from concupiscence. The very persons whom St. Paul describes as cleansed from their sins are exhorted by him to struggle against concupiscence, for, otherwise, even those who are justified will lapse into all manner of sins and forfeit sanctifying grace (cf. Col. iii. 5 *et seq.*).

The Catholic Church's conception of sin is proved to be the correct one by the very distinction she makes between concupiscence and sin. Even original sin, or the sin of our origin, is in very truth sin. It is a *state* of sin resulting not from any act of ours, but from the act of our first parents. That we inherit this state of sin till released from it by sanctifying grace, we know only by revelation. The Catholic Church commits herself to this doctrine without any hesitation. It has been the traditional doctrine of the Church from the beginning. The Reformers' conception of original sin was a novelty, and could find no foothold in the sacred writings or in the teachings of the Fathers. According to the Reformers, original sin is identical with concupiscence, and, as concupiscence remains after Baptism, no real change of state is produced by Baptism—its only effect being that our sins are, as it were, *covered over* by the baptismal rite, and justice is *imputed* to us by God. But let any follower of the Reform open the New Testament and turn to the fifth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. In verses 12, 18, 19, he will find the Apostle describing a state of real and veritable sin inherited by the children of Adam.

"As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, *in whom all have sinned*. . . . Therefore, as by the offense of one, *unto all men to condemnation*, so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. For, as by the disobedience of one man, *many were made sinners*, so also by the obedience of one many shall be made just."

If all have sinned in one, if all have been under condemnation, if all have been made sinners by the sin of one man, there can be no question here of our being born merely into a state of concupiscence, but into a state of sinfulness; the more so as the Apostle contrasts the state produced by original sin with that of justice, or moral and supernatural goodness; but the opposite of moral good-

ness is moral badness, or sinfulness, and not an involuntary inclination to sin, which is concupiscence.

The sin of Adam was, therefore, transmitted to his entire race. As he was constituted by God not only the father, but also in a special sense the moral head of the human family, a stigma of sinfulness was to come upon every one of his descendants in case he sinned himself—just as in past history many a subject who has rebelled against his king has thereby forfeited all the lands and titles he had previously received from the free bounty of his sovereign, not only for himself, but for all his descendants as well. It is not for us to inquire how or why things were so ordered by the divine wisdom. But the fact is so impressive that it can not help awakening deep reflection, in every serious mind, on the enormity of any grievous offense against the infinite and all-holy God.

But God has not left us without a remedy for this moral infection that accompanies us at our entrance into life. Baptism awaits us at the threshold of our existence, and the sanctifying grace imparted by it restores, if not the special privileges of our first parents, at least that supernatural life which is the germ of our eternal life with God. Baptism does not merely "cover over" our sin, nor is righteousness merely "imputed" to us on our reception of Baptism. An intrinsic change is produced in the soul. Let any one who holds the Reformed doctrine on the effects of Baptism reflect seriously on the import of those expressions of Scripture in which the effects of Baptism are alluded to. Let him ask himself what significance he has attached to such phrases as "*born again* of water" (John iii. 5) and the "*laver* of regeneration," i.e., the cleansing of the new birth (Titus iii. 5). Has the second birth any significance unless the new life it imparts is intrinsically better than the old? Could any such metaphor as "*born again*," or the "*new birth*," be used with any propriety if it could be explained as a mere "*covering over*" of our sins, or as our having justice "*imputed*" to us, without the reality of justice? Or, does not cleansing imply the removal of what defiles, and is not the "*laver of regeneration*," therefore, a real and true removal of sin? Scripture is a stumbling-block, and must always prove such, to the innovations in doctrine introduced in the sixteenth century.

PANTHEISM

A Pantheistic Plea.—Pantheism, which teaches that God and the universe are one, has been held by so many eminent thinkers that it can not be so utterly foolish as it is sometimes considered; and the tendency toward pantheism is rapidly increasing.

THE ANSWER.—There never was a system of thought so absurd as not to number among its adherents some wise heads who were not wholly wise and in whose minds there was considerable room for philosophic nonsense. Readers of Emerson, no doubt, feel they are conversing with a thinker in whom there is a dash of genius. Stimulated, perhaps at times elevated, by his thought, which is a product of his genius, they are oftentimes unaware that what they admire so much is an embroidery of sentiment worked into a texture of the flimsiest pantheistic philosophy.

Emerson, destitute of any sound philosophical training, and attracted by the speculations of the German school, has emulated his masters by playing the part of seer rather than that of a painstaking searcher after truth. "His reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff: you shall seek all day ere you find them," and if you are fortunate enough to find them at all, "when you have them they are not worth the search."

It was the foggy, subjective philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel that gave so great an impulse to modern pantheistic tendencies; and if pantheism is welcomed by many it is because they are interested in getting rid of a personal God or because they are attracted to a system which seems, though it only seems, to realize one of the principal aims of all philosophizing—the reduction of multiplicity to unity. They take what is offered them by the pantheist, but without reckoning the cost. There have been no really great thinkers in modern times whose names have been associated with pantheism; whereas, against pantheism, are arrayed nearly all the great lights of the scientific world in all time.

Pantheism teaches that the world is God and that God is the world. Things may seem to differ from one another

in substance, but in reality there is only one substance, and all things are modes of being or manifestations of the one infinite and eternal substance. We human beings, with all that we think and do, are but a part of the grand panorama of changing phenomena that marks the evolution of Deity. The pantheistic deity is not a personal God, intelligent, distinct from the world and free in his acts. He can not be prayed to; he can not be adored; he is *simply the world*, manifesting itself variously, now as brute matter, now as having animal life, and again as knowing and loving. He is not a sovereign being and men are not subject to him. He is not the fountain-source of the moral law. In fact, there is, strictly speaking, no moral law, as things happen as they must, and human freedom is a chimera. It is only too plain that pantheism is virtual atheism: a pantheistic god is no god at all.

The essential absurdity of pantheism should be evident to any one who realizes what is implied in its teachings. The wonder is that even a limited number of intellectual men should accept the doctrine apparently without any regard to its logical consequences. It is easy enough to *think* of the universe as a unit and then give it a name—the Be-All or the All-One, or whatever other name is preferred—but if one gets no further than that he is still in the region of fancy. It is easy to construct a system of pantheism and give it an air of scientific completeness; it is quite another thing to reconcile all the contradictions which the system involves.

Let any pantheist weigh well the words he uses in describing his system, and we warrant him he will not be a pantheist five minutes longer. The pantheist does not simply read a unifying principle into the aggregate of things which are substantially different (we Christians do as much, though in a different way), but goes the whole length of asserting that all things constitute but *one substance—one nature*—which evolves itself, by some law of necessity, in various forms of being and in varying phenomena. What meaning can the terms “substance” and “nature” convey to the mind of a pantheist? Given a certain substance, whatever be its nature, can it evolve itself in contradictory qualities? Can it be wise and foolish, for instance, at the same time and in regard to the same objects in the moral order? And yet the pantheist combines

all the wisdom and folly in the world in one being, whom (or which) he identifies with the world. The same is true of all other categories of thought, feeling and action. No matter how incompatible two attributes may seem to be, they are found side by side in the accommodating nature of the All-One.

A pantheist who knew his own mind would say, or might say, on observing any phenomenon of mind or matter, "That is the All-One manifesting itself in that particular way." If he should light on a friend who carried in his head a very unsound philosophy, he would say, "There is the All-One under the aspect of a philosopher." If the next moment he should meet another friend whose philosophy was a flat contradiction of the first friend's, he would say with equal complacency, "Ah, there is the All-One again under the aspect of a philosopher." He evidently unites all sorts of contradictions in his conception of the pantheistic deity. Morality and immorality, wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance, must be ascribed to this one all-embracing being.

If all things are one, it is easy to imagine what strange antics the All-One must play. He is at once the lion and the lamb when the latter is devoured by the former. He kills himself and yet survives his killing when a thunderbolt strikes a man dead, for thunderbolt and victim are identified in the one being.

Experience, aided by reason, tells us that many things differ from one another substantially. Living beings, for instance, can not be confounded with non-living. One chemical element can not be identified with another. The individuals of a species differ and among human beings one differs from another and lives, so to speak, in a little world of his own. Has pantheism discovered a cryptic philosophy which reduces all things to one? The truth is that the pantheist is seized by the modern craze for reducing multiplicity to unity by new and as yet undiscovered ways. He is not satisfied, or professes not to be satisfied, with the Christian conception of the origin of things—a conception at once simple and sublime—according to which, before the universe was created, all things existed in God, not *formally*, that is to say, as they are when created, but *eminently*, or in a much higher manner, inasmuch as God had from eternity not only a conception of

the universe in all its details, but also the power to bring it into existence. The pantheist professes not to be satisfied with the evidence for this genesis of things, and straightway turns to a philosophy abounding in manifest contradictions.

Perhaps the crowning absurdity of pantheism is its conception of the way in which the All-One evolves itself and advances toward its perfection. First of all, the only determinate existence it has consists in the changing facts or phenomena of the universe. Prior to and apart from these phenomena, it is nothing determinate. And yet the entire evolution of things is produced by something inherent in its nature, to which, therefore, we must refer back all things as to their efficient cause. In other words, *it is the cause of determinate existence and yet has no determinate existence of its own*—which is a palpable absurdity. The primal cause of things must have an existence of its own, and therefore a determinate mode of existence—otherwise it is nothing. Hence, the pantheist presents us with the idea of production out of nothing in a new form. He repudiates the idea of creation, which is the production of a thing out of nothing by the act of an omnipotent God, and then turns to contemplate *nothing producing something* without the aid of divine omnipotence! The trite objection against creation, urged by pantheists and others, to wit, that out of nothing nothing is made, may now be turned against this bundle of contradictions which passes under the respectable name of pantheism.

As to the bearings of the system on morality, logically the pantheist can not speak of morality; for morality supposes a universal moral law which has its primal origin in a personal divine Lawgiver. Pantheism can furnish no such basis for morality. The pantheist may profess to recognize with the rest of men two opposite moral aspects in human actions, but why he should call the one good and the other bad he has no reason furnished by his system of philosophy. With him morality is essentially a matter of convention or of expediency, and thereby ceases to be morality.

Pantheism, nevertheless, seems to have a poetical aspect, which excites a certain effervescence in minds capable of feeling a delight in the thought of their identity with the Great Absolute; but poetry is one thing, objective truth

another; though, for the matter of poetical inspiration and human consolation, what pantheistic idea ever rose to the level of the beauty and sublimity of the Christian conception of man's ultimate perfection, as realized in his conscious and never-ending union with the God whose perfection is infinite? The pantheist finds his consolation in drifting with the ages and ending in—*nothing!*

PAUPERISM

(Anti-Socialistic)

See "Socialism II—Its Philosophy of History."

POPE, THE

I. SUCCESSOR OF ST. PETER IN THE ROMAN SEE

Erroneous View.—"On the subject of St. Peter's residence in Rome we possess no trustworthy information."—Schaefer's "Manual of Instruction," etc.—"It is only a guess . . . that St. Peter was ever at Rome at all; it is only a guess that he was ever Bishop of Rome."—Dr. Littledale.

THE TRUTH.—The above are specimens of the offhand judgments pronounced in our day upon a tradition which has ever been regarded in the Church as most trustworthy, resting as it does on the unimpeachable testimony of the historians, the Fathers, and the councils.

Not a few leading Protestant thinkers are found to express their entire dissent from the opinion so lightly delivered by the Schaefer and Littledales of popular controversy. Even Harnack, who has so large a following in Germany and America, declared at a meeting of the Society of Art and Science, held at Hamburg in 1899, that St. Peter's dying in Rome was a proved fact of history. The following utterance of the professor is surely strong enough: "The martyrdom of Peter in Rome was contested, for controversial purposes, first by Protestant, afterward by higher critical prejudice . . . ; but that the position was erroneous must be clear to any investigator who does not shut his eyes to the truth. The entire array of

critical arguments with which Baur combated the old tradition is to-day considered worthless."—*Germania*, September 5, 1901.

The Protestant authorities quoted by Dr. Ryder in "Catholic Controversy"—Chamier, Cave, Grotius, Pearson, Bramhall—express themselves no less decidedly. Kneller asserts and proves in his essay, "Herr Soltan and St. Peter," that no fact of antiquity is better attested than the presence of St. Peter in Rome. His contention is chiefly based on the primitive tradition, upon which he remarks that no other city in the world ever claimed to possess the grave of St. Peter.

A similar appeal to early tradition was made by the Protestant historian Schroeckh in 1770. He says: "Some great scholars in the Protestant body have asserted, in the heat of controversy with the Roman Church, that St. Peter was never in Rome; but there is no other event of that period which has in its favor such unanimous testimony borne by the earliest Christian writers." Leibnitz may be added to the number of dissenting voices among Protestants. "The ancients," he says, "unanimously attest that the apostle Peter governed the Church, suffered martyrdom, and appointed his successor, in the city of Rome, the capital of the world."—*Syst. Theol., The Roman Pontiff*.

The Catholic thesis we are defending is equivalent to the double proposition, (1) St. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and (2) the Popes have been his successors. The first part of the proposition has the testimony of universal Catholic tradition; and representative Protestant authorities, whilst bowing to the force of that tradition, either tell us explicitly, or imply by their words, that denial of the tradition has been due to pressure of controversy. We deem it unnecessary to repeat the numerous citations from ancient authorities to be found in Catholic treatises on the subject—from Irenæus, Eusebius, Dionysius of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria, Papias of Hieropolis, Ignatius of Antioch, and Clement of Rome.

The second part of the proposition is equivalent to the assertion that the present Pope, Benedict XV, is the latest, in an unbroken succession, of Bishops of Rome from St. Peter downward. The list of the successors of St. Peter has been preserved—if "preserved" is the apt word

¹Church Hist. (German), vol. ii., p. 155.

in the case of personages that stand out so prominently in the history of the world. The series of Popes is not lost in the twilight of fable, as Macaulay lightly put it. The Popes, from the first to the latest, have been historical personalities, for each of whom there is a distinct record in the pages of history. The total number of the Popes, including the present venerable pontiff, is 260.

Certain writers of our day have sought to cast doubt upon the unbrokenness of the Papal succession by pointing to the fact that there have been times when there were several claimants to the pontifical throne, and that at those times considerable portions of the Church have been in doubt as to who were the rightful claimants. To those who are troubled with such scruples we would say, in the first place, that our list of the Popes would retain all its controversial significance even if it contained some doubtful names, which, however, we do not admit, for doubts or difficulties do not necessarily destroy the force of strong, positive evidence telling the other way. But even supposing that 260 names must be reduced to 255 by reason of doubts as to five on the list: if there is positive evidence that 255 Popes have been canonically elected, including the present pontiff, then it is certain that apostolical succession in the See of Peter has been preserved, even though the Church were, for a short time, without a sovereign pontiff, as it, in fact, always is between the death of one Pope and the election of his successor. We see no essential difference between a gap caused by the death of a Pope and a gap caused by the nullity of his election—*provided that finally right succession is established and perpetuated.*

The Great Western Schism, as it is generally named by historians, furnishes an interesting illustration of succession established with absolute certainty after a period of what was considered in some quarters as doubtful succession. The schism lasted thirty-nine years. The first of the Popes whose title was questioned was Urban VI (1378). The validity of the election was denied by certain of the cardinals who had elected him, although by their previous words and acts they had acknowledged him as the legitimate Pope. His claims were admitted by the most distinguished ecclesiastical lawyers of the day. As to modern opinions, the most eminent Catholic and many Protestant

authorities agree with the jurists of the earlier period. If Urban's title to the office was valid, the three Popes successively chosen by the cardinals acknowledging Urban's jurisdiction were no less validly elected. But in the present connection the question concerns us little. There can be no doubt that a lawful successor to the See of Rome was appointed in the person of Martin V, by whose election the schism was healed. The point we insist on is that *there has been a succession of legitimate pontiffs from St. Peter to Benedict XV*. If during the entire schism there had been no Pope at all—that would not prove that the office and authority of Peter was not transmitted to the next Pope duly elected.

POPE, THE

II. CHRIST'S VICAR

Erroneous View.—The primacy of the Bishop of Rome is not founded on Scripture and is simply the result of a struggle for supremacy in which the Roman pontiff won.

CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.—The primacy of the Bishop of Rome is identical with the primacy conferred on St. Peter. In other words, the Bishop of Rome is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy. That St. Peter received the primacy, or supreme headship, in the Church is clearly indicated in Scripture. That the Bishop of Rome is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy has been the constant and universal teaching of the Church. It is proved, moreover, by theological arguments based upon the nature and constitution of the Church. There has been no struggle for supremacy by the Bishop of Rome, as the Church, in the beginning and throughout its history, has acknowledged the supreme dominion of the See of Rome. The arguments in favor of these positions we shall proceed to develop.

I. ST. PETER CONSTITUTED HEAD OF THE CHURCH

Our first witness to the primacy of St. Peter is St. John the Evangelist. In the first chapter of his Gospel (41, 42) he relates that when Andrew had seen and conversed with the Lord, he brought his brother Simon to him. "And

Jesus, looking upon him, said: Thou art Simon the son of Jona: thou shalt be called Cephas, which is interpreted Peter." The Lord thus gave Simon a new name, Cephas, an Aramaic word meaning *rock*. The significance of this change of name, though certainly very striking, would perhaps remain somewhat vague had we not the following well-known passage in St. Matthew:

"And He asked His disciples, saying: "Whom do men say that the Son of man is? But they said: Some John the Baptist, and other some Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the prophets. Jesus saith to them: But whom do you say that I am? Simon Peter answered and said: Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus, answering, said to him: Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona; because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven. And I say to thee: *That thou art Peter; and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*" (Matt. xvi. 13-18).

Here, on the occasion of Peter's confession of faith, the Lord promises to make him the very foundation of His Church—or, in other words, the principle of its stability and of its resistance to the powers of evil (the "gates of hell"). The significance of these words can not easily be exaggerated. They are much stronger words than any used to set forth the greatness of the rôle played by any eminent man in the affairs of the world. When we say of one that he was the head and front of some great undertaking, or of another that he was the soul of some great enterprise, we are using words of high commendation; but how they dwindle in significance when we think of one who was made the very foundation—the rock on which was built the superstructure—of a great institution of world-wide influence which was to confer ineffable benefits upon mankind, even to eternity! But, what is more significant still, Peter's prerogative is in some sense to be perpetual; for as the Church was to withstand the assaults of hell to the end of time, its foundation, as laid by Christ, must remain forever. We shall see later in what sense Peter is the perpetual foundation of the Church.

The idea of the primacy is still further developed in other parts of the Gospels. Let the reader weigh well the following passage from St. John describing a scene that

took place after the resurrection. It will exhibit the primacy, not as an honorary office, but as the office of one who is commissioned to instruct, guide, and govern the entire Church, pastors, and people. The scene is laid on the shore of the Sea of Tiberias, where the risen Lord had prepared a simple repast for His apostles against their return from their labors at the net.

"When, therefore, they had dined, Jesus saith to Simon Peter: Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these [*i.e.*, more than the other apostles]? He saith to Him: Yea, Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee. He saith to him: *Feed My lambs*. He saith to him again: Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me? He saith to Him: Yea, Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee. He saith to him: *Feed My lambs*. He saith to him the third time: Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me? Peter was grieved because He had said to him the third time, Lovest thou Me? And he said to Him: Lord, Thou knowest all things: Thou knowest that I love Thee. He said to him: *Feed My sheep*" (John xxi. 15-17).

The first thing to be noted about this passage is that St. Peter is singled out in a special manner and is separately addressed. His Lord draws from him a triple profession of love; and now, after this special expression of devotion, what special mark of divine favor is going to be bestowed upon him? Nothing less than the tending and feeding of Christ's flock—the whole of His flock, sheep and lambs alike; or, in other words, the supreme ruling of Christ's Church, pastors as well as people. The expressions "My sheep" and "My lambs" are sufficiently explicit—they can mean nothing but the entire flock.

And although the other apostles also were to tend the flock of Christ, their commission to do so is nowhere so significantly worded or so expressive of universal power. And then, if we consider the incidents narrated in the above extract, we may ask with perfect justice, is it possible that Our Lord could have given such signal prominence to St. Peter in this scene and drawn from him so special a protestation of love and devotion without intending to confer upon him by the words, "Feed My sheep, etc.," special and exclusive powers in the government of the Church? If any doubt remains in the reader's mind, let him compare the passage we are considering with one quoted above and

ask himself if the one does not explain and supplement the other and both together point unmistakably to the primacy: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

We can now understand the full import of the words reported by St. Luke (xxii. 31, 32): "Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired to have you [*i.e.*, all the apostles, the pronoun being in the plural], that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for *thee*, that thy faith fail not; and thou being once converted, confirm thy brethren." Peter is here constituted the mainstay of the faith in God's Church; a prerogative which is one of the essential features of the primacy.

But the texts upon which we have based this demonstration of the primacy of Peter are not the only ones bearing on his peculiar position in the Church. Passages abound in which St. Peter is brought into special prominence; and these can have but one meaning when interpreted in the light of what we have seen. Wherever we find a list of the apostles' names (*e.g.*, Matt. x. 2; Mark iii. 16; Luke vi. 14; Acts i. 13), Peter's is the first. St. Matthew begins his list by these words, "The first, Simon, who is called Peter" [or the Rock]—intimating, in all probability, that he is named first because he was the rock or foundation of Christ's Church. SS. Mark and Luke also, in their respective lists, remind us that the surname of Peter had been added to the apostle's ordinary name.

Besides these passages, there are numerous texts relating to incidents in the Gospels in which Peter is specially conspicuous; the following, for example: "And Simon and they that were with him" (Mark i. 36), "Peter and they that were with him" (Luke viii. 45), "Peter and the apostles answering" (Acts v. 29). Peter was the recipient of many special marks of favor from his Lord. His house was Jesus' place of abode at Capharnaum; from Peter's fishing-boat the Lord addressed the multitude; at his Master's bidding Peter paid the coin of tribute, miraculously provided, for himself and his Lord—as though the Master identified Himself with His disciple. Peter was the first of the apostles to see the risen Saviour (1 Cor. xv. 5). After the resurrection the angel at the sepulcher, speaking in the name of the Lord, told the holy women to "go tell His disciples and Peter."

After Our Lord's ascension Peter's behavior is altogether in keeping with the exceptional position he occupied during Our Lord's lifetime. He presided at the election of Matthias (Acts i.). It was Peter that inaugurated the ministry of the word on Pentecost Day. At the first assembly of the apostles and the ancients at Jerusalem it was Peter's opinion that prevailed for the settlement of an important question.

The evidence, then, is abundant—superfluously abundant—for the fact that St. Peter held a unique position in respect to the other apostles; one, indeed, that, if all the texts be well weighed and compared, must seem to be nothing short of a primacy of authority identical with that of Catholic dogma.

The strange thing is that any other meaning but the one we have indicated should have been taken out of the texts we have cited. To suppose that one who is seen to exercise, on so many occasions, a *primacy of some sort*—one who is declared by his divine Master to be the *rock on which the Church is built*—one who is made *the bulwark of the faith* for the rest of Christ's disciples—one who is constituted *the feeder of Christ's entire flock*—to suppose that such as he possessed no more than an honorary primacy—hardly more than a permanent chairmanship—is to show a degree of skepticism which is rarely exhibited in the weighing of evidence in purely secular matters.

As the subject of the primacy is one of sovereign importance, we would ask any non-Catholic inquirer who may light on these pages to give the maturest consideration to the texts and facts we have cited from the Sacred Books before reading any controversial matter on this particular topic. Nay, we should much prefer that the non-Catholic reader should stop at this point and not read another line of this article on the primacy, if he has not taken the trouble to make a comparative study of the passages cited above and endeavored to view each in the light shed upon it by the others. Speaking generally, we would add that a little at a time, but that little well considered, is an indispensable rule for those who wish to be solidly convinced.

II. THE POPE THE SUCCESSOR OF ST. PETER IN THE PRIMACY

And now, the connecting link between the primacy of Peter and the primacy of the present reigning pontiff, Ben-

edict XV. In the first place, let us cast a rapid glance at the primacy as conceived and realized in the Catholic Church to-day. The Roman Catholic Church is the only Church possessing a unity which in any degree corresponds to the ideal which was in the mind of the divine Master—an ideal for the realization of which He prayed—and, of course, effectually—to His Heavenly Father.

“And not for them only [the apostles] do I pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe in Me. *That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee.* That they also may be one in Us: that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me” (John xvii. 20, 21).

The prayer of Christ must have been heard; and that it has been heard is witnessed by the unity of the Church in communion with Rome; a unity which grows ever more wonderful with the succeeding ages. But what is the secret of such unity? Can there be more than one answer to the question? Ask our enemies how it is that Catholics in every clime have but one way of thinking and acting, when the rest of the world is in a constant ferment of conflicting opinions. They will tell you that it is because Catholics are Pope-ridden. The epithet is insulting, but it contains a kernel of truth. It is precisely the Pope’s primacy that preserves unity of faith and worship among almost 300,000,000 Catholics, who are found in every clime and represent every phase and variety of human existence.

Imagine what the Catholic Church would be to-day without the primacy. A body without a head inevitably tends to dissolution. The larger a social organization and the more varied its membership, the greater the need of a center of authority. In the case of any human society, to provide an internal principle of cohesion is deemed but ordinary human wisdom. God, it is true, has infinite resources at His command, and the primacy is not the only conceivable means by which He might have provided for the unification of the Church. But He does, as a matter of fact, adapt Himself to our human ways; and that He has done so in the organizing of His Church is proved by the fact that, on the one hand, the actual exercise of a primacy has a wonderful effect in the unifying of the Church, whilst, on the other, the absence of the primacy in bodies designated as Christians is everywhere marked by a tendency to division and disintegration.

The necessity of a central authority may be conceded by some of our opponents, but the necessity of its being vested in a single individual may not be granted so easily. Those who deny the primacy of the Pope would not always be so unwilling to accept the decrees of a general council. But a little reflection will show that general councils, as ordinary instruments of government in a world-wide religion, would prove exceedingly impracticable. It is now forty years since the Vatican Council was obliged to discontinue its sittings, and meanwhile a hydra-headed heresy known as Modernism has sprung up, against which the world would be well-nigh helpless had it no refuge but in a general council.

The much-needed exercise of primatial power by the late sovereign pontiff in rooting out this heresy of heresies is but one illustration of the part played by the Roman pontiffs from the beginning in their preservation of Catholic doctrine. So comprehensive has been their action that there is scarcely a single religious truth which does not owe its preservation to the sovereign authority wielded by the bishops of Rome. Many of these truths are still retained and cherished by most of our separated brethren; and a serious consideration of this fact should beget not only gratitude to the Roman pontiffs, but the conviction that the primatial authority of the Popes is not an accident of history, but the result of a special providence.

No less objectionable would be the ordinary government of the Church by a permanent committee or commission elected by and representing a general council, for this would be the handing over of the Church to an oligarchy which would have no authorization either in Scripture or in tradition. The Church was to have been governed either by the bishops or by the Pope, or by both together, but not by an arbitrarily constituted bureau. Moreover, in any council or governing committee the presiding officer must be vested with considerable authority; and when we consider the important matters that might be affected by his rulings—touching, as they would, at one point or another, directly or indirectly *divine revelation itself*—we can see the necessity of such an officer's possessing primatial authority of the highest order. In point of fact, at all general councils of the Church it was deemed necessary that

the meetings should be presided over either by the Pope or by his specially appointed legate.

We are now within measurable distance of the connecting link between the primacy of the present Pope and the primacy of Peter; but we must let the argument develop itself further. We now see that a primate is necessary. The primacy of one is needed for the unity of the many. But in the mind of the divine Founder of the Church unity was to be a perpetual condition of the Church's life and ministry; therefore, the primacy must always have been, and in the future must be, absolutely necessary for the preservation of essential unity. Moreover, it is not only necessary in the abstract, but must have been realized as a fact in history; for, unless we are willing to admit that the unity of the Church has been destroyed—which would prove that the prayers of the Son of God for unity were but vain and idle words that never reached the throne of God—or that the gates of hell *have* prevailed against the Church, contrary to the Lord's assurance—and that, consequently, He has ceased to be present among His disciples, contrary to His explicit promise; unless we are willing to believe that the realization of long ages of prophecy and the culmination of the work of Providence is a jumble of conflicting doctrines and a flock dispersed because the shepherd is stricken—we must admit that the Church has not been without a sovereign ruler—one who is such both in fact and in right—one who has been invested from on high with sufficient authority to preserve the unity which the divine Master had so much at heart.

But who can such a primate be if not the Bishop of Rome? He is the only bishop who has laid claim to the title; he is accepted as primate by much the largest body of Christians; and the Roman pontiffs have claimed and exercised the rights of primates from time immemorial. Moreover, the fruits of the primacy are shown in a wonderful unity which brings in its train peace, order, and a single-minded devotion to God's glory.

Finally, as this long succession of primates must have had a beginning, as there must have been one who was the first of the primates, who can possibly be the first if not he whom we have seen appointed the ruler of the Church from the beginning? The Popes, therefore, are the successors of Peter, who continues to be the foundation of

Christ's Church in the persons of those who have successively occupied his see. And, indeed, the continuance of the office after the death of St. Peter seems to be implied in the words, "upon this rock I will build My Church," for the foundation must remain if the building is to endure; and Peter must still be regarded as the foundation of the Church inasmuch as he has transmitted his powers to his successors. And the same significance attaches to the words, "and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"; for to withstand the assaults of the demons the Church must always retain its firm position on its original foundation.

Thus the latest century of Christianity is connected with the first. And yet the distance between them, as measured by the lapse of years, is so great that our readers will desire to see how they are connected by the chain of historical events. They would like to see the primacy in action during all those centuries, or at least during the first five, a period which is regarded by most Christians of the present day as one of great purity of faith and worship. We shall, therefore, exhibit in brief the witness of the Fathers of the primeval Church both to the fact and to the right of the primacy as exercised by the Roman See.

In the first century and in the lifetime of St. John the Evangelist, a schism having broken out at Corinth, the Corinthians *appealed to St. Clement, Bishop of Rome*, who wrote the schismatics a powerful letter enjoining submission to the authorities. The following remarkable passage is commended to the attention of the reader:

"If any disobey the words spoken by God through us, let them know that they will entangle themselves in transgressions and no small danger, but we shall be clear from the sin. . . . You will cause us joy and exultation if, obeying the things written by us through the Holy Spirit, etc."

This remarkable epistle of Pope Clement's is mentioned favorably by St. Irenæus. We know from the testimony of Eusebius that it was read in the churches. "This," he says, "we know was publicly read in many of the churches, both in former times and in our own." Dionysius, an earlier witness, who in the year 171 was created bishop of this very city of Corinth, testifies to the same custom.

At each of the four first general councils, those, namely,

of Nicæa (A.D. 325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451), legates of the Pope, specially appointed for the purpose, presided. As regards the Council of Ephesus, nothing can be more manifest than that the action taken by that council against the heresiarch Nestorius was *simply prescribed* by Pope Celestine, who, in his letter to the council, says that he has sent his legates "to be present at what is done and *to execute what has been previously ordained by us.*"

Acknowledgment of the Pope's primacy appears at every turn in the proceedings of the council; as, for instance, when Firmius, Bishop of Cappadocia, said: "The Holy Apostolic See of the most holy bishop Celestine has already, by the letter sent to the most religious bishop Cyril, prescribed the sentence and the order to be observed in the present proceedings. We have adhered to this and have put that decree into execution, pronouncing the canonical and apostolical judgment on [Nestorius]."

In the third session the words of Philip, the Papal legate, which were received with approval by the assembled Fathers, show that the Papal power was believed to have its root in the primacy of Peter: "It is doubtful to none, yea rather it has been known to all ages, that the holy and most blessed Peter, the prince and head of the apostles, the pillar of the faith and foundation of the Catholic Church, received from Our Lord Jesus Christ the keys of the kingdom, and to him was power given to bind and to loose sins; *who even until now and always, both lives and exercises judgment in his successors.* Wherefore our holy and most blessed Pope Celestine, the bishop, his successor in order and holder of his place, has sent us to the holy synod as representative of his person. As, therefore, Nestorius, the author of this new impiety, has not only allowed the term fixed by the Apostolic See to pass by, but also a much longer period of time, the sentence upon him stands ratified by a decree of all the churches. . . . Wherefore let Nestorius know that he is cut off from communion with the priesthood of the Catholic Church."

The sovereign position of the Pope is no less strongly evidenced by the proceedings of the Council of Chalcedon, composed of about 600 bishops, the largest number up to that time assembled. The council was convened by Papal authority. Among other testimonies to this fact is the

declaration of the bishops of Mysia, in a letter addressed to Marcian, the Emperor of Constantinople: "*Many bishops are assembled at Chalcedon by command of the Roman Pontiff Leo, who is truly the head of the bishops.*" The act by which in this council Pope Leo deposed Dioscurus, Bishop of Alexandria, was preceded by a declaration of the Papal legate, Paschasinus, from which we extract the following passage: "Whereupon Leo, the most holy and blessed archbishop of the great and elder Rome, has by the agency of ourselves and the present synod, in conjunction with the thrice-blessed and all-honored Peter, who is the rock and foundation of the Catholic Church and basis of the orthodox faith, deprived him of the priestly dignity and every priestly function. Accordingly, this holy and great synod decrees the provisions of the canons against the aforesaid Dioscurus."

The sentence which thus emanated from the Sovereign Pontiff was signed by all the members of the council. Before drawing up a confession of faith the council ordered several documents to be read, among others a letter from Pope Leo. On hearing the letter, the Fathers exclaimed: "This is the faith of the apostles. We all believe this. The orthodox believe this. Anathema to him who does not believe it. *Peter has spoken thus by the mouth of Leo.*"

That the Popes of the first centuries frequently asserted their prerogative is acknowledged by many Protestants, but they quietly assume that such assertion was but the beginning of an evil which culminated in the decree of the Vatican Council. But, surely, the facts already brought to the reader's attention prove that if the claims of the Popes were false the acquiescence of the bishops must have committed the whole Church to an error in doctrine and in practice; and yet we are dealing with a period which is universally regarded as standing in no need of reform.

That the See of Rome was regarded as the final court of appeal might be proved by numerous cases brought to it for decision. We shall confine ourselves to a case associated with the name of the greatest of the Doctors of the West, St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in Africa. The bishops of Africa, having assembled in council, first at Carthage and afterward at Milevi, and having condemned the doctrines of Pelagius on grace, sought a confirmation of their sentence by the See of Rome. For that purpose

they wrote to Pope Innocent a letter from Carthage and a second one from Milevi, and in both they acknowledged the superior authority of the Apostolic See. "It is our judgment," they say, "that by the mercy of the Lord God, who deigns both to direct your consultations and to hear your prayers, the authors of these perverse and pernicious opinions will yield more easily to the authority of Your Holiness, which is derived from the authority of the Holy Scriptures."

What authority of Scripture can be referred to if not the authority of the texts we have quoted in favor of St. Peter's primacy? In a third letter written by five of the African bishops, one of whom was St. Augustine, the writers address the Pope in these words: "Our purpose is to have it proved by you that our rivulet springs from the same fountain-head as your abounding river, and to be consoled by your rescript in the consciousness of participating one grace."

But the story does not end here. Pope Innocent answered the letter of the African bishops by an epistle which asserts the necessity of Papal confirmation for the decrees of local councils; and it is in reference to this letter that St. Augustine, writing to Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, says: "Pope Innocent of blessed memory answered all that we said as was right and as became the prelate of the Apostolic See." It was in reference to the same decision that those other more famous words of St. Augustine were used: "Two councils [i.e., reports of the proceedings of two councils] have been sent to the Apostolic See, and an answer from it has been received. *The case is ended.* May the error itself be ended." (Serm. 131, Contra Pelag.)

We may remark in passing that even non-Catholic readers must at this point be struck by the resemblance of the Church of St. Augustine's day to the Catholic Church of our day.

Our readers can not be surprised that the Pope's decisions were regarded as final when they glance at the testimonies furnished by the writings of the Fathers in favor of precisely that conception of the Papal prerogative which is conveyed by Catholic teaching to-day. The following passages are specimens:

ST. IRENÆUS (A.D. 178).—"With this church [of Rome] on account of her *superior* [or, according to another read-

ing, her *more powerful*] *headship*, it is necessary that every other church—that is, the faithful everywhere dispersed—should be in communion.”

The opponents of the Papacy are keenly aware of the value of the testimony of Irenæus, who was a pupil of the immediate disciples of the apostles; and, hence, anti-Papal ingenuity has been exercised to the full in the endeavor to wrest the above sentence from its true meaning. They have fastened upon single words in the text and have attempted to show in each case that the meaning is not necessarily pro-Papal. But the question is settled by the context of the words quoted, which are found in the treatise “*Cont. Haer.*,” III, c. 3, n. 1-3. Against certain heretical opinions, the writer appeals to the traditional teaching of the bishops, who in succession have ruled the several parts of the Church founded by the apostles; but, as he remarks, “as it would take too long, in a volume such as this, to enumerate the successive occupants of *all* the sees,” he appeals to the traditional teaching of the *Roman* See, whose successive rulers, from the time of the apostles, he names. “With this church, on account of her superior or more powerful headship, it is necessary that every other church . . . should be in communion.” Evidently he regards the Church of Rome as the standard church in doctrine. All others must agree with it. There is no possible interpretation of this dictum of Irenæus that will make the words equally applicable to any other church. If this is not the primacy of the Roman bishops, what can it be?

But St. Irenæus confirms the interpretation we have given his words by referring with commendation to the decision of Pope Clement in the case of the Corinthian schism, a case in which the Corinthians themselves had appealed to Rome and in which they had received an answer in a tone of authority which perhaps has few parallels in Papal utterances. An extract from the Pope's letter has been given above. “Under this Clement, then,” writes Irenæus, “there having happened no small dissension among the brethren who were at Corinth, the Church which is at Rome wrote a most powerful letter to the Corinthians, gathering them together to peace, and *repairing their faith*, and announcing the tradition which it had so recently received from the apostles.”

ST. CYPRIAN (A.D. 250).—"After all this, they dare to sail and to carry letters from schismatics and profane persons to *the Chair of Peter and to the leading church, whence the unity of the priesthood has its origin*. Nor do they consider that they [to whom they are carrying letters] are the same Romans whose faith is praised in the preaching of the Apostle, and to whom *heretical perfidy can have no access*." The distorting process has been applied to these words also; but the short passage so repeatedly emphasizes one and the same thing and its parts so effectually support one another that all attempts to wring the Roman primacy out of it have proved abortive. In his epistles, the saint calls the Roman Church the "root," the "mother," the "parent-stem" of Catholic unity.

ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN (A.D. 370).—"The faith of Rome was of old and is now right, binding the whole West by the saving word; as is just in her *who presides over all*, reverencing the whole harmonious teaching of God."

ST. OPTATUS OF MILEVI (about A.D. 370).—"You can not deny that you are aware that in the city of Rome upon Peter, first of all, was conferred the episcopal seat in which he sat, who was *the head of all the apostles*; whence he was called Cephas (the rock); so that in this one chair unity might be preserved by all, lest the other apostles might each lay claim to a chair of his own." He then gives a list of the successors of Peter, down to the reigning pontiff, "with whom we and the whole world, besides, are united in the bond of communion by the interchange of letters of peace."

ST. AMBROSE (died A.D. 391).—1. Speaking of one who had arrived after shipwreck in a strange place, he says: "He called the bishop to him and, not deeming any grace true which was not of the true faith, he inquired of him whether he agreed with the Catholic bishops, that is, *with the Roman Church*." 2. "From the Church of Rome *the rights of venerable communion flow unto all*." 3. "We have recognized in the letter of Your Holiness the vigilance of the good shepherd faithfully guarding the door of the fold entrusted to you and, with pious solicitude, watching over the fold of Christ, and thus deserving that the flock of Christ should hear and follow you."

ST. JEROME (A.D. 376).—When the Church of Antioch was rent by the rival claims of Vitalis, Meletius, and

Paulinus to the episcopal throne, St. Jerome wrote thus to Pope Damasus for the settlement of the dispute: "I, following no one as first but Christ, am joined in communion with your Blessedness, that is, with the Chair of Peter. *Upon that rock I know that the Church is built.* Whosoever eats the Lamb outside that house is profane. If one be not in the Ark of Noe, he will perish when the flood prevails. . . . I know not Vitalis; Meletius I reject; I am a stranger to Paulinus. *Whosoever gathers not with you, scatters; that is, he who is not of Christ is of Antichrist.*"

In another letter on the same subject he clearly regards communion with the see of Rome as the touchstone of orthodoxy. "*If any one is united with the see of Peter he is mine.* Meletius, Vitalis, and Paulinus say they adhere to you. If only one made the assertion, I could believe him. As it is, one or other or all three lie. Hence, I conjure your Blessedness . . . that you, who are the successor of the apostles in dignity, may be their successor in merit . . . and that you would inform me by letter with which bishop in Syria I should hold communion."

ST. PETER CHRYSOLOGUS (died about A.D. 450).—"Blessed Peter, who liv-~~g~~ and presides in his own see, gives the true faith to those who seek it. For we, in our solicitude for truth and faith, *can not, without the consent of the Roman Church, hear causes of faith.*"

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, Patriarch of Constantinople (died A.D. 407).—Theophilus of Alexandria having attempted to usurp the see of Constantinople, St. Chrysostom sent an embassy, composed of four bishops and two deacons, to Pope Innocent I, to obtain a redress of his grievances. "Lest," he says, "such great confusion should become general, I beseech you to write to the effect that these irregular proceedings, which have been carried on in our absence and which were based upon *ex parte* information, whilst we have not declined a trial, *are of no effect*—as they are, in fact, null in themselves—and that the authors of these illegal measures *shall be subjected to the penalty* prescribed by the ecclesiastical laws."

THE BISHOPS OF SPAIN (A.D. 440).—"The most blessed Peter, *the supremacy of whose vicar, as it is eminent, is no less to be feared and loved by all.*"

Later centuries than the fifth there is no need of exploring for witnesses to the primacy, as all the world ad-

mits. We have given but specimens of the language and practice of Christian antiquity as exhibited by the writings of the Fathers of the Church, and have said nothing of the abundant proofs of the general recognition of the Roman primacy found in the utterances of emperors and of historians, orators, and poets.

A circumstance on which we would lay emphasis is that the authorities we have quoted regard the prerogative of the Popes as identical with the prerogative of St. Peter. Now, it is impossible to reconcile this universal belief with the alleged struggle of the Popes for supremacy. Why struggle when from the beginning their rights were acknowledged as having a divine source?

It has been a common practice with anti-Catholic controversialists to leave unnoticed the positive and explicit testimonies cited by Catholics in favor of the Roman primacy and confine their attention to a comparatively small number of passages in the Fathers which seem, at first sight and apart from their context, to tell against the Papal claims. But even if the Protestant interpretation of these latter passages were correct, what value can these testimonies have when confronted with the cloud of witnesses to the Roman primacy, both in the East and in the West, whose language concerning the primacy is at least as clear, as explicit, and as strong as that which we have cited above?

Where shall we find an expression of the Church's mind if not in the utterances of the great majority of her representative teachers and in the acts of her general councils? In all cases, however, in which an early authority is cited against the Papal primacy, either the circumstances under which the words were uttered disprove the Protestant interpretation of them, or the words cited against the Catholic position can be matched, from the same authorities, by expressions which are clearly pro-Papal. When St. Augustine, for instance, is quoted as saying that St. Peter, when he received the keys, was endowed with no personal prerogative, but received them for the whole Church, the truth is that St. Augustine is opposing not Papal claims, but Novatian error; for the Novatian heretics held that the power to *remit sins* was a personal and exclusive privilege of St. Peter's, which, of course, St. Augustine denied, as all Catholics do to-day. An exclusive privilege of the kind was never claimed by the Roman pontiffs.

St. Cyprian, who is regarded by Protestants as favoring their side of the controversy because of his undoubted opposition to the reigning pontiff in the matter of the re-baptism of heretics, clearly and explicitly records his belief in the Roman primacy in different parts of his writings. Besides the quotations from him given above, we shall add here the testimony of one of his letters (Ep. lxviii. 3) to his having acknowledged in practice the sovereign jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome. When Marcian of Arles fell into heresy, Cyprian, at the request of the bishops of the province, wrote to Pope Stephen to request him "to send letters by which, Marcian *having been excommunicated, another may be substituted in his place.*" If this was not an exercise of sovereign and universal jurisdiction, the terms have no meaning.

Acknowledgment of the Pope's authority was so universal and, what is more, was made so often by the bishops assembled in general council, that it must be regarded as an expression of the mind of the Church. And to suppose that the Church was in error on so vital a point, and that, too, in the first centuries of its existence, is to suppose that the assurances of the Son of God had come to nought. The idea, moreover, runs counter to the general conviction of Christendom. When, finally, we consider how magnificently the ideal of unity which was in the mind of the divine Founder of the Church has been realized through the exercise of the primacy, we can only conclude that "*this is the finger of God.*" It should now be more difficult to imagine that the primacy is an illusion than to regard as conclusive the evidence we have adduced in its favor.

POPE, THE

III. HIS PREROGATIVE OF INFALLIBILITY

(To be read after the preceding article on the Pope as Vicar of Christ.)

Objection.—To err is human. All men are subject to error, and the Pope is no exception. Is not the dogma of Papal infallibility a deification of the Pope?

THE ANSWER.—The strong feeling against Papal infallibility outside the Catholic Church is due in great part

to lack of correct information about the doctrine. A clear and simple explanation of the dogma should be enough to remove the antipathy felt toward it on the score of its supposed unreasonableness. The historical arguments in its favor we have virtually given in the article on "the Primacy." For the sake of clearness and simplicity, we shall cast the discussion into the form of a dialogue between a Catholic and a non-Catholic. The latter, we shall suppose, is an honest inquirer who has already learned much from his interlocutor, and is willing to learn more, but, at the same time, is frank in setting forth his objections.

Non-Catholic.—I have been longing to come to the discussion of the doctrine of Papal infallibility—although, as you must be aware, few Protestants can approach the subject in a state of perfect equanimity. The Pope, fallible or infallible, is our great bugaboo; and the climax is reached when the Pope is placed on a pinnacle by being declared free from human error.

Catholic.—Why, then, are you so eager to take up the subject?

Non-Catholic.—I have had a taste of it which has whetted my appetite. The fact is, I have reached a turning-point in my thoughts about the Sovereign Pontiff. These few weeks past I have been studying the evidences of the Pope's primacy, and now, I must acknowledge, I see the Pope in a new light. Though it is still difficult for me to regard the Pope simply from the Catholic standpoint, nevertheless, after weighing the evidence adduced from Scripture, the Fathers, and the early councils, and the arguments aiming to prove the necessity of a primacy of authority and the actual possession of it by the Popes as the successors of St. Peter, it seems to me that I can never again regard the Pope as the spiritual usurper that I have always believed him to be. At the very least, I am convinced that the Pope occupies a very exceptional position among the rulers of God's Church.

Catholic.—I am gratified, of course, to learn that another point of Catholic doctrine is being cleared up; but I must remind you that it is possible for a student of early tradition to get an entirely different impression of the teaching of the Fathers on the Pope's position. If you dropped into an Anglican or an Evangelical school of divinity, you might find the professor of apologetics citing passages from

the Fathers to prove that the Pope has not a particle of authority more than the other bishops. You are naturally surprised at this after seeing the overwhelming mass of evidence in favor of the primacy. Yet, it is not, after all, so surprising that in so large a mass of writings clever minds should find material for bolstering up a case against the Papal prerogative. But the attempt is futile in the face of the grand array of testimonies on the Catholic side; so impressive by reason of their *number*, their *clearness*, their *emphasis*, and, above all, by reason of the *highly representative character of those who have rendered them*. The testimony of a single great council must far outweigh a comparatively few citations, which can often be explained in a Roman Catholic sense and, no less often, can be matched from the very same sources by passages which are as "Romanist" as any Roman Catholic could desire.

Non-Catholic.—The "representative character" of many witnesses to the primacy does seem to add much weight to the argument. But a point I have been wishing to come to is that, in seeking proofs of the primacy, I have found a good deal that bears on infallibility. In many cases in which the supreme headship of the Bishop of Rome was spoken of, the inerrancy of his teaching seemed to be either expressed or implied. Am I right in this interpretation?

Catholic.—Yes, you are perfectly right—the Fathers and the councils are clear and emphatic in declaring infallibility of teaching to be an element of the primacy.

Non-Catholic.—And yet, when I began to realize the fact, I could not bring myself to believe that the Fathers and the councils were teaching the precise doctrine taught by the Catholic Church to-day.

Catholic.—I should like to feel sure that your conception of the Catholic teaching of to-day is the right one.

Non-Catholic.—Well, to save time, I will tell you that I have long since unlearned some of the false ideas of infallibility which, I must confess, are still entertained by many of my co-religionists; such, for instance, as that infallibility means impeccability—that the Pope can not sin—or, in general, that everything the Pope does must be right.

Catholic.—I should certainly have credited you with better notions than that. But how would you describe your own impression of Papal infallibility?

Non-Catholic.—I should suppose that what the Catholic Church means by infallibility is that when the Pope speaks on *matters of religion* his word is law—he can not be wrong and every one must think him right.

Catholic.—But wouldn't you distinguish? I hope you don't suppose that *every* utterance of the Pope, in public or in private, on matters of religion is infallible.

Non-Catholic.—I have never attempted to analyze my impressions about that matter; but if I had I should probably have found myself supposing that a Vicar of Christ endowed with infallibility could never on any occasion give utterance to erroneous doctrine.

Catholic.—And that possibly in any private conversation he might be dropping infallible remarks at every turn?

Non-Catholic.—Well, possibly so. You smile.

Catholic.—Well, we shall clear up that point at a later stage of the discussion. Suffice it to say, just here, that so far as the Catholic dogma goes the Pope is infallible only when he speaks in his public and official character and as head of the Church. What objection have you to the head of the Church laying down the law in matters of religion without any danger of error?

Non-Catholic.—I should be delighted to know that the head of the Church was infallible in his public teachings—as I should be delighted to have an infallible guide in any department of thought or knowledge—and, as you are aware, I have been struck by the historical argument in favor of Papal infallibility; but my repugnance comes to the surface when I confine my attention to the *human depositary* of the gift of infallibility. The Pope is, after all, a poor mortal like ourselves. Like the rest of us, he has his knowledge out of books, and he is not necessarily the greatest theologian in the world. Even if he were, it would be difficult to see how his teaching would be anything more than the expression of his personal opinions.

Catholic.—But it is not to his personal opinions that infallibility attaches, but to his official declarations.

Non-Catholic.—Ah, but isn't that a distinction without a practical difference? The Pope's official declarations, I should suppose, are the sincere expression of the Pope's own mind; hence, his official declarations have just as much or as little value as his personal opinions.

Catholic.—You have put it very neatly, and if the sub-

ject on the tapis were any other than Papal infallibility you certainly would have struck home; but there is a decidedly weak point in your argument. Is it not conceivable that no matter what be the sources of a man's knowledge, no matter how erroneous his private opinions, he may be *guarded by a special providence from making certain public utterances?* The Pope's infallibility means simply this (at least, so far as our present controversy is concerned), that, whatever be the private views of the Pope, *he will always be preserved by a special providence from teaching error when exercising his functions as head of the universal Church.* Personally and privately, it is possible for him to hold erroneous views on the essentials of the Faith—though that would be a very exceptional thing—but a special providence will never permit any such views to enter into his public official dogmatic utterances.

No Christian can doubt that God has it in His power thus to preserve His Church from error by means of a special divine guardianship over the official pronouncements of the one placed at its head. And the one thus guarded is not made more than human, and especially is he not deified, by any such divine protection.

Your argument, then, amounts to this: Given a certain official declaration of the Pope, it has no more value than the personal opinion of which it is an expression; and personal opinion is subject to error. The Catholic position is this: Given an erroneous personal opinion of the Pope, it will never find an expression in any official declaration—in consequence of the action of an overruling providence.

Non-Catholic.—That, I must admit, throws considerable light on the subject. . . . But I must let the matter mature in my thoughts before giving full assent. . . . Meantime, I must admit I can see no reason why God could not so order things as to prevent the Pope from teaching erroneous doctrine.

Catholic.—Indeed, to say that He could not would be a reflection on His wisdom and His omnipotence. But the idea will find easier admittance into your mind if you will recollect that God has, as a matter of fact, conferred infallibility on certain individual men for the good of His Church. Why can He not do the same in the case of the one who rules the Church in His name?

Non-Catholic.—So there are other cases of infallibility?

I must say I am getting a little jealous in the Pope's behalf.

Catholic.—You are a Christian, and as such you must believe that *the twelve apostles were infallible* in their public teaching, as they had a special promise of the assistance of the Holy Ghost. *The same is true of the four evangelists* in their written message to the Church.

Non-Catholic.—That's an idea which I have never had brought home to me, especially in connection with Papal infallibility. . . . The apostles and evangelists were certainly infallible in their message to the Church of God. . . . But am I to understand that the Pope is endowed with the same high gifts and graces as the apostles and evangelists?

Catholic.—Not precisely, or, at least, not necessarily. In the case of the Pope, so far as we know, it is simply a case of a special providence guarding the public and official utterances of the head of the Church. It is not a matter of personal inspiration. The Pope hears no voice from on high telling him that the decision he is about to render is God's own truth. Nor is it a matter of miraculous intervention of any kind. It is simply a case of an overruling providence.

Non-Catholic.—I must say, the question is considerably cleared up. . . . At the very least, you have supplied me with matter for profound reflection. It takes a little time to assimilate a new idea of the kind. . . . But I must admit that it all seems very reasonable. There is nothing God-like implied in the prerogative of the Sovereign Pontiff. All seems very human on the side of the human agency employed by Providence. But, now, there are some points in detail I should like to have cleared up; and, I must confess, my curiosity is more excited here than it was in reference to the main point. I should like to learn more precisely when, how often, and under what circumstances the gift of infallibility is brought into exercise. What, more precisely, are the limits of infallibility? And how can we distinguish between a fallible and an infallible utterance of the Pope? As to these last questions, you have placed particular emphasis on such expressions as "public" and "official" as qualifying Papal declarations to which infallibility is attached.

Catholic.—I have used these expressions only provisionally. They are correct except for some limitation and

greater precision which are given them by the Vatican decree, which I shall point out to you presently.

Non-Catholic.—The first thing I am eager to learn is whether infallible pronouncements are of frequent occurrence.

Catholic.—I expected the question. You seem not averse to admitting the dogma of infallibility, but, like many another inquirer, you feel a jealousy of too frequent an invasion of human liberty, even under the action of a special providence. Now, I am not going to ask you to be of the temper of Doctor Ward, the famous Oxford convert of some years back, who declared he should be delighted to find an infallible Papal decree laid upon his breakfast-table with his newspaper every morning of his life. On the other hand, I should be sorry to see you take up the attitude of a number—an exceedingly small number—even of the Pope's subjects, who are fidgety at the thought of important Papal pronouncements of any kind.

In the whole history of the Church infallible decrees have doubtless been of frequent occurrence—though here there can be no question of statistics. The See of Rome has been the guiding star of the Church these nineteen centuries. Catholics have received its decisions without inquiring narrowly into the limits of their infallibility. When necessary or expedient, the certainty of infallibility can be assured by a clear and distinct declaration. In the general course of Papal government the Pope employs the aid of those standing committees of cardinals known as congregations. The decisions of these bodies are frequent enough; but, even if they be issued with the Pope's approval, they are not infallible. They may be reversed, though such is the maturity of the cardinals' deliberations [you have heard the saying that Rome moves slowly], and such the wisdom of their decisions, that it is the rarest thing in the world for any of their rulings to need reversal. But occasions will occur when the Pope feels impelled to issue, in virtue of his sovereign authority, a document which, from its terms or its drift, must be deemed infallible and irreversible. These may be said to be of comparatively rare occurrence.

Non-Catholic.—That, I must say, does bring some relief to my Protestant susceptibilities. Nevertheless, I must ad-

mit that as I am now more than half a Catholic, as regards infallibility, the fact that I need such comfort may be no great credit to me. I wonder if I shall ever fall into Ward's breakfast-table cravings. But I see you have there what I suppose is the Vatican decree on the infallibility of the Pope.

Catholic.—The decree bearing on infallibility is part of a long constitution (*Constit. Dogmat. I de Ecclesia Christi*). I shall translate it almost verbatim, on paper, and at the same time number off certain clauses by way of giving prominence to the conditions under which the Pope is declared to be infallible in his teaching. The words are these:

“Therefore, adhering to the tradition received from the beginnings of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour, for the exaltation of the Catholic religion and the salvation of Christian peoples, with the approval of the sacred council, *We teach, and define as a divinely revealed dogma, that the Roman Pontiff, (1) when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, in the discharge of his office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, (2) he defines, (3) in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, (4) a doctrine relating to faith or morals, (5) as one to be held by the universal Church, he possesses, by virtue of the divine assistance promised to him in the person of blessed Peter, that infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed that His Church should possess in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals.*”

The first thing to be noted about the decree is that it is only when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra* that he is declared to be infallible. The literal meaning of “*ex cathedra*” is “from his chair of office.” The theological meaning of the phrase is set forth with the greatest exactness by the council. The Pope is infallible when he speaks “in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority” and “when in discharge of his office of pastor and teacher of all Christians” he defines a doctrine and sends it forth as one to be held by the whole Church. These conditions are important, as they limit the range of infallible teaching. A Papal utterance may be more or less public, but that does not necessarily stamp it as infallible. It is only when the Pope evidently wishes to exercise his apostolic authority as head of the Church and to define a doctrine to be held

as so defined by the whole Church that he is declared to be infallible.

Note, in the second place, that it is only in defining doctrine that the Pope is pronounced infallible, and not, therefore, in matters of external discipline or administration. Moreover, it must be doctrine bearing on faith or on morals. The world need fear no exploiting of the Pope's prerogative in the domain of politics, or of science, or of history. Interference in these matters does not belong to the Pope's province as head of the Church, except in so far as they have bearings on faith or morals. The word "defining" is not used here in the ordinary English sense of the word, as equivalent to "giving the meaning of," but in the sense of declaring explicitly and authoritatively.

All doctrines taught infallibly have been implicitly contained in the original deposit of the Faith; all, with perhaps no exception, have been explicitly held and acted upon by large portions of the Church; some, like the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, have been implied and embodied in the practice of the universal Church from the beginning; and yet the time had not come for their explicit and definitive declaration; but when a pressing, or at least a suitable, occasion has occurred, the true status of such doctrines has been clearly set forth by the Sovereign Pontiff. It is clear, then, that in the exercise of this prerogative there is no springing of new ideas on the Church—no "manufacturing" of dogmas out of the whole cloth.

As to the "divine assistance" enjoyed by the Pontiff, in virtue of the promise made to him in the person of St. Peter, neither the English expression nor the Latin original implies any special or personal inspiration or any kind of miraculous intervention. It is a matter of special divine guardianship over the dogmatic utterances of the head of the Church.

The Vatican decree exhibits one of the special ways in which Providence has guided the destinies of the Church as the custodian of revealed truth. The Church of Christ is infallible in its teaching; otherwise, it would not be worthy of its name. Christ has commanded us to hear it and has promised it the Spirit of truth, and hence it can teach no error. But it must teach as a unit, and hence it

must have a principle of unity. There must be a standard of right doctrine to which the whole world may appeal. That such a standard of truth has been preserved in the See of Rome has been the belief of the Church from the beginning, and the belief has been embodied in acts of the most vital consequence to the Church.

God might have ordered things differently. By a great miracle He might have preserved the Faith by the simple transmission of revealed truths from one Christian to another; or He might have confirmed in the Faith all bishops in succeeding ages, as He had done in the case of the apostles, and thus have made each bishop a virtual Pope (in that case, there would be no need of general councils as regards matters dogmatic); or He might have ordained that a general assembly of the bishops should be the ultimate referee in all matters of faith and morals. In this last case, if the Pope were eliminated, another miracle would be needed to make such a body of bishops effective without a head. If a presiding officer were chosen, it is impossible that his rulings, or his decisions, or his casting-vote, should not, directly or indirectly, affect the decrees of the assembly in matters of faith and morals—and thus he would be virtually Pope. And who but a sovereign pontiff, universally recognized as such, would be competent to determine the conditions under which the decisions of such an assembly would be infallible? Who, for instance, could decide what degree of unanimity was necessary to stamp a decree as final and infallible? As a matter of fact, the Church's councils have never been troubled by questions like these, because there never was a time when the presidency, the decisions, and the consent of the Bishop of bishops were not considered as putting the seal of apostolical sanction upon the acts of the council.

General councils, with the Pope or his delegate at their head, have been great instruments for good in the hands of Providence, but a council is an instrument that can not always be brought to bear upon situations fraught with danger to faith or morals. During the era of persecution in the early Church, an interval of nearly three centuries elapsed between the founding of the Church and the first ecumenical council, held at Nicæa in 325. During the forty-three years that have passed since the Vatican Council was obliged to discontinue its sittings, a most baneful heresy

has arisen; but during this and all such periods, the flock of Christ has not been without its shepherd.

God has not chosen the way of the miraculous for the preservation of the faith of His Church; He has appointed a visible head, the successor of Peter, to whom He has vouchsafed a special assistance to enable him to guide the Church aright. Under the direction of this special providence, the Vicar of Christ employs every possible human means to ascertain the truth. Aided by his high position, and by the combined learning of Christendom, he is enabled to take up the threads of tradition and weave them into the continuous strand of apostolic teaching. All seems very human when we confine our gaze to the work of the human instrument employed by Providence, but faith reveals the presence of the guiding hand.

Non-Catholic.—During this exposition of the Catholic doctrine, which you have had the kindness to develop for me, the idea has been gradually growing in my mind that the divine character of the Church and its consequent perfection are, perhaps, by nothing better illustrated than by the doctrine of the Papal primacy and infallibility. I am now forming a conception of a Church which never dawned upon my mind before. The divine conserving element in the Church is taking the place in my thoughts of that idea of a church which made of it no more than an assembly of minds more or less in agreement about certain truths—minds relying, it may be, on the personal guidance of the Holy Spirit, and yet ever tending to follow the most divergent paths.

Papal infallibility, I must acknowledge, has captured my intellect; maybe it will soon have my heart; though, perhaps, I shall always be at a little distance from Dr. Ward's enthusiasm for Papal decrees.

PRAGMATISM

An Old System Revamped.—Truth is neither absolute nor eternal. The truth of a proposition is to be tested by the effects it produces on the mind that considers or accepts it—and in general by its influence on life. If it brings about a readjustment of one's ideas, or changes a men-

tal attitude, or awakens a new motive of conduct, it has just that amount of truth. The truth of an idea is to be tested by how it works.

A COMMENT ON IT.—“How does it work?” is a very apt question *in the practical sphere*, and in reference to things that are *made to work* and have no reason for existing if they do not work; but in the sphere of abstract knowledge quite a different query is in order. “*Is it true?* and, if it is true, *what is the evidence* of its truth?” What we want to know is whether the thing affirmed is reality or fiction, and, if reality, on what grounds can we accept it as reality.

Once the truth is evident, it is regarded as one of the mind’s permanent acquisitions. It is a fixture in the mind, and is not regarded as an idea held only provisionally, as is the case with an unproved theory. Its reception by the mind constitutes knowledge—pure, unconditioned knowledge. In every-day language, it is *the simple truth*—which is another way of saying that it is absolute truth.

All this may seem to be too well known to need stating; but in pragmatism we are confronted with a system of thought that repudiates all absolute truth. A pragmatist regards nothing as the simple truth. No conclusion, no matter how well demonstrated, contains any reality of such an absolute nature that one can say, “This is the simple truth about the matter; here my mind can rest contented; my absolute knowledge is enriched forever by a new conquest.” No, with the pragmatist it is a matter of ever learning, never knowing. His vagrant mind travels on from one experience to another, each new experience adjusting itself as best it can to the old experiences, or modifying them, or altogether dislodging them from the mind, but never presenting or evolving an image of absolute truth in the concrete. Logical demonstrations, received axioms, first principles—these he regards as relics of the mental childhood of the race. They lead to no knowledge and their results are but makeshifts for knowledge.

But, have pragmatists at least any hope of getting at absolute truth? It is hard to say, but to judge by their very notion of truth and by their criterion of truth, if they ever did stumble on any truth they would never be

aware of the fact. Logically, as we shall see, they would have no right to declare any proposition true.

We are not aware that any pragmatist has given a formal definition of truth (it is difficult to see how he could), but some sort of foggy notion of truth may be disengaged from their enunciation and explanation of the criterion of truth. What do they regard as the criterion of truth? The formula, "A thing is true if it works well," if rightly understood, interprets the pragmatist mind on the subject. But let us endeavor to understand it. "Works well"—what is the pragmatist meaning of the phrase? Can any truth be said to work at all? In a certain sense, yes. It can influence one's thoughts or feelings. It can thus revolutionize a man's whole life. If the truth that there is an infinite and eternal God enters an atheist's mind, it may transform him, morally and intellectually, into another being and affect his existence for eternity. The truth that man has a spiritual soul, essentially differing from the life-principle in a brute, may suggest, or more than suggest, the idea of immortality, and thus a new vista may be opened up to the mind. In these and in many other ways ideas and truths "work."

The criterion is not, then, to be interpreted in any narrowly practical sense, as though it implied that a truth was to be considered such because it had a good practical bearing on the necessities or the conveniences or the pleasures of life. No, what the pragmatist means is this: Does it make any difference whatever to human thought or life whether a certain idea is true or not? Does it give one a new outlook on life, or a new point of departure in one's speculations, or a new working hypothesis? If it does, it has so much truth. A vague expression this, but it satisfies the pragmatist.

It must be at once evident to the reader that even a false idea entering a mind may make a great "difference" in the adjustment of thought and conduct, and hence that the criterion is useless for distinguishing the true from the false. A false notion of deity has made a great "difference" in pagan times and countries. A pious Greek or Roman adjusted his thoughts and behavior by his ideas concerning the gods, whom he thought himself obliged to propitiate.

The reader who is made acquainted for the first time

with the pragmatist criterion of truth will, doubtless, open his eyes in astonishment. "Does not all this imply an arbitrary dealing with the word 'truth'?" he will ask. Quite so, is our answer; nothing could be more arbitrary; the term is retained, but the old meaning thrown away. A criterion of truth which, in a given instance only shows that an idea has worked out *some result*, is a criterion neither of truth nor of anything else. What it points to is not truth, which the human race has always regarded as something fixed and always itself, but a changed, and changeable, attitude of thought or feeling.

The fact of the matter is that pragmatists despair of arriving at real truth by the methods hitherto in vogue. Logic they discard; reasoning they consider a pitfall. They are content, or resigned, to jog along the road of life with what intellectual satisfaction they may. When a new idea is presented to their minds it encounters a mass of ideas, or experiences, as they term them, already in possession, and they find some satisfaction in provisionally dovetailing the new experience with the old ones; but truth—in the sense in which most men have conceived it—well, that may or may not one day dawn on their intelligence after a long series of mental adjustments.

We have already hinted at the refutation of the system, and little more is needed. Pragmatists do not pretend to demonstrate their position. If they did, the fact would be a strange comment on the value they set upon demonstrations in general. They can only hope that pragmatism will here and there light upon minds that experience the same chaos of thought as their own and coax them along the rough highway of speculation from one stopping-place to another.

Pragmatism may seem to be a new phenomenon in the world of thought, but it is little more than a revival of old forms of skepticism which the world has discarded again and again. Twenty-four centuries ago Protagoras, the first of the sophists, talked much in the same vein as James and Schiller and Dewey in our day, on the nature and tests of truth, and, doubtless, just as cleverly. Truth, in his eyes, had no objective existence. Man, as he expressed it, was the measure of all things; and an idea was true because it found a place in some individual mind and managed to adjust itself in some fashion to the mind's previous ex-

periences. Two men might differ, but both had the truth!

But in those early days, fortunately, and indeed providentially, a genius appeared on the scene who succeeded in unraveling the tangled skein of human thought. Socrates taught men how to think to some purpose, first by clearing up their concepts of things, and then by showing them how to link their concepts together in processes of reasoning, applying, at the same time, his rules for correct thinking to specific questions, as occasions occurred.

Now, in this connection, the saying that history repeats itself is strikingly illustrated. The dialectic of Socrates, which cleared away the mists of ancient sophistry, led, more or less directly, to the founding of a system of philosophy which, purged of its errors and more fully developed, is the very system of philosophy which is recommended and prescribed as an antidote against the errors of our day by the illustrious pontiff Pope Leo XIII, and his no less illustrious successor, Pope Pius X. The peripatetic, or scholastic, philosophy, which has been held in such honor in the Catholic Church, is to-day the only safeguard, except revelation, against the rampant errors of the times.

Minus the subtleties and the (relatively) unnecessary questions discussed in a past age, the scholastic philosophy is the system taught at the end of the undergraduate course in Catholic colleges; and we who are familiar with the life of the colleges, and have followed the careers of many students after their graduation, are confident that no student of philosophy, either during his studies or long years after, has not felt reason for congratulating himself on the intellectual training he received in the study of scholastic philosophy. And this is true not only in the case of thoroughly Catholic minds, but no less in the case of non-Catholics who have been permitted to follow the course. There is a moral in this for Christian parents who care in the least to save their children from the pragmatism and the atheism that now hold sway in so many non-Catholic colleges and universities.

PRAYER AND NATURE'S LAWS

Objections.—“1. The hearing of prayers for temporal blessings would be an interference with natural laws, which science demonstrates is impossible. 2. The hearing of such prayers would involve a miracle; but it is preposterous to suppose that God works a miracle every time He grants a temporal favor.”—Professor Tyndall.

THE ANSWER.—Prayer, nature, and science are in perfect accord; but, unfortunately, certain scientists happen to know more about science than about prayer, and yet talk with equal confidence about the two. They tell us that if we pray for a temporal good—for instance, recovery from illness, an abundant harvest, the averting of a pestilence—we ask that nature's laws be interfered with; and yet the operation of nature's laws is unchangeable, as science demonstrates. Pestilences and bad harvests will come if the causes that produce such things have been set in motion.

Such is the position of a certain number of scientists who are not necessarily atheists or agnostics. Now this dictum, which is often loudly asserted and which has an air of plausibility to the half-educated, has not the smallest foothold in true science. There is no denying, of course, that in the ordinary and natural course of things, certain causes must produce certain effects. A certain condition of the atmosphere must bring on a shower of rain; certain conditions of the human system must result in disease. This is true; but the scientific critic should reflect that it may be no less true that *the natural order is subject to control from a higher order.*

Just as in the political world a municipality may have its laws and yet be subject to a suspension of its laws by a higher authority in the State, so the world of natural phenomena is subject to control at the hands of its Creator. The existence of a power above nature, or of a supernatural order, may be denied, but the denial would not be dictated by physical science, or by true science of any sort. Physical science has to do with the world of natural phenomena. What lies beyond the confines of nature must be left to the student of rational philosophy and revealed re-

ligion. But just here we are only concerned with maintaining that if a supernatural order is possible, it is not irrational to suppose that the natural order is subject to its control.

And yet there is no absolute necessity of supposing that, as a matter of fact, when God hears such prayers, He strictly interferes with the laws of nature. Granted the existence of an omnipotent God, the Author and Preserver of nature, it is rational to suppose that, even without interfering with natural laws, He can *direct their operations* to the accomplishing of His designs. If even a finite being can direct the action of a piece of mechanism invented by himself, God can do as much with the forces of nature. To suppose that an infinite Intelligence can not use for its own purposes a thing of its own creating is manifestly absurd. The further question as to *how* God directs the forces of nature need not concern us, except as a matter of theological speculation or as bearing on modes of answering objections.

But the objector is to the fore, and the question of the *how* calls for a solution. The criticism of Professor Tyndall on the practice of praying for temporal benefits of the kind we have instanced has been re-echoed by many who have even less justification for their criticism than the professor himself. Tyndall labored to prove that the hearing of a prayer for the averting of a temporal evil—say, for the warding off of a hurricane or a pestilence—would involve a miracle, and, whatever might be said about the possibility of miracles, the working of a miracle in so many cases can not be admitted by any reflecting Catholics. Catholics, he tells us, frequently pray for such favors, and yet seem to be unaware that they are asking for the miraculous. They have a vague notion that, somehow or other, God will arrange events according to their wishes. He gives two typical instances of such simple and unreasoning trust. The first is that of a young priest whom he meets at the foot of the Rhone Glacier, and who is about to perform an annual ceremony of blessing the mountain. The second is that of a Tyrolese priest, who, when he feared the bursting of a glacier-dam, offered the sacrifice of the Mass as a means of averting the calamity. Both priests, he urges, were asking for a miracle, and it must be absurd to suppose that such miracles would be granted.

The professor's criticisms may be briefly answered, and in a way regarded with favor in the schools of theology. There is no necessity of invoking the miraculous in explaining the effect of such prayers. An easier explanation is found in God's foreknowledge and providence. Before the creation of the world, God's perfect knowledge of the future enabled Him to foresee that certain prayers would be offered for temporal blessings or for the averting of temporal evils, and His infinite wisdom and power enabled Him to order events accordingly. Natural causes would produce their natural effects in due course, but God's wisdom enabled Him to predetermine the action of those causes from the beginning, so that events would occur when needed as answers to prayers. Supposing, then, that in the year of grace in which Professor Tyndall was making his reflections in the Alps, a calamity was impending which either of those priests sought to avert by their prayers: nature's course would remain undisturbed, and yet the calamity would be prevented, in consequence of the initial direction given to nature's forces by their Creator.

We can not, of course, know whether such is the actual way in which God hears such prayers; but it is a possible way, and that should be enough to satisfy science.

It was Professor Tyndall who once seriously proposed an experiment by which to test the efficacy of prayers for the sick. He suggested that a number of patients suffering from some disease well known to the medical profession should be segregated in an hospital conducted after the best modern methods and confining its treatment to that particular disease, and that then the prayers of all Christendom (at least, so far as they could be commanded by some central authority, as, for instance, the Pope's) should be concentrated upon that one hospital. After a certain number of years statistics of recoveries in that hospital might be compared with statistics for the same disease in other hospitals or in the same hospital at an earlier period.

The proposal must have seemed amusing to those who knew anything of the spirit of Christian prayer. Christians do not regard the effects of prayer as capable of being weighed, or measured, or exhibited statistically. We have no gauge in this life whereby to determine the exact extent to which our prayers are heard, whether we pray for temporal or for spiritual favors. That we are helped

by prayer we can not doubt, as our prayers are offered in obedience to the divine will. Nevertheless, the mathematics of the divine dispensation are quite beyond our powers.

Then, as regards purely mundane blessings, we pray for them always with at least the tacit proviso that the granting of the petition will be for God's glory and the good of souls. In some cases the purposes of Providence are better served by God's withholding a temporal favor than by His granting it. Prayers are often said for health, and health is not granted. The whole of Catholic Christendom has frequently been on its knees praying for the recovery of a beloved pontiff, and yet he has died. In one sense, we may trust, the prayer was heard, whilst in another it was not. It was not heard inasmuch as the pontiff was not spared; but it was heard inasmuch as it contributed to the spiritual and eternal welfare of the one for whom it was offered. Tyndall's proposed hospital might, possibly, have no better showing than other hospitals, for the reason that the ultimate benevolent designs of Providence in regard to the patients, or others, might be served better by sickness than by health. Christian confidence in prayer is nurtured much more by faith and hope than by any sensible effects following the act of petition; though, at the same time, it is no less true that in many cases God vouchsafes to the soul a certain moral assurance that the petition has been heard.

PRIMACY OF THE POPE

See "Pope, The. II—Christ's Vicar."

PROPERTY

Erroneous View.—"Private ownership is robbery."—Proudhon.

THE TRUTH.—A bold statement, this—made by communists and socialists—implying, as it does, that all the world is in possession of ill-gotten goods.

But whom have the holders of property robbed? Some one must have owned it originally—otherwise it could not have been stolen. Were the original owners single indi-

viduals, each with his own share? In that case, there was private ownership before the supposed robbery, which the opponents of private ownership can not admit. The original ownership of property must, therefore, have appertained in some way to the entire human race; and we naturally inquire in what sense and under what conditions could the ownership of the earth and its productions have been vested in the human race.

The more we inquire the more are we convinced that *there was no general ownership excluding private and individual proprietorship*, and that individual ownership was the natural, the primitive and, in the beginning, the normal form of ownership, and that by the following arguments:

Man was either created by a sovereign God or was in some way a product of the elements. The latter alternative is usually accepted by leading communists and socialists, who account for man's origin by supposing—though never proving—that man was evolved out of some lower form of life, and ultimately out of the slime of the earth. Now, if the human race was created, its right to the possession of the earth must have depended on the will of the Creator. Did the Creator, as a matter of fact, make over the earth and all it contains to the whole human race? On this point the unbelieving philosopher or economist can give us no information. The only direct indication of God's will in this matter is furnished by revelation. The Book of Genesis tells us (i. 28) that God said to the first representatives of the race: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air, etc.," and that He said to Noe and his sons, "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, etc." (ix. 1).

Now it is impossible to read either communism or socialism into the passages of Scripture just quoted. The earth, with all that it contained, was indeed given to the human race, but not necessarily to the race in its corporate capacity, to the exclusion of private and independent ownership. A thing given to a multitude of men need not be given in such a way as to constitute the multitude in its collective capacity the owner of the thing given. It may be given with the intention that each member of the multitude shall appropriate a share of the thing given,

according to his needs or according to his good pleasure. A rich man who makes a present of a case of shoes to a shoeless crowd would not think his benevolent intentions frustrated if each man in the crowd carried off the pair of shoes that fitted his feet. So, too, when God commanded the human race to take possession of the earth, the design of God could be amply fulfilled if each one, according to his needs and his opportunities, took possession of a portion of the earth and used it for his needs; and there is nothing in the texts quoted indicating that God wished to establish any other order of things. We should thus have private ownership based on priority of occupation, a title which has held good ever since.

That such was the actual intention of the Almighty may be safely concluded from the fact that both public order and individual prosperity required that the individual man should have what he could strictly and legally call his own. Personal responsibility is an element of social order, and personal responsibility is a necessary accompaniment of personal ownership. The possessing and the hope of possessing private property give a stimulus to human activities and a scope to the practice of certain virtues which would be lacking if all things were possessed in common. Moreover, the utterly impracticable character of any communistic order of things would have revealed itself in proportion as the human race spread itself over the face of the earth and when corporate ownership by the entire race would be no more than a name.

But the most direct proof that it was God's intention that men should have individual possession of this world's goods is furnished by the divine laws by which private ownership was recognized and protected. "*Thou shalt not steal*"—"Cursed be he that removeth his neighbor's landmarks"—these are well-known samples of the divine legislation protecting the property of individuals. Nay, even the coveting of one's neighbor's goods, to say nothing of the appropriating of them, was forbidden by divine law.

Even if we admitted the theory—which we can not, of course, as Christians—that man was not created, but was evolved out of some lower form of animal life, that of the ape, for instance—in that case, there could be no question of right or wrong in the matter of ownership, and robbery would be a word without a meaning. But, waiving that point

for the present, and supposing that man was developed out of the ape, the dawn of reason would not have been a sudden occurrence; it would have taken place only very gradually; nor would all men have ripened into rational beings at the same time. Some would have reached the verge of reason, when others would be left far behind. The first in the race—that is to say, the first to acquire a bit of intelligence—would have asserted his superiority over his less fortunate brethren who were still in the animal state and would have seized the choicest morsels at nature's well-furnished table; but here, again, we should have private ownership before the great robbery.

So, it appears, no case has been made out against private ownership. If private ownership is robbery the robbery must have been committed against private ownership whose title was perfectly valid—and this, on the face of it, is absurd.

PROTESTANTISM

See "Reformation, The."

PURGATORY

Protestant View.—The doctrine of purgatory is not scriptural, nor does reason find sufficient grounds for accepting it.

CATHOLIC TEACHING.—The doctrine of purgatory is so reasonable that many Protestants in our day have been obliged to face about and admit the existence of a "middle state," as they term it, a state in which are detained souls whose condition bars their immediate admission to heaven. The "middle state" does not precisely tally with our purgatory, but the doctrine is supported by arguments similar to those advanced in favor of purgatory. Very few of our separated brethren who reject and even deride the notion of purgatory can have given any very serious consideration to the grounds on which the Catholic doctrine rests. And yet very little consideration should suffice to show that the doctrine is both rational and scriptural.

According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, the

eternal lot of each one who departs from this life will be either the enjoyment of unspeakable happiness in the possession of God, or banishment from God and unspeakable misery. It will be either heaven or hell. The latter fate will immediately overtake those who die with their souls stained with grievous sin and are consequently in a state of enmity with God. Those who die free from grievous sins and in the possession of sanctifying grace, whereby they are made friends of God, will have for their portion the eternal joys of heaven. But an immediate entrance into heaven, an immediate participation of God's beatitude in the visible presence of the all-holy God Himself is impossible except for those who are entirely clean of heart and free from the slightest stain. So great is the holiness and purity of God that nothing in the least degree defiled can stand in His presence. "There shall not enter into it [heaven] anything defiled" (Apoc. xxi. 27). "Thy eyes are too pure to behold evil" (Hab. i. 13). Now, there are souls whose sins are not so great as to have deserved *eternal* punishment; and yet by reason of lesser defilement those souls are unfit to enter the presence of God. How are these souls to fare? They must be pure as the driven snow before entering heaven. Therefore they must previously pass through a state of purification, which is purgatory.

This argument, it is plain, is based upon the distinction between slight and grievous transgressions. Reason must acknowledge such a distinction, and it is borne out by Scripture. "In many things we all offend," says St. James (iii. 2). But "all" must include not only the wicked but also the just, and the sins of the just must be comparatively slight. Now if one who dies in the state of grace has not repented of all such venial offenses, his sins are not so grave as to exclude him from eternal happiness, and yet he can not carry the guilt of them into the presence of God. Sin and infinite holiness can not be such close companions for one moment, much less for eternity. Hence the sinner will be excluded from heaven till he repents of all his offenses.

But, it may be asked, can not the divine mercy cancel the guilt—or, in other words, justify the soul by the infusion of grace? Undoubtedly it can, but on condition of repentance. Now repentance is a free act; it implies a change of disposition in the will; and once the will is duly repent-

ant and turns to God, then the grace of justification is infused. If, therefore, a man pass out of this life with the guilt of lesser offenses on his soul he must repent before entering heaven.

The need of repentance supposes a *state* of guilt, and not merely the *fact* of having sinned. If one sins and is not sorry for his sin his will remains infected with the guilt of his sin, and it is only by a free act of his will that he can rid himself of the infection. This change of will must take place either here or hereafter; if hereafter, then surely in purgatory. The need of purgatory for uncanceled guilt is especially evident in the case of confirmed habits of sin. Let us suppose that a man dies who has been justly regarded as a good Christian. With all his virtues, however, he is not free from defects. Perhaps, as the French put it, he has the defects of his virtues. He has a tinge of spiritual pride, and is consequently harsh in his judgments about others. Or perhaps, living in easy circumstances, he is immoderate in his pleasures. Repentance must be brought to bear upon these dispositions, either here or hereafter; and the greater the force of habit the deeper the repentance required. The approach of death may or may not have brought him to a realization of his defects, but before he sees God he must be pure and stainless. Purgatory must do the work of cleansing which was left undone in this life.

But repentance for sin is not the only condition for reconciliation with God; *satisfaction must be rendered*, even for sin of which the guilt has been remitted. That pardon does not necessarily cancel all one's indebtedness to God and that satisfaction may have to be rendered even after pardon, should be clear to any one who knows God's ways of dealing with offenders under the Old Law. Adam was forgiven his sin, but nevertheless he was obliged henceforth to eat his bread in the sweat of his face. Moses was pardoned for his want of trust in the Almighty, but he was excluded on account of his sin from the land of promise. David was forgiven his double crime of adultery and murder, but in consequence of it he was obliged to suffer many tribulations. The idea of rendering satisfaction for sin committed is familiar to the history, the literature and the practice of religion under the Old and New Testaments.

God is merciful, and He turns not away from the sinner when the sinner turns to Him in a repentant spirit; but it

is His very mercy that prompts Him to bring home to the sinner the gravity of his sin; for sin is not only an offense against the Divine Majesty but at the same time the greatest evil that can befall the human soul.

That God is rigorous in exacting satisfaction for sin we may gather from the words of Our Lord reported by St. Matthew (v. 25, 26). "Be at agreement with thy adversary betimes, whilst thou art in the way with him; lest perhaps the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Amen I say to thee, *thou shalt not go out from thence till thou repay the last farthing.*"

And yet, how many can be said to have made full and complete satisfaction for their sins before leaving this life? Evidently, then, there must be a state after death in which the soul pays its debts to the last farthing; and this state we call purgatory.

As to the nature of the punishment inflicted in purgatory, there is no dogmatic teaching of the Church on the subject, but the more common teaching of theologians is that it consists in the endurance of fire. In this sense the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 15) may be interpreted: "He himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." It is a well-grounded opinion of some leading Catholic theologians that purgatorial suffering far exceeds in severity any of the sufferings of this life. It is natural that in the next life God should be doubly rigorous in dealing with those who have been less diligent in this life in atoning for their transgressions.

We have seen what reason and Scripture have to say on the subject of purgatory; but the undoubted teaching of God's Church from the beginning of its history furnishes a no less cogent argument in favor of the Catholic doctrine. The voice of antiquity is decidedly against the teaching of the Reformers; and if so, we would ask any candid Protestant reader of these pages whether he can feel it safe to hold an opinion which is contradicted by testimonies derived from an age when the doctrine and the practice of the Church are acknowledged to have been of the purest.

In recent times the pickax and the spade have brought to light in the catacombs of Rome memorials of early Christian life which to many of our separated brethren will be quite a revelation. There on the walls and tombs of those ancient Christian cemeteries is depicted much of the devo-

tional life of the Church, and it is found to coincide exactly with that of the Catholic Church of to-day. Indeed, Catholics feel quite at home in such places. Now, among these monuments of ancient Catholic devotion are inscriptions in abundance containing *prayers for the dead*—prayers that the departed souls may soon be admitted into paradise, and the like. Why prayers for the souls of the dead if there was no need of prayers? We may add that it is a well-known historical fact that on the anniversaries of deaths the friends of the dead used to assemble at their tombs and offer prayers for the repose of their souls.

And lest any one may think that the customs to which the catacombs bear witness were only a matter of personal devotion, tolerated at the best—though the number of the inscriptions should dispel the thought—Providence has preserved for us numerous testimonies to the doctrine and practice of the Church in the writings of the Fathers and in the ancient liturgies. Can any witness be clearer in his testimony or send more weight with it than St. Augustine when he says, "Some there are who have departed this life not so bad as to be deemed unworthy of mercy, nor so good as to be entitled to *immediate* happiness"? What but the Catholic doctrine can be embodied in the words of St. Ambrose publicly pronounced at the departure from this life of the Emperor Theodosius: "I will not leave him till by my prayers and lamentations he shall be admitted unto the holy mount of the Lord"?

And what shall we say to the following statements of St. Cyprian? "It is one thing," he says, "to hope for pardon, and another to enter into glory; to be thrown into prison, and not to be allowed to go out from thence until one has paid the last farthing, or at once to receive the reward of our faith and virtue. It is one thing to atone for sin by long-enduring sufferings and to be cleansed by fire, and another thing to have all our sins washed away by martyrdom. It is one thing to hope for a favorable sentence, another thing to receive at once the crown from the judge."

These are only specimens of the teaching of the Fathers. One would be quite puzzled to know how such clear and explicit testimonies either should not be known to Protestant readers or should fail to produce conviction if we were not aware of the practice of Protestant apologists, who pass over in silence such testimonies as we have produced in favor of the Catholic doctrine, and then fasten upon

some obscure or irrelevant passage in the writings of a few of the Fathers which might be thought to tell against the existence of purgatory. If Saints Ambrose, Augustine, and Cyprian were placed in a witness-box and made to state before a jury of average intelligence their belief in regard to a middle state after death, could they be much clearer in favor of the Catholic teaching than they are in the above passages?

We shall add with Cardinal Wiseman that "there is not a single liturgy existing, whether we consider the most ancient period of the Church or the most distant part of the world, in which this doctrine is not laid down. In the oriental liturgies we find parts appointed in which the priest or bishop is ordered to pray for the souls of the faithful departed; and tables were anciently kept in the churches, called *Diptychs*, on which the names of the deceased were enrolled, that they might be remembered in the sacrifice of the Mass and the prayers of the faithful."

Is it not clear, then, that the rejection of the doctrine of purgatory by the Reformers was the rejection of a teaching of God's Church—a Church which, according to St. Paul, is "the pillar and ground of truth"? And has not the silencing of prayers for the dead been the closing up of a fountain of mercy in the Church, of which faith and natural affection would avail themselves, as they do in point of fact in the Catholic Church, in behalf of those who are still dear to us in the life beyond the grave?

And now a word before closing about a certain scriptural argument in favor of purgatory which to Catholics is, and must be, conclusive, but which to Protestants is unacceptable. In the Second Book of Machabees (xii. 43-46) we are told that Judas Machabeus "sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice to be offered for the sins of the dead, thinking well and religiously concerning the resurrection . . . and because he considered that they who had fallen asleep with godliness had great grace laid up for them." The sacred writer adds: "*It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins.*" This statement both of fact and of doctrine furnishes, to a Catholic, proof positive of the existence of purgatory; but it is useless to quote it to a Protestant, because the Protestant churches exclude the books of the Machabees from the canon of the Scriptures. Regarding them as not inspired, they do not accept

their statements of fact or of doctrine as the word of God. We shall not stop to quarrel with Luther and Calvin for having, on their own private authority, rejected one of the sacred books which the Church had always included in the canon. But granted that the Second Book of Machabees is not in the canon and can not be cited as an inspired writing, it still has considerable weight as a historical document. It throws no little light upon the belief and practice of the chosen people of God—or at least of by far the larger and better portion of them. For if the great and good leader of the Jewish nation and its high priest could thus proclaim his belief in an intermediate state after death, at a time when the Law was well observed, and if he was seconded by the historian, in whose narration there is nothing to indicate that the idea was a novel one, the testimony of the Second Book of Machabees to the acceptance of the doctrine of purgatory by the people of God is of no little value; and thus the voice of antiquity is reinforced in its witness against the innovations of the sixteenth century. Besides, it is a fact well known from other sources that the Jews have had the custom of praying for their dead.

It is evident, then, that the Catholic doctrine rests firmly on the basis of history, reason, and Scripture.

The objection is sometimes urged, though we hope not very seriously, against the Catholic doctrine, that it contradicts the words of Ecclesiastes: "If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there it shall be" (xi. 3). The words are interpreted as meaning that death settles a man's fate for eternity. It is either heaven or hell, and consequently there is no room for purgatory. But we see no necessity of running the metaphor into the ground. The way in which a man's *eternal* destiny is settled by a good or a bad death may well be compared to the way in which the position of a fallen tree depends on the direction of its fall; but an eternal destiny is not less eternal, or less final, because of a temporary delay in its accomplishment—any more than the general position of a tree on the ground is less determined by the direction of its fall, even though in falling it should have rested a few moments on the edge of a roof. But, aside from the metaphor, if the text quoted disproves purgatory, it disproves limbo as well. Are the critics of the Catholic doctrine ready to sacrifice limbo as well as purgatory?

RATIONALISM

Objection.—I follow the light of my reason. I can not be forced to admit what I can not understand. Why was my reason given me?

THE ANSWER.—You always follow the light of your reason? Well, does not your reason tell you that it is reasonable to admit many things which you do not understand yourself, but which others do understand?

Faith (which is the same thing as belief) is eminently reasonable. The child believes his parents; the pupil believes his teacher. Neither the child nor the pupil may be able to demonstrate that the earth revolves about the sun; but they believe it, none the less; and they are right in their belief. They believe in the moons of Jupiter, though they have never seen them. Every day of our lives we believe what is said by trustworthy men. We believe, among other things, the well-established facts of history.

It is thus we are brought to a belief in the existence of Christ, which is an undeniable historical fact; in the miracles of Christ, for the Gospels contain an authentic record of them; in Christ's mission, for He proved His mission by His miracles. Of course, if you hold miracles to be impossible, you will probably not believe in Christ's mission. But miracles are possible, and Christ did actually work miracles. Reason can say nothing against either statement. Follow your reason, by all means. (See "Miracles" and "Christ's Divinity.")

Christ declares He is the Son of God; He says He is eternal, as the Father is (John xvii. 5); He says He is all-powerful (John x. 28); He places Himself on a level with the Father, as in the formula of Baptism (Matt. xxviii. 19). Christ has made known to us certain truths in the name of His Father. These truths we must believe, because they are taught us by Christ. What God reveals is absolute truth.

If Christ the Son of God teaches that there is a heaven, we believe Him. If He teaches there is an eternal hell, that we must observe the Ten Commandments, that a man is judged by his works, that there is one God in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, if He teaches that Baptism is necessary, that we must believe all that God has

revealed, that He is corporeally present in the Sacrament of the Altar, if He teaches all this we believe Him, even if we can not understand all. When God has imparted to us truths which we can not understand, it is reasonable to believe in them, no matter how mysterious they may be to us. This He has done through the medium of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

Follow your reason, and we shall have no fear for your welfare, temporal or eternal.

REFORMATION, THE

Protestant Position.—The Reformation was “the restoration of the Church to the primitive truth and power of the Gospel of the Redemption.” It has been a source of manifold blessings. To call it a revolution or a rebellion is to slander it.

ITS REPUTATION.—1. The Reformation was a revolt against divinely constituted authority. 2. By substituting private judgment for authoritative teaching it rendered unity of doctrine impossible, and hence aimed a blow at the existence of the Church itself. 3. Its logical and historical outcome is rationalism. 4. It has been the fountain-source of many social evils.

A dilemma: When the Reformers made their appearance in Europe the Church of Christ either still existed or it did not. If it no longer existed, the promises of Christ had been made in vain. He had promised Peter that the gates of hell should never prevail against His Church (Matt. xvi. 18). The gates of hell must have actually prevailed against it and destroyed it. He had promised the apostles (Matt. xxviii. 20): “Behold, I am with you [in your discharge of the office of preaching the word] all days, even to the consummation of the world,” *i.e.*, to the end of time. Christ must have ceased to be with His apostles or their successors, and the Church must have become a purely human society.

And not only His promises, but also His prayers must have been ineffectual. “And I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever, the Spirit of truth” (John xiv. 16-18).

If His prayer was not heard the Church was no longer inspired by the Spirit of truth.

But neither the promises nor the prayer of Christ could have failed of their object.

Therefore, *the Church of Christ still existed*. It was still the divinely appointed custodian of revealed truth; its claim to obedience was unquestionable; its visible teaching authority remained intact; *in all its essentials* it must have remained such as Christ had constituted it.

It was not, however, necessarily perfect in all respects. The Church had a human side to it, and on its human side it was open to defect. Even before Our Lord's ascension human weakness or human passion had asserted itself in two of the chosen twelve. The Church could remain true to its mission and yet include in its fold many an unworthy member. Christ and His Holy Spirit could still abide with the Church *as a body*, even though many of its members were but dead branches on the living tree of the Church.

Therefore, when Luther and his fellow-reformers made their appearance, the Church of Christ still existed and its rulers were still the accredited representatives of Christ. Any attempt to destroy their authority must be an attempt to destroy the work of God.

And this was the general belief of Christians at that period. There had been, it is true, opponents of the authority of the teachers and rulers of the Church, but their very opposition stamped them as unchristian. The touchstone of orthodoxy was submission to authority.

Luther himself did not begin with direct opposition to Church authority. He began by preaching his peculiar doctrines on faith and good works, even before his outbreak at Wittenberg¹; and in proportion as he became wedded to his own opinions and found himself a popular leader with numerous followers, then, seeing that the Holy See repudiated his doctrines, he forthwith repudiated the Holy See. But that, we repeat, was not his first position.

Even after the publication of his Ninety-five Theses, in 1517, he frequently declared that he would remain subject to the Pope and the Church. Separation from the Church he had, in all probability, not dreamed of. As

¹Cf. Janssen, *History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages*, vol. iii, pp. 86-89, for documentary proof of the above assertion.

late as 1519 he said, in reference to the Hussites, that "he had never countenanced a schism and never in his life would." In the same year he again wrote apropos of the Hussites the following words: "No provocation is great enough, or can become great enough, to justify one in separating himself from the Church"—and the following: "No manner of sin or evil of which we can form any conception can justify any one in an attempt to sever the bond of Christian charity or destroy religious unity."²

It is only too evident, therefore, that when he afterward persisted in preaching his peculiar doctrines in defiance of the Pope and the bishops, he was guilty of a revolt against divinely constituted authority. But, in following this course of conduct, he was only treading in the footsteps of most other would-be reformers from the beginning of the history of the Church. Opposition to ecclesiastical authority was not usually the first step. The die was cast and open revolt begun only when the personal views of the reformers were formally rejected by the Church. The touchstone of submission was applied and they were found wanting.

When divine authority was gone human judgment stepped into its place. It was no longer the Church that taught and governed in the name of Christ. Each self-constituted reformer—and very soon their name was legion—sought to impose his own personal opinions on the multitude. Authority of some kind had to be assumed, and hence we find Martin Luther placing himself on a level with St. Paul. "My teaching shall be called in question by no one, not even by angels. Whosoever refuses to accept my teaching shall not be saved."

But no assumption of personal authority could ever avail to preserve unity of doctrine among those who had rejected the one infallible authority established by Christ. Before Luther finished his career, he saw the Reform split up into numerous sects, each of them hurling anathemas at all the rest. To-day the sects are numbered by the hundred, though practically each individual is a law to himself in the matter of religion. Outside the Catholic Church, unity of faith has vanished forever. There is no basis

²Ibid, p. 28.

for unity, as private judgment and corporate uniformity must ever be at variance.

But the dissolution of unity was not the only evil effect of the abandonment of divinely constituted authority. Protestant individualism is chiefly responsible for the origin and growth of modern rationalism. The exaggerated claims of reason and the ignoring of all authority in the matter of religion were the natural outcome of Protestantism. When a Catholic becomes a rationalist, it is because he has neglected and forfeited his gift of faith. When a Protestant becomes a rationalist, it is because he is more logical than his fellows. When Protestantism discarded the authority of the Church, it still held to the authority of Scripture, but even the authority of Scripture has been gradually disappearing under the solvent of private judgment.

If private judgment can get rid of the authority of the Church, there is no reason why it can not get rid of the authority of Scripture.

What possible pledge can it have that Scripture is the word of God? The Church is gone, and yet the Church was the only legitimate custodian of Scripture. Hence, Scripture has fallen from the high place it once occupied as the inspired record of God's dealings with men. It ranks no higher than any other narrative of past events. Criticism can play fast and loose with its statements; entire books can be discarded; its most important records of God's revelation can be reasoned out of existence. Finally, all belief in revelation must disappear from the mind and leave at best a residue of deism. The rationalistic deism that infected so many English minds in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which afterward, through the English philosophers, so profoundly influenced French thought among the contemporaries of Voltaire, and thus helped to precipitate the great atheistic Revolution which closed the eighteenth century, was the direct offspring of English Protestantism. The rationalism that infects Germany to-day, and extends its influence to America, has sprung from the bosom of German Evangelicalism. It would be safe to assert that every second or third professor of theology in northern Germany handles Scripture, tradition, and the Fathers in a rationalistic spirit. Many of

them retain little or nothing of positive belief that entitles them to be strictly called Christians of any type.

As to the manifold blessings attributed to the Reformation, it would be difficult to imagine any single blessing due to the Reformation *as such*. Whatever blessings it has conferred are due to the remnant of Christianity which it has handed on from the old Catholic days. Its own distinctive work and influence have been fraught with evils rather than with blessings. Religious discord is not a blessing; neither is rationalism. During the Middle Ages there was at least one bond of union between the nations of Europe—a common faith. To-day national animosity is everywhere intensified by religious hatred.

To the Reformers we owe the spirit of revolution which has so often convulsed modern society. Revolt against the highest authority on earth at once set the pace to malcontents of every description and in every clime. It is to the lax principles of the Reformation that we owe the secularization of education which is bearing such lamentable fruit in our own country to-day. It is to the Reformation that we owe the violation of the sanctity of marriage by divorce and by laws permitting and legalizing divorce. In contrast to this, the Catholic Church is the one power on earth which consistently and uncompromisingly takes its stand on religious education and the inviolability of marriage.

It is to the weak and ineffective authority exercised by the churches of the Reform over their individual members, and to the small sense of obligation in the members themselves, that we must attribute the wholesale abandonment of public worship in the United States which has become one of our national scandals. There are probably fifty-five million persons in the United States who have no connection with any religious denomination and are never seen within the walls of a church!

These are some of the evils that have followed in the wake of Luther's Reformation.

RELICS

See "Saints" and "Superstition."

RELIGION, A CHANGE OF

Objections.—"To change one's religion, or even one's communion, is a very serious and solemn, nay a very awful, step to take, whatever that religion may be."—R. F. Littledale. And why should I become a Roman Catholic? Is it possible that all those hard things I have heard said against the Roman Catholics have no foundation? And why should I leave a religion that has afforded me so much help and consolation? And then, too, Providence has placed me under the guidance of spiritual directors who bid me quiet my fears and remain where I am: what warrant should I have for rejecting their counsel?

THE ANSWER.—But *whence* those fears? If you derive so much help and consolation from your present religion, whence your misgivings? Is it not true that you see strong reasons for abandoning your religion, however much help and consolation it may have yielded? The greatest help you can receive in your journey to eternity is that which shall place you on the right way, no matter what consolation you may feel in traveling on the wrong way.

The question of questions to be considered by any of our separated brethren whose minds are not quite at rest about their religion, is not whether there is some good, or even much good, in the religion of their birth, but whether there is not another religion to which it is their duty to belong—the question of help and consolation being left to that Providence of whose dispositions they make so much in their present anxious situation.

It has unfortunately been the habit of recent controversialists, particularly those of the "higher" Anglican type, to confuse the issue, in their attempt to stop the stream of conversions flowing Romeward. Dr. Littledale, for instance, is careful to remind the wavering that nothing can justify their becoming Catholics but a reasonable belief that they shall be obeying God's will *better* and shall know *more* truth about Him than formerly. But, as Dr. Ryder reminds him, these are just *not* the points to be considered. It is not a question of obeying God's will *better*,

but of obeying it at all; nor of knowing *more* truth about *Him*, but of knowing *the* truth about *His Church*. It is a question of the *esse*, not of the *bene esse*—in other words, of simply *being* in the Church of God, and not of being *well* or *ill* in it—though well-being will necessarily follow admission into the Church, if one coöperates with grace.

Writers of this school, in order to show that converts to "Romanism" will not be better off as "Romanists," work upon their fears by exhibiting all the abuses, real or imaginary, that have ever been laid at the door of the Church, and, of course, never a word about the work of sanctification that has been wrought and still is being wrought in its members by the Church, or of the peace of mind which thousands upon thousands have experienced on entering the Church.

Controversy on questions of dogma, moral, or history may be prolonged indefinitely, and with a degree of plausibility, by a clever anti-Catholic disputant; but there is one thing that should at least give him pause, and that is the explanation of the fact that countless men and women—many of them of the first order of intelligence—whose thoughts and judgments about Rome had been steeped in prejudice as deep as Doctor Littledale's, have at length, by becoming Catholics, entered what has been for them to the end of their days the City of Peace. The number of those who have not found such contentment, or who have returned to the City of Confusion, might almost be counted on the fingers of both hands.

Another mode of working on the fears of those who are looking Romeward is to enlarge upon the tremendous importance of the step they are tempted to take. The opening sentence of Doctor Littledale's "Plain Reasons Against Joining the Church of Rome" (quoted above) furnishes a typical instance of this species of rhetoric. We call the reader's attention to the climactic arrangement of epithets. "To change one's religion," he says, "or even one's communion, is a very serious and solemn, nay, a very awful step to take, whatever that religion may be." We shall not take him too literally in the last clause, "whatever that religion may be," for we can hardly suppose he would deliver a sentence like the one we are quoting to the idolatrous natives of the Zambesi, endeavoring to impress them

deeply with a sense of the awful responsibility they were assuming in becoming Christians.

But Rome is more of a bugaboo. Imagine the effect of these words on the timorous conscience of one who looks to his Anglican pastor for guidance in a matter which is, we admit, certainly important. Though, really, I fancy that here and there an Anglican reader of the book would retain sufficient coolness of judgment to see that where it is a question of escaping from a flood and getting into some ark of salvation, it is not the awfulness of the step that would impress one so much as its absolute necessity as a means of self-preservation. As a matter of fact, a thought that often visits the minds of converts is that of the awful risk they had incurred *by remaining so long outside the Church of God.*

No less mischievous is the effect of another device of the controversialist, that, namely, of harping perpetually on the fact that Providence has placed Anglicans where they are, and that, consequently, there is a presumption in favor of their remaining there. "On the face of things," Dr. Littledale goes on to say, "this step at least looks like revolt against God's will, since we were born and reared in our first creed without any act or choice of our own, and just as He was pleased to ordain for us." A sweet and consoling thought it is that Providence has placed us where we are. We shall not have a word to say against an Anglican's appreciation of the work of Providence in placing him in a communion which retains so much of Catholic truth. We are only anxious that full justice be done the work of Providence, which has placed many Anglicans in a communion in which it is natural for them to have serious doubts whether, after all, Anglicanism is no more than a halfway-house on the road to Rome—doubts which they must resolve, and which they can certainly resolve by the aid of ordinary logic and the grace of God.

And this brings us to the consideration of the true logical bearings of the situation in the case of the doubting ones. Many honest inquirers are seriously hindered by the complexity which they throw into the problem. They seek an answer to many questions, whereas there is only one. They are exercised by the question of infallibility, or by the abuses of the Roman court in past centuries, or by the

reverence of relics; and they pass in a bewildered, perhaps a despondent, state of mind from one to another of these subjects and make little or no progress toward the truth. The one great question that should occupy their attention is, *Where shall I find a Church which is divinely commissioned to lead me and others into the way of salvation; a Church, therefore, which speaks in the name of Christ and with a consciousness of divine authority?*

And this is not only the leading question, but the one most easily solved. The great outlines of the Church of God are clearly enough exhibited in Holy Writ; and one great distinguishing feature of the Church was that it was to go forth and announce the Gospel with all the authority of Him who sent it on its mission. Ponder the following words:

"Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20).

The apostles and their successors, even to the consummation, or end, of the world, were to teach in the name of Christ, and, therefore, with a claim to authority. And the perpetuity of their authority, as well as of their teaching, was to be sealed by the perpetual presence of Christ in their midst.

And, again: "He that heareth you heareth Me; and he that despiseth you despiseth Me" (Luke x. 16). Moreover, the Paraclete was to abide with them forever (John xiv. 16, 18); and He was to teach them all truth bearing on man's salvation (John xvi. 13).

And we find the apostles actually exercising this authority as the teachers and rulers of the Church. They act as the vicegerents of Christ and speak in no faltering tones. Notably, at the general assembly of the apostles and ancients in Jerusalem, does this consciousness of authority distinguish their utterances. After deciding the question that has brought them together, they write to Antioch and the other places concerned, saying, among other things: "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost, *and us*, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things" (Acts xv. 28).

It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and us!

The same confident sense of authority is seen in the teaching of the disciples and successors of the apostles, as their acts are reported in the writings of those who are known as the apostolic Fathers. Indeed, there is no age of the Church in which the successors of the apostles have not spoken in the most clear and decided tones. Now, the Church must always be found teaching with the same authority; otherwise she would fail of her mission; she would not be the "pillar and ground of truth"; the "gates of hell" would have prevailed against her, contrary to the promise of her divine Founder; Christ would have ceased to be with His Church, whereas He promised to be with her to the end of time; the Holy Ghost, "the spirit of truth," whose presence in the Church was pledged by Our Lord Himself, would have departed from her.

The inquirer after the truth is, therefore, confronted with these two alternatives: he must either consider Christ's promises as worthless, or acknowledge that there is still a Church on earth speaking infallibly in His name and with His authority.

And now the problem should be much simplified. The application of the above dilemma may be made thus: 1. It is admitted on all hands that the Church commonly called Catholic, the Church subject to the See of Rome, was founded by Our Lord Jesus Christ. 2. *It is the only church that speaks with authority* and requires absolute submission to its teaching. Other churches are little more than schools of opinion, with a certain amount of external organization, and requiring a certain degree of external conformity. Not one of them lays claim to absolute authority; most of them boast of the absence of it; all of them acknowledge, at least virtually, that the message they are delivering to the world admits of indefinite amendment. The conclusion is inevitable: Therefore, the Roman Church is the Church of the apostles, the Church of Christ.

The conclusion we have reached is, of course, fatal to all branch theories; for any so-called branch of the true Church which repudiates the principle of authority, and refuses to place itself in communion with, and in submission to, the one Church speaking with authority, is a branch of the true Church only in name.

Other aspects of the Church's life and mission may in-

deed present themselves to inquiring minds, and many indeed are the legitimate avenues of approach by which serious minds have made their way back to the Church of their fathers; but the ultimate synthesis of all modes of reasoning other than the one we have proposed will be found in the divine credentials of the teaching authority of the Church.

And now one word as to the position of those individual souls who have placed their destinies in the hands of their spiritual guides and find no warrant for rejecting their advice. God forbid that we should wantonly inspire distrust where confidence is reposed with such edifying submission of spirit, and doubtless, too, with much spiritual profit. We should fear that the attempt to do so might recoil upon ourselves. Nevertheless, we see a vast difference between the position of a Catholic and that of an Anglican confessor. In matters bearing on the Faith, the Catholic director of consciences can speak in the name of a Church which teaches with authority, whereas the non-Catholic director can do no more than repeat the formulas of his Church and defend them, if he finds it in his conscience to do so. For the rest, *if he is consistent with his own theological principles*, he can only say: "Follow your lights. Read, inquire, pray. Don't allow anything to keep you from embracing the truth—no, not even the necessity of consulting a Catholic priest."

These last words may fall unpleasantly on the ears of the Anglican or the Evangelical director of consciences, but they reflect his true position. Any attempt to coerce the conscience of a penitent, or even to discourage him from entering the path of free inquiry, is morally wrong on Anglican and Evangelical principles.

RELIGION

IS IT A PRIVATE AFFAIR?

See "Socialism IV—Its Bearings on Religion."

RESURRECTION OF CHRIST, THE

Objections.—1. The disciples of Christ, in thinking He had risen from the dead, were laboring under an hallucination. Their minds were

so filled with the thought of the Master that faith and imagination combined to create an image of His living humanity, which they took for the reality.—Pfleiderer, Strauss et al. 2. The story of the Resurrection can not be accepted as authentic because the number and order of succession of the Lord's apparitions to His disciples can not be ascertained with certainty.—Harnack.

THE ANSWER.—On no other subject connected with Our Lord's earthly career has the ingenuity of critics been more busily exercised than upon His resurrection from the dead; and their critical zeal is the best proof of the crucial character of the question of the Resurrection. The sovereign importance of the dogma of the Resurrection is recognized by every Christian. "If Christ be not risen again," says St. Paul, "your faith is vain, for you are yet in your sins" (1 Cor. xv. 17). But an all-wise Providence has brought it to pass that no other fact in history has been better attested and no attempts at disproving Christian dogma have covered critics with half as much ridicule as the effort to reduce the history of the Resurrection to a myth.

The books of the New Testament have had the same good fortune—though it was more than good fortune—as Christianity itself, inasmuch as both came into being in a period of the world's existence when any important event, if it took place at all, could never be buried in obscurity or be lost beneath a mass of legendary lore. The world had become more of a unit by the intercommunication of its parts, and more than ever, as a unit, had learned to transmit its written records to succeeding ages. Two great languages, which divided the civilized world between them, to wit, the Latin and the Greek, became the twin channels by which the thoughts of one people were conveyed to all the others. Hence Christianity, which in its essence is a world-religion, and the sacred documents, or "Scriptures," which emanated from it, have come down to us, not obscured and deformed by time, but in all their original integrity and bearing the same intrinsic relation to each other as in the days of the apostles. We are, of course, describing only a partial cause, and that, too, under Providence, of the perpetuation of Christianity and its sacred writings.

The books of the New Testament, taken in the gross, are accepted, even by most of the "higher critics," as the genuine writings of the apostles and their immediate disciples, and, so far as they are historical, as credible narratives of facts connected with the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. Many of the "higher critics" have indeed impugned the genuineness of the fourth Gospel, which from the earliest centuries has been ascribed to St. John the Beloved Disciple; but their acceptance of the first three, or the synoptic Gospels, is quite sufficient so far as we are concerned. The synoptics contain more than enough to establish the fact of the Resurrection. But the critics, whilst admitting the genuineness of the Gospels, assail the Christian interpretation of them. As to the Resurrection, whilst crediting the evangelists with honesty of intention, they consider them the dupes of their own imagination.

Several of these hostile criticisms are so utterly baseless—in some cases so utterly silly—that it is only extrinsic considerations that entitle them to any consideration at the hands of a serious apologist. Take, for instance, the view of the Resurrection defended by Pfeiderer, a writer whose superficial books on great subjects are unfortunately finding their way into English. The illusion of the apostles regarding the Resurrection, he tells us, was a psychological fact "to which history furnishes countless parallels, the miraculous character of which consists in nothing more than the creative force of a faith and a love which are stronger than death." In other words, the faith of the disciples was so lively and their love so ardent as to produce in their imaginations an image of their Lord so lifelike as to persuade them that they beheld Him with their bodily eyes. It is a wonder that the very penning of such a statement was not enough to make it seem ridiculous before the ink was dry on the paper.

In lieu of the "countless parallels" furnished by history, where, we ask, is there one solitary parallel to the series of supposed delusive apparitions recorded by the evangelists? To suppose that, not one, but many persons—not in their sleeping, but in their waking hours—fancied, merely fancied—on many distinct occasions, and all at the same time and in the same way, at intervals during a period of exactly forty days and not a day longer, that they saw with their bodily eyes one who had risen from the dead—heard Him

speaking, listened to His instructions, took food with Him, felt His presence with the sense of touch, and finally saw Him mount into the skies—to suppose that all this was the work of pure imagination is to exhibit in oneself a psychological phenomenon no less remarkable than the supposed delusion of the disciples of Jesus.

And what possible warrant is there for supposing that the faith of the disciples was in such a state of exaltation? Their very lack of faith was so great as to deserve the reproaches of the divine Master. His efforts to revive their faith and the devices He so condescendingly employed for this purpose furnish some of the most touching passages in the four Gospels. "We hoped," said two of them despondingly as they were retiring from the scene of their great disappointment, "we hoped that it was He that should have redeemed Israel; and now . . . to-day is the third day since these things were done." The third day? Why, that was the very day on which their faith and their imagination should have been liveliest; and yet it is the day on which their despondency reaches its height and their faith was all but entirely eclipsed. The incredulity of the disciples is indeed one of the most striking features of the history of the Resurrection.

Even Harnack, the cynosure of German evangelical theologians, is found in the benches of the opposition. Harnack finds it difficult to make out of the four Gospel narratives one clear story in which the number and the order of occurrence, of Our Lord's apparitions are given with perfect clearness; hence he rejects the four narratives in the lump, as furnishing no satisfactory evidence of the Resurrection.

Strange, that a man of Professor Harnack's caliber should take up an attitude of mind so utterly illogical. If his argument is conclusive we might with as much reason infer from the fact that the precise number and order of Julius Cæsar's expeditions to ancient Germany can no longer be ascertained with exactness that he really never set foot in Germany. And yet no one questions Cæsar's having been in Germany.

Let the reader suppose that four persons come to him, one after the other, and give him a somewhat detailed account of a series of important happenings, all tending to prove and illustrate a certain fact. Let him suppose, fur-

ther, that a few of the details in one narrative can not easily be made to fit in with certain details in the others. Not that there is any manifest contradiction, but that there is a trifle of mystery as to how certain incidents could be made to dovetail together in a single account of the whole transaction. Now, if the mysterious element should be dropped altogether out of the narrative, and yet an abundance of evidence of the main fact remained, it would be quite illogical to infer from the mysteriousness of the part eliminated the uncertainty of the part retained.

And yet this is precisely what Professor Harnack does with the accounts of the four evangelists. It is not clear to his mind how the incidents are to be arranged chronologically, or how the journey or journeys of the holy women to the sepulcher are to be made to harmonize; and for these and similar reasons he rejects the entire story; and yet the story in all its other aspects is simply overwhelming as furnishing evidence of the Resurrection and of the subsequent apparitions. Every species of testimony is supplied. Our Lord's disciples see Him frequently, speak with Him and in some cases hold long conversations with Him, take food with Him, and at His own pressing invitation touch His hands and feet or His side.

If the multitude and the variety of the details are so convincing, the special and unlooked-for character of some of them would alone be convincing if unsupported by the other incidents. We refer to those which exhibit the incredulity of the disciples and the repeated efforts of their Lord to remove it. Here, as elsewhere, the perfect artlessness of the story and the air of guileless sincerity as well as of objective reality that pervade it have succeeded in breaking down the objections of those who had begun by endeavoring to demolish either the genuineness or the authenticity of the Gospel narratives, but were ultimately obliged to make a change of position, which only revealed the inherent weakness of their main contention.

The palpable weakness of the case made out by such able men as Harnack can be explained only by the fact that their minds are constantly playing at cross-purposes. Accepting, on the one hand, the Gospels as genuine, they are committed, on the other, to philosophical dogmas which make them quite incapable of seeing in the Gospels what would otherwise obtrude itself upon their notice. If they

could only reduce the Gospels to those inferior types of sacred books of the East which have come down to us out of a nebulous past and bear upon them only obscure marks of their origin, the task of demolishing the evidence for the Resurrection would be a much simpler one; but the books of the New Testament can never be relegated to such a category of sacred writings. They shine both by their own intrinsic light and by the light of all modern history. And yet their obvious message is obscure to those whose minds are warped by an antecedent prejudice against the supernatural, and especially the miraculous. The Resurrection, if it was a fact, was a miracle; but miracles are impossible; therefore—for Harnack and his compeers—darkness in the midst of light!

Two other objections to the Resurrection deserve only a passing notice, as they receive to-day but little countenance from those who would gladly avail themselves of them if the objections had any force. The one is that Our Lord never rose from the dead, because He had not really died. His apparent death was followed by a revival of bodily strength during His entombment. The other is that the story of the apparitions was a deliberate fabrication of the disciples of Jesus. A thoughtful and unprejudiced reading of the Gospels will convince the reader that neither of these assertions has the smallest foundation in fact. If there is anything for which Providence has provided in connection with the life of the Saviour it is a superabundance of evidence bearing on the reality of His humanity and of His passion and death. As for anything like wilful imposture practised by the apostles, the theory refutes itself so easily that few authors of any reputation in our day subscribe to it. (See "Christ's Divinity.")

RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD, THE

Objection.—It is chemically impossible that men's bodies should rise from their graves; for the same chemical elements have passed in succession into different human bodies. How can they be assigned to individual bodies at the Resurrection? A human corpse decays; in the course of time it becomes a fertilizer for grass;

the grass is eaten by a cow; the cow finally becomes food for men.

THE ANSWER.—Our scientific critic of the doctrine of the Resurrection is thinking of a sort of clearing-house process which is going to baffle the divine wisdom because the conditions of the problem make it impossible of solution. I can not rise with the identical body which I have in this life because others, doubtless, who will have died before me will lay claim to the chemical elements of my bodily composition; and those claimants will be confronted with still others, to whom they will have to surrender all that they have taken from me.

This objection has been seriously urged; but what an amount of assumption it is built upon! Among other things, it takes for granted that on the last day the confusion described above must be universal, and that *no* human body can be identified as simply belonging to this or that individual man. But why assume so much? If particles of carbon are found to-day in any living human body and a few generations hence in the grass of the fields, and still later in some other human organism, it does not follow that at the Resurrection *each and every* human body will be unable to claim anything simply and absolutely as its own, or, in other words, will have lost its identity. Indeed *it can not be proved that any single body will have lost its identity.*

What, after all, constitutes the identity of a human organism? It is scientifically certain that in any given human body not a single atom remains of those which it contained twenty years ago. And yet who will maintain that we do not possess the same bodies we possessed twenty years ago? With an entire change of component elements in successive stages of its life, the body remains one and the same in identity. The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection does not imply that the bodies of men are to rise with all the component parts which they had at any particular moment of time, or which they had even at the moment of death. Nor is it in contradiction with anything which we know for certain as to what constitutes the continuous identity of an organism. If any actual part of our bodily

composition is needed on the last day to complete our corporeal identity, we may rest assured that an all-wise God will be able to find it.

“He knoweth our frame” (Ps. cii. 14). “No word shall be impossible with God” (Luke i. 37).

REVELATION

Objections.—How can God, who is a Spirit and infinite, speak to men or make any revelation to them? Even if He could make a revelation, it would be unnecessary; men by the aid of their understandings can arrive at a knowledge of God and of natural religion and by the exercise of their wills lead a religious life.

THE ANSWER.—If God has conferred upon us the gift of speech to enable us to communicate with one another He surely can find a means of communicating with us Himself. As well might we say that an infinite and purely spiritual Being could not have created or preserved us as say that He can not reveal Himself to us. If our natures were purely material we should not be capable of receiving a revelation, and for that reason God could not make a revelation to us; but as He has given us spiritual souls and has therefore made us like, though infinitely inferior to Himself, He can communicate with our souls much more easily than souls can communicate with one another.

Whether any revelation is necessary it is for God to judge. If, as a fact, He has made a revelation, and if besides the precepts of the natural law He has laid upon us other precepts, it is for us to hearken to the revelation and obey His commands.

God has made a revelation through the medium of His Son, Jesus Christ, and it is for us to accept it with gratitude.

ROMAN SEE, THE

See “Pope, The,” I, II, III.

SAINTS

Objections.—The Catholic veneration of saints detracts much from the purity of divine worship, which should be concerned with God alone. The intercession of saints is a doctrine opposed to Scripture, for Christ alone is our advocate and mediator; and Scripture nowhere tells us that the dead can hear our prayers.

THE ANSWER.—*Veneration of Saints.*—Why do we venerate the saints? We venerate the saints, first, because we admire their marvelous virtues and gifts of grace. An admiration of what is good and great is an instinct implanted in every child of Adam. It would be difficult, even if it were desirable, to rid the heart of this natural disposition; and no less difficult would it be, without unnatural violence, to banish the expression of that feeling from the public services of the Church. God Himself has so intimately associated holy men and women with Himself in the work of man's salvation that it is impossible to celebrate the great mysteries of the Christian religion without giving due recognition to the human instruments which God deigned to employ in the regeneration of mankind.

Hence from the very beginning Christians paid fitting honor to the saints of the New Dispensation. The Roman catacombs—those underground places of refuge of the early Christians—exhibit on their walls, even to this day, representations not only of our Blessed Redeemer, but also of His Mother and the apostles; and the fact supplies clear evidence of the way in which the thought of those holy persons mingled with the devotion felt for the person of Our Redeemer Himself.

OBJECTION.—But Catholics kneel to the saints and ask them to help them. In fact, their devotion to the saints bears all the marks of divine worship.

REPLY.—Catholics *venerate* the saints, but do not worship them. The word "worship" as used to-day has been narrowed down to meaning the supreme homage paid to God alone. Such supreme homage we Catholics do not pay to the saints—and this every Catholic child knows from his catechism. If we kneel to the saints it is because kneeling is one of the natural attitudes of earnest petition and

of reverence, and because in praying to the saints we are praying to God through the saints. In days of yore a dutiful child would fall upon his knees to ask his parents' blessing. If we ask the help of the saints we ask for only such help as they can give us by *interceding* for us. *They are humble petitioners like ourselves, only more powerful ones.*

In the second place, we honor the saints because God Himself has lavished His honors upon them. Even in this life He has put upon them the seal of His love and benediction and held them up for the admiration of mankind. But still greater are the honors conferred upon them in heaven. Readers of the Apocalypse know the sublime heights to which He has raised His servants. The four-and-twenty ancients, representing the hosts of the elect, are not only raised to an equality with the angels, but occupy thrones near to, and encircling, the throne of the Most High. The apostles are on the last day to be associated with Christ Himself as the judges of the world. "When the Son of man shall sit on the seat of His majesty, you also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Can it be surprising, then, if the honors bestowed upon the saints in the other life are in some degree reflected in the ritual and the devotion of God's Church on earth?

Finally, Catholic veneration of the saints is inspired by a love of holiness, and, implicitly, of the holiness of God Himself. Why do we praise and admire the saints? Evidently because of their holiness. Our praise of the saints is a tribute to holiness, and no one can sincerely pronounce a panegyric on a saint without thereby manifesting his love of holiness, and implicitly his love of Him who is holiness itself. And we may add that if our veneration of the saints has for its inspiring motive a love of holiness, our devotion to the saints results in an increase of holiness in ourselves. Our opponents can never realize to the full what they have lost by relegating the saints to the position which they occupy in the doctrine and the formularies of Protestantism.

OBJECTION.—But, really, the veneration of the saints seems to be allotted a disproportionate share in the devotion of Catholics. To a Protestant it seems to obtrude

itself everywhere into religious services. It surely must lessen the honor paid to God.

REPLY.—We are not surprised at the objection. Protestants have generally only a very meager knowledge of Catholic doctrine and practice, and their knowledge is mostly of what seems to them to be objectionable features of Catholicism. They know little of the actual proportions observed in Catholic devotion, being unable, of course, to view the Church from within. To borrow a comparison from Cardinal Wiseman, they are like persons who view from the street, and in the daytime, the stained-glass windows of a church and are consequently unable to make out the meaning or judge of the merits of the pictures. In the first place, even if devotion to the saints were more common than it is, the considerations we have already placed before the reader ought to convince him that the result of such devotion to the saints would be an increased fervor in the service of God. But if our separated brethren desire a more decisive proof that devotion to the saints does not overshadow the direct worship of God in the Catholic Church, we would call his attention to the fact that no other Christian denomination can bear any comparison with the Catholic Church in its public celebration of the essential mysteries of religion and in its direct worship of the supreme Lord of heaven and earth. The solemnities connected with Easter, Holy Week and Christmas, Corpus Christi and the Forty Hours' Devotion may be cited as instances. The holy sacrifice of the Mass, which is the sacrifice of the cross daily renewed and offered to God by His Divine Son, is the very core and center of religious life in the Catholic Church. It is in the Catholic Church that Lent and Advent have a meaning, and each is a preparation for one of the two great feasts of Our Lord. On Sunday, which is the Lord's Day *par excellence*, Catholic churches are the only ones filled with worshipers—and that not only once in the course of the day, but many times from five or six o'clock in the morning to midday. In a word, devotion to the saints pales before the worship of God.

What we have said thus far goes to show that devotion to the saints is not unreasonable in principle, and that it has no harmful, but rather positively good, results; but what if it should prove useless? Is there any proof that

the saints can know that we are praying to them, or that if they do know it and present our petitions to God, their prayers are heard? Any one who should put this question might be asked, in turn, Do you believe that the saints are in heaven? The saints are, of course, in heaven and enjoy there the same beatific vision as the angels. Moreover, their state is like to that of the angels: "They are as the angels in heaven" (Mark xii. 25). The visions of the Apocalypse represent angels and saints as forming one heavenly community. Now, as regards the knowledge possessed by the heavenly choirs of the events of this earth, we have but to recall the words of Our Lord describing the joy that thrills the hosts of the blessed at the sight of repentance for sin. "I say to you that even so there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance" (Luke xv. 7). Joy at the sight of repentance supposes a knowledge of the repentance. Therefore, the inhabitants of heaven are not ignorant of the happenings of earth; and, surely, if there is anything they are likely to know about us it is the fact that we are imploring their intercession with God.

The angels, who, as we have said, form one heavenly assembly with the saints, are deeply interested in the affairs of mortal men. "Are they not," asks St. Paul, "all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. i. 14)? And they are represented by the sacred writers as offering the prayers of men before the throne of God. Of this the angel Raphaël gave Tobias assurance when he told him, "When thou didst pray with tears and didst bury the dead, and didst leave thy dinner and hide the dead by day in thy house and bury them by night, I offered thy prayer to the Lord" (Tob. xii. 12). In the Apocalypse (viii. 3) an angel is described as offering the prayers of the faithful of God's Church to the Almighty under the symbol of the smoke of incense rising out of a golden censer. It is inconceivable that the saints, who enjoy the same glory and the same divine favor as the angels, should not join with the angels in their acts of mediation between God and men.

THE VENERATION OF RELICS.—Once the true idea of devotion to the saints is grasped, it should be easy to understand a Catholic's behavior with regard to sacred relics.

If we love and venerate the saints, we can not help feeling our devotion moved at the sight of objects once in close relation with them. The feeling is born of an instinct implanted in every human heart. It is essentially the same feeling as is awakened by the presence of an object once belonging to a dear departed friend.

It is the same feeling as our fellow-citizens here in America experience in regard to those numerous, though in themselves trivial, objects which are so carefully guarded in our museums and to which so many pilgrimages have been made, solely because of the association of those objects with the lives and deeds of the Fathers of our republic. These things are not cherished and venerated for their own sakes, but for the sake of those whose memory is, on its own account, dear to us. Many of our readers will easily recall the veneration shown to our famous Liberty Bell in its various triumphal progresses in different sections of the country. They will remember with what eagerness the people flocked to see it, and how they actually touched it with coins or other objects to be handed down to their children.

Why this veneration for an old bell? The bell is venerated because it is the bell that rang out the news of a heroic deed performed by those who are venerated as the founders of our liberties. *And may not Christians venerate the remains of those whose deeds in the service of their Maker were no less heroic?* May they not pay special honor to human bodies which were once the temples of the Holy Ghost? Is there any essential difference between the veneration paid to civic relics and that shown to the relics of God's saints?

Yes, it may be objected, there is an essential difference between the two. You attribute a supernatural power to relics of saints. You pretend that they can heal the sick and that by burning lights before them you can obtain special graces.

Now, in the first place, there is no general attributing of miraculous power to the relics of the saints. If miracles are ever wrought by their relics, it is a thing of exceedingly rare occurrence, and Catholics rarely give a thought to the matter. Thousands of sacred relics are preserved in Catholic churches from the single motive of honoring those who were so dear to God.

Undoubtedly, wonders have sometimes been wrought by relics of saints; but, as touching these events, the objection we are considering is based on a very serious misconception of Catholic belief in this matter. No Catholic is foolish enough to think that a fragment of bone or a shred of a garment has any miraculous virtue in itself. If the devotion paid to such objects is ever the occasion of any supernatural effect, the effect is produced by the power of God, who wishes to honor His saints by bestowing favors on those who honor their remains. It must surely be pleasing to God to see His children pay honor to those bodies which once enshrined so much holiness.

The Old Testament furnishes a remarkable example of a miracle wrought by the body of a saint, without any thought or expectation of such a wonder on the part of those concerned. After the death of the prophet Eliseus, and when the Moabites were making an incursion into the land, the mourners at the funeral of a dead man, perceiving the Moabites approach, hurriedly threw the corpse into the tomb of the prophet. "And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus the man came to life and stood upon his feet" (4 King^s xiii. 21). What God did to testify His love for Eliseus He can do in the case of other saints. Indeed, it is only natural to suppose that under the Christian dispensation such divine testimony in favor of His saints should be more frequent than under the Old Law. And yet the common Protestant idea is that since the coming of Christ the heavens have been closed and God's favors are no longer showered down with the same profusion as of old—that there was, indeed, an outpouring of miraculous favors from the person of Christ and through the agency of the apostles, and then—it suddenly ceased.

This idea, strange enough in itself, is at variance with the experience and the persuasion of Christians, East and West—everywhere, except where Protestantism holds sway. For, we are certain that in all ages of the Church the wisest and best of her children have borne testimony, not only to the general veneration of relics, but also to the common persuasion of Christians that God is wont to work wonders through the medium of such objects. The "Dialogues" of St. Gregory the Great, a pontiff to whom the majority of English-speaking people owe their Christian faith, testify to many such instances of supernatural favors.

Similar testimony is rendered by many of the Fathers. Leibnitz, the illustrious German philosopher, after citing, Protestant though he was, numerous authorities of the early Church in favor of the veneration of the saints, adds the following short comment: "It is not necessary to add much on the subject of relics. From the example of the bones of Eliseus it is certain that God has performed miracles through their instrumentality."—*Syst. of Theol.*, p. 88.

As to the images and pictures of the saints by which Catholic churches are adorned, their presence there is no less rational and conducive to devotion than the veneration felt for the saints themselves. Protestant opposition to them would have been intelligible under the Old Law, when there was such extreme danger of infection by idolatry from contact with idolaters; but to-day the all-pervading influence of idolatry is a thing of the past; nor has the Church of God, at any period of its existence, thought that prohibition of images under the old dispensation had any application to the use of images of Christ and His saints under the new.

That the first Christians were familiar with such representations of holy persons in their churches is plain from the testimony of the catacombs, which may be seen by any visitor to the Eternal City. On the walls of those underground chambers, once used both as cemeteries and as churches, are plainly to be seen pictures representing Our Lord, His Mother, the apostles, and the saints of the Old Testament. In other words, the churches of those who were taught by the apostles or their immediate successors were, in this respect, exactly similar to Catholic churches of the present day. Are Catholic churches the less Christian for resembling the churches of the first Christians?

Even under the Old Law, although it was said, "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing," the prohibition was primarily directed against idolatry; hence, was added, "Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them." The exclusion of idolatry was the one object of the ordinance; and where there was no danger of idolatry, to wit, in the Holy of Holies, which was completely hidden from the multitude, there were images of the cherubim placed over the Ark of the Covenant. To-day, in the full exercise of

the freedom of the children of God, we can adorn the new Ark of the Covenant not only with images of the angels, but also with pictures and images of those who are no less dear to God.

SCIENCE AND FAITH

A Grievous Error.—In a truly scientific mind science and faith can not exist without coming into collision, for no one who knows and realizes the results of scientific research can remain a believer.

THE TRUTH.—When Zeno the Eleatic denied the possibility of motion, an opponent answered him not by an abstract argument, but by giving him a visible example of motion: he straightway began to walk about the room. In the present article we are going to use an argument similar to the one leveled at Zeno's doctrine. We are going to point to concrete examples. It is asserted that science and faith can never get on well together in a well-balanced mind, or that it is impossible to reconcile faith and science. We are going to show that science and faith *can* be reconciled by proving that they *have been* reconciled in concrete instances—and not in one or two solitary instances, but in the case of numerous men of science enjoying the highest reputation in the scientific world. We shall not seek our example among the smaller scientists, or even among those of medium reputation, but among the leading lights of scientific research. What is more, we shall confine our selection of names to the scientists of the nineteenth century.

In the case of many men of science the world at large has known little about their attitude toward faith or revelation. They have been known simply as scientists, and it is only their scientific achievements that have been trumpeted abroad; but a study of the matter has made it clear that during the nineteenth century the really great men of science, with a few exceptions, were believers in many of the fundamental truths of the Christian faith.

We owe it to a German Jesuit that we are able to produce abundant and convincing testimony on this point. Father Kneller, in his work entitled "Christianity and the

Representatives of Modern Science," furnishes a list of eminent scientists of the nineteenth century, of all countries, and numbering upward of two hundred—all of whom were at least believers in a personal God and the spirituality of the soul, whilst the vast majority were adherents of one or other of the Christian creeds.

We are aware that such lists may well be regarded with suspicion when they are mere lists and nothing else; but Father Kneller's work is not a catalogue of names; it is a review of the careers of the scientists mentioned; it is based on trustworthy authorities and abounds in quotations which furnish conclusive evidence of the real sentiments of the scientists in question. Although in Father Kneller's book there is not a name that does not stand for some notable service rendered to science, we shall select here only the greater lights. The number in parenthesis after each name indicates the date of the person's death.

MECHANICAL THEORY AND MATHEMATICS.—Count von Rumford (1814), J. R. Mayer (1878), J. P. Joule (1889), G. A. Hirn (1890), W. Rankine (1872), H. von Helmholtz (1894), Sir William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin, 1907), K. F. Gauss (1855), J. F. Pfaff (1825), A. L. Cauchy (1857), V. A. Puiseux (1883), C. Hermite (1901), P. S. Laplace (1827).

ASTRONOMY.—G. Piazzi (1826), A. Secchi (1878), F. Cecchi (1887), F. de Vico (1848), Sir John Herschel (1871), U. J. Leverrier (1877), L. Respighi (1889), K. Kreil (1862), J. F. Encke (1865).

PHYSICS.—*Electricity*: A. Volta (1827), A. M. Ampère (1836), M. Faraday (1867), G. S. Ohm (1854), J. C. Maxwell (1879), W. Weber (1891).—*Light*: A. Fresnel (1827), J. Fraunhofer (1826), A. Fizeau (1896), Sir George Stokes (1903), Lord Rayleigh (still living).—*Miscellaneous*: J. B. Biot (1862), V. Regnault (1878).

CHEMISTRY.—Sir Humphry Davy (1829), L. Vauquelin (1829), L. Thenard (1857), J. B. Dumas (1884), J. von Liebig (1873), M. Chevreul (1889), C. Schoenbein (1868).

MINERALOGY.—R. Haüy (1822), J. von Fuchs (1856), E. Mallard (1894).

GEOLOGY.—G. Cuvier (1832), C. Deville (1876), L. de Beaumont (1874), J. Barrande (1883), G. Daubrée (1896), B. d'Omalus (1875), A. Dumont (1857), J. D. Dana (1895), Sir William Dawson (1899), K. Bischof (1870),

F. Quenstedt (1889), Oswald Heer (1883), B. Studer (1887), K. Lossen (1893), W. Waagen (1900).

PHYSIOLOGY.—J. Müller (1858), T. Schwann (1882), D. Eschricht (1863), A. Volkmann (1877), C. Bernard (1878), Sir Charles Bell (1842), L. Pasteur (1895), J. B. Carnoy (1899), R. Laënnec (1826).

ZOOLOGY AND BOTANY.—C. Ehrenberg (1876), L. Agassiz (1873), P. J. Beneden (1894), A. David (1900), K. von Martius (1868), Asa Gray (1888), Karl Baer (1876), G. J. Romanes (1894).

EVOLUTION THEORY.—J. B. de Lamarck (1829), E. Saint-Hilaire (1844), Sir Charles Lyell (1875), and others mentioned above.

Any well-informed reader must see that the above list represents the great bulk of scientific achievement in the nineteenth century; and yet there is not a single name on the list that does not stand for at least the more fundamental beliefs of Christianity. Many of these scientists were devout Christians; a very large percentage were Catholics, and some of them were priests or monks. This, by the way, is a refutation of a certain public pronouncement that "scientific eminence among Roman Catholics is rare." The statement must be based on a very narrow survey of the history of science.

It will be noticed that the latter half of the century is as well represented as the former; and yet it is in the latter half that Christianity is supposed to have received its death-blow. It was the latter half of the century that witnessed the scientific achievements of Lord Kelvin and Louis Pasteur. It was only a few years ago that Lord Kelvin made the famous public declaration that caused such a flutter in anti-Christian circles, to wit, that *science positively affirmed the existence of a Creator*, and that science was not antagonistic to religion, but rather a help to it. It is only a few years since Pasteur, a devout Catholic, closed his illustrious career; and it was Pasteur that gave the memorable answer to a pupil of his who had asked him how it was possible for one who had studied and reflected so much to remain a believer in Christianity: "It is precisely because I have studied and reflected that I have to-day the faith of a Breton; and had I studied and reflected more I should have the faith of a Breton's wife."

A few of the names on the above list will, it is true, ex-

cite the surprise of those who are acquainted with certain parts of their writings; and there is no denying that in the works of these few there is some downright bad philosophy; but against this must be weighed the evidence that indubitably points to the habitual attitude of the authors' minds toward the things unseen, either during the greater part of their lives or toward their close. Laplace is a case in point. There is nothing to prove that he ever lost his hold upon his Catholic beliefs.

True, there is a story about him which has been thoughtlessly bandied about, to the effect that during a conversation with Napoleon, to whom he had presented one of his works, he spoke of the existence of God as being no more than a hypothesis. Napoleon had remarked to him: "Newton in his work speaks of God: I have gone through yours, but find no mention of God." "Citizen First Consul," Laplace is said to have answered, "I find no need of that hypothesis." Now, be it observed, in the first place, that Laplace would never have dared to play the part of a skeptic before Napoleon, who in the days of his power gave short shrift to unbelievers. In the second place, when Laplace learned that the story was about to appear in a printed sketch of his life, he directed a friend of his, Arago the scientist, to interest himself in having it omitted. We have this from Arago himself, and yet Arago was an unbeliever. In the third place, supposing the story to be true, a very natural explanation of Laplace's remark is found in the difference of opinion existing between him and Newton as to the necessity of special divine intervention for the ordering of the planetary system as regards the number, the size, and the relative distances of the planets and satellites and for the prevention of confusion resulting from their movements. The necessity of God's intervention was maintained by Newton, but denied by Laplace, who held that the ordering of the system might result from the action of general laws already established.

"May not this disposition of the planets," says Laplace, "be itself an effect of the laws of motion, and may not the Supreme Intelligence, to whose intervention Newton had recourse, have made this orderly disposition dependent on a phenomenon of a more general character?" Here there is no question of God's existence, but of His special intervention for a particular purpose; and here there is

probably a key to the anecdote. The "Encyclopedia Britannica," in its article on Laplace, observes that in the astronomer's private correspondence there are scattered remarks which are inconsistent with the atheistical opinions with which he is so often credited. It is certain that he asked for and received the last sacraments before dying, and that he expired in the arms of two priests, M. le curé des Missions Etrangères and M. le curé d'Arceuil.

Karl von Baer's case is no less noteworthy in this connection. Though at first admitting the force of the argument from design for the existence of a personal God, he lapsed into pantheism, but in his latter days he returned to a belief in a personal God. There had always been a certain wavering in his pantheism, but the die was cast upon his reading a work of Fichte's on German speculation. "I had long believed," he says, "in the possibility of reaching through pantheism a unifying conception of the universe. Fichte's book taught me better. Pantheism won't do."

Romanes, too, drifted away from his early Christian faith, but a little book of his which we have before us as we write—"Thoughts on Religion"—was written for the purpose of tracing his progress in returning, as he finally did, to his early beliefs. We are assured by his editor and friend, Bishop Gore, that he made full and open profession of Christianity before his death.

The geologists and the evolutionists have given special scandal to the "orthodox," but many of them, as, for instance, Lyell the geologist, have not been shaken in their religious beliefs. Some have even striven to demonstrate the entire consistency of the evolution theory with the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. This, we are told by Joseph LeConte, has been the special rôle assumed by the American as distinguished from European scientists. "My own work," he adds, "has been chiefly in this direction." Alfred Russel Wallace, who was associated with Darwin in the first propounding of the theory of natural selection and whose eminence as a scientist is well known, steadily held to the spirituality of the human soul and a creative Intelligence in the universe.

As to Darwin, the protagonist of modern evolution, he certainly lost his grasp of Christian truth. He would fain have believed, but when thoughts of religion visited his

mind he found himself unable to grapple with the subject. He did not positively and consistently reject Christianity, either on scientific or other grounds; but, even had he done so, it is doubtful whether any importance should have been attached to his reasonings on the subject. "What he says in his autobiography about Christianity," remarks Romanes, who knew him thoroughly, "shows no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His mind was too purely inductive for this." It is clear, then, that Darwin's thoughts about religion are useless material to the anti-Christian controversialist. (The reader will learn much more to the purpose by turning to the article "Darwin.")

OBJECTION.—Whatever may be said about many of the great leaders in science, it is notorious that to-day the majority of men of science have little or no religious belief. The fact seems significant, or at least demands an explanation.

ANSWER.—There is no denying that unbelief has made sad inroads among men of science; but in what profession has it not? There are scores of reasons why men in all walks of life are losing their religious faith—reasons that have no connection with their several professions. There are infidel lawyers and infidel merchants, and yet neither their law nor their merchandise has anything to do with their infidelity. The general independence of the age and the neglect of solid religious instruction are alone sufficient to account for most defections from the Faith. We may add to these causes of infidelity the exclusive absorption in study which is a characteristic of the scientific specialist. And once the fashion of skepticism has set in, fashion itself becomes a powerful motive for the profession of unbelief. True science is not a cause of unbelief, but it may easily be used as an excuse after faith has been thrown away.

Physical science has so commanding a position in our day that its representatives are regarded by the unthinking and the ill-informed as authorities on every conceivable subject, not excluding theology. And yet most of the skeptical scientists of the day never give religion more than a passing thought and have written on the subject little or nothing that is worth reading. In contrast with

this apathy or wilful neglect on the part of the unbelieving, we find that many of the believing scientists whose names are on our list—notably Ampère, Cauchy, Volta, and Maxwell—have given years of study both to religion and to the religious bearings of scientific truths, and yet have been unable to find any mutual repugnance between the demonstrations of physical science and the real teachings of Christian revelation.

Volta, whose name has passed into the very vocabulary of science, once penned the following declaration: "I have always believed and still believe the holy Catholic faith to be the one true and infallible religion; and I constantly give thanks to God, who has infused into me this belief, in which I desire to live and die, with the firm hope of eternal life. In this faith I recognize a pure gift of God, a supernatural grace. But I have not neglected those human means which confirm belief and overthrow such doubts as may arise to tempt me. I have given attentive study to the foundations of my faith. I have read in the works both of defenders and of assailants of the Faith arguments for and against it, and have derived thence arguments in its favor which render it most acceptable even to the purely natural reason and prove it to be such that any mind unperturbed by sin and passion, any healthy and generous mind, can not but accept and love it."—KNELLER, p. 116 f.

Maxwell's more colloquial form of confession, made to a friend, is no less weighty: "I have read up many queer religions: there is nothing like the old thing, after all. I have looked into most philosophical systems, and I have seen that none will work without a God."—KNELLER, p. 136.

Moreover, there is a proneness to exaggerate the loss of faith occurring among men of science. It is chiefly as scientists that they are known to the world at large, and men who live in mixed society are reticent on the subject of religion. The change that took place in Baer and Romanes may have its counterpart in the case of many others. Certainly Virchow, Du Bois-Reymond, and Wundt experienced, in the course of their careers, a change of views that brought them nearer the truth. The exaggerated impression as to the number of scientific unbelievers is due in great measure to the statements and the living example of the popular platform scientists, who are generally not the leaders of scientific thought.

Finally, even though the actual number of scientists without faith were doubled or trebled, the thesis we are defending would not be weakened in the least. Our aim has been to show that if it is maintained, as it frequently is, that faith must conflict with science, the position is demolished by an appeal to the experience of many eminent scientists. As a matter of fact, science and faith have dwelt in peace in many of the leading scientific minds of a century. We have sought out the great minds of the scientific world and found that in very many instances intellectual greatness has gone hand in hand with religious faith and fervor. There can be no question here of counting up so many votes on the one side and so many on the other and then deciding by the majority. The vote of a single great mind must outweigh those of a score of inferior minds, and we have seen that many great minds in the world of science have held and proclaimed allegiance to Christian truth.

SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM

A Mistaken View.—The authority claimed by the Catholic Church is an obstacle to modern scientific progress, its attitude toward physical science operating as a clog upon individual research.

THE TRUTH.—Some Catholics will perhaps need to be assured, on our authority, that there really are persons who hold the above view with apparent sincerity. To this class of persons scientific research and Catholic authority are as hostile to one another as fire and water; and, considering how the notion has been inculcated upon them from childhood, it is not surprising that they can not see things in any other light.

If any such person should come upon this little book of ours, we would ask him to examine carefully into the origin of his views on the subject. In the circles in which he moves there is probably a traditional opinion about Catholic authority which effectually blocks out all inquiry into the real attitude of the Church toward science. The very mention of authority is enough to move the disgust of this class of persons. But why this aversion to authority? Au-

thority is an element in human life without which life would not be worth living. From the cradle to the grave we are continually leaning upon the authority of those who know more than ourselves. And this is true not only in regard to the facts of social and private life, but also in regard to the objects of intellectual research. In the matter of science and history the great mass of men are dependent on the authority of the specialist, because he is the only one who learns things at first hand.

The origin of the aversion felt to Catholic authority is not far to seek. Authority must be regarded with aversion by any one who holds that the unaided human intellect can attain to *all* truth, and that nothing is truth but what it can attain to. But suppose there is an order of truths which can not be reached except by divine revelation, and suppose the revelation has been made: are not the paramount claims of such a revelation, and of the authority that has it in its keeping, at once manifest? You may not believe in revelation, either as a fact or as a possibility; but there are those that do believe in it. Many of the world's brightest intellects, both in the past and in our own day, have believed in it. Men of the caliber of Cardinal Newman and Leo XIII have been whole-hearted believers in revelation.

It is not our purpose here to prove either the fact or the possibility of a revelation, nor, principally, even to plead for respect for an authority which is, after all, but a consequence of revelation as a fact. The point we aim to establish is that, notwithstanding the high claims of the Catholic Church—notwithstanding the fact that the Church asserts her right to pass sentence upon any so-called scientific conclusion conflicting with revelation—*there is absolutely nothing to prevent a Catholic from following out any line of scientific research, or from drawing conclusions which are solidly supported by well-ascertained facts.*

Within the legitimate domain of any science a Catholic may proceed with unfettered freedom, and that for the simple reason that he knows that what is revealed to him by his telescope or by his microscope can not contradict any truth of the supernatural order. *Truth can not be at variance with truth.* By truth he, of course, understands genuine truth, and not supposed truth. By scientific truth he understands scientifically *demonstrated* truth, and not

hypothesis, or crude reasoning upon demonstrated truth. He is aware, of course, that facts may be discovered by the scientist whose bearing upon revealed truths may not at first be easily determined; or he may be aware that certain half-demonstrated scientific truths or half-discovered facts may seem to be inconsistent with certain religious dogmas. But he keeps the even tenor of his way, confident that when the *full* truth is known it will be found to accord with the teachings of faith.

And in this he is never disappointed. The advances made in the sciences tend to confirm rather than to discredit Catholic beliefs. Archeological science shows an increasing tendency to corroborate the narratives of Holy Writ. Geology, as more than one geologist has pointed out, presents a picture of primitive life on the globe which strikingly harmonizes with the order of creative eras exhibited in the Book of Genesis. Biology and paleontology may point with more or less certainty to an evolution of species, but they can tell us nothing about the primeval species, nor can they say a word for or against creation.

No, the Catholic man of science need not fear to enter any field of research. The solid results of his labors will be welcomed at the Vatican no less than in the laboratories and lecture-rooms of Paris or Berlin.

But an ounce of concrete example is oftentimes worth more than a pound of general assertion. We need not ask any of our readers if they have heard of Louis Pasteur. If we found ourselves in an assembly of distinguished scientists and made the statement that Pasteur was the greatest scientist of the nineteenth century, we doubt whether any one present would deny it. If deep research, brilliant discovery, and enormous practical results furnish any criterion of scientific greatness, Pasteur's title to the first place in the ranks of the scientific is well certified. *But Pasteur was a Catholic, a devout Catholic, a Catholic fearless in the profession of his faith.*

Moreover, he had thought out maturely the relations between science and revelation, and was convinced that, although they constituted two distinct worlds of thought, they could never come into mutual collision. Truth could never contradict truth. But Pasteur is not the only Catholic scientist who has pursued the work of original research with untrammelled freedom. If the results of the

free and independent study of nature made by Catholic men of science were subtracted from the present sum total of scientific knowledge, science would be thrown back at least a century. (See "Science and Faith.")

OBJECTION.—But, as a matter of fact, Catholic men of science have been condemned by the Church for scientific conclusions which every one admits, and must admit, to-day. Witness the case of Galileo.

ANSWER.—If there is anything that shows poverty of resource in our critics it is their repeated citation of the case of Galileo. This is their one venerable weapon, which they keep ready for instant use in case the "intolerance" of the Church should come upon the tapis. Even though the worst possible case were made out against the Roman tribunal concerned, is it not absurd to go back three centuries for evidence that will tell against the present mind and spirit of the Church? Or, why revert to a period when not only the Catholic, but also the Protestant, authorities were naturally and justly suspicious of novelties in science which had points of contact with religion? Or, again, why make so much of the condemnation by a body of cardinals of propositions that were *not really demonstrated*—a condemnation that was afterward canceled when the demonstration was forthcoming?

The theory—for it was then only a theory—of the earth's revolution about the sun did not really admit of a demonstration at a time when astronomical science was in so crude a state. Had it been strictly demonstrated, Galileo would have met with different treatment at the hands of the cardinals. Not that the Congregation of the Holy Office had any direct concern with any such question of physical science; but the question seemed to have biblical bearings. To make the sun the immovable center around which the earth revolved seemed to contradict the obvious and generally received interpretation of certain passages in Holy Writ; as, for instance, where Josue is narrated to have stopped the sun in its course, or where the Psalms speak of the sun as rising in the East and going down in the West, and the Fathers of the Holy Office were in duty bound to take cognizance of any such novelties of interpretation. If any such case arose to-day the issue would be different. Catholic theologians are agreed that where physical science has clearly demonstrated the nature or

the causes of purely natural phenomena mentioned in the Bible, the interpreters of the Bible can not ignore any such demonstration, any more than they can ignore the science of philology in interpreting the words of a text or in determining the structure of a sentence.

Did the theologians of Galileo's day hold a different view? There is nothing to prove that they did, and there is no little reason for thinking they did not. The truth is that it was only then that science was beginning to cast doubts upon opinions that had been held for centuries. The reader will find it instructive to learn the views of a distinguished contemporary of Galileo, a leader among theologians and the most trusted adviser of the Pope, to wit, Cardinal Bellarmine. The Cardinal defined his attitude toward Copernicanism in terms that prove him to have been as modern in his spirit as can well be desired. In a letter to Foscarini, a Carmelite friar and an ally of Galileo's, at a time when the Galileo question was well to the fore, he expresses himself in the following words:

"If it were solidly demonstrated that the sun was in the center of the world and the earth in the third heaven, and that it is not the sun that revolves about the earth, but the earth that revolves around the sun, *then we should have to behave with much circumspection in explaining those passages of Scripture which seem to say the contrary, and rather acknowledge that we do not understand those passages than assert that a thing can be false which is demonstrated to be true.*"

If he added the following words, "But I will not believe there is any such demonstration until it is shown me," he said what would have won the applause of a Huxley or of a Tyndall. And the same pair of modern scientists would have deemed perfectly reasonable the position explained in the further remarks of the Cardinal:

"It is not by any means one and the same thing to show that on the supposition of the motionless position of the sun in the center and the movement of the earth through space, the actual phenomena are better explained, and to show that as a fact the sun is in the center and the earth moves through space." In other words, a hypothesis is not necessarily proved to be the correct one because it gives a *better* explanation of certain facts.

The Cardinal, then, did not consider the theory demon-

strated; but it is important for us to have learned what so influential a member of the Roman court thought should be the attitude of the Church in case any such theory *were* demonstrated.

But there was another aspect of the Galileo controversy which must not be left out of sight. The new system had arrayed against it the bulk of scientific opinion, as scientific opinion stood at that date. It was not simply a case of science vs. theology; it was no less a case of science vs. science, or at least of scientists vs. scientists. Galileo's chief opponents were eminent scientists, who themselves, animated by the true spirit of modern discovery, had made valuable contributions to scientific knowledge; amongst others, Scheiner, one of the discoverers of the spots on the sun; Clavius, surnamed the Euclid of his age; the astronomer Magini, Grienberger; and even the English philosopher Francis Bacon, who was so much lauded at a later period as the Father of Modern Science. Bacon regarded the Copernican system as a convenient mathematical fiction, useful in calculating and predicting.¹ Science itself, therefore, rejected the new system as not having produced its credentials. *Were the cardinals of the Holy Office expected to be in advance of the science of their day?*

OBJECTION.—In one respect the Catholic scientist must feel not a little hampered. He is much restricted in the forming of hypotheses, which have so often opened a path to scientific truth. Any hypothesis that excludes creation must at once be rejected by the Catholic investigator.

ANSWER.—We are dealing with the physical sciences. Now, which of the physical sciences, as such, need be concerned about whether things were created or not? What have they to do with questions touching creation? Creation, the spirituality and the immortality of the soul, and other such questions, are quite beyond the limits of observation and experiment, which are the instruments of the physical sciences. When the physicist finds himself speculating on these subjects, he should remember that he is essaying the rôle of the philosopher, in the higher sense of the term. Unfortunately, when scientists of the stamp of Haeckel begin to philosophize they abandon the impartial and unemotional temper which we have been taught to regard as a characteristic of the scientific mind; and

¹Descript. Glob. Int. c. 6.

then it is that they hazard statements about God, creation, or the human soul which have no foothold in any science known to them.

As to rational philosophy, as distinguished from natural philosophy or natural science, that is a region in which hypotheses, especially working hypotheses, can hardly have any scope. But here, too, the same law will hold, to wit, that if the truth of a proposition is demonstrated it can not conflict with revealed truth. But who will presume to say that any system of philosophy has demonstrated the impossibility of creation or of the immortality of the human soul?

Let any Catholic scientist, therefore, come to the Vatican with a demonstration of any scientific truth, and his demonstration will be honored as Copernicanism was finally honored when its claims were established.

SECRET SOCIETIES

Objection.—Why is the Church opposed to secret societies? If individuals may lawfully have secrets, why may societies not have them?

THE ANSWER.—The Church condemns certain societies not simply and solely because they have secrets, but because of the particular *kind* of secrecy practised in those societies. In some cases, also, she condemns them because there is sufficient evidence, as in the case of masonry, that secrecy is used as an instrument for the propagation of error and for the destruction of all true religion.

If a Catholic thinks of joining a secret society he must know, not only as a Catholic, but simply as a man with a conscience, to what sort of secrecy he is going to commit himself; and those who have a right to know the state of his conscience have also a right to know whether his joining that society will be to him a source of spiritual harm or to others an occasion of scandal.

One very objectionable feature of certain secret societies is an oath of *absolute* secrecy, *blindly taken*; that is to say, without one's knowing what he may be committing himself to. A no less objectionable one is the oath of *absolute* and *unconditioned* obedience, which no one, under any circumstances, can conscientiously take. The use of a

religious ritual is often a sufficient reason for condemnation, especially if it be accompanied by the use of symbols of a religious character whose meaning is known only to higher adepts. Even in many of the less objectionable secret societies of the day there are influences constantly at work tending to weaken the faith of Catholic members and lessen their allegiance to the Church.

It is partly because of such objectionable elements in freemasonry that Catholics are forbidden under pain of excommunication to join any masonic organization. The Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, and the Sons of Temperance are also condemned by the Church. But what about other secret societies not thus explicitly condemned? Are Catholics free to join them simply because the Church has not expressly condemned them? Not so; for membership in them may be a source of harm, and careful inquiry should be made into the character and aims of such societies and prudent advice sought as to the wisdom of actually joining them. The Church and those who exercise jurisdiction in her name should have every reasonable assurance that membership in any given society will not prove baneful to the Catholics concerned.

We shall give the reader a specimen of masonic oaths of secrecy. The oath is that of the first degree, taken on the Bible. And let it be remembered that the secrets of masonry are not known to the great mass of the brethren, and that so-called masonic science does not regard the Bible as the word of God. The initiate pronounces the following formula: "I, in the presence of the Great Architect of the Universe . . . do hereby and hereon solemnly and sincerely swear that I will always hide, conceal, and never reveal any part or parts, any point or points of the secrets or mysteries of or belonging to Free and Accepted Masons in Masonry which may heretofore have been known by, *shall now or may at any future time be communicated to me.* These several points I solemnly swear to observe under no less *penalty* than to have *my throat cut across, my tongue torn out by the root and my body buried in the sands of the sea, or the more efficient punishment of being branded as a wilfully perjured individual, void of all moral worth.* So help me God." (Gruber, in *Cath. Encycl.*, "Masonry.")

No one, be he Christian or Mohammedan, or even Mason,

can in conscience pledge himself by promise or by oath to any duty or obligation the nature of which he does not know. If a Mason has a seared conscience for such matters he is an enemy of society and of all honest men. (See "Freemasonry.")

SELF-DENIAL

Objection.—Self-denial cannot be a virtue. It is a repressing of the sensuous inclinations; and yet these inclinations have been implanted in our souls by God Himself.

THE ANSWER.—It is undoubtedly true that these inclinations have been implanted in our natures by God Himself. The only question that concerns us is, *why* they were implanted in our natures. They were not placed there to *rule*, but to *serve*. God loves order, and order requires that the lower be subject to the higher. The reverse of this would be endless disorder. Unfortunately, it so happens that the sensuous or lower part of our nature strives to assert itself against the higher or rational part. Hence, if it is God's will that reason should hold the mastery, reason must exert itself in repressing the sensuous appetites. This is the philosophy of self-denial.

Self-denial, so far from destroying or rendering useless any part of our nature, simply confines the sensuous appetites within just bounds and then leaves to them the enjoyment of a vast range of sensuous yet lawful pleasures. But, although the essential aim of self-denial is repression and its immediate effect a diminution of pleasure, it really secures in the long run, for those who cultivate it, a much greater sum of personal happiness than is secured by unrestrained indulgence: *it saves us from the tyranny of passion.*

Even in heaven, after the resurrection, we shall retain the sensuous part of our nature, but it will be so completely under the dominion of reason—or, rather, it will be so entirely absorbed in the divine life of the soul—that self-denial will have nothing to act upon. But this state is reserved for those only who in this life preserve themselves from all defilement by mortifying their natural inclinations, and thus win a title to the possession of eternal joys.

The so-called healthy life of the senses of modern times is simply a sinful subjection of the higher to the lower part of our nature. It is a sinful and cowardly yielding to natural instincts, unrestrained in many cases even by the certain prospect of serious bodily detriment. It knows nothing even of the restraints imposed of old by the higher type of Epicureanism, which practised a degree of self-denial which was seen to be absolutely necessary as a means of preventing pleasure from growing sour to the taste by reason of its very excess, or from producing after effects which would more than outweigh the pleasure of indulgence. Pleasure was indeed the ultimate object of the Epicurean, but he saw that excess in the desire for pleasure was an obstacle to its attainment. "Confine your desires to the limits within which you can satisfy them," was the maxim of Epicurus. Now, we are not aware that this particular phase of Epicureanism has ever been condemned by our modern hedonists; but when Christianity comes forward and counsels a restraint of the passions—and that, too, in a nobler spirit and with motives more elevating—it is scornfully assailed as an inveterate enemy of man's happiness.

The Christian reader need not be reminded that at the background of Christian belief and practice in this matter there is a group of historical facts vouched for by Holy Writ and the Church of God. God was so good as to give man, in the beginning, an antidote against concupiscence, and consequently a preventive of warfare between reason and passion. This was one of the privileges of the state of primitive innocence. By a special grace, reason was perpetually in the ascendant; the passions, blind themselves, submitted to the guidance of reason; and self-denial was not the irksome or painful task it so often proves to-day. It was not long, however, before this privileged state was forfeited by man's transgression; and then for the first time he knew the force and stress of concupiscence and felt the necessity of using force to subdue it. But God did not leave him to struggle alone. Through the Redemption He made available for him an abundance of interior grace by which the native powers of the will were reinforced and enabled to struggle successfully on the side of reason. The result of such successful struggling is the reduction, and in some cases all

but the annihilation, of concupiscence, and the consequent establishment of the reign of peace in the soul. Peace is indeed the inseparable companion of self-denial.

SOCIALISM

I. ITS ECONOMIC FALLACIES

A Socialist Argument.—The workingman is the sole producer of wealth; therefore he should be the sole owner of it. And yet the capitalist appropriates nearly the whole product of the workingman's labor. The only remedy for this abuse is the socialistic commonwealth, each member of which will be insured the possession of what he produces.

THE ANSWER.—That labor is the only producer of wealth is one of the fundamental errors of socialism; and as this is the very corner-stone of socialism as a popular movement, the movement has no reason for existing if the principle is false. Certain socialist writers have been forced to admit its falsity; and yet *they continue to preach the doctrine to the mass of their followers.*

The aim of socialism is to revolutionize society by placing it on an industrial basis and by making the workingmen the owners and administrators of all wealth. And how is this to be accomplished? By taking out of the hands of individuals and transferring to the commonwealth all the sources and means of production—mines, lands, factories, machinery, raw materials, and finished products, together with the entire business of transportation, distribution, and exchange. Private property will be confined to the compensation received for labor performed. Each member of the community must contribute his quota of manual labor, and each will receive from the public storehouse or from the public treasury what his labor is worth. All distinctions will be leveled. A doctrine of equal rights of the strictest type will be carried into effect. Men, women, and children will have the same rights and, as far as possible, the same duties.

But advanced socialistic theory does not stop here. Society will be still more thoroughly revolutionized. Mar-

riage will be placed on a new basis. Men and women will remain united in marriage only as long as either or both of the parties to a marriage desire. Family life will be abolished. Children will never learn to know or love their parents, for as soon as they see the light of day they will be taken, like orphans or foundlings, and reared under the motherly and fatherly supervision of the State. Domestic happiness, we are told, will be merged in the happiness of the community. Family affection will be superseded by a love of humanity. The commonwealth will be a democracy. The elected representatives of the people will administer the affairs of the State under the people's supervision. Government and law will be reduced to the minimum.

But what is the motive or the necessity for so drastic a change? The socialists answer that such a revolution is necessary because under the present dominance of private capital the many are becoming poorer and the few becoming richer. In former times the means of production belonged more generally to the individual workman; what he produced was his and no one disputed his title to it; but to-day the means of production have passed into the hands of a comparative few. One man thus equipped employs hundreds or thousands under a system of combined labor which enables him to produce, by means of a hundred pairs of hands, enormously more than was possible in times past. With this fact as a basis, the socialist argues thus: If a hundred workmen produce ten times as much to-day as they could have produced two centuries ago, they are entitled to ten times as much compensation. The only way to secure such compensation is by making the workingmen themselves the owners of the means of production. If they fail then to get their due, the fault is theirs. Formed into a commonwealth in which each of its members will be obliged to work, in order to contribute to the common store, they will severally receive the full value of their labor, or at least as large a percentage of it as can be afforded from the general fund. Private capital, then, as being the great source of industrial evils, is to be done away with in favor of collective ownership.

The account we have given of socialism is based upon standard socialistic literature. We mean such works as those of Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, Bebel, Carpenter, Bax,

and others, whose writings are zealously circulated among the "comrades" and recommended in the booklets of socialistic organizations. If a socialist makes any attempt to disavow any of the above doctrines, he can easily be brought to book.

And now what are we to think of all this? The socialists profess to have a reason for the faith that is in them. Let us see if it holds water.

They take their stand upon the principle that every one is entitled to be the owner of what he produces. Let us grant the principle—but what then? Well, say the socialists, is it not evident that a hundred men in any industrial establishment produce vastly more wealth than they would have produced a couple of centuries ago? And where does the excess go? Into the pockets of the capitalists; and they have not moved a little finger in the production of it. The poor toiler gets barely enough to pay his rent and feed his wife and little ones. Meantime, the capitalist goes spinning about in his motor-car or sailing to the ends of the earth in his palatial steam-yacht. Socialist orators are wont to add to this picture some vivid touches that never fail to move the indignation of their hearers.

Now, it seems to us, that any fairly intelligent workman ought to be able to detect the fallacy of the principle that labor is the only producer of wealth. In the production of wealth there are other agencies at work more effective than labor. What is the real reason why a workman can turn out twenty dollars' worth of shoes in a day, whereas formerly he could not have made a single pair of shoes worth five dollars? The answer is obvious. In the old days they knew none but the simplest methods of production. To-day the methods of production are more elaborate and immensely more effective. The distinguishing features of the system are chiefly these: the use of machinery, the uniting of many hands under one general direction, the division of labor, the utilization of the physical sciences, superior management, and, finally, the possession of capital, which is constantly renewing the sources whence it is derived.

It is, therefore, the perfection of the system that multiplies the productiveness of the workman. The amount of manual labor is actually less than formerly, but its efficiency has been raised a hundredfold; and the change

is due to the system. Therefore, it is not the workingman that produces wealth, but the system and the workingman combined.

But to what do we owe the system? We owe it to thought, science, genius, superior power of administration, and other such causes, but not to the labor of the workingman. To adopt Mallock's terminology, we owe it to *ability* as distinguished from labor. If this be conceded, it is manifestly absurd to attribute a surplus value to labor of which the fruits are seized by one who does nothing. The truth of the matter is that labor borrows a new and extraordinary power from ability; and if there is any truth in the socialistic principle that every man is the rightful owner of what he produces, surely the able minds that have added so enormously to the productiveness of labor should receive the larger share of the reward.

Now, this is so obvious that the more shrewd and intelligent socialist writers have had to acknowledge it. Encountering educated criticism, they have been forced to see the necessity of reconstructing the theory of socialism, in this as in many other points; and yet they have not the courage to go before any meeting of their "comrades" and tell them that, after all, workingmen are *not* the only producers of wealth. In such meetings they do precisely what Mr. Wilshire does in his pamphlet, "Why the Workingman Should be a Socialist": "You know, or you ought to know, that you alone produce all the good things of life; and you know, or you ought to know, that by so simple a process as that of casting your ballot intelligently you will be able, etc." Or they address the man in the street as the author of the socialist catechism quoted by Mr. Mallock speaks to budding socialists: "Who creates all wealth? The working class. Who are the workers? Men who work for wages."

Men who work for wages! Isn't there a shade of ambiguity in the phrase? We had thought that the socialistic movement had only workingmen in view—that is to say, manual laborers, including mechanics. But they are not the only workers who receive wages. Clerks, bookkeepers, reporters, editors, all work for wages. And are these the downtrodden classes for whom the socialists draw the tear of sympathy? Some of our readers may think us hypercritical. "Salary" is the polite term used for compensa-

tion received by the higher type of workers. We must caution our readers that no such distinction is intended. Mr. Wilshire, who is regarded as an authority among socialists, takes Mr. Mallock to task for supposing that socialists mean by "workingmen" and "laborers" only manual workers. They include all men, he tells us, who contribute to production: inventors, like Edison, and great industrial captains, even though millionaires! And yet it is quite impossible that in the leaflet quoted above he could have meant any workingmen but manual laborers. Otherwise we might ask him with Mr. Mallock, "Does Mr. Wilshire seriously wish us to believe that he is telling Mr. Edison that 'if he will only cast his ballot intelligently' he will be able to treble his income at the expense of richer men?"

It is only too evident that leaders of this class mean one thing when addressing manual laborers and another when dealing with educated critics.

The truth is that socialist thinkers have begun to see not only that room must be found in their commonwealth for men of exceptional ability, but also that exceptional compensation must be given them for their superior services. Now, this means that some will be wealthy and others comparatively poor. And the conclusion is frankly accepted by more than one socialist authority. But its consequences for socialism seem to be ignored. Socialism aims at abolishing all distinction of classes, and here we have a distinction of classes regarded as inevitable—a distinction, too, of the most invidious kind—one based on the possession of material goods. If envy for the rich plays so important a part in the present movement, how will citizens of the humbler sort in the new commonwealth endure the presence of a class whose exceptional gains and exceptional prosperity will be thrust upon their notice every hour of the day?

It must be conceded, then, that ability would have to be stimulated by the prospect of exceptional rewards. As for still higher motives, such as a disinterested devotion to one's fellow-men, these, under any system, may actuate a choice few; but no one except an extreme enthusiast would suppose that whole classes of men would be stimulated to deeds of self-abnegation by such a phantom idea as *Humanity in General*. Even the Christian virtue of charity, embodied though it is in the beautiful earthly life of the

Son of God, has not so effectually raised the world to so high a level of self-obliviation as the socialists propose to do by the spread of their peculiar ideas. They fancy that when the world is converted to socialism it will find itself automatically rid of the old Adam. Self will be sunk in a love of humanity. Artists will sing with as little hope of gain as nightingales. An inventor who has labored for years at a new piece of mechanism will make a present of it to the public treasury, and then be lost in the ranks of his fellow-workers.

And how are they preparing workingmen for this reign of unselfishness? Is it not by exciting their greed? Is it not by telling them, and falsely telling them, that they are the only producers of wealth, and that they should seize what is theirs? Is it not by holding out to them the prospect of personal possessions and personal prosperity increased at least tenfold in the commonwealth they are going to rear upon the ruins of capitalism?

We are confident that the great mass of English-speaking workingmen are too shrewd to be deceived by any such quack system of economics, and that they will see that in any commonwealth some distinction of classes is unavoidable. Nature itself, as well as the essential conditions of human life, will range men in higher and lower social strata. The great problem, therefore, is not how to abolish classes, but how to bring them into harmony; and this with a view to creating the highest sum of happiness for all classes.

Such is the charlatan character exhibited by socialism in its more popular aspect. There is a more dignified phase of the system which is no less unsound. "Scientific Socialism" is a phrase that has done yeoman service among those who are taken by high-sounding designations. The root principles of the so-called science must be sought for in its *theory of value*.

Marx distinguishes two kinds of value: *use value* and *exchange value*. The use value of a thing is that which it has as ministering to human needs and desires. Its exchange value is its worth as an object of barter, or its value in the market. The use value of a pair of shoes is the utility of the shoes in protecting the feet of the wearer. If the same pair of shoes be exchanged for ten pounds of butter, that quantity of butter represents the

exchange value of the shoes. And here we must introduce to the reader a novel principle of socialist economy, which is that the total exchange value of a commodity is to be measured solely by *the amount of labor* involved in its production. The proposition is so ridiculous that even a child could refute it. The labor of a lifetime might be expended on an object without adding to its exchange value. The thing produced must be useful, or at least in some way desirable. No dairyman would exchange a quarter of a pound of rancid butter for even a dozen pairs of paper shoes, no matter how much labor had been expended on their making. Why are certain kinds of wood—say, mahogany or ebony—valued, either in the raw state or in manufactured articles? It is surely because of their superior value as supplying the needs or otherwise satisfying the desires of the purchaser. But it is useless to multiply examples of commodities that are valued for their use, quite irrespective of the amount of labor bestowed upon their making. Labor has its value, but it is not the only factor that goes to the production of exchange value.

From the theory of value is derived the theory of *surplus value*, which the socialists make the immediate basis of their practical demands. It turns upon the market value of human labor. A man's labor-capacity may be regarded as a commodity brought to the labor-market. A workman exchanges his labor-capacity for a sum of money, or his wages. The exchange value of labor, say the socialists, must be determined by the same standard as that of a pair of shoes or of a pound of butter. It is represented by the amount of labor that has produced it. But the immediate producers of labor-capacity are food and the other necessities of life; and they, in turn, derive all their value from the amount of labor involved in their production or preparation. Hence, if a man's maintenance costs a dollar a day, a dollar represents the exchange value of the labor-capacity which he places at his employer's disposal.

Now, under the present system, as the socialists argue, only a fraction of the workman's time is consumed in producing that dollar's worth of commodities for his employer. The time required for producing it is called the necessary labor time. The remaining time yields the workman nothing and is a source of pure gain to the em-

ployer. The value of the labor performed after the necessary labor time is called by socialists the surplus value. It is this that creates capital and produces untold wealth for the great leaders of industry. Socialists admit that there is no injustice done the workingman inasmuch as his labor-capacity is worth a dollar and a dollar is what he receives. And yet he must labor beyond the necessary labor time, producing wealth for others and getting none of it himself. The fault, they say, lies not so much with the capitalist as with the system. Change the system and transfer the means of production to the workingmen as a body, divide the proceeds among them after deducting what is needed for the continuance of trade and the conducting of the commonwealth, and then the nearest approach will have been made to a man's receiving back as much as he has given.

Thus far the socialist reasoner. What are we to think of this fine-spun theory? Our space will not permit more than a brief exposure of the fallacy of the argument; but no more is needed.

We have seen how worthless is the theory of value. Things produced do not derive their exchange value from labor. The theory of surplus value is no less absurd. It is supremely absurd, in the first place, to reckon the value of a man's labor-capacity by the cost of his maintenance. Food and other material things contribute, of course, to the production of labor-capacity, but it would be absurd to attempt to establish an equation thus: so much food, etc., = so much labor capacity. So much food does produce so much brawn—though the ratio varies with the individual; but brawn is not brain; nor is it skill, or industry, or power of application; and yet all these qualities go to the making of a good workman. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that labor-capacity can be measured by cost of maintenance.

No less absurd is the idea of necessary labor time. There is no ground for asserting that there is any necessary time as distinguished from surplus time, or that under the present system the value of a man's labor is necessarily greater than what he gets for it. What does the manual worker really contribute to production? The answer to this questions brings us back to a point we have already

developed. A hundred workmen organized under capital do, in some sense, produce immensely more than would be possible if they worked separately and without such organization; but the difference is due precisely to the organization and to the other elements of the modern system, in which the laborer is a comparatively insignificant factor, and to the perfection of which he has contributed absolutely nothing. How utterly unreasonable, then, is the assertion that the workingman is compelled to donate to the capitalist nearly the whole of the fruits of his labor.

We are not disposed to ignore the real abuses of capitalistic industry. We are aware that although the lot of workingman, generally, has been vastly improved, there are still classes of workers who are defrauded and victimized by their employers; but we are not without hope that their grievances may be remedied by legitimate means. Let them use the just means that have succeeded in the past, and some hope of improvement will appear. If one half the propaganda devoted to communistic schemes had been diverted into more practical channels, socialism would not have the pretext on which it leans to-day for aiming to revolutionize the industrial world and with it society in general. As a matter of fact, *socialists have done little or nothing to improve the lot of the workingman.*

We confess we should be delighted to see workingmen in general receiving a *larger* share of the public wealth, which they certainly *help* to produce; but it is exceedingly questionable whether a *much* larger share would make for the workingman's genuine happiness and the higher good of society. We should be no less delighted to see the workingman, after spending a reasonable time in manual labor, devoting his leisure to the cultivation of his mental faculties and to healthy amusement. In the abstract, there is nothing incompatible between working at the loom during a part of the day and enjoying the products of the fine arts during the remainder. The only question is whether and to what extent it is practicable. Under socialism all this and much more is promised, but unless socialism in practice is much better than socialism in theory, it is a promise which can never be fulfilled.

SOCIALISM

II. ITS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Socialistic Delusions.—"Two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history and the revealing of the secret of capitalistic production by means of surplus value, we owe to Marx. Through them socialism has become a science."
—Frederick Engels.

THE TRUTH.—In the palmiest days of science no body of doctrine was called scientific unless its conclusions were well supported by their premises. In our day an oracular style and an air of profound thought are sufficient credentials for the winning of scientific honors. Conspicuous among the pseudo-philosophers of the age is this self-same Karl Marx, a taste of whose scientific economics we have had in another article. (See "Socialism I—Its Economic Fallacies.")

German philosophers sink their shafts deep, even when boring in the wrong place. The reader must not suppose that "scientific" socialism, conceived as it was in the brain of a Marx, could ever have confined itself to the immediate field of practical economics. It goes much deeper—it professes to bring us back to the beginning of things. But, unfortunately, we fail to discern there the real beginning: scientific socialism is essentially atheistic. Marx and his fellow-prophet Engels, and socialistic philosophers generally, are of much the same school as Haeckel of Jena, about whom the reader will learn something in other parts of this volume. (See "Evolution" and Haeckel.")

The ultimate basis of scientific socialism is what is known as the materialistic conception of history. It is the doctrine of materialistic monism applied in the domain of economics. Marx and his followers hold that nothing exists but matter. Mind is but a modification of matter. Thought, feeling, consciousness, are mere reflection from the material world. A spiritual and immortal soul is an obsolete fiction. God, creation, providence are respectable myths. Matter and motion sum up the history of the universe and of man.

The next link in this chain of speculation is the doctrine that the universe and all that it contains is perpetually changing. Man, with his thoughts, his principles and his

moral standards, his social institutions, his beliefs, his worship, is moving on like the rest of the universe. There is nothing fixed or stable. There are no immutable ideas, no eternal truths. Moreover, a man's environment is the one determining factor in the details of his intellectual life. The human will is thus fated to act by a blind irresistible impulse.

But what has this to do with economics, or with socialism? It has much to do with them in the mind of Marx and his associates; for the one law of change and evolution, they tell us, operates in the world of production as it does elsewhere. The great aim of the socialist philosopher is to show how the law of change is going to land socialists one day in the possession of power. Assuming the rôle of prophet, the philosopher points to the land of promise which must eventually be reached by the multitude in the desert. And he endeavors to unfold the process of social evolution in some such way as this: The whole of human life is ruled and shaped by methods of production and exchange. The dominant ideas and intellectual tendencies of the race depend primarily on the way in which men produce and barter what is needed for the perpetuation and well-being of their kind. With every change in the economic basis of life there is a resultant change in the social and intellectual life of men—in their mental life, in their social institutions, in their religion.

Thus two distinct orders of things are recognized: the order of economic facts and the order of ideas. Now these two orders, socialists tell us, do not run together with the exactness of clockwork. The one may lag behind the other; and for a time, whilst the economic order is developing on new lines, the order of ideas happens to remain unchanged. Consequently a state of tension ensues between the two orders, till finally it reaches the snapping-point, and then—a revolution, resulting in the adjustment of the order of ideas to the order of facts.

And now let us see how the socialists apply this precious bit of philosophy to the present posture of affairs. In the past few centuries the industrial world has been undergoing a revolution. The individual laborer working on his own account is comparatively rare. His place has been taken by the employee who works for wages. In all the industries the productiveness of each pair of hands has

been vastly increased. Not that the human hand has acquired any new deftness. On the contrary, manual skill has decreased rather than increased. It is rather the perfection of the modern system of production, of which the human hand is an instrument, and a comparatively insignificant instrument, that enables a hundred pairs of hands to-day to produce on so vast a scale, and at the same time enables the owners of industries to reap such enormous profits.

Now, according to socialistic doctrine (refuted in "Socialism I.—Its Economic Fallacies") the profit really belongs to the workingmen, though it nearly all passes into the pocket of the capitalist. The result, we are told, is ever-increasing poverty for the working class. Hence the struggle between the classes—a phenomenon, we are assured, which not only has occurred frequently, but has really formed the warp and woof of human history. Accompanying the present class-struggle is the glaring contrast between the condition of the industrial world and its intellectual environment. This means, in the view of the socialist, that the present condition of the industrial world calls for and will inevitably bring about a revolution in which the ideas and institutions which the mass of civilized men believe to repose upon eternal truths or upon divine appointment will come to naught. Rights of property, the right of inheritance, the rights of the family, marriage, authority and obedience, even religious belief and worship—all these must go, as unsuited to the conditions under which man must work out his earthly destiny. Here, surely we have socialism coming down to men's business and bosoms.

REFUTATION.—*The Materialistic Conception of History.*—This doctrine, so far as it is identical with materialistic monism in general, we have already refuted. (See "Mind and Matter," "Soul," "Materialism," "Evolution," "God's Existence.")

We have shown that matter is not the only form of being. Immaterial mind and soul are as real as matter, and the primal and eternal Being is spiritual. What we wish to emphasize here is that the doctrine is held by nearly all leading socialists, and books in which it is set forth as truth are circulated among the rank and file. Crass materialism is the daily bread of those who feed their minds upon such

literature. This fact is alone sufficient to determine the bearings of socialism on religion.

The Law of Change.—According to this doctrine, nothing is fixed or permanent, even in the sphere of thought and science, or of religion. This sweeping assertion is lightly and gratuitously made; and indeed its falsity has been recognized by the more reflecting socialistic writers. Some have admitted that mathematics and the sciences dependent upon mathematics have to do with fixed ideas and immutable truths. A large concession, surely; for the exact sciences cover a large part of the territory of human knowledge, and they are based, moreover, on principles which belong to the still larger province of mental philosophy. Other socialists have frankly admitted that, in general, the realm of thought is independent of the material conditions of life, and that permanent principles of thought have modified the conditions of life.

The Economic Basis of Human Life.—Here the absurdity of the materialistic view reaches its height. We are told that upon modes of production, buying and selling depends the whole structure of society as well as the whole world of ideas. Among other things, the dominant philosophy and religion of a country will depend upon its economic tendencies. Most of our readers will be astonished at so bold a generalization, even as coming from a socialist. If there is anything to be learned from history it is surely the fact that most great movements—social, political, and religious—have had an origin quite independent of economic conditions. The growth of ideas, the sudden appearance of geniuses and of saints, personal and national ambition, faith and fanaticism—these are the main factors that have changed the face of society, quite irrespective of the material conditions of life. Christianity, early in its career, found a home in every clime and flourished under every system of economics. The conquests of Alexander, which so profoundly influenced the course of history, had little or no connection with the economic state of society. Mohammedanism, the Crusades, the Renaissance, the Protestant Revolution, were independent of the conditions of commerce and production.

But our best allies in this contention are in the camp of the socialists. The *ecclesia docens* of socialism is split, on this and on other subjects, more hopelessly than it dare

acknowledge to the mass of its adherents. The revisionists form a powerful section of the party, devoted to the modification or the entire repudiation of the extravagances of socialistic teaching. If retained within the party, they must inevitably bring it to its ruin. Concerning the doctrine of the economic basis of society the teaching of the "revisionists" runs counter to that of the pure Marxian section of the party. Bax, Bernstein, L. Woltman, and others have acknowledged in their writings that the realm of thought is to a great extent independent of the economic world.

Let the reader not fail to grasp the significance of this admission. Taking their stand upon the doctrine we have been refuting, socialist leaders assure their "comrades" in the ranks that the new economics will one day adjust all things to themselves. But if the leaders are themselves unlearning the materialistic philosophy which is at the basis of these predictions the question now is, how long will the leaders be able to sustain the equivocal rôle of thinking one thing and preaching another.

Economic Contrasts and Class Struggles.—Socialists, repeating by rote the words of their father and prophet, tell us that the history of human society is simply the history of struggles between the classes. Here they are reading their one idea into all history. Class struggles are indeed prominent in history, but they are not the only struggles on record; nor can it be proved that the majority of struggles are in any way even reducible to class struggles. The great historical events cited in a preceding paragraph, events involving many an important struggle, were not connected with the mutual opposition of classes. In many an important struggle members of the two great classes which socialists have in mind fought side by side.

Nor is it true that such class struggles as have occurred have had their origin in the glaring discordance existing between the state of economics and the general state of society. The discordance has had no existence outside the brains of a Marx or an Engels. Who could ever hope to prove that the ideas and institutions of society as at present constituted are at variance with the actual system of production and exchange? There is much, of course, in those ideas and institutions which is in utter discordance with

the hopes and beliefs of Socialists; but that is another matter.

The Theory of Increasing Pauperization.—The same recklessness of assertion is shown in the dictum that under the domination of capital there has been a steady and increasing tendency to pauperism, whilst, on the other hand, all wealth is gradually passing into the hands of the few. The Erfurt Platform of 1891, which is the present gospel of the party, plainly sets forth the assumption that the present system means for workingmen a “a growing increase of the insecurity of their existence, of misery, oppression, enslavement, debasement, and exploitation.”

Now, as regards the validity of the pauperization theory, it must, of course, be admitted that the lot of certain classes of workingmen has been made hard by small wages, long hours of work, and high cost of living; but to assert that the lot of workingmen in general has been growing ever more miserable, and to appeal to the feelings of workingmen by drawing pictures of misery tending to starvation but destined to end in revolution, is to act the part of a demagogue. Statistics and general experience contradict the assertion. The material prosperity of workingmen has been steadily increasing; and although colossal fortunes have been acquired by the few, the intermediate grades of society have also been growing in wealth.

But here again the revisionists among the socialists ally themselves with men of sense and reject the pauperization theory. Opposition to it was well to the fore in the Socialist Congress of Lübeck in 1901, when Bebel, the recent leader of the party, felt himself obliged to repudiate the doctrine taken in an *absolute sense*. Whilst admitting that, *absolutely* speaking, the workingman is better off to-day than in past generations, he maintained that *relatively* he was not. Quoting from Lassalle, he said: “If you compare what the rich class has with what the working class has to-day, then the gap between the working class and the rich class to-day is greater than ever before.” What does this mean but that the working class is not getting rich as quickly as the non-working class? Their condition is vastly improved, but not in the same proportion as that of their masters. So that now it is not pity for the poor, but envy toward the rich, that is supposed to fire the socialist breast.

But this false pauperization theory has done splendid service in gatherings of workingmen, and doubtless will continue to do so for many a day. Workingmen will be told, as they are in a socialist booklet that lies before us, "You are living in a slavery which is in many respects worse than that which prevailed in the South before 1863." This, then, is the doctrine reserved for the masses. In the upper strata of socialism reason and reflection are working their beneficial effects, but the greatest care is taken that not even a modicum of reason or reflection shall filter down among the rough-handed sons of toil: otherwise the game would be up.

The Iron Law of Wages.—The doctrine of the iron law of wages, which is now abandoned by socialists, is mentioned here only as an additional illustration of the unstable character of socialistic theory. According to this law, the wages of workingmen vary from high to low and from low to high, but never remain for any length of time much higher than will enable a workingman to obtain the barest necessities of life; and hence poverty is his eternal lot. The theory is contrary to facts and now occupies a place in the crowded lumber-room of socialistic science.

Men of reflection in the higher walks of socialism doubtless see with no small degree of vexation how unfortunate a thing it was that their system had its origin in the brain of a philosopher. Whilst pressing forward to the goal of collectivism they feel themselves seriously hampered by the load of "scientific" rubbish which their early preceptors have clapped upon their backs; and so they fling their pet doctrines, one after another, to the winds. It remains to be seen, now that socialistic thought is going to pieces, how long the farce can be maintained by which the rank and file promoters of the movement are drugged with a doctrine in which their leaders no longer believe.

The reader will have noticed that we have given little direct refutation of the fanciful dogmas of the Marxian philosophy. That task we have left mainly to the socialists themselves.

SOCIALISM

III. ITS IMPRACTICABILITY

A Dream.—Socialism will turn a complex problem into a very simple one. Instead of attempting to secure justice for all classes it will abolish all distinction of classes. All must be workers. The one class, the people, will own its own industries, work for itself, and pay itself according to the value of the work done.

THE REALITY.—Such is the vision that presents itself to the rank and file of socialism; but the leaders should by this time know that it is a delusion and a snare. Socialist writers, though occupied chiefly with fine-spun theories, which they deal out to the multitude garnished with prophecies and denunciations (here they feel quite at home), become painfully aware, when they enter the region of practical socialism, that their path is a thorny one. They cannot help seeing the innumerable difficulties that must be met when they attempt to apply their theories to the stubborn actualities of life. No wonder that certain leading socialists, in the stress of controversy, have made concessions which are fatal to their system as a whole. Some of these concessions we have considered in our other articles on socialism.

The task of reducing all men to one level, the task of fitting society into an artificial framework of governmental and industrial activity, the task of controlling the countless personal peculiarities of living human beings, and of subduing personal greed, personal ambition, and personal antipathies; these are some of the tasks which socialists have merrily set about accomplishing. Scarcely less difficult will be the problem of providing needed scope to personal independence, personal initiative, and just personal claims to exceptional rewards for exceptional services. Difficulties such as these start up at every turn. Hence it is that no two socialists agree on important points connected with the construction of the new commonwealth. But for that they are not to blame—the task is an insuperable one. The blame rests with socialism.

Socialism is not a mere system of political philosophy. It is a system of practical politics, for the realization of

which our citizens are asked to give their votes. And what they are asked to vote for is a chimerical scheme of government based upon a bad philosophy, and one so impracticable that it would take much more than the wisdom of a Solon or a Solomon to fit it to the needs of our common human nature.

There is one feature of socialistic speculation which stamps it as utterly visionary. When socialists are pressed hard by objections drawn from the ineradicable tendencies of human nature or of human society they have the coolness to tell us that by the time the new system has been matured a moral transformation will have come over the race! Socialism, by some sort of Orphean music of its own, will have charmed men into a renunciation of self and into a willingness to work for the general good of the race. Applied science, moreover, will have rid labor of all its disagreeable features, and men will take to work as boys now take to play. This is the stuff with which the "comrades" in the ranks are deluded by their leaders. This is what the compatriots of Marx and Bebel might well call *schwärmerei*, or wrong-headed enthusiasm.

SOCIALISM

IV. ITS BEARINGS ON RELIGION

A Snare.—Religion is a private affair. The social democracy is concerned "solely with the purely secular questions connected with the struggle for economic, social, and political emancipation. Social democracy never asks its followers what religious opinions they hold; and in general its position toward religion is that of a neutral." (Von Vollmar, in the Reichstag, Dec. 5, 1900.)

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF SOCIALISM TOWARD RELIGION.—"Religion is a private affair." This is a sop thrown to the unwary. Socialists know full well that their system is very much concerned with religion, and especially with the Christian religion. Its aims and its teachings, as well as the explicit statements of its leaders, prove it to be at variance with the spirit and the teachings of the Christian religion.

Christian teaching recognizes the right of private and individual ownership; socialism ignores it, denying as it does a man's right to acquire property, to enjoy the income it yields, to enhance its value, or freely to dispose of it. Socialism, if it had the reins of power in its hands, would make a general seizure of personal and real estate in defiance of the will of the possessor, not by an act of eminent domain, such as obtains under the present system; for it would not include a full, direct, and immediate indemnification. It would entirely annul the private ownership of estates, against all natural right. But as the actual possessors of property would not submit to the change of their own free will, they would be compelled to do so by force.

And force is really contemplated by socialist leaders. "In most countries of Europe," said Marx in the Congress of The Hague, "violence must be the lever of our social reform. We must finally have recourse to violence in order to establish the rule of labor." That an armed revolution will be resorted to has either been intimated or explicitly stated by socialist speakers and writers, as, for instance, by Liebknecht in the Socialist Convention of Ghent, in 1877. "The Army," he says, "will, after all, consist of the sons of the people whom we are gaining over by our revolutionary propaganda When the day shall have arrived rifles and cannon will of their own accord face about to prostrate the foes of the socialist people." The same sentiment has been so often re-echoed in socialistic journals that it needs no illustration here.

It is a common Christian tenet that marriage, which is a permanent union of husband and wife, was instituted by God, and that the wife is subject to the husband. The family, too, according to the Christian conception, possesses inalienable rights, which the State is bound to respect. In a socialist commonwealth the State would be a supreme dictator in such matters. Matrimony would be succeeded by free love—State-regulated free love, if you will, but not marriage. The wife would owe no obedience to her husband. She would be in all things his equal. Even in the "demands for the present," set forth in the Erfurt Platform, "the abolition of all laws which subordinate woman to man in public and private life" is insisted upon.

Another demand of the Erfurt Platform is that the schools be secularized; which means that the teaching of

religion be entirely banished from them. But it is a distinctively Christian principle that secular education should never be divorced from religious training; and a constant effort to reduce the principle to practice is a distinguishing mark of Catholicism—the form of Christianity that socialists will chiefly have to reckon with. Socialism sees in the Christian school its most formidable foe; and hence even in its “demands for the present” it includes, by way of preparing the soil for socialism, the abolition of religious instruction in the common schools.

The dictum that religion is a purely private affair is both false and anti-Christian. Religion would perish if it were locked away in the human heart and could find no external expression. Christianity, moreover, is necessarily and by divine institution a religion that enjoins public as well as private worship. It would consequently be a very undesirable element in a socialistic commonwealth and would not be tolerated any longer than could be helped. Christianity must have its public places of worship, its rectories, its seminaries, its novitiates, its schools, its asylums—and all these things suppose material resources and must rest upon an independent financial basis. But under socialism all material treasure would belong to the people at large; and the people—or the populace, or perhaps even the rabble—would have the only say in the distribution of it. Now, let any reader of these pages fancy a socialistic commonwealth donating a sum of money for the building of a Catholic Church! Furthermore, a Christian clergy should be free and untrammelled in the exercise of its ministry. The public offices of religion, attendance upon the sick and the dying, and a score of other essential duties, should remove them from the chance dictation of those who set no value upon their sacred functions, and should free them from the obligation of manual labor which socialists would impose upon all members of the commonwealth without any distinction.

Socialist leaders differ, it is true, in the attitude they assume before the public in regard to religion. Some take the bull by the horns and make a frank acknowledgment of what is really held by all leading socialists. The Socialist Party of Great Britain, in a recent manifesto, declared that “*no man can be consistently both a socialist and a Christian.*” George D. Herron, Secretary to the

International Congress of Socialists, makes a clean breast of his sentiments. "*Christianity to-day*," he tells us, "*stands for what is lowest and basest in life. It is the most degrading of all our institutions, and the most brutalizing in its effects on the common life. For socialism to use it, to make terms with it, or to let it make approaches to the socialist movement, is for socialism to take Judas to its bosom.*" E. Belfort Bax, a leading English socialist, informs us that "Socialism has been described as a new conception of the world, presenting itself in industry as co-operative communism, in politics as international republicanism, in religion as atheistic humanism."

These later authorities on socialism only re-echo the sentiments of the patriarchs of the movement. Karl Marx, the father of modern socialism, once wrote: "*Religion is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people signifies their demand for a real happiness.*" Frederick Engels acknowledged that "*religion will be forbidden.*" "*Religion*," he thinks, "*is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's mind of the external forces which dominate their every-day existence.*" Joseph Dietzgen declared that "*socialism and Christianity differ from each other as the day does from the night*," and that "*social democracy has decided against religion.*" And August Bebel: "*In politics we social democrats profess republicanism, in economics socialism, in religion atheism.*" And Liebknecht: "*It is our duty as socialists to root out the faith in God with all our zeal, nor is one worthy of the name who does not consecrate himself to the spread of atheism.*"

Another class of socialist writers and speakers content themselves with harping on the assurance that socialism has nothing to do with religion and that religion is altogether a private affair with which socialism has no intention of interfering. We have seen the hollowness of such pretensions. A third class quietly assume that, in respect to religion, things will settle themselves. Bellamy, who made formal profession of socialism in his later writings, takes it for granted that by the time socialism is at the top religion will have undergone so complete a change as to need neither priest nor altar nor congregation. A man's religious wants will be confined to religious instruction or religious conference; and he can gratify himself in that

matter by establishing telephonic communication with some oracle of religious wisdom whose reputation will have attracted to him a multitude of hearers. If a man feels any need of priest or sacrifice or public place of worship, he can have them to his heart's content. On this last point the writer must have been jesting. We can well believe, however, that in proportion as socialism gains ground the world will feel small need of priest or sacrifice or place of worship. The influence of socialism must necessarily work in that direction, and that means the gradual destruction of Christianity. Bellamy's speculations on the future of religion are much of a piece with those of other socialistic writers.

But what better could be expected of practical socialism when the philosophy on which it is built is materialistic and atheistic to the core? We are dealing with socialism of the Marxian type, for of this type the socialism that is at our doors professes to be. But at the very root of the Marxian system is the theory of the materialistic origin and evolution of the universe—a theory which rules God and the soul out of existence. With the atheism of this theory all the leaders of socialism, as we have seen from abundant evidence, are imbued. If there are any socialists who are not atheists it is because they are made to swallow the bolus of Marxism without knowing what they are swallowing.

We have said enough, and more than enough, to show the anti-religious character of socialism. But now, a last word to the Christian, especially the Catholic workingman: Don't allow yourself to be induced to join any party or organization bearing the name of "socialist." Reform and improvement are one thing; socialism, atheism, and revolution are quite another. You may not believe in the extreme doctrines of socialism, but by helping to swell its ranks you are helping to popularize a movement which is essentially godless. You are strengthening the hands of men who are bent on destroying Christianity root and branch.

You may be tempted by the promises of socialism, but remember that socialism is but a revamping of old communistic schemes which have had their day and from which all sensible men have held aloof. You feel drawn to men who profess a sympathy for the toiling poor, but the truth is that socialists feel less pity for the poor than envy toward

the rich. All solid improvement in the condition of the workingman has been brought about by means with which socialists are out of sympathy. Honest agitation and well-directed practical movements have done something; socialism has done nothing. Nor is it likely to effect anything in the future. No movement based upon any such flimsy theorizing as we have considered in the course of these articles can ever prevail against the good sense of the people. The very leaders of socialism will differ, as they have differed, on important points of theory and practice, and difference of opinion will lead to the splitting up of the party. Trades-unions, in proportion as they are ruled by socialists, will be used as catspaws to further the ends of socialism. Therefore, keep the socialists out of your trades-unions, and there will be no danger of your aims being confounded with theirs.

SOUL

Objection.—Observation and experiment have failed to discover the existence of a soul in man. The so-called spiritual acts that are supposed to prove the existence of a spiritual soul have been discovered to be modifications of the cell-tissue of the brain.

THE ANSWER.—Are observation and experiment the only means of acquiring knowledge? They form the basis of the physical sciences; but are there no other sciences? Are not logic, rational philosophy, and mathematics sciences as well as physics, chemistry, and physiology? Even in the latter sciences observation and experiment are only the beginning of a process of induction which is brought to a close by deduction or inference. This may seem too obvious to need mentioning, but the exclusive dominion of observation and experiment in the realm of science has been so often assumed, or practically held in our time, that we deem it necessary to emphasize the part played by deduction even in scientific research.

Very little reflection is needed to see that the acts of the mind are of a different order from those of the bodily senses and of the imagination. Thought is immaterial, supersensible, spiritual. Even when we think of material

things we think of them in an immaterial manner. This is evident from the way in which we designate them, referring them as we do to certain classes or species. We predicate the universal of the individual. We say, "This is a tree," "That is a house," which is equivalent to saying, "That belongs to the class of things called trees, etc." The mind has, therefore, certain immaterial and general concepts, such as *tree*—not this or that tree, but the species tree—*horse, man, animal*. These universal and immaterial concepts are the product of the mind and, formally, exist only in the mind. They are called abstractions, because the mind, in forming them, abstracts or withdraws its attention from the individual object and considers only the class or species to which it belongs.

Such is the spiritual alchemy by which the mind acts upon the things of sense and imagination and transforms them into the things of the mind. These universal notions differ from impressions produced upon the senses, and even from pictures of the imagination, both of which are confined in each case to the particular and the individual. My general or abstract notion *tree* is not identical with the image of any particular tree which I happen to be thinking of at the moment. It may be applied to any tree.

Now, we conclude that if the mind is able to think of things in an immaterial or spiritual way, it must itself be spiritual, and the soul, of which it is a faculty, must also be spiritual. The argument grows stronger when we consider the purer forms of abstraction, which get furthest away from concrete existences of any kind, material or spiritual; such, for example, as the general ideas of virtue, vice, truth, falsity, right, obligation, power, possibility, being. It is impossible to explain by the materialistic theory we are refuting such expressions as "can," "must," "might," and "ought," connoting possibility, necessity, or obligation. Those four monosyllables represent ideas. No mere picture-making faculty, such as the imagination, could ever do justice to them in its attempt to represent them. They pass beyond the limits of the sensible and the concrete.

Universal ideas have so much reality that they can be made the subject of thought and discourse as distinct immaterial entities. Not that they have any existence outside the mind such as Plato imagined. They represent

things outside the mind, but only under some universal aspect. Formally, and in themselves, they are the things of the mind; but as such they are realities, and not less so than the things we see, feel, and touch. To deny their reality is to deny the reality of science, which is wholly made up either of abstract ideas or of universal formulæ.

Nevertheless, there are those who deny the existence of universal ideas. Some object to them as being airy nothings. Ideas, they tell us, should stand for objective realities in the order of existing things, but there is nothing in that order resembling a universal. Our answer, in the first place, is that universals are realities themselves, but of the immaterial order. In the second place, they represent that objective reality which consists in the identity of nature of many things belonging to the same class or species; as, for instance, the humanity which is common to all human beings. This it converts into a universal notion which it predicates of all members of the species. Such is the basis of all true science, which sees the general law in the particular instance.

Others regard universal ideas as convenient fictions—a sort of mental algebra, whose formulæ are generalized for convenience' sake. Abstractions, they say, are only symbols indicating that we have noticed points of resemblance in things that differ. To get, for instance, what is called the idea "horse," we simply observe a number of horses, and then, recollecting our experience and having a confused phantasm of horses in the imagination, we confine our attention to the points in which they all agree and which mark off the horse as distinct from other animals. This single impression of likeness left on the imagination we represent by the term "horse." Here, we are told, there is no more universality than there is in comparing a man's face with its portrait on canvas.

Thus far the objection: it carries with it its own refutation. For how is it possible to confine the attention to points of resemblance and exclude points of difference unless by the aid of a faculty which is independent of the individual and the material? Sense and imagination are pinned to the single objects which they represent and have no power of passing from one object to another for purposes of comparison. In the mind, on the other hand, there is a tran-

scendent activity which makes it rise superior to material and individual conditions.

The process described in the objection may possibly be a horse's way of knowing things, but it is not a man's. A horse, after some experience of dogs, possibly has in his imagination a confused image of dogs (with accompanying feelings, mostly unpleasant), and every new member of the canine species brings the image (and by association, the feelings) to the surface of consciousness; and then follow the usual external marks of recognition. But the horse's master has a much superior knowledge of dogs. The man, like the horse, has seen many dogs in his time; and like the horse he may have a confused phantasm of dogs in his imagination, to which he relates every new dog he meets; but he possesses a faculty which passes beyond the limits of sense and imagination. These latter faculties are but picture-making faculties. The pictures may be either successive or simultaneous and confused, but they can never represent anything but single objects. Now let us suppose that the man undertakes to write a book on the dog: is the subject of the book a confused mass of phantasms of dogs? Surely not; it is the dog, not dogs. By the superior power of mind the writer will be enabled to review his successive impressions of dogs, note the various points of identity and difference existing between individual dogs, and draw his general conclusions. But general conclusions are general propositions; and even though they represented no reality of any sort, do they not argue certain mental processes of composing, dividing, and comparing which exceed the powers of any sensitive organ or of any sensitive faculty? Such processes are evidenced even in our daily use of human language.

But there is another faculty which furnishes a no less cogent proof of the immateriality of the soul; namely, the will. This faculty possesses freedom of action—a fact that may be proved by any one and at any hour of the day. The very fact that it acts upon motives; that it waits till it sees a reason for acting; that it passes from one insufficient reason to another till it finds an adequate reason for deciding, proves that it is master of its actions. Such freedom can not belong to material things. The action of matter is fixed by law. Gravitation, chemical affinities, and the like, act always in the same way, and the scientist in

his laboratory would be surprised to find them varying in their action. But the soul is free and self-determining, and consequently immaterial and spiritual.

Thinking and willing are not, then, modifications of the tissue of the brain. Brain action does indeed accompany every act of thought and volition but *only* accompanies it, and is not identical with it. Sensible images also accompany those spiritual acts, but are not identical with them. The senses and the sensitive appetites of the pure animal nature range among natural objects with an activity which, up to a certain point, resembles that of man; but where it is a question of reviewing one's experiences, classifying, generalizing, reducing to science, then higher or spiritual powers must be brought into requisition, which powers must, of course, belong to a *soul* that is spiritual.

SPIRITISM

It is contended in favor of spiritism that the phenomena which it presents are a plain matter of observation and evidence and are attested by numerous and trustworthy witnesses. They are to be accepted as any other facts are accepted for which we have the evidence of our senses; but if they are accepted they will revolutionize religious thought.

Facts of a striking nature are undoubtedly exhibited at spiritistic séances; but are the facts, in their substance, such as they are believed to be by spiritists? Do they proceed from the agency of disembodied spirits? And what are Christians, especially Catholics, to think of them? Before answering these questions let us cast a glance at the origin and history of spiritism.

In one form or other spiritism is at least as old as the scriptural story of Saul and the Witch of Endor; but in its present phase it dates from a little more than sixty years ago, and it had its origin in America. In 1848, at Hydesville, N. Y., two sisters, Margaretta and Mary Fox, girls of twelve and fifteen respectively, professed to have a means of communicating with the souls of the dead. The story as told by themselves was that they had heard some mysterious rappings, which they had thought might pro-

ceed from the spirit of a man who had been murdered in the same house. They afterward discovered that the noises could be used as a code of signals in communicating with the souls of the dead. It was agreed between the girls and their new acquaintances in the other world that when the spirits were questioned the answer "Yes" should be indicated by one rap, "No" by three, and "Doubtful" or "Wait" by two. Later on, the Fox family removed to Rochester, N. Y., and here it was that spiritism as a system took shape.

The girls gave exhibitions of their powers, acting the part of "mediums," i.e., persons professing to be able to produce spiritistic manifestations. Spiritism became the sensation of the period. It soon spread from America to England, from England to the Continent. Mediums arose in every part of the world, and to the rappings were added other manifestations even more strange. The spirits showed their presence by the turning and tilting of tables, by ringing bells and by playing on musical instruments. Under the action of the spirits bodies were altered in weight, a touch of the hand was enough to move heavy bodies from their places, human beings were raised in the air, phantom forms and faces appeared. Particular spirits were invoked and made to answer questions. Secrets were revealed, and predictions were made that afterward proved true. As all the world knows, these wonders have continued down to the present day.

Such is the story as it might be told by a spiritist; but the reality of these phenomena, and still more their significance are matters demanding serious investigation. In the early days of spiritism men of science either laughed or looked askance at the pretensions of spiritists, but the progress of events in the spiritistic world ultimately obliged them to face about and consent to examine into the reported facts as they would into any other class of phenomena. The Church and her theologians are necessarily interested in a movement which has important bearings on the souls of the living. The alleged phenomena have accordingly been tested and scrutinized by many who greatly differ from one another in their point of view and in the spirit in which they approach the subject. It would be quite premature to attempt to set forth the resultant of these converging lines of investigation; though it must be said that

the scientists have been steadily veering round to the recognition of a certain number of facts for which there is no scientific explanation and which seem to be due to some preternatural causation. The results of these studies, immature as they are, will justify us, if we mistake not, in making the following observations:

1. There has always been a strong presumption established against spiritism, as, indeed, against most forms of occultism, by the fact that the phenomena take place only under set conditions. There must be a medium present; darkness is desirable; a certain apparatus is used, draped tables, curtains, and what not. When the performance fails, the medium has an excuse pat: there is some one in the audience whose lack of sympathy exercises an adverse influence or the medium's powers have undergone a momentary eclipse! In a word, there is much that savors of the tricks of the ordinary conjurer. But the successes and the failures of the mediums are explained by a crude but pretentious philosophy, which among other things speaks of an astral body—something intermediate between spirit and gross matter—which in each sensitive subject is the active and passive principle of spiritistic experiences, and upon the condition of which depends the degree of success of the manifestations.

We have a secondary motive in mentioning the material and mechanical accompaniments of spiritistic displays. Spiritists of our day have had the presumption to measure their psychic achievements against the wonderful deeds of the Saviour of the world; but what an immense contrast between the staginess of spiritism and the simple grandeur of those manifestations of the supernatural recorded in the four Gospels. In the latter case the wonder in each instance was wrought by a single word, or by the touch of a hand. Miracles of the most stupendous kind were worked in open daylight, in the presence of thousands, and their number was past all reckoning.

2. Fraud has very frequently been detected in the performances of mediums; in fact, the majority of mediums have met with little reverses of the kind but have afterward mounted the platform with the greatest apparent serenity. Spiritism made its very debut by a piece of roguery. The Fox sisters, mentioned above, were twice detected in imposture, and full details of the frauds prac-

tised by them were afterward given in a written deposition, signed by a lady who was a marriage relation of the girls, and presented to the magistrates of the town in which she lived. According to this statement, the mysterious raps were produced by a peculiar movement of the toes. The deponent gave an illustration of the trick, which she had learned from the two young adepts. The Fox girls have had many a successor in the practice of this species of roguery, and hence it is not surprising that spiritists, as a rule, try to avoid the searchlight of scientific scrutiny. Apart from fraud, many of the phenomena are plainly attributable to hallucination, whilst some of the more marvelous stories—amongst others one relating how a certain English medium actually floated in the air—turn out to be stories of the type of the Three Black Crows.

3. But after due allowance has been made for fraud, hallucination, and exaggerated reporting, known or suspected, there is a considerable residue of well-observed phenomena baffling all attempts to explain them by natural laws. There is no dearth of hypotheses offered in explanation of them, but these are mostly based on a false philosophy of spiritual and material substance. The "astral body" (or the "perispirit") has played a prominent part in such hypotheses. According to some spiritists, the astral body may detach itself from the visible body and be brought into communication with the astral bodies of other persons, including those of the dead, who are supposed to have carried their astral element with them beyond the grave. There is no foundation in fact for the assumption of any such agent as the astral body; but, of course, an Arabian Night's Tale had to be invented to account for the mysterious by those who ignore the Christian point of view in the matter of ghostly apparitions.

Perhaps equally unsound is the hypothesis of those who attempt to account for the facts by the agency of certain subconscious or subliminal powers, of the existence of which, at least in certain classes of persons, there seems to be no doubt in many minds. The subconscious or subliminal memory—whether the faculty be thus properly designated or not—is described as a mysterious storehouse of impressions once received, but received, strange to say, without the subject's knowledge. In a state of hypnosis or in a spiritistic trance, the unsuspected treasures of the

memory are brought to the surface, and there is a marvelous manifestation of knowledge which was thought to be quite beyond the range of the person's powers or experience. To account for the utterances of mediums at such moments some investigators hold, or suggest, that when the subliminal activities are set in motion in the medium connection is made, through them, between the medium's mind and that of some other person, present or absent, and that what he gives forth as communications from the spirits are really the thoughts of living human beings. The reader may set his own valuation upon this explanation; remembering, however, that theories relating to subconscious memory and such other capabilities are in too crude a state to be accepted as scientific.

4. As to the main question, whether there is any real communication with intelligences of another world, Catholics as well as others can form their opinions according to the evidence. It is quite in accord with Catholic teaching to believe that spirits mingle in the affairs of men; *but there are spirits and spirits*—there are spirits good and bad. Now, of one thing we can rest assured, that, considering the circumstances connected with spiritistic manifestations, *it is inconceivable that either God or His good spirits (including the souls of the just) can have anything to do with such performances.* Spiritism thrives upon idle and even criminal curiosity, and its exhibitions have been marked by triviality, frivolity, and moral grossness, whilst the moral and physical effects they produce upon the mediums and their sitters are notoriously bad.

The literature of the subject abounds in cases of ruined lives due to spiritistic practices. "Ten thousand people," wrote Dr. Forbes Winslow as far back as 1877, "are at the present time confined in lunatic asylums on account of having tampered with the supernatural." (Quoted from Raupert's "Modern Spiritism.") Moreover, the supposed spirits often utter contradictory statements on matters of religion, and deny articles of the Christian faith. Hence, the only conclusion that a Catholic can draw is that if any spirits are concerned in these transactions, *they are undoubtedly evil spirits*, and that spiritism, whether its adepts are aware of it or not, is nothing less than commerce with the devil. The very fact of its professing to have a free

entrée into the world of spirits is enough to condemn it in the eyes of all true Christians.

As to the belief of spiritists that their mediums hold communication with the souls of the dead and that the souls of particular persons are identified in such manifestations, the evidence furnished is of the most untrustworthy kind and has never been subjected to any very rigorous tests. Catholics are, of course, aware that God has at times permitted the souls of the departed to appear under visible forms, but always for purposes worthy of His infinite holiness. It is, therefore, quite impossible that the souls of the just should have any participation in spiritistic doings. What the devils may do with the souls of the damned in connection with spiritism is a matter beyond our ken.

Amongst the worst features of spiritism is one that is ominous of mischief in the future. Spiritism has been made a religion, and it aims at revolutionizing the religious beliefs of the world. It professes to have its revelation, derived from communications with spirits; though it is considerably baffled in its attempts to piece together the scattered fragments of information received and shape them into a consistent and comprehensive body of doctrine. They are learning by experience what it is to have to do with the Father of Lies.

Such being the real character of spiritism, little need be said as to what should be the practical behavior of Catholics in regard to it. In the very nature of the case, it is grievously sinful to have any part or share in spiritistic practices. Even to be present at spiritistic séances is, ordinarily, sinful, as being an occasion either of harm to the person present or of scandal to others. For Catholics it should be enough to know that spiritism is under the ban of the Church. The Roman authorities have more than once condemned its practices, and the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, after a scathing denunciation of them, exhorts the faithful not to favor or abet them, directly or indirectly, and not to be present, even out of curiosity, at spiritistic gatherings.

SPONTANEOUS GENERATION

An Argument.—There was a time when no living thing, plant or animal, existed on the earth. Therefore, when living things appeared they must have been evolved out of non-living matter; the organic must have grown out of the inorganic.

THE ANSWER.—To the extreme evolutionist the above argument seems conclusive, but only because he assumes as true two things that have never been proved, to wit, that creation is inadmissible and that evolution is the all-sufficient explanation of all phenomena. Let us see if we can give the reader a fair idea of the bearings of the question and of its importance to the Christian apologist.

It is a matter of common knowledge that most living things with which we are familiar come, either directly or indirectly, from other living things. A chicken is produced from an egg which was laid by another chicken; an oak grows from an acorn which once grew on another oak. *Life is derived from life.* Neither chickens nor oaks are produced from stones. Now this is the same thing as saying that organic matter is not produced by inorganic. Organic is the same as living matter; inorganic is inanimate matter.

The two are widely apart in respect to origin, structure, and mode of action. Everything that has life—every plant, every animal—has a structure that makes it essentially different from a stone, a mineral, or a clod of earth. It has organs, that is to say, parts which are adapted, each in its own way, to the performance of certain functions. A human being, for instance, has organs of sight, hearing, and smell, as well as a heart, lungs, and digestive organs.

The way in which living things grow and develop is also peculiar. They have a way of building themselves up out of small beginnings; and this they do by the action of an inherent vital principle which enables them to take to themselves even inorganic matter and convert it into their own living substance. Beginning with a mere speck—a cell—they put forth other cells and form a cellular tissue, and are finally developed into the perfect plant or animal.

The developing power in each case does not work at hap-

hazard and produce now one thing, now another—at one time a rose-bush, at another an apple-tree: each germ produces invariably one distinct species of living being, and always the same species from which it has itself sprung. All these characteristics of organic beings mark them off as quite distinct from inorganic.

Such is the nature and such the mode of action of the living beings known to man. But is there no exception to the rule? Are not certain well-known living creatures produced spontaneously by dead matter?

Down to a century or two ago there was a universal belief that decayed animal or vegetable matter had the power, under certain conditions, of producing, without germ, cell, egg, or anything of the kind, certain living beings, of which specimens could be seen in decayed meat or cheese. The revelations of the microscope erected this popular belief into something more than a belief with many scientists of the last century. At last the whole scientific world was set agog by the question whether at least certain forms of life could not be produced from inorganic matter.

A brilliant series of experiments threw some light on the subject but failed to convince, one way or the other. At last Pasteur entered the field. He was persuaded that the animalcules produced by dead matter were formed from germs derived from the atmosphere, which germs had, of course, been produced by living creatures. The experiments he set on foot must be numbered among the triumphs of modern science. They had this result, that spontaneous generation was henceforth regarded as a myth. The animalcules found in dead matter were found to be hatched from germs conveyed through the atmosphere.

Even Huxley, in summing up the results of these investigations, says: "For my own part, I conceive that, with the particulars of M. Pasteur's experiments before us, we can not fail to arrive at his conclusions, and that the doctrine of spontaneous generation has received a final *coup de grace*." (*On the Origin of Species*, p. 79.)

That was one phase of the controversy; but in our day we have to deal with another. Extreme evolutionists are naturally interested in the subject. Without spontaneous generation evolution, as they conceive it, would have been an impossibility. They hold that *all* life, including the intellectual life of man, has been evolved out of inorganic

matter. Ignoring creation, they believe that all things have been evolved from the simplest inorganic elements by the laws of matter. They hold with most scientists that at a certain period, when the earth was in an igneous state, no living thing could have existed upon it. Therefore, they conclude, life, when it first appeared, must have sprung from inanimate matter.

Of late years a hypothesis has been started which attempts to account for the existence of life on the earth by supposing that in some remote age the earth received organic germs from some other planet. Now, apart from the consideration that, in all probability, life would have been as little possible on any other planet as on ours, and the further consideration that to shift the more immediate origin of life from our planet to another is not to settle the main question; namely, whether life can spring from inanimate matter—the hypothesis in question need not, and in fact does not, affect the position of the extreme evolutionist, who takes such high ground as to make it unnecessary to stoop to the consideration of any fact or of any hypothesis militating against his pet theory. He is wedded to universal evolution, and universal evolution postulates spontaneous generation, for otherwise it would be impossible to account for the appearance of life on the earth. Neither science nor common experience gives him any encouragement; but it does not matter. Evolution is a fact—therefore spontaneous generation is a fact. Huxley, though apparently rejoicing at the results of Pasteur's experiments, saw that spontaneous generation was necessarily involved in the evolution theory to which he clung and that to accept the one was to accept the other; so he accepted both.

Evolutionists of this type should naturally be disheartened in their attempt to bridge over the gap between living and non-living matter without admitting a Creator; but they have a way of keeping up their courage. They make the most devout acts of faith in universal evolution; and to faith is added hope; and hope imparts a sort of mental exaltation which expresses itself in words of prophecy. This unscientific state of mind they exhibit both in their books and in their popular lectures; and they do so, in many cases, with all the more assurance as they know that

their words will be taken by many as uttered in the name of Science—a word of magic power in our day.

With evolutionists of the Haeckelian type it is a matter of reckless and triumphant assertion; with those of the Huxley pattern it is a matter of cool-headed but confident “philosophical faith” based on “analogy.” When a man of Huxley’s knowledge and acumen makes an act of what he calls philosophical faith and rests his faith on what he calls analogy, he is presumed to attach a definite meaning to his words. What manner of analogy, then, can furnish a basis for his faith in spontaneous generation? He must be thinking of the analogy presented by the general course of evolution. But what has evolution to show? Not a single species of any kind is proved conclusively to have been derived from any other species. Within certain limits there may have been an evolution of species; but what appeal to evolution can be made in the present state of science?

One thing is certain, that the production of life on this earth, which we Christians know by revelation to have been the work of a Creator, has not been accounted for in any way that enables us to dispense with the creative act.

We are not in the least inclined to ignore the investigations of recent years. We can only wish them godspeed—though it must be said they have made no progress toward the solution of the question, so far as it can be said to be a question at all. Some years ago Professor Burke of Cambridge made a number of experiments on the action of radium on solutions of beef gelatin. He succeeded in producing what seemed to be veritable living cells. There was an immediate sensation; the men of science approached to get a near view of the new arrivals, but their expectations were sadly disappointed. The supposed living cells could not be shown to have more than the semblance of cells, and their counterfeit character was given an ingenious and no less probable explanation by Sir William Ramsay, of University College, London. Another striking set of experiments was that of Professor Loeb, of the University of California. The professor actually succeeded in producing life. But how? By producing the larvæ of certain animals by artificial means from unfertilized eggs. He produced living things, but he had the eggs to start with; which, of course, is not analogous to spontaneous generation. Be-

sides it is a well-known fact that the same process takes place in nature in the case of bees and ants.

To return to the argument in favor of spontaneous generation placed at the head of this article, it does not follow that because life appeared where it had not existed before it must have arisen spontaneously from inorganic matter. There was the alternative of creation; and there is nothing in science to disprove either the fact or the possibility of creation; rather there is much to prove its necessity.

"Let the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind"—this is the only positive account we possess of the origin of life on this earth. It is vouched for by the authority of the Creator Himself, and it will never be proved to be false by anything which human science can bring against it.

STRIKES

See "Labor Unions."

SUPERSTITION

A Groundless Accusation.—The Catholic Church permits, and even fosters, every manner of superstition. The Mass, the worship of images and relics, the use of scapulars, beads, Agnus Deis—to all of which a special supernatural virtue is attributed—furnish abundant proof of the accusation.

THE ANSWER.—The Catholic Church, as every Catholic and every convert knows, neither permits nor fosters superstition of any kind. It regards superstition as a sin against faith and against the virtue of religion, and condemns it as a practical denial of God and His providence.

But what are we to understand by superstition? The definitions of the standard lexicographers agree in the main with that of the Catholic catechism, according to which we may be guilty of superstition in two ways: 1. By practising an ignorant or irrational form of worship, or by worshiping a false deity. 2. By attributing to things a power which they can not have, either by their nature, or

by the prayers of the Church, or by virtue of a divine ordinance. Our dictionaries, as might be expected, have nothing to say about the prayers of the Church or about the effect of a divine ordinance.

The first of these forms of superstition is the subject of the most virulent attacks made upon the Church. The Mass, devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and the invocation of saints are regarded as flagrant instances of what our enemies are pleased to style the Romish superstition. In our separate articles on these topics we have shown that both the doctrine and the practice of Catholics in these matters are both rational and Christian. In the sacrifice of the Mass we do not adore a wafer—the idea is monstrous. We adore the living God, who has deigned to perpetuate His incarnate life on earth beneath the sacramental species. Our adoration is based on faith, and we have a reason for the faith that is in us. Our veneration for the saints, and especially for the Mother of our divine Lord, is felt and expressed because they are dear to God; and we invoke their intercession as we would ask the prayers of God's friends on earth.

Even though we Catholics were wrong on these and other points, our opponents would not be justified in hurling at us such an epithet as "superstitious," which always suggests either crass ignorance or a low degree of intelligence and education in the one to whom it is applied. It must be remembered that these supposed forms of superstition have been practised by the vast majority of Christians, East and West, for nineteen centuries, and that among those Christians there have been countless men and women of the highest culture and intelligence, who knew the difference between the blind acceptance of stereotyped forms and a rational adoption of a religious creed.

In our own day they have been accepted, practised, and defended by many of the brightest intellects in the Anglican communion, who, since the beginning of the great Oxford Movement, have come over to the Catholic Church in thousands. Catholics are not to be placed on a level with West African fetich-worshippers. Superstition is blind and unreasoning, as well as degrading, whereas Catholic belief is able to assign a reason for its adherence to the dogmas of religion, and at the same time it elevates and purifies the soul of the believer.

In the second form of superstition certain powers are ignorantly attributed to things that do not possess them. The most familiar examples are those of the silly sort, such as a belief in unlucky days (Friday has the worst reputation, whatever be the reason)—unlucky numbers (thirteen is in very bad repute, from which it will probably never recover)—a belief in the magic virtue of horse-shoes, and the like. Ascending the scale, we meet with practices of a graver sort—the arts of divination (fortune-telling, etc.), interpretation of dreams, consulting of spiritistic mediums or theosophic wonder-workers, abuses of hypnotism, and similar practices. To charge the Catholic Church with favoring any of these superstitions would be the suggestion of ignorance or of malice. So far from encouraging them, the Church has always most strictly, and in some cases solemnly, forbidden them.

No well-informed person would assert that superstitions of this order are in any way distinctive of Catholic countries. Among the simpler classes in Catholic countries there is a good deal of superstition of the milder and the comparatively harmless sort, but those countries have not by any means a monopoly of it. Scotland, Sweden, and Northern Germany—which are not Catholic regions—abound in superstitious beliefs and customs of a much more serious nature than those prevailing in Catholic Ireland or in Catholic Italy. The cities of Hamburg and Berlin would seem to bear off the palm for an unblushing practice of the arts of divination. Adepts in all manner of occultism seem to gravitate to the two cities, where they not only practise their trade and advertise their skill, but at the same time busy themselves with spreading superstitious literature. In Berlin a single work of the kind has had a circulation of fifteen thousand copies in three years. As to meddling with spiritism, Catholics may possibly be found here and there whose curiosity gets the better of their Catholic faith and loyalty; but it must be admitted that Catholics as a class stand aloof from the rest of the world in this matter. Catholics, as a rule, are too much in touch with right sources of instruction, and too much in communication with the sources of grace, to either forget or neglect their duty in the matter of superstition.

Those who are inclined to condemn the Catholic use of rosaries, scapulars, Agnus Deis, and the like, as supersti-

tious, must be reminded that in each and all of these practices there is no attributing of any power to the things themselves, even when they have the special blessing of the Church. They are used either because they are aids to devotion—as in the case of pictures—or because they are external marks or badges of loyalty to our powerful patrons in heaven—the brown scapular, for instance, being the livery of those who reverence the Mother of Our Lord. The good they do the soul does not proceed from themselves, but from the pious dispositions and affections which accompany their use.

THEOSOPHY

Its Pretensions.—Theosophy is the only system of thought that furnishes a key to the mysteries of human life and explains the presence of evil in the world. The number and the respectability of its adherents and the wondrous power displayed by some of them are no small argument in favor of the intrinsic value of the system.

THEIR VALUE.—Theosophy abounds in absurdities, and its miraculous pretensions are a species of imposture. Unfortunately, it has a sufficient number of fairly respectable adherents to justify a notice of the system in our pages.

Theosophy as a public cult dates from the establishment of the Theosophical Society, founded in the City of New York, in 1873, by Madam H. P. Blavatsky and Colonel H. S. Olcott. Madam Blavatsky had been initiated in the occult sciences in the East and had made an unsuccessful attempt to found a spiritistic society in Egypt. The theosophic system was modified and developed by Madam Besant, who was once associated with Mr. Bradlaugh in the propagation of atheism.

Theosophy acknowledges no intelligent or personal Supreme Being. It substitutes for such a Being an indefinite Something, sometimes called the Infinite Mind or the Great Reality; but it might as well have been called by any other name, as it has no positive attributes of any kind. From the Great Reality all things emanate. The human soul comes forth from it as a spark issues from a fire. In

the course of time the soul finds its way into a human body, which, however, is only its temporary dwelling-place, as it is destined to animate other bodies before it finishes its career. The soul and the Great Reality are but one Divinity; but the soul does not at once attain to a full realization of the Divinity. This it will achieve by a series of reincarnations.

According to theosophists a man's future is entirely in his own hands—but, in this sense, that his merits or demerits in his present incarnation will settle his status for the next one. This is effected by the blind, but inevitable, operation of a law—the law of Karma, as they term it—by virtue of which a man's deeds cling to his soul in the shape of "thought-forms," and are landed with him in his new stage of existence in a new body. In his second life he will find himself, at the start, virtuous or vicious, fortunate or unfortunate, happy or unhappy, according to his deserts in his previous state of existence. It is for him to work out his salvation; that is, to make provision for his next incarnation; for when he arrives at it he will find his ledger-account carried forward and ready to accompany him on his new journey. Finally, when his virtues have ripened to perfection, he is absorbed back into the great Eternal Blank from which he originally came. Theosophy is, therefore, a form of Emanational Pantheism, as well as a form of atheism of the Buddhistic type.

The space we can allow ourselves in this article will only permit us to indicate a few reasons why this strange creed should be rejected by every sensible mind.

1.—Theosophy can not be established by proof. Scarcely any attempt has been made to prove its tenets save by an appeal to its supposed aptitude to explain the presence of evil in the world. But of this more anon.

2.—Theosophy bristles with absurdities. In the first place, the Great Reality is nothing in particular in itself. How, then, can it be the cause of all things that exist? Reason tells me that before a thing can be the cause of another thing it must have a definite and determinate mode of existence itself.

3.—As the soul is identical with the Divine Reality, both its good and its bad instincts must be ascribed to the Divinity. Hence, when virtue struggles with vice, it is divinity struggling with divinity! This is all the worse as

theosophists represent the Divinity as absolute perfection.

4.—Theosophists speak of “duty” and “obligation”; and yet one would search in vain in their system for any principle on which duty or obligation could be based, or for any higher power to which duty is owed. The one motive for the performance of duty is a practical, calculating self-interest; and as for the moral relation of the soul to the infinite, the one has no more obligation to the other than a spark has to the bonfire from which it has escaped.

5.—There are honest and clear-headed theosophists, however, who admit that, strictly speaking, duty has no place in their system. “Right” and “wrong,” accordingly, are only convenient terms used instead of the more correct expressions, “upward tendency” and “downward tendency.” Why the distinction should be between *up* and *down* any more than between *right* and *left* or between *plus* and *minus*, we can not see. But, that question apart, one thing is certain—there must be a dividing-line between the two things. In other words, there must be an absolute standard or law of morality—if morality is the right name for it—by which the will may be effectually moved. If a theosophist tells me, “The right thing for you to do is to tend ‘upward,’ ” I ask him, “Why?” His answer is that it is the way to the perfection of my being. My rejoinder is that seeking the perfection of my being is only a matter of self-interest and is quite outside the moral sphere. It furnishes no motive belonging to the moral order. And even supposing that “up” and “down” were moral ideas, what criterion does theosophy furnish whereby to distinguish an “up” from a “down”? The two are well distinguished in the Ten Commandments, but theosophy has had no Mount Sinai of its own. The truth is that theosophy, at bottom, recognizes no moral order of any kind. Even self-interest can not be very cheering to the man who is struggling “upward” when he reflects that when he reaches absolute perfection all personality and consciousness in him will be destroyed and become identified with the great “nothing-in-particular.” Thus successive degrees of perfection bring him to nothing! Cold comfort, this.

6.—Physical evil overtaking the individual man is supposed to be the consequence of sins committed by him in

some previous incarnation. In other words, the multitudinous workings of natural laws which are the cause of physical evils are brought into perfect correspondence with the equally multitudinous workings of the human will, which is the author of sin. If a man sins, the laws of nature are so adjusted as to bring it about that in his next incarnation he will be born, say, to poverty instead of wealth. This amounts to saying that laws that are regular and inflexible are made to dove-tail with the fitful and arbitrary and incalculable operations of the human will. Now, such nice adjustment as this is only possible on the supposition that there exists an intelligent personal Deity who has a foreknowledge of the two orders of events and is able to adjust the one to the other. But no such Deity is acknowledged by the theosophist. Hence, he is logically driven either to abandon one of the most distinctive elements of his system or to deny the freedom of the human will.

7.—Yet it is just this attempt to account for physical evil, especially human suffering, that has attracted to theosophy a certain type of Europeans who would otherwise condemn this modern adaptation of Buddhism as an effete superstition. These converts to theosophy tell us that they are dissatisfied with the Christian explanation of human suffering. The Christian holds that suffering is *permitted* by God for our greater good, especially in the life to come. He regards the very worst afflictions of the present life as perfectly insignificant, both in intensity and in duration, as compared with the smallest portion of bliss in life eternal. Meanwhile, there is a superabundance of divine grace at hand to console, strengthen, and encourage him, and to enable him to convert his sufferings into occasions of merit for eternity; and that, too, notwithstanding that many of his sufferings may be the fruits of sin. But the theosophist prefers cutting the knot to untying it. He gets rid of a personal God altogether and then consoles himself with the thought that he has no one to blame for his sufferings but himself. He attributes all the vicissitudes of life to a law of blind necessity—a law, nevertheless, which contrives to act as an engine of retribution. But whilst drugging his mind with the new doctrine, he shuts his eyes to its real contents. We have seen above some

of the doctrinal absurdities which the theosophist is made to swallow.

8.—But apart from these, and taken as an explanation of temporal suffering, the system breaks down utterly when applied to the facts of human life. Theosophy attributes pain and poverty in the individual to sins committed by him in previous states of existence—the law of Karma working with mathematical exactness and landing him, at each fresh incarnation, in the precise groove in life which his merits have entitled him to occupy. Well, let us apply the doctrine to a case like this: A man during the first forty years of his life is healthy, wealthy, and wise. Virtue within and good fortune without make his life an ideal one. Suddenly he is overtaken by a malignant disease which makes his life utterly miserable. Has Karma blundered? That man came into his present existence with a diploma entitling him to a life of happiness, and forty years of virtue have given him a claim to additional happiness. Why, then, is he treated as a felon?

The Christian has *some* explanation for the case of this sufferer, but the theosophist is stranded. The opposite case of forty years of suffering followed by a period of fairly good health is equally inexplicable on theosophical principles. Then, again, how can theosophy explain the fact that physical well-being and moral well-being, though both are supposed to be the effect of Karmic retribution, are not always found in each other's company at a man's start in life? Many a child is born at once to wealth and to what are called inherited vicious propensities. It is easy to weave theories, but not so easy to make them square with the facts of life.

9.—It is almost needless to dilate on the feebleness of theosophy in supplying motives for virtuous conduct. Discouragement must be the effect of the discovery that the law of reward and punishment does not work with uniform exactness. In any case, for whom does a theosophist conceive he is struggling and striving in the pursuit of virtue? For himself, we are told, in another term of existence. But is he not virtually striving for another, in whom he does not feel a particle of interest? In each successive incarnation he has no recollection of previous incarnations, and consequently he has virtually changed to another person.

Then think of the prospect of such a series of isolated lives closing in real or virtual annihilation! The motive derived from eternal happiness has, therefore, no place in theosophic morality. Christianity, on the other hand, does present such an inducement to virtuous conduct, not to speak of motives of a higher and more ennobling order which it is constantly holding out to the more generous-minded, whereas the motives of theosophy are shadowy and illusory. Imagine the case of a man who is drawn to sinful pleasure with all but irresistible force: what a tremendous horse-power of theosophic motive must he stand in need of to offer any resistance to temptation. On the other hand, the man who wallows in vice need be in no particular hurry to better his moral condition: he has plenty of time on his hands, for his present incarnation is not his last.

But what about the wonderful powers supposed to be possessed by certain theosophists? We are gravely told that when one has reached the higher grades of theosophic perfection, or has become a "Master" or "Mahatma," the divine or spiritual element is so perfectly developed in him that he obtains a complete control over nature's forces. In the twinkling of an eye he can pass from one side of the globe to the other! He can make things travel through the air with the speed of thought! But are there any such Mahatmas in existence? We are assured that there are—somewhere in the mountains of Thibet—and certain leading theosophists tell us that they have had communication with them and have caught something of their power. They are not unwilling to exhibit their wonderful skill. They will restore at a moment's notice a long-lost brooch, or whisk through the air a beautiful vase of flowers, all the way from India!

What are we to think of these marvels? Many of them, fortunately, have been investigated by experts, with results exceedingly damaging to the supposed wonder-workers. The Society for Psychical Research, which numbers among its members many of the leading thinkers and specialists of Europe and America, appointed, some years ago, a committee of inquiry having at its head Dr. Richard Hodgson, who had himself strong leanings to occultism and entertained a favorable opinion of Madam Blavatsky. He traveled to India, saw things for himself, and laid the evidence

collected before the committee, whose full endorsement it received. The following are extracts from Dr. Hodgson's report:

"I finally had no doubt whatever that the phenomena connected with the Theosophical Society were part of a huge fraudulent system worked by Madam Blavatsky with the assistance of the Coulombs and several other confederates, and that not a single genuine phenomenon could be found amongst them all." (*Proceedings of S. P. R.*, v. iii., p. 210.) "My lengthy examination of the numerous array of witnesses to the phenomena showed that they were, as a body, excessively credulous, excessively deficient in the powers of common observation, and too many of them prone to supplement that deficiency by culpable exaggeration." (*Ibid.*, p. 210.) "We think that [Madam Blavatsky] has achieved a title to permanent remembrance as one of the most accomplished, ingenious, and interesting impostors in history." (*Ibid.*, p. 207.) No wonder that later theosophic miracles have been regarded with suspicion or have been proved impostures.

Theosophy, therefore, has failed to accredit itself as a body of doctrine; it fails to unravel the mystery of human suffering; it is a feeble prop to virtue and a no less feeble deterrent from vice; its miraculous side-show is a hoax. We have said thus much on the subject partly because theosophy is in many points typical of modern systems of morality in which a personal God is discarded.

TOLERANCE

An Accusation.—Tolerance is the first duty of the citizen as regards religious matters; but "the Roman Catholic Church, if it would be consistent, must be intolerant."—Tschackert.

THE ANSWER.—According to Christ's teaching, the first duty of a man living in a community is not tolerance, but love of his neighbor. A pharisaical doctor of the law once "asked Him, tempting Him: Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said to him: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to

this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets" (Matt. xxii. 35-40).

Justice and love are the two first duties of a man to his fellow-men. Tolerance is nowhere mentioned in the law. Mere tolerance does not go far enough. The Catholic Church does not merely tolerate her erring brethren. She loves them with a divine charity—and that is more than tolerance. "Tolerance" is the catchword of genuine liberalism, which manages to put up with an obnoxious fellow-citizen, but knows nothing of charity.

But a distinction must be made in the matter of tolerance. Catholics are not intolerant of the *erring*, but toward their *error* there can be no such thing as tolerance. We can not compromise with error. What is false we can not call true, any more than we can call black white. When, therefore, the Catholic Church combats error and champions truth, she only follows the example of Christ and does what every right-thinking man will acknowledge to be just.

Dogmatic tolerance is self-contradiction. How can a Church that professes to be a teacher of truth say to the thinking world: "If you believe in the Trinity, in the divinity of Christ, and in the sacrament of Penance, well and good. If you don't believe in them—again well and good—for I can't be intolerant"? A Church which is the custodian of revealed truth can not compound with error; and any church—no matter what elements of truth it may retain, or what good it may do to men—any church which is seen to throw the mantle of a false charity over all vagaries of opinion within its pale is proved thereby not to have the hall-mark of Christian orthodoxy. In this connection the Catholic Church stands quite alone—and is thereby proved to be the one faithful custodian of the doctrine revealed by Christ.

TRADITION AS A RULE OF FAITH

Objection.—Tradition can not be a source of true knowledge. There is nothing so unreliable as an old story that has passed from mouth to mouth and is subject to change at every telling. Even written documents are not safe from alter-

ation. Every new copy made is likely to contain fresh errors.

THE ANSWER.—Many who urge this objection are believers in Christianity; and yet what guarantee can be had for the truth of Christianity except in reliable tradition? Perhaps such guarantee is furnished by the Bible; but *how can we know that the Bible is the word of God save by tradition?*

Doubtless there are matters of secular interest about which neither writing nor tradition can afford any security from error; but there are also matters regarding which all fear of error is reasonably absent. No sensible man doubts about the existence of such historical characters as Cæsar, Napoleon, or Luther. So, too, in the religious domain, there is a body of truth which is sealed as such by the continuous and unfailing witness of God's Church; and what is this but tradition?

The Gospels can be proved to be genuine and reliable historical documents. And it may be proved from the Gospels that Christ, who was sent from on high, established an infallible Church—a fact which is plain from His having commissioned the apostles to preach the Faith to all nations and from His having declared that whosoever would not believe them would be condemned (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; Mark xvi. 15, 16). The Church as represented by the apostles must be infallible, for otherwise no one would be condemned for not accepting the apostolic teaching. Now the Pope and the other bishops are the successors of the apostles; and they must be supposed to teach with the same infallible authority as the apostles, for otherwise we are forced to the very unchristian conclusion that Christ must have meant that all authoritative teaching should cease with the apostles! It follows that once the Pope and the bishops proclaim anything to be a truth of the Faith, it must infallibly be such.

Now tradition is nothing else but the continuous and uninterrupted teaching of God's Church. God has it in His power to provide for the continued infallibility of His Church—*just as of old He provided for the preservation of the writings of the evangelists and the other sacred writers from errors of fact and of doctrine.*

In the Catholic Church there is every possible guarantee

that the tradition on which Catholics rely is not of a loose, haphazard sort, containing a large admixture of hearsay and legend. The communion of all parts of the Church with the Apostolic See of Peter and Peter's successors has been the one great source of unity and continuity of teaching in the Church. The decrees of the Popes, and of councils presided over by the Popes, are written in broad characters on the pages of history; but, even if there were no such record of them, the unfailing continuity of the Church's life makes her a witness to apostolic truth in every succeeding age. It is to Catholic tradition as thus understood that Protestants owe such elements of pure Christianity as they retain in their several creeds. (See "Bible, The, and Tradition.")

TRANSUBSTANTIATION

See "Eucharist, The. III.—Transubstantiation."

TRINITY, THE

Objection.—The mystery of the Trinity is at odds with the multiplication table: one, surely, can not be three.

THE ANSWER.—A mystery of religion is a fact or a truth which, in itself, is incomprehensible to the human understanding, but which, nevertheless, we have God's word for accepting as a fact or a truth. Our not understanding it is no reason for rejecting it: there are many things we do not understand, but, none the less, they are facts.

The rational grounds on which we place our belief in a mystery are these: 1. The doctrine of the mystery is not a contradiction of any known truth established by reason. 2. We have divine authority for accepting it.

The dogma of the Most Holy Trinity presents to the human mind one of the highest and most incomprehensible of mysteries, but it does not contradict any truth of reason. It does not imply that one is three, or that one God is three Gods, or that one person is three persons, but simply this, that *what is one in a certain respect is three in another*—and in this there is not the smallest contradic-

tion. There is only one divine nature, but in this one indivisible divine nature there is a threefold personality. As God is one in His nature or essence, there is only one God, but in respect to His personality there is a threefold distinction. Hence, the Catholic formula: I believe in God—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

In created nature there is nothing that presents a likeness or a parallel to this exalted mystery. There are none but very imperfect analogies. In the human soul there are three distinct powers or faculties—memory, understanding, and will, and yet there is only one indivisible soul to which they belong. Here there is a suggestion of the Trinity, but only a suggestion. Memory, understanding, and will are the soul's powers or capacities, whilst the three persons of the Trinity have no such relation to the divine nature. The soul, though simple and indivisible, is differentiated by the faculties in respect to its activities; whereas in the Trinity there is no such distinction or differentiation in the divine nature: only the persons are distinguished; and each of the persons, though distinct from the other two, possesses the divinity whole and entire. Each is God, and yet there is but one God.

The mystery is unfathomable, but we have no hesitation in accepting it. God has revealed it to mankind through the teaching of His divine Son. Human reason can say nothing against it, as it is rational to conceive of unity and multiplicity in the same individual viewed under two different aspects: an army is one inasmuch as it is an army, but multiple inasmuch as it is composed of many units; a man is one as regards his humanity, but multiple in respect to the offices he holds or the dignities he possesses. God is one in respect to His divinity, but multiple in respect to His personality. Reason does not contradict it, but still it must be confessed that it is beyond the range of reason to conceive how three distinct personalities can be the one only God whom we adore.

But who can be surprised that mysteries should be found in our articles of belief touching the nature and attributes of God? God is infinitely above all the works of His hands. Hence, there is nothing more natural than that there should be many things in the innermost depths of His being which are impenetrably mysterious.

VALUE, SOCIALIST THEORY OF

See "Socialism I—Its Economic Fallacies."

VIRGINITY

The Plea of the Flesh.—The leading of a pure life in a state of virginity is impossible for natures like ours.

THE WORK OF GRACE.—The above proposition is unchristian, both in meaning and in spirit. Few persons either can or ought to marry before reaching what nature and custom have fixed as a marriageable age; and yet they are supposed to lead a pure life before marriage. They *must*—for such is the commandment of God—therefore, they *can*, for God requires nothing that is impossible. Many persons are prevented from entering the married state at any age. Condemned—if condemnation it is—to the lot of the unwedded, they must, nevertheless, practise chastity. Even in the married state chastity must be observed, according to the conditions and requirements of that state of life.

Who will presume to assert that all unmarried persons are lecherous? or that the occasional difficult situations encountered in the married life necessarily lead to impurity? Those who hold that chastity is an impossibility offend against faith, against reason, and against the honor of their fellow-men; and they are, in many cases, as hard upon themselves as they are upon others.

In order to live chastely, one must be earnest in prayer and learn to do violence to himself. Those who neglect prayer can not expect to obtain the gift of chastity, for chastity is an impossibility without divine grace. A man without faith naturally considers chastity an unattainable virtue, because, on the one hand, he knows by experience the difficulty of overcoming himself, and, on the other hand, he ignores the supernatural aid of grace. In other words, *there is one whole side of the Christian life of which he knows nothing*; and, hence, he is likely to lose his bearings when speculating on possibilities and impossibilities in the matter of chastity.

Those who desire to live chastely must carefully avoid

the occasions of sin, such as dangerous company, seductive literature, bad theatres, the indulging in impure thoughts and desires. Carelessness in these matters will lead almost inevitably to sins of the flesh. Temperance in eating and drinking must also contribute its aid.

In a word, the practice of self-denial and the training of the will (both by the aid of divine grace) are among the first requisites for the preservation of one's virtue.

VIRGIN MARY, THE

See "Blessed Virgin, The" and "Saints."

ALPHABETICAL INDEX

A

- Abstract thought a proof of the spirituality of the soul, 452.
 Adoration in spirit and in truth, 65.
 Agnosticism, 7.
 Anglican excuses for not entering the Church, 103.
 Anglican jurisdiction—whence derived? 103.
 Apes and men, 13.
 Apostolicity a note of the Church, 101, 256.
 Arnold, Matthew, on the Mass, 196.
 Astronomy and the Bible, 44.
 Augustine [St.] on the Real Presence, 182; on Matrimony, 282; on the primacy of the Pope, 353.
 Authority of the Church acknowledged by Luther, 389.
 Authoritative teaching the basis of unity in the Church, 106, 257; and found only in the Church of Rome, 105, 258.

B

- Bellarmino [Cardinal] on the Copernican system, 424.
 Bernadette Soubirous, 318.

- Beza on Protestant disunion, 259.
 Bible, the, its teaching on celibacy, 64; the morality of its heroes, 16; its interpretation, 18; its bearing on modern thought, 22; is it open to Catholics? 37; Protestants indebted for it to Catholic tradition, 41; how to read it, 37; do Catholics read it? 42; is it at variance with science? 44; its relation to tradition as a rule of faith, 48; its translation into all civilized languages before the Reformation, 39.
 Blessed Virgin, the, 54; apparition of, at Lourdes, 318.
 Bourget, Paul, on divorce, 160.
 Boycotts, 275.
 Brain as related to mind, 299.

C

- Calvin on Protestant disunion, 259.
 Catholic and Protestant countries, 58.
 Catholicity or universality a note of the true Church, 107, 257.

- Causation, argument from, in proof of God's existence, 232.
- Celibacy of priests, 63.
- Ceremonies in public worship, 65.
- Chance and the world's origin, 67.
- Change, law of (socialistic), 442.
- Change of religion, 393.
- Character and school life, 165.
- Chastity in the state of virginity, 480.
- "Christian Science," 68.
- Christ's divinity, 74.
- Church of Christ—how to find it, 97.
- Church, the, Luther's revolt against it, 102; its office of mediator between Christ and mankind, 119; its relation to Greek philosophy, 152; its continued vitality, 101, 114; its doctrine on salvation outside of its pale, 122.
- "Class struggles" in socialistic doctrine, 443.
- Communion under one kind, 125.
- Confession, divinely instituted, 129; not a means of enslavement, 136; not a pitfall to the penitent, 140; not an invention of the priests, 136.
- Copernican system, how received by scientists in Galileo's day, 423.
- Countries, Catholic and Protestant, 58.
- Cranmer on the open Bible in Catholic England, 39.
- Creeds and deeds (against indifferentism), 141.
- Cremation—why forbidden, 144.
- D
- Darwinism, 13, 146, 208, 417.
- Darwin's mentality, 149.
- Dead, resurrection of the, 403.
- Design, argument from, in proof of God's existence, 238.
- Development of doctrine, 150.
- Didache*, the, on the sacrifice of the Mass, 293.
- Divinity of Christ, 74.
- Divorce forbidden by Christ, 153; favored by socialism, 218, 448.
- Dogmas, 162.
- E
- Economic basis of life (socialistic), 442.
- Economic contrasts (socialistic), 443.
- Education, the Christian ideal of, 164.
- Education and eugenics, 201.
- Education and religion, 164.
- Emerson's pantheism, 336.
- Equality amongst men, 173.
- Eucharist, the, arguments for the Real Presence, 175; the doctrine rational, 185; transubstantiation, 188; doctrine of the Eucharist in har-

Eucharist, the (*continued*)
 money with Christian
 ideas, 195; manner in
 which Christ is present,
 175, 188; Christ impass-
 ible in Eucharistic state,
 198; Eucharist received
 under one kind, 125.

Eugenics, 199.

Eve and the serpent, 30.

Evolution, Darwinian, 208;
 Haeckelian, 212; in rela-
 tion to spontaneous gen-
 eration, 462; and Chris-
 tianity, 214.

F

Faith, reasonableness of,
 216; necessity of, in con-
 junction with good works,
 for salvation, 268; and
 science, 413.

Fathers, the, on the Real
 Presence, 180; on tran-
 substantiation, 192.

Flood, the, was it universal?
 32.

Foxe, John, on the open
 Bible in Catholic Eng-
 land, 40.

Franzelin [Cardinal], on
 "substance" and "na-
 ture" in patristic writ-
 ings on the Eucharist,
 291.

Free love and socialism,
 218.

Free research among Cath-
 olics, 420.

Free thought, 228.

Free will, 455.

Freemasonry, its character
 as a religious sect, 222; its
 anti-Christian spirit, 223;
 its so-called spirit of
 brotherhood, 226; its oath
 of secrecy, 427; its atti-
 tude toward cremation,
 145.

G

Galileo and the Church, 423.

Geology and the Bible, 45.

God's existence, 230; His in-
 finite perfection, 235; His
 revelation of Himself, 239.

Goethe's eulogy of Jesus,
 76; opinion of confession,
 138.

Good works and salvation,
 240; Luther's doctrine,
 268.

Grabe (Protestant) on the
 sacrifice of the Mass, 290.

Grace, necessity of, 240.

H

Haeckel's system of evolu-
 tion, 212; his methods,
 242.

Harnack on development of
 doctrine, 164; on the life
 and work of Jesus, 76; on
 the Popes as successors of
 St. Peter in the See of
 Rome, 340; on the resur-
 rection of Christ, 401.

Hartmann, Edward von, on
 the decline of pure Dar-
 winism, 211.

Hell, 246.

History, socialistic philos-
 ophy of, 439.

Holiness a note of the Church, 111.
Human race, how old is it? 249.

I

Idolatry, 412.
Illumination, personal, in reading of Scripture, 20.
Indifferentism, 252.
Indulgences, their nature, 261; not a pardon for sin, 266; as related to canonical penance, 263; as applied to souls in purgatory, 264; as abused by the unworthy, 264.
Infallibility of the Pope demonstrated, 359.

J

Jesus of Nazareth, His existence, 266; His divinity, 74; His Messiasship, 296; His resurrection, 398.
John's [St.] conception of the Word, 152.
Justification by faith *and* good works, 268.

K

Kelvin [Lord] on science as witnessing to a Creator, 415.
Kneller, Father, S.J., author of "Christianity and the Leaders of Modern Science," 414.

L

Labor and prayer, 166.
Labor unions, 271.
Labor and exchange value, 435.

Ladd [Prof.] on spirituality of mind, 303.

Latin in the liturgy, 278.

Law of change (socialistic), 442.

Leibnitz (Protestant) on ceremonies, 65; on communion under one kind, 127; on confession, 139; on relics, 412; on the sacrifice of the Mass, 291; on transubstantiation, 193; on St. Peter's presence in Rome, 341.

Liturgies, ancient, witnesses to the Real Presence, 183.

"Logos" [Word] of Philo Judæus, 92, 152.

Lourdes, miracles of, 307.

Luther, his reformation a revolt against divinely constituted authority, 388; his "experience of salvation" (Heilserfahrung), 130; his condemnation of schism, 390; his insertion of the word "alone" in rendering Rom. iii. 28, 268; his opinion of marriage, 280.

M

Marriage a sacrament, 280; a permanent union, 154, 282, 284; subject to divorce under socialism, 218, 448.

Marriages, mixed, 322.

Married clergy, 63.

Marx' philosophy of history, 439.

Mary, devotion to, 54.

Masonry, 221.

Mass, the, a sacrifice, 284.
 Materialism, 294; socialistic, 439; monistic, 212, 439.
 Materialistic conception of history (socialistic), 439.
 Matter and mind, 299.
 Matter not self-existent and eternal, 236.
 Mausbach on development of doctrine, 163.
 Maxwell, J. C., religious belief of, 419.
 Melancthon on Protestant disunion, 259.
 Messiah, the, sent in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, 296.
 Mind and matter, 299.
 Miracles are possible, 304; are recognizable in actual cases, 307; have been wrought by Jesus, 80, 96; have been wrought at Lourdes and elsewhere, 307; are not in conflict with science, 305; have been unreasonably denied by Protestants, 321.
 Missions, Catholic and Protestant, 108.
 Mixed marriages, 322.
 Modern thought and the Bible, 22.
 Monks, 115, 327.
 More, Bl. Sir Thomas, on Bible reading in Catholic England, 40.
 Morality, its causes not to be confounded with its conditions, 328; its dependence on religion, 330;

Morality (*continued*)
 its basis in divine law, 331; its connection with education, 166; are Bible heroes deficient in morality? 16; Catholics as compared with non-Catholics in point of morality, 112.

Mysteries, 332.

Myths, so-called, of the Bible, 29.

N

Natural laws and prayer, 374.

Natural selection, theory of, 209.

Notes, or marks, of the true Church, 100.

O

Original sin, 333.

Oxford Convocation, the, and the Bible, 41.

P

Pantheism, 336.

Papal infallibility, 359.

Parochial schools, 166.

Pasteur, on spontaneous generation, 308, 463; faith of, 415; his place as a scientist, 422.

Paul [St.] on good works, 240; on marriage as a sacrament, 280.

Pauperization theory (socialistic), 444.

Penance, sacrament of, 129.

Peter [St.] on private interpretation of Scripture, 19.

- Pfleiderer's view of the resurrection of Christ, 400.
- Philo Judæus, the "Logos" [Word] of, 92, 152.
- Philosophy of history (socialistic), 439.
- Philosophy, modern, and the Eucharist, 186.
- Pius VI's commendation of Bible reading, 37.
- Pope, the, successor of St. Peter in the See of Rome, 340, 347; possessor of the primacy, 343; in what sense infallible, 359.
- Pragmatism, 369.
- Prayer and labor, 166.
- Prayer and nature's laws, 374.
- Priests and celibacy, 63.
- Primacy of the Pope, 343.
- Private judgment and the Bible, 18.
- Property, right of, 377.
- Prophecies of Jesus, 81.
- Prophecies relating to the Messias, 88.
- Prosperity, national, no test of country's religion, 58.
- Protestant disunion, 106, 390.
- Protestant view of miracles, 321.
- Protestantism a revolt against divinely constituted authority, 388.
- Protestantism a breeder of rationalism and revolution, 392.
- Public schools in U. S., 172.
- Purgatory, the doctrine of, proved, 380.
- Purgatory and indulgences, 264.
- R**
- Rationalism absurd, 387; an outcome of the reformation, 391.
- Real Presence, the, demonstrated, 174.
- Reason and faith, 216, 387.
- Reformation, the, a revolt against divinely constituted authority, 388.
- Relics, 392, 409.
- Religion, its relation to morality, 330; its attitude toward eugenics, 199; toward freemasonry, 221; toward socialism, 447; is it a "private affair"? 398, 447.
- Religion, a change of, 393.
- Religious Orders, 115, 327.
- Renan's eulogy of Jesus of Nazareth, 76.
- Resurrection of Christ, 398; of the dead, 403.
- Revelation, possibility of, 405.
- Revisionist element of socialism, 443.
- Rome, See of, occupied by St. Peter's successors, 340.
- Rule of faith in Bible and Tradition, 48.
- S**
- Sacrifice of the Mass, 284.
- Saints not worshiped but venerated, 406; prayed to only as intercessors, 407;

- Saints (*continued*)**
 not produced by Protestantism, 116.
Salvation and Church membership, 122.
Salvation outside the Church, 122.
Satisfaction for sin and the doctrine on purgatory, 381.
Sayce [Prof.] on the "higher criticism," 28.
School children and the "secrets of nature," 201.
School life and character, 165.
Schools, Catholic parochial, in U. S., 166.
Schools, the public, in U. S., 172.
Schopenhauer on God's existence, 230.
Schurman [President] on Darwin's mentality, 150.
Science and the Bible, 44.
Science and faith, 413.
Science and God's existence, 230.
Scientific research open to Catholics, 420.
Scientists who were believers, 414.
Secret societies, why condemned, 426.
Self-denial rational and salutary, 428.
Serpent, the, and Eve, 30.
Sin, original, 333.
Six days, the, of the creation, 45, 215.
Socialism, its aims, theories, and demands, 430; its philosophy of history, 439;
Socialism (*continued*)
 its impracticability, 446;
 its religious bearings, 447;
 its view of marriage, 218, 448.
Soul, the spirituality of the, 452.
Spiritism, 456.
Spirituality of the soul, 452.
Spontaneous generation and evolution, 462.
Strikes, 271.
Suggestion and miracles, 93.
Superstition not fostered by Catholicism, 466.
Surplus value, socialist theory of, 436.
Sympathetic strikes, 274.
- T**
- Telepathy and Christ's miracles**, 95.
Theosophy, 469.
Tolerance, religious, 475.
Tradition, true meaning of, 476.
Tradition and the Bible, 48.
Transubstantiation, 188.
Trinity, the Blessed, 478.
Tyndall [Prof.] on prayer and natural laws, 374.
- U**
- Unions, labor**, 271.
Unity a note of the true Church, 105, 257.
Unity destroyed by the Reformation, 390.
"Unknown laws" of nature unable to account for the Lourdes miracles, 315.

V

- Value, socialist theory of, 435.
Virchow [Prof.] on the ape theory, 14.
Virgin, the Blessed, in Catholic devotion, 54.
Virginity and chastity, 480.
Volta's Catholic faith, 419.

W

- Wages, iron law of (socialistic), 445.
Wallace, A. R., and evolution, 26.

Western Schism, the, and Papal succession, 342.

Will, freedom of the, 455.

"Word," the, of Philo Judæus, 92, 152.

Workingmen's condition, improvement of, 430, 438, 444.

Works, good, and salvation, 240.

Worship and ceremonies, 65.

Wundt [Prof.] on brain and mind, 303.

Wycliffe's Bible, 41.

STANDARD CATHOLIC BOOKS

PUBLISHED BY
BENZIGER BROTHERS

CINCINNATI:
843 MAIN ST.

NEW YORK:
36-38 BARCLAY ST.

CHICAGO:
214-216 W. MONROE ST.

Books not marked *net* will be sent postpaid on receipt of advertised price. Books marked *net* are such where ten per cent. must be added for postage. Thus a book advertised as *net*, \$1.00, will be sent postpaid on receipt of \$1.10.

Complete descriptive catalogue sent free on application.

INSTRUCTION, DOCTRINE, APOLOGETICS, CONTROVERSY, DEVOTION, MEDITATION, THEOLOGY, LITURGY, HOLY SCRIPTURE, BIBLE, SERMONS, PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY

| | |
|--|-------------------|
| ABANDONMENT; or, Absolute Surrender of Self to Divine Providence. CAUSSADE, S.J. | <i>net</i> , 0 50 |
| ADORATION OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. TESNIERE. | 0 50 |
| ANECDOTES AND EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATING THE CATHOLIC CATECHISM. SPIRAGO. | <i>net</i> , 1 50 |
| ANGELS OF THE SANCTUARY. For Altar Boys. MUSSER. | <i>net</i> , 0 15 |
| ART OF PROFITING BY OUR FAULTS. TISSOT. | <i>net</i> , 0 50 |
| ASSERTIO SEPTEM SACRAMENTORUM; or, Defense of the Seven Sacraments, by Henry VIII. O'DONOVAN. | <i>net</i> , 0 75 |
| AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ST. IGNATIUS. O'CONNOR, S.J. | <i>net</i> , 1 25 |
| BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY, THE. A history of conditions of Christian life in the first three centuries of our era. SHAHAN. | <i>net</i> , 2 00 |
| BENEDICENDA; or, Rites and Ceremonies to be Observed in some of the Principal Functions of the Roman Pontifical and Roman Ritual. SCHULTZ. | <i>net</i> , 1 50 |
| BLOSSOMS OF THE CROSS. For those who lead a life of suffering or seclusion. GIEHL. | 1 25 |
| BONOMElli, RT. REV. J. HOMILIES ON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS. 4 vols. | <i>net</i> , 5 00 |
| — HOMILIES ON THE COMMON OF SAINTS. 9 vols. | <i>net</i> , 2 50 |
| — THE CHRISTIAN MYSTERIES; or, Discourses for All the Great Feasts except Those of the Blessed Virgin. 4 vols. | <i>net</i> , 5 00 |
| BOOK OF THE PROFESSED. Vols. I, II, III. Each. | <i>net</i> , 0 75 |
| BOY-SAVER'S GUIDE. Society Work for Lads in Their Teens. QUINN, S.J. | <i>net</i> , 1 25 |
| BUDS AND BLOSSOMS. Spiritual Readings for All Seasons. COLTON. | <i>net</i> , 1 25 |
| CASES OF CONSCIENCE for English-speaking Countries. SLATER, S.J. 2 vols. | <i>net</i> , 2 50 |
| CATECHISM EXPLAINED. SPIRAGO. | <i>net</i> , 2 50 |
| CATHOLIC BELIEF. FAA DI BRUNO. Paper, <i>net</i> , 0 10; Cloth, <i>net</i> , 0 25 | |
| CATHOLIC CEREMONIES. DURAND. Ill. Paper, 0 20; Cloth, 0 50 | |
| CATHOLIC HOME ANNUAL. Calendars, Stories, etc. Ill. | 0 25 |
| CATHOLIC PRACTICE AT CHURCH AND AT HOME. KLAUDER. Paper, 0 25; Cloth, 0 60 | |
| CATHOLIC TEACHING FOR CHILDREN. WRAY. Paper, 0 15; Cloth, 0 25 | |
| CHARACTERISTICS OF TRUE DEVOTION. GROU, S.J. | <i>net</i> , 0 75 |
| CHARITY THE ORIGIN OF EVERY BLESSING. | <i>net</i> , 0 50 |
| CHILD PREPARED FOR FIRST COMMUNION, THE. ZULUETA, S.J. | 0 05 |
| CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS. A Defence of the Catholic Faith. DEVINER. | <i>net</i> , 2 00 |
| CHRISTIAN EDUCATION. O'CONNELL. | <i>net</i> , 0 50 |
| CHRISTIAN FATHER, THE. Instructions. CRAMER. Paper, 0 15; Cloth, 0 25 | |
| CHRISTIAN MOTHER, THE. Instructions. CRAMER. Paper, 0 15; Cloth, 0 25 | |
| CHRIST IN TYPE AND PROPHECY. MAAS. Vols. I and II. Each, <i>net</i> , 2 00 | |
| CHRIST'S TEACHING CONCERNING DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. GIGOT. | <i>net</i> , 1 50 |
| CLERGYMAN'S HANDBOOK OF LAW. SCANLAN. | <i>net</i> , 1 25 |

| | |
|---|-----------|
| COMPENDIUM JURIS CANONICI. SMITH. | net, 2 00 |
| COMPENDIUM JURIS REGULARIUM. BACHOFEN. | net, 2 50 |
| COMPENDIUM SACRAE LITURGIAE. WAPELHORST. | net, 2 50 |
| CONSECRANDA; or, Rites and Ceremonies Observed at the Consecration of Churches, Altars, etc. SCHULTZ. | net, 1 50 |
| CORRECT THING FOR CATHOLICS, THE. BUOG. | 0 50 |
| COUNSELS OF ST. ANGELA TO HER SISTERS IN RELIGION. | net, 0 25 |
| DEVOTIONS TO THE SACRED HEART FOR THE FIRST FRIDAY OF EVERY MONTH. HUGUET. | 0 25 |
| DEVOTION TO THE SACRED HEART OF JESUS, THE. NOLDIN, S.J. | net, 1 25 |
| DIGNITY AND DUTIES OF THE PRIEST. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| DIVINE GRACE. Explains the doctrine of the Church on divine grace. WIRTH. | net, 1 00 |
| DIVINE OFFICE. Explanation of Psalms and Canticles. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, OUTLINES OF. HUNTER. Vols. I, II, III. Each. | net, 1 50 |
| ECCLESIASTICAL DICTIONARY. TREIN. | net, 5 00 |
| EDUCATION OF OUR GIRLS, THE. SHIELDS. | net, 1 00 |
| ELEMENTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. SMITH. Vols. I, II, III. Each. | net, 2 50 |
| ENCYCLICAL LETTERS OF POPE LEO XIII. | net, 2 25 |
| EPISTLES AND GOSPELS. Large type. | 0 25 |
| EUCCHARISTIC CHRIST. Reflections on the Blessed Sacrament. TESNIERE. | net, 1 25 |
| EXPLANATION OF BIBLE HISTORY. NASH. | net, 1 60 |
| EXPLANATION OF CATHOLIC MORALS. STAPLETON. | 0 50 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE BALTIMORE CATECHISM. KINKADE. | net, 1 00 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE COMMANDMENTS. ROLFUS. | 0 50 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE CREED. ROLFUS. | 0 50 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE GOSPELS AND CATHOLIC WORSHIP. LAMBERT. Paper, 0.20; Cloth. | 0 50 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE HOLY SACRAMENTS. ROLFUS. | 0 50 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE MASS. COCHEM. | 0 50 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE OUR FATHER AND THE HAIL MARY. LIGUORI. | net, 0 75 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE PRAYERS AND CEREMONIES OF THE MASS. LANSLOTS, O.S.B. | net, 1 25 |
| EXPLANATION OF THE SALVE REGINA. LIGUORI. | net, 0 75 |
| EXTREME UNCTION. PHILLIPS. | 0 05 |
| FLOWERS OF THE PASSION. Devout Thoughts. | 0 50 |
| FOR FREQUENT COMMUNICANTS. | 0 05 |
| FOUR LAST THINGS. Meditations. COCHEM. | net, 0 75 |
| FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. Translated by Rev. J. P. M. SCHLEUTER, S.J. | net, 0 60 |
| GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. GIGOT. | net, 2 50 |
| GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES. Abridged. GIGOT. | net, 1 50 |
| GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. VERHEYEN. | net, 0 30 |
| GENTLEMAN, A. Manners and Social Usages. EGAN. | 0 50 |
| GIFT OF THE KING, THE. An Explanation of the Mass for Children. | 0 60 |
| GLORIES AND TRIUMPHS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, THE | 2 00 |
| GLORIES OF DIVINE GRACE, THE. SCHEEREN. | net, 1 60 |
| GLORIES OF MARY, THE. Vols. I and II. LIGUORI. Each. | net, 1 50 |
| GLORIES OF MARY. Popular edition. | 0 50 |
| GLORIES OF THE SACRED HEART. HAUSHEER, S.J. | 0 50 |
| GOD, CHRIST AND THE CHURCH. HAMMER. | 2 00 |
| GOFFINE'S DEVOUT INSTRUCTIONS. | 1 00 |
| GOLDEN SANDS. Counsels for the Sanctification and Happiness of Daily Life. 8 vols. Each. | net, 0 50 |
| GREAT MEANS OF SALVATION, THE. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| GREAT SUPPER, THE. Discourses on Weekly Communion. COCHEM, S.J. | net, 1 25 |
| GREETINGS TO THE CHRIST CHILD. Poems for Children. | 0 60 |
| GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES. BURNS. | net, 1 75 |
| GUIDE FOR SACRISTANS. | net, 0 85 |
| HANDBOOK OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. WILMERS, S.J. | net, 1 50 |
| HARMONY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. HEUSER. | net, 1 25 |
| HELPS TO A SPIRITUAL LIFE. SCHNEIDER. | 0 50 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| HIDDEN TREASURE; or, The Value and Excellence of Holy Mass. BLESSED LEONARD. Paper, 0.15; Cloth, | 0 35 |
| HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. ALZOG. 8 vols. | net, 8 00 |
| HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. BUSINGER-BRENNAN. 8vo. | 2 00 |
| HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. BUSINGER-BRENNAN. 12mo. | 0 50 |
| HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. BRUECK. 2 vols. | net, 2 00 |
| HISTORY OF ECONOMICS. DREW. | net, 1 50 |
| HISTORY OF THE MASS. O'BRIEN. | net, 1 25 |
| HISTORY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION. CORBETT. | 0 50 |
| HOLY EUCHARIST AND FREQUENT AND DAILY COMMUNION. O'CONNELL. Paper, 0.25; Cloth | 0 60 |
| HOLY EUCHARIST, THE. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| HOLY HOUR, THE. KEILEY. | 0 05 |
| HOLY MASS, THE. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| HOLY VIATICUM OF LIFE AS OF DEATH, THE. A provision for the journey of life as well as of death. DEVER. | net, 0 75 |
| HOLY WEEK, COMPLETE OFFICE OF. Cheap Edition, cloth, net, 0.20; Cloth, | 0 45 |
| HOW TO COMFORT THE SICK. KREBS. | 0 50 |
| HOW TO MAKE THE MISSION. | 0 10 |
| INCARNATION, BIRTH, AND INFANCY OF CHRIST. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| INDEX TO LIGUORI WORKS. | net, 0 10 |
| IN HEAVEN WE KNOW OUR OWN. For those who have lost dear ones by death. BLAZ, S.J. | net, 0 60 |
| INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRST COMMUNICANTS. SCHMITT. | net, 0 60 |
| INSTRUCTIONS ON THE COMMANDMENTS AND SACRAMENTS. LIGUORI. Paper, 0.15; Cloth, | 0 35 |
| INSTRUCTIONS ON MARRIAGE, POPULAR. GIRARDEY. Paper, 0.15; Cloth, | 0 35 |
| INSTRUCTIONS ON PRAYER, POPULAR. GIRARDEY. Paper, 0.15; Cloth, | 0 35 |
| INSTRUCTIONS TO PARENTS, POPULAR. GIRARDEY. Paper, 0.15; Cloth, | 0 35 |
| INTERIOR OF JESUS AND MARY. GROU, S.J. 2 vols. | net, 2 00 |
| JESUS LIVING IN THE PRIEST. MILLET-BYRNE. | net, 2 00 |
| LADY, A. Manners and Social Usages. BUGG. | 0 50 |
| LAWS OF THE SAVIOUR. Talks on the Commandments for Children. | 0 60 |
| LESSONS OF THE SAVIOUR. Christ's Miracles Described for Children. | 0 60 |
| LETTERS OF ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI. 5 vols. Each, | net, 1 50 |
| LIFE OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN. ROHNER-BRENNAN. | 0 50 |
| LIFE OF CHRIST. BUSINGER-BRENNAN. Profusely illustrated. | net, 10 00 |
| LIFE OF CHRIST. COCHEM-HAMMER. | 0 50 |
| LIFE OF CHRIST. Adapted from BUSINGER. MULLETT. | 2 00 |
| LIFE OF SISTER ANNE KATHARINE EMMERICH. McGOWAN. | net, 1 75 |
| LIFE OF VEN. CRESCENTIA HOSS. | net, 1 25 |
| LIGHT FOR NEW TIMES. A Book for Catholic Young Women. FLETCHER. | net, 0 60 |
| LIGUORI. COMPLETE WORKS. Vols. I-XXII. Each, | net, 1 50 |
| LITTLE MASS BOOK. LYNCH. | 0 05 |
| LITTLE OFFICE OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION. | 0 05 |
| LIVES OF THE SAINTS. Adapted from ALBAN BUTLER. | 0 50 |
| LIVES OF THE SAINTS FOR CHILDREN. BERTHOLD. | 0 60 |
| LIVES OF THE SAINTS, PICTORIAL. SHEA. Illustrated. | 2 00 |
| LIVES OF THE SAINTS, SHORT. DONNELLY. | 0 60 |
| LIVES OF THE SAINTS, LITTLE PICTORIAL. Illustrated. | 1 25 |
| LOURDES. Its Inhabitants, Its Pilgrims and Miracles. CLARKE, S.J. | 0 50 |
| MANUAL OF HOMILETICS AND CATECHETICS. SCHURCH. | net, 1 25 |
| MANUAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY. SLATER, S.J. Vols. I and II. Each, | net, 2 75 |
| MANUAL OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND CHRISTIAN PERFECTION. HENRY, C.S.S.R. Paper, 0.25; Cloth, | 0 60 |
| MANUAL OF THEOLOGY FOR THE LAITY. GEIERMANN, C.S.S.R. Paper, 0.25; Cloth, | 0 60 |
| MARY, HELP OF CHRISTIANS. Instructions, Legends, Novenas, and Prayers. HAMMER. | 2 00 |
| MARY THE QUEEN. A Life of the Blessed Virgin for Children. | 0 60 |
| MEANS OF GRACE. Complete Explanation of the Sacraments. Fully illustrated. ROLFUS-BRAENDLE. | 2 00 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| MEDITATIONS FOR EVERY DAY. BAXTER. | net, 1 50 |
| MEDITATIONS FOR EVERY DAY. HAMON. 5 vols. | net, 5 00 |
| MEDITATIONS FOR EVERY DAY. VERCRUYSE, S.J. 2 vols. | net, 3 50 |
| MEDITATIONS FOR EVERY DAY OF MONTH. NERVEU- RYAN. | net, 0 75 |
| MEDITATIONS FOR MONTHLY RETREATS. For Religious. | net, 0 50 |
| MEDITATIONS FOR RETREATS. St. FRANCIS DE SALES. | net, 0 85 |
| MEDITATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE SECULAR CLERGY. 2 vols. CHAIGNON, S.J. | net, 4 50 |
| MEDITATIONS ON THE LIFE, THE TEACHINGS, AND THE PASSION OF JESUS CHRIST. ILL. 2 vols. | net, 2 50 |
| MEDITATIONS ON THE MONTH OF OUR LADY. MULLANEY. | net, 0 75 |
| MEDITATIONS ON THE PASSION. By a Passionist. | 0 50 |
| MEDITATIONS ON THE SUFFERINGS OF JESUS CHRIST. PERINALDO. | net, 0 75 |
| MIDDLE AGES, THE. Sketches covering the period from the fifth to the fifteenth century. SHAHAN. | net, 2 00 |
| MISCELLANY. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| MOMENTS BEFORE THE TABERNACLE. Prayers and Aspira- tions. RUSSELL, S.J. | net, 0 50 |
| MONTH, LITTLE, OF THE SOULS IN PURGATORY. | net, 0 25 |
| MONTH OF MAY, LITTLE. | net, 0 25 |
| MONTH, NEW, OF THE HOLY ANGELS. St. FRANCIS DE SALES | net, 0 25 |
| MORAL PRINCIPLES AND MEDICAL PRACTICE. COFFENS, S.J. | net, 1 00 |
| MORE SPIRITUAL READINGS FOR MARY'S CHILDREN. MADAME CECILIA. | 0 50 |
| MY FIRST COMMUNION. The Happiest Day of My Life. BUCH- MANN-BRENNAN. | net, 0 75 |
| NEW TESTAMENT. 82mo, flexible cloth, | net, 0 18 |
| NEW TESTAMENT. Illustrated. | net, 0 60 |
| NEW TESTAMENT. (India Paper.) Leather, gold edges, | net, 0 80 |
| NEW TESTAMENT. 12mo. | 0 50 |
| OUR OWN WILL and How to Detect it in Our Actions. ALLEN. | net, 0 85 |
| OUTLINES OF NEW TESTAMENT HISTORY. GIGOT. | net, 1 50 |
| OUTLINES OF SERMONS FOR YOUNG MEN AND YOUNG WOMEN. SCHUBERT. | net, 2 00 |
| PARADISE ON EARTH; or, A Religious Vocation the Surest Way in Life. NATALE, S.J. | net, 0 50 |
| PARISH PRIEST ON DUTY. THE. HEUSER. | net, 0 60 |
| PASSION AND DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| PASTORAL THEOLOGY. STANG. | net, 1 50 |
| PATRON SAINTS FOR CATHOLIC YOUTH. Illustrated. Vols. I, II, III. MANNIX. Each, | 0 60 |
| PATRON SAINTS FOR CATHOLIC YOUTH. Illustrated. MAN- NIX. Each, | 0 10 |
| St. Agnes, St. Aloysius, St. Anne, St. Anthony, St. Blase, St. Bernard, St. Bridget, St. Catharine, St. Cecilia, St. Charles, St. Clare, St. Elizabeth, St. Francis Xavier, St. Helena, St. Joseph, St. Louis, St. Margaret, St. Martin of Tours, St. Michael, St. Monica, St. Patrick, St. Philip Neri, St. Rose of Lima, St. Teresa. | |
| PEARLS FROM FABER. Selections from His Works. BRUNOWE. | net, 0 50 |
| PERFECT RELIGIOUS, THE. D'ORLEANS DE LA MOTTE. | net, 1 00 |
| PHILOSOPHIA MORALI, DE. RUSSO. | net, 2 00 |
| POLITICAL AND MORAL ESSAYS. RICKABY, S.J. | net, 1 75 |
| PRAXIS SYNODALIS. | net, 0 75 |
| PREACHING. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| PREPARATION FOR DEATH. LIGUORI. | net, 1 50 |
| PRINCIPLES, ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CATH- OLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IN THE U. S. BURNS. | net, 1 75 |
| PRIVATE RETREAT FOR RELIGIOUS. GIERMANN, C.S.S.R. | net, 1 50 |
| PULPIT SKETCHES. Outlines of Sermons. LAMBERT. | net, 1 25 |
| QUEEN'S FESTIVALS, THE. Instructions on the Feasts of the Blessed Virgin for Children. | 0 60 |
| REASONABLENESS OF CATHOLIC CEREMONIES AND PRAC- TICES. BURKE. Paper, 0.15; Cloth, | 0 25 |
| RELIGIOUS STATE, THE. LIGUORI. | net, 0 50 |
| RETREATS FOR SISTERS, TWO. WIRTH. | net, 1 00 |
| RIGHTS OF OUR LITTLE ONES. On education. CONWAY, S.J. | net, 0 05 |
| RITUALE COMPENDIOSUM. Sacristy Ritual. | net, 0 90 |
| ROMA. Ancient, Subterranean, and Modern Rome in Word and Pic- ture. By REV. ALBERT KUHN, O.S.B., D.D. Preface by CARDI- NAL GIBBONS. 18 bi-monthly parts, each 0.85 postpaid. Subscrip- tion by the year, 6 parts, 2.00; complete work, 6.00. 928 text | |

THE BURKE LIBRARY

5 0227 197

